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# **September 11<sup>th</sup> in the Greek and British Media: A discourse analysis of newspaper representations**

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University of  
**BRISTOL**

A thesis submitted to the University of Bristol, UK in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, Department of Politics.

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# Abstract

The September 11 events received extensive coverage in the British and Greek media. This thesis employs a post-positivist, discursive analytic framework drawing largely from Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault and Derrida to explore the press representations of major Greek and British newspapers six months before September 11 and during the ensuing Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Specifically, the analysis focuses on these two culturally distinct, European countries' constructions of the events, the role of the U.S. in the international system, their role as E.U. members, as well as their perception of emerging threats. Some of the key representations analyzed are the Kyoto protocol, globalization and the anti-globalization movement, terrorism, Islam and Saddam Hussein. The thesis explores the way events are understood and represented in different cultural contexts. One of the primary aims of the project is to discover the differences and similarities in the representations of the two countries, as well as whether and in what respects events such as those of September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent Iraq war can affect existing articulations and existing state identity constructions. Finally, drawing from the belief that discursive practices are political practices, the thesis studies the ways in which these discourses may have enabled, necessitated or disabled particular responses and courses of action and the ways in which they may have marginalized other discourses.

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# Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

Signed:

Date: July 22, 2006

Anna Sirmoglou

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This thesis compares British and Greek press representations after September 11 and during the ensuing Afghanistan and Iraq wars. It aims at determining what this comparison reveals about the ways these two culturally distinct, European countries understood the events, the role of the U.S. in the international system, their role as E.U. members, as well as their perceptions of emerging threats. As a Greek person studying in Britain in 2001-2002, I was intrigued by the substantially different Greek and British media responses to the September 11 events. I was also fascinated by the uniformity within each country's media in their interpretation of the events. This uniformity within and divergence between the two countries' media discourses aroused my curiosity as to, firstly, what accounted for such uniformity. Was this the usual state of affairs, or could the September 11 events have triggered this otherwise unusual convergence? Moreover, I was intrigued as to what accounted for such divergence. Greece and the U.K. may be two culturally different countries, but they are both members of the E.U. and share similar economic and political values, operating within a liberal, capitalist system. Precisely because these discourses were prevalent within each country's media I was also interested in finding out what they were reflective of and what their political consequences were.

I found that a post-positivist, discursive analytic framework can provide a deeper understanding of the above issues. Based on this framework, the thesis asks the following questions:

- What were the prevailing articulations in the Greek and British press during the proposed period of study? Were there multiple discourses or was there a hegemonic discourse?

- What were the similarities and differences in the press discourse of each country and between the two countries?
- Was there continuity in the representations or were there abrupt and sudden changes during the proposed period of study?
- In what ways were identities and subject positions constructed, reconstructed and subverted in the texts? By means of what mechanisms and strategies were specific discourses rendered dominant while others were marginalized?
- What were the consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another?
- In what ways did the discourses enable, necessitate or disable particular responses and courses of action?

By asking the above questions I hope to draw some general conclusions about how and under what conditions “discourses are constructed, contested and change” (Howarth 2000: 131). I also hope to gain an understanding of the way events are understood in different cultural contexts; Moreover, I aim at exploring whether, the extent to which and, in what respects events such as those of September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent Iraq war can affect existing discursive articulations. Finally, drawing on the belief that discursive practices are political practices, I am interested in the ways in which these discourses affected policies and courses of action. The remainder of this introductory chapter elaborates on issues raised above by covering the research question and the theory, as well as providing explanations for the data and its use (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 13).

### **Why post-structuralism? Why discourse analysis?**

Traditional IR theories can provide useful insight into interstate relations and issues of security and war. However, they also make certain assumptions that render some issues much more relevant than others and adopt a state-centric approach, whereby the world is an anarchical arena in which the states, as unitary and rational actors with stable identities, interact according to objectively observable laws. Essentially, all social



identities are seen “as rooted in pre-given essences” (Torfing, 1999: 93). Moreover, power is centered around the states (see for example, Hobbes, 2002; Morgenthau, 1985; Waltz, 1979) and is conceived as essentially synonymous with military capabilities or economic supremacy. Furthermore, it is also assumed that an objective social reality with natural laws determines political and social events. This social reality can, in turn, be objectively analyzed and falsified by an empirical study; natural and social science can thus follow the same rules to observe and analyze the world objectively. Similarly, “a realist approach to language assesses speech on its ability to accurately represent some independent reality outside it”, while “the critical social project will require being able to differentiate distorted from true accounts of reality” (Miller, 2000: 320).

Based on the above assumptions, a study of the Greek and British press would compare the institutions and explore the relationships between institutional and state power (see for example Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky and Herman, 1995; Norris, 2003) in order to determine the extent to which the government is involved in propaganda and the manufacturing of false accounts. Moreover, the newspaper language would be viewed as a direct consequence of institutional and state interests. The primary reason for studying newspaper language would thus be to understand what those interests are and unmask domination and distortions of the truth (Van Dijk, 1985, 1988) in order to arrive at an accurate assessment of reality. Newspaper language would also be analyzed over a period of time in order to understand any changes in those power interests. Even though this is a worthwhile endeavour, it limits the study of discourse, in this case media discourse, to the study of discourse as language employed by rational actors interested in promoting their own interests.

It is my contention that discourse should be understood as not merely reflecting but as constituting reality. Discourses<sup>1</sup> are essentially structures of meaning which, at least temporarily, fix meaning and construct “our” reality in that they enable us to understand the world around us (see for example Doty 1996; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Milliken, 1999). Such a conceptualization of discourse results in “the

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<sup>1</sup> Discourse theory and discourse analysis will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 2.

breakdown of once central political narratives and ideologies, the dissolution of stable political identities and institutions, and the decline of utopian projects and discourses” (Newman, 2004: 145). In this respect, discourse analysis is compatible with post-structuralism and postmodernism<sup>2</sup> (see for example, Campbell, 1998a and 1998b; Derrida, 1976; Doty, 1993a and 1996; Weldes, 1996 and 1999), which dismiss the possibility of any true knowledge of the world outside of discourse. Post-structuralism and postmodernism are essentially a reaction to the assumed belief that reality can be objectively analyzed and explained and that “truth” can be reached by means of objective, scientific methods. They reject the existence of an ultimate truth and of any ultimate principles, whilst also refuting the notion of fixed social identities and of fixedness of meaning. They argue against universality, closure, unity, uniformity, homogeneity, totality and stability, while celebrating particularity, open-endedness, multiplicity, diversity, heterogeneity, partiality and change. Moreover, unlike mainstream IR theories, power in postmodern and post-structuralist thought is broadened and permeates all levels of society, rather than being centered around the states, institutions and elites. It is not agency-centered, in the sense that agency is seen as located within the political process.

In turn, such conceptions of the political result in analysis which aims at showing that what seems to be real and true is merely a contingent construction. Thus, post-modernists and post-structuralists are not interested in discovering the real causes and the hidden interests behind an issue or event, since “there is no such thing as a real interest independent from the discursive context in which interests emerge” (Diez, 1999: 599); they instead show the ways identities are constituted and reconstituted and the political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another, thus uncovering the constructedness and contingency of meaning as well as the contestedness of certain notions. As a result, social science “becomes a more subjective and humble enterprise, as truth gives way to tentativeness” (Rosenau, 1992: 8), while politics loses its straightforwardness and universality, and becomes an indeterminable venture.

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<sup>2</sup> I do not equate post-structuralism with postmodernism and I believe that there are very important differences between the two, but I do not discuss them separately because they have many similarities which inform my study



Postmodernists' refusal to privilege scientific reason and their commitment to analyze and deconstruct the different constructed realities, as well as their problematization of agency and their emphasis on exclusionary practices by means of which dominant knowledge is produced, are essential to an understanding of the workings of international politics. Postmodernism is also very important in that it can account for change, since it recognizes the non-static character of politics and points out issues of exclusion and silencing. Judith Squires (1993: 3) refers to postmodernism as "a post Enlightenment defence of principled positions, without the essentialist or transcendental illusions of Enlightenment thought".

### **Why media discourse?**

The mass media is beyond doubt central for the production and reproduction of individual and state identity and the transformation of social phenomena (see Beck 1999; Castells 1998; Hall 1990: 11; Hardt and Negri 2000; Kellner 1995; Torfing 1999), since media representations "help constitute an individual's view of the world, sense of personal identity and gender, playing about of style and lifestyle, and socio-political thought and action" (Kellner, 1995: 5). News is very important in people's daily lives, and it is news in the press and on television that people are exposed to and mostly rely on for their information (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 135; Semetko 2000: 343; Traugot and Brader 2003: 194). Especially regarding foreign policy issues, which "lie outside the orbit in which most of us habitually move", we are to a great extent dependent on the information provided by the media (Lang and Lang, 1994: 58). Moreover, the media's power to some extent also lies in that many people nowadays readily accept media discourses as "objective" and "truthful" (see Ekecrantz and Olsson, 1998: 83), or, at least, as less biased than, for example, the state officials' discourses. Moreover, not only do the media construct national public spheres, but they also reflect and are constituted by these spheres; that is, they are shaped by national cultures and identities (Moore, 2000: 94-96), since they "do not exist outside the political and social world they describe" (Allen and Seaton, 1999: 4). This means that studying media discourses can also provide insight on national discourses. As Kellner (1995: 5) points

out, “since media culture is both constituted by and constitutive of larger social and political dynamics, it is an excellent optic to illuminate the nature of contemporary society, politics and everyday life”.

Since power permeates all levels of society, it is important to study it on many different levels in order to more comprehensively understand the political process. Even though governmental elites are very significant actors, and the study of elite discourses is essential for an understanding of the political process (see for example Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Doty 1996), it should be complemented by the analysis of discourses in the public sphere, such as media discourses, since collective identities largely influence how elites come to see their interests (Risse, 2000). Thus, in turn, the study of media discourses, which reflect and construct collective identities, can account for the success or failure of certain policies, and can help explain certain issues that intergovernmental approaches cannot fully explain. For example, purely intergovernmental approaches can only partially capture the multi-level governmental structure of the E.U. (Chryssochoou, 2001: 56-8; Rosamond, 2000); an approach is therefore also needed which explores the media's role in the constitution of public political debates (Hodess, 1997; Tsagarousianou, 1998).

This thesis compares British and Greek press representations. One of the reasons for this choice is limited access to a wide range of television news programmes; however, the main reason is the partisan nature of the press (Semetko, 2000: 343), which enables a study of a wider range of political spectrums. As far as the choice of newspapers is concerned, I analyze newspapers from different political spectrums in order to find out whether, and to what extent, the discourses differed depending on the papers' ideological orientation and whether the press discourses of the two countries were similar or different depending on their political affiliations, rather than, for example, their cultural specificity. Moreover, such a comparison can provide insight into the predominance of a discourse within the press of each country and its future development. Thus, for example, a discourse which is hegemonic in all newspapers within the same country regardless of their political affiliation is generally less likely to change swiftly or be



replaced by an alternative discourse which is only prevalent in one newspaper. Three Greek and three British newspapers are thus studied, chosen mostly because of their popularity and high circulation as well as their different political stances, which means that they cover a wide spectrum of opinions. The British newspapers analyzed are two broadsheets, *The Times* and *The Independent*, the first being right wing and the second more towards the center. Furthermore, since tabloids are very popular in the U.K. and since they deal with political issues, a left wing tabloid, *The Mirror*, is looked at. *Kathimerini* is a right-wing Greek broadsheet, *Ta Nea* is center oriented, and *Eleutherotipia* is a left-wing newspaper. Since tabloids are a recent phenomenon in Greece, and since they mainly deal with entertainment or local issues, no Greek tabloid is looked at.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, it is worth noting that the project conducts a qualitative analysis. Even though I examined all available material in the proposed period of study, I focused mostly, but not exclusively, on the editorials, opinion and comment articles in the daily newspapers, since they more clearly convey the existing discursive structures in the British and Greek press. Furthermore, elements such as cartoons, photos and captions are all very important features which are also analyzed, since they work together with texts to construct meaning and thus enable a deeper understanding of discursive practices and hegemonic articulations (see for example Burgin 1983; Gamson 1992; Hall 1973; Gunther and Leeuwen 1998; Kuhn 2000; Lutz and Collins 1993).

### **Why comparative analysis and what is being compared?**

A comparative study identifies similarities and differences in articulations and representations in different cultural and political contexts. Comparing the British and Greek press is important because it can provide an understanding of the ways the “same” event can be understood in different ways and the similarities and differences in identity

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<sup>3</sup> I have translated the Greek newspapers in such a way, that they are as close to the Greek original as possible. I didn't try to provide a smoother English translation, because my aim was to expose the understanding of events in different cultural contexts; thus, an “English” translation of the Greek text would hinder the understanding of the cultural specificity of the discourses.

constructions. As Howarth points out, “the point of comparison is to further our understanding and explanation of different logics of identity formation and hegemonic practice in different historical conjunctures [it should also be stressed in different cultural contexts]” (Howarth 2000: 138-139). Identifying the similarities and differences is, in turn, very useful in that it leads to the questioning of dominant forms of knowledge and the refuting of absolute truisms.

The comparison in this thesis is conducted on two levels. The press discourses are compared over time and across countries. Thus, the first time period examined extends from March to September 10, 2001, that is 6 months prior to the September 11 events, while the second period from September 12 until the end of December, thus covering both the September 11 events and the Afghanistan war. The third period extends from October 2002, shortly before the U.N. Security Council resolution 1441<sup>4</sup> and up until April 2003, thus covering the build-up to the war in Iraq and the beginning of the war. The primary purpose of this thesis is to compare the press representations after September 11 in order to understand the extent to which the September 11 events affected existing articulations. It is therefore essential to examine the representations before September 11 in order to locate the existing discourses before the attacks and thus determine any changes in the representational practices. Moreover, it is also important to analyze the discourses during the Afghanistan war and in the months leading to the Iraq war in order to appreciate whether any occurring changes were only temporary or carried a lasting effect.

This, in turn, raises the question: Why do the September 11 events form a good case study? It has been argued that these events marked a turning point -- politically, economically, culturally and in our perception of the world and the international system, while the day when the events took place has often been referred to as “the day that changed the world” (Campbell, 2002: 12; Martin and Phelan, 2002: 104). Of course, this view can be contested, but it is the case that the September 11 events caused a ripple

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<sup>4</sup> Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously by the U.N. security council on November 8, 2002, offering Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations”.



effect, initiating a series of actions on the part of the U.S. Whether or not, therefore, these events are system transforming or not, they have certainly attracted a lot of attention, have caused heated debates and were crucial in the development of world events, in the sense that two wars, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, were justified in their name, as part of the “war on Terrorism”, which was recently also referred to as “the long war” by the Bush administration. As Bush (2003) pointed out, the war in Iraq was “one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001”.

Precisely because the September 11 events marked a period of turmoil, such a moment is a good starting point for any study which seeks to look into issues of hegemony and identity formation since such events may disrupt and affect identities through discursive dislocations.<sup>5</sup> Such dislocations occur “when discourses begin to disintegrate during periods of social or economic turmoil, and when such dislocations are experienced by subjects as an identity crisis” (Howarth, 1995: 123). Dislocations, according to Laclau and Mouffe, “disrupt identities and discourses, but also create a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated structure” (cited in Howarth 2000: 13). It is therefore possible that the September 11 events affected the Greek and British press discourses, and as a result their states’ identities, to such an extent that new discursive constructions may have arisen, at least temporarily. Studying the press representations after September 11 therefore enables one to determine the extent to which, and the ways in which, the events affected these states’ identities as well as the ways in which the identities accommodated and conditioned the events.

It is also noteworthy, that after these events there was a revival of somewhat forgotten themes on the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1998) and the battle between ‘the west’ and ‘the rest’, ‘Christianity’ and ‘Islam’. Therefore, it is very interesting to look at the constructions of these themes in two countries that not only belong to the so called west, but are also members of the same western bloc, namely the E.U.

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<sup>5</sup> These terms and notions are comprehensively analyzed in the following chapter (chapter 2).

The choice of countries is quite important and is to some extent related to the fact that I am a Greek person studying and residing in the U.K., whose interest in analyzing these two countries' discourses has developed as a result. It is also related to my interest, as an E.U. citizen and a researcher, to gain an understanding of issues relating to the E.U., especially since there have recently been extensive debates on and a renewed interest in the future of the E.U., its expansion and its role in the international sphere as well as in relation to the U.S. in the face of the perceived terrorist threat (see for example, Kagan, 2003; Patten, 2006; Peterson and Pollack, 2003; Shapiro, 2004). Greece and the U.K. are also good case studies because they are "comparable", which means that they are "similar in a large number of important characteristics" but "dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other" (Lijphart, 1971: 688).

Indeed, Greece and the U.K. are "comparable" countries in that both belong to a particular geographic region of the world and are members of the E.U., operating within a liberal democratic, capitalist system and, as a result, sharing similar foreign policy decision making systems. Moreover, both countries share similar concerns and perceived "security threats", ranging from terrorism, to ethnic conflicts and environmental issues. However, the two countries are different in other ways. Firstly, they may both be E.U. members, but they are not equally powerful. The U.K., as a major global actor, has a more independent role in world politics. Not only has it got a very strong economy, compared to Greece, but it is also one of the founding NATO members and a G8 member. In contrast, Greece is a smaller and "weaker" E.U. member, in a rather volatile area, the Balkans, with a long history of disputes and rivalry with neighbouring Turkey. History and geography also mean that these two European countries are culturally distinct; specifically, Greece is located in southeastern Europe and is seen as having both "Eastern" and "Western" cultural influences, in contrast to the U.K., a northwestern European country with close ties to the U.S. Linking the U.K. and Greece to the September 11 events, it is also worth comparing these two countries, since they adopted different policy stances and political positions before and during the Iraq war.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> It needs to be pointed out at this stage that the above "facts" about the U.K. and Greece are not used as points of departure in order to justify discourses. It is thus not assumed, for example, that the U.K. press discourses on the U.S. are more favourable towards the U.S. than the Greek ones, because the U.K. has historically more in common with the



The final issue that needs to be addressed in this section pertains to the choice of the specific representations to be analyzed. In the following chapters I look at the press representations of the U.S., the E.U. and the perceived threats before and after September 11. Even though I analyze representations of many different issues, such as the Kyoto protocol and the anti-globalization movement, they are all somewhat related to either of the above actors or perceived threats and all together enable an understanding of the overall discourses on these actors and “threats”. I focus on the above actors/issues because they were central in the Greek and British press constructions of the “self” and because they were intrinsically linked –in the press constructions – to the September 11 events.

### **Concluding remarks and chapter outline**

This thesis fits into the literature on comparative media discourse, identity and IR. Using a post-modernist, discourse analytic framework, I hope to identify the multiple and hegemonic discourses in the British and Greek press. Moreover, I wish to explore what difference, if any, the September 11 events have made for the British and Greek media discourses, and thus for the British and Greek identity constructions. Such an analysis is very important, since our understanding of who we are and, hence, the ways in which we should or shouldn’t act is to a great extent dependent on such discursive representations. Thus, by analyzing the dominant discourses in the press, I hope to provide insight on state identity constructions and thus add to the growing literature that shows that IR can benefit from a post-positivist discourse analytic framework. By comparing the discourses of two European countries it is not only possible to explain and understand the construction and reconstruction of those states’ identities, but also to account for their rather different policy responses in the months following September 11. Moreover, by exposing the contingency of certain constructed “truths” and the instability and volatility

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U.S. than Greece does. In contrast, ties with the U.S. are discursively constructed and are thus the outcome of these discursive constructions. In turn, the purpose of this thesis is to highlight and analyze the social construction of these “facts” rather than presuppose inherent similarities and differences between the two countries which result in different representations of the same event.

of knowledge regimes, which result in the legitimization of some and the delegitimization of other actions, I address the possibility of change by deconstructing the myth of absolute truths and well-established binaries, such as self/other, west/east, Christianity/Islam and good/evil. In addition, this thesis hopes to contribute to the area of European studies by exposing the complexity of foreign and security policies in the E.U.

In the next chapter, I introduce my theoretical and methodological framework, which informs the rest of the thesis. Specifically, I explain my understanding of discourse, drawing largely from Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault, and explain notions such as hegemony and play of practice, which are vital for the understanding of discourse. I then move on to an explanation of the methodology I employ in conducting discourse analysis and make the connection between theory and methodology.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 analyze the discourses in the Greek and British press in each of the three periods that inform my study. Chapter 3 focuses on the pre- September 11 period, from March to September 2001. Thus, I analyze representations of the most “heated” issues in the British and Greek press during that period, namely the Kyoto protocol, the spy plane incident with China, the U.S. missile defense system, globalization and the anti-globalization movement, as well as the role of the E.U. in the international system. All these issues and actors were discussed in relation to the U.S., eliciting very different responses both within the British press, and between the newspapers of the two countries. In contrast, Chapter 4 reveals uniformity both in the British and Greek press discourses in the aftermath of September 11. Even though there was significant divergence between the Greek and British press representations of the U.S., terrorism, Islam and the events of September 11, there was much less divergence within the press discourses in each country. Chapter 5 analyzes the discourses in the months leading to the Iraq war, focusing on representations of the Iraq war, the U.S. and the role of the U.K. and Greece in relation to both the U.S. and the E.U. Finally, Chapter 6 compares the Greek and British press discourses both over time and across countries. It draws some general conclusions on the importance of a discursive analytic approach in understanding state identity constructions and accounting for change. It also elaborates on the virtue of a



comparative analytic approach in explaining national variation and exposing the contingency of established “truths”.

## CHAPTER 2: THE CENTRALITY OF DISCOURSE: THE CASE FOR A DISCURSIVE ANALYTIC APPROACH

As has already been pointed out, discourse analysis is vital to this study since it facilitates a deeper understanding and interpretation of the empirical world around us by being “critically self-aware of the closure imposed by research programmes and the modes of analysis which scholars routinely use in their work and treat as unproblematic” (Milliken, 1999: 227). The chapter will justify the use of a post-positivist, discourse analytic framework to gain an understanding of the Greek and British press representations in the proposed period of study. This discourse analytic approach draws from the writing of Michel Foucault (1971, 1978), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and the ‘Essex’ school, which has implemented and systematized Laclau and Mouffe’s work (see Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, Howarth, 2000), while for its methodological framework it also draws from the work of Jacques Derrida (1967), Jutta Weldes (1996, 1999) and Roxanne Doty (1993, 1996). I chose this type of discourse analysis, rather than, for example, content analysis<sup>7</sup> or critical discourse analysis (Coulthard 1994; Fairclough 1992, 1999),<sup>8</sup> most commonly used by analysts of media discourse, because I don’t see discourse/s as equivalent to language. Rather, they are concrete “systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects”, which are “intrinsically political” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4) and closely tied to relations of power. Moreover, this type of discourse analysis is particularly relevant to this study, since it sees politics as “essentially concerned with the formation of an ‘us’ as opposed to a ‘them’” (Norval 2000: 224), and is therefore concerned with identity constructions and social formations. The central role of identity is very important to this study, which explores the press representations of two culturally distinct members of the E.U. and is interested in the construction and reconstruction of identities. Finally, this type of

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<sup>7</sup> Ole Holsti (1969: 14) refers to content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”. Content analysis is thus a quantitative technique mainly aiming at making links between causes and effects and assuming the “objectivity” of the social.

<sup>8</sup> CDA views language as a type of social practice and endeavors to uncover ideologies and power relations that are hidden in discourse. CDA distinguishes between the discursive and the “real”, and thus “doesn’t problematize the process through which ‘reality’ is constructed and the ‘material’ given meanings as a ‘reality’” (Shepherd, 2006: 20).



discourse analysis is essential to this study because it embraces the post-structural, while also addressing methodological and epistemological issues (Milliken, 1999: 228). In this chapter I initially point out the main theoretical premises of discourse analysis. In the second section I analyze the different methodological techniques that I use in the analysis of the Greek and British press representations. I then discuss the specifics of media discourse by highlighting the importance of captions and images. I conclude by summing up the main workings of a discourse analytic approach

## **The role of discourses**

### **Discourses as productive systems of signification**

The first point to be made about discourses is that they don't merely define an unproblematical and uncontested 'reality', an objective world which is out there to be discovered; rather they construct social realities. Discourses are not what positivists would describe as language used to express or describe the 'truth' or what structuralists would characterize as language used to mask a hidden ideology and an underlying deeper meaning. Meaning is not simply there waiting to be discovered. Instead, "meaning is discourse dependent" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 157) since all objects and actions derive their meaning from discourses, from "historically specific systems of rules", and therefore "all objects are objects of discourse, in that a condition of their meaning depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 157). Thus, knowledge is located within discourse and "nothing has any meaning outside of discourse" (Foucault, in Hall 1997: 44). As Howarth also points out, this doesn't mean that objects don't have a 'real existence' outside discourse; rather, objects don't have an extra-discursive meaning (Howarth, 2000: 104). So, for example, the occurrence of the September 11 events is not being disputed. It is beyond doubt that two airplanes crashed onto the twin towers in New York City. However, we cannot understand these events 'objectively' outside of discourse. Thus, in the Greek press the events were mostly seen as the punishment of the 'evil American superpower', while in

the British press they were to a great extent conceived as an attack on 'the West' and an attack on liberal values.

However, discourses don't only function as structures of signification. They are also "productive or reproductive of things defined by the discourse" (Milliken 1999: 228). This essentially means that discourses favour and privilege certain ways of living in, conceiving and acting towards the world, while excluding other ways. They don't just give a language for speaking about phenomena, but introduce and define specific regimes of truth with which people identify. "A discourse delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular 'reality' can be known and acted upon" (Doty, 1996: 6). Thus, "when we review the set of constructs relating to conduct that exists in a language, we are reviewing not only the horizons of possible speech, but also the horizons of possible actions" (Shapiro, 1981: 130). So, for example, the constant articulation of the September 11 events as world changing reconstitutes the world we live in. It doesn't matter that this is mainly an unsupported argument, because its constant articulation constructs the world we live in and serves to bring the changes it ostensibly describes.

### **The fluidity of discourses and the play of practice**

Even though discourses fix meaning and construct particular social realities, this fixity is not constant and everlasting. Specifically, one of the defining characteristics of discourses is their instability and openness, which makes them changeable and historically contingent. Hard work is therefore needed to articulate and rearticulate their knowledge and identities (Milliken 1999: 230). This inevitably means that the social world itself is not a fixed, stable entity and that all identities are open to change and transformation. There is always the possibility of change even in those discourses that seem extremely predominant. Discourses are "contingent and historical constructions which are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control" (Howarth and Stavrakakis,

2000: 4). Laclau and Mouffe borrow the term 'overdetermination'<sup>9</sup> from Althusser to describe this "field of identities which never manage to be fully fixed" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 11).

While discourses are not constant and there is always the potential for change, it would also be inaccurate to say that they are always in flux and that the transition from one discourse to another can happen at any time, or even suddenly. Thomas Diez conceptualizes discourses as glaciers: "in a snapshot, it is the structures that allow for a very limited range of concrete articulations. But with each of these articulations the structures are themselves transformed a bit, and after a longer timespan, the glacier/discourse is no longer what it used to be" (2001: 31). Thus, for example, the discourses on the E.U. in the Greek press substantially differed in the months prior to the September 11 events and in the months leading to the Iraq war. However, the change wasn't sudden but gradual and there were elements of the former discourses in the latter. Specifically, even though the E.U. was seen as not having fulfilled its potential and as an anti-democratic organization governed by the powerful members in the months before September 11, this discourse gradually changed, leading to a discourse about a democratic union capable of opposing U.S. unilateralism in the months leading to the Iraq war. Even though the two discourses seem opposing, they are not; in fact, the E.U. was seen as having great potential even before September 11, though it was not constructed as having fulfilled it yet. It was still seen as the only hope against a unilateralist and imperialist U.S., even though it was only after the Afghanistan war that it was represented as having fulfilled its potential and having united Europe against U.S. imperialism. Therefore, even though discourses are not fixed and do change, this change is usually gradual rather than automatic and swift.

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<sup>9</sup> The term was originally used in Althusser's essay *Contradiction and Overdetermination* (1962), in which he argued that all incidents are the result of conflicting instances, rather than a singular cause.



## The subject and subject positioning

Another characteristic of discourses is that they construct the identities of subjects and objects, because “all ‘experience’ depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 115). Subjects don’t merely use language to do things, but operate, exist and acquire their identities within prevailing discursive practices, “which contain preconceived ways of thinking that are predicated on rules with a content, a content involving modes of interpersonal relations” (Shapiro 1981: 144). Thus, the idea of a rational subject as the originator of ideas is misleading since “the historical analysis of scientific discourse is subject not to a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice” (Foucault, 1973: 172). Thus, it is the discourses which “define subjects authorized to speak and to act, and the relations within which they see and are seen by each other and in terms of which they conduct business with respect to that issue area” (Milliken, 1999: 229). Therefore, questions such as ‘what are the author’s intentions in the text’ and ‘have we got proof of the text’s authenticity’, should be replaced by questions such as ‘where does the discourse come from’, or ‘what subject positions are created in the text’ (Foucault, 1977: 127). Consequently, the category of the subject can only be used in the sense of subject positions within a discursive structure (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 115). Moreover, the concrete, empirical subject is constructed through a plurality of discursive subject positions. For example, one can be white, middle-class, Greek, Christian Orthodox, a student and a woman.

Such a conception of the subject and its discursive construction is reminiscent of Althusser’s theory on the interpellation and hailing of the subjects by ideological practices. However, this analysis departs from “the deterministic connotations of Althusser’s theory”, since the analysis doesn’t view ideological practices as an autonomous region of social formation and opposes the reduction of the autonomy of social agents “to the mere effects of pre-existing social structures” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 13). Subjects are neither autonomous agents who constitute the structure, as has already been pointed out, nor are they mere products of the structure, as Althusser suggests. Instead, “structure itself is constructed along with the meaning which

simultaneously produce subjects' identities and their positions vis-à-vis another. Possibilities are not explained by the prior existence of structures or social actors but rather by the continual and simultaneous production of subjects and structures" (Doty, 1993: 305). In other words, this analysis transcends the agency/structure divide (see Bieler and Morton, 2001; Dessler, 1989; Wendt, 1987) and asserts that "the specificity of the category of subject can't be established either through the absolutization of a dispersion of subject positions, or through the equally absolutist unification of these around a transcendental subject. The category of subject is penetrated by the same ambiguous, incomplete and polysemical character which overdetermination assigns to every discursive identity" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 181). This understanding of agency and structure enables one "to conceptualize agents and agency without falling into the trap of attributing some timeless and unexplained quality to all subjects" (Doty 1997: 384-5) and without establishing structure as overpowering and unchanging.

### **Antagonism and identity construction**

The fluidity of discourses and the non-fixity of different identities raises the question of how discourses are subverted and replaced by different discourses as well as under what circumstances agency is made possible. Key to understanding this issue is the term antagonism, which "constitutes the limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as partial and precarious objectification" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125). Laclau and Mouffe call antagonism "the witness of the impossibility of a final suture" (1985: 125), while Howarth and Stavrakakis characterize antagonisms as revealing "the limit points in society in which social meaning is contested and cannot be stabilized" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 9). According to Laclau and Mouffe, social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to attain fully their identity and thus construct an enemy who is deemed responsible for this failure and lack. An antagonism occurs when the presence of an "Other" "prevents me from being myself". Thus, the relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their construction. Moreover, this blockage of identity is not one-sided but experienced by both the antagonizing and the antagonized force. "But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence. Its

objective being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevent its being fixed as full positivity” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 125). Antagonisms show the failure of difference and the limits of objectivity which characterize the social and never allow it to turn into ‘society’; they show the non-fixity of identity and its contestation by forces which stand either outside or at the limit of the contested order. However, antagonism not only shows the impossibility but also demonstrates the possibility of the social, since “the construction of antagonisms and the institution of political frontiers between agents are partly constitutive of identities and of social objectivity itself” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11), since by means of antagonism old identities are subverted and temporarily substituted by new ones.<sup>10</sup>

### **Hegemony and hegemonic formations**

Crucial to understanding the political role of discourses is the notion of hegemony. Hegemony is not a new concept and has been touched upon by different thinkers. This project adopts Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of hegemony, which resembles the Gramscian conception (1971),<sup>11</sup> but moves away from two important aspects of his work; the assertion that subjects are constructed on the plane of the fundamental classes, and his suggestion that every social formation structures itself around a single hegemonic center (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 138). Hegemony can be defined as any attempt to achieve the impossible, that is, social unity. According to Laclau and Mouffe, (1985: 112), “if the social doesn’t manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the social only exists, however, as an attempt to construct the impossible object”. Hegemony is thus the process by which a concept attempts to establish itself as universal and achieves fixity of meaning. Any bid for universality is hegemony, while “hegemonic practices are those practices that seek to create a fixedness of meaning” (Doty, 1996: 8).

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<sup>10</sup> The process through which old identities are subverted and new ones emerge is explained in detail in the methodology section of this chapter, under “the logics of equivalence and difference”.

<sup>11</sup> Gramsci developed his notion of hegemony in order to account for the fact that the socialist revolution predicted by Marxists had not occurred by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In contrast, capitalism was still thriving and maintained control economically, politically, but also through a hegemonic culture which created “common sense” and thus maintained the status quo of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the revolution didn’t take place because the dominant class had managed to maintain the status quo and achieve hegemony through a number of institutions and ideas.



Similarly, Howarth and Stavrakakis refer to hegemonic practices as “an exemplary form of political activity that involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common project, while hegemonic formations are the outcomes of these projects’ endeavours to create new forms of social order from a variety of dispersed or dislocated elements” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 14).

Because of the impossibility of social closure, these hegemonic formations are not permanent and a fixedness of meaning can never be fully achieved; however, partial fixations are possible. In fact, “even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be partial fixations – otherwise the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112).

Hegemony is achieved through the temporary exclusion of some item which threatens a discursive order by preventing ultimate closure. One the means by which meaning is temporarily fixed and thus a content becomes hegemonic is through nodal points, defined as those privileged discursive points (Laclau and Mouffe:1985: 112), which “confer partially fixed meaning on a particular set of signifiers” (Howarth, 2000: 110). In particular, “what happens is this: a variety of signifiers are floating within the field of discursivity; suddenly some master signifier<sup>12</sup> intervenes and retroactively reconstitutes their identity by fixing the floating signifiers within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence” (Torfig, 1999: 98-99). In other words, “by filling these nodal points with meaning through the tying together of a number of discourses on other, more general concepts, meaning becomes stabilized” (Diez, 2001: 26). Nodal points “sustain the identity of a certain discourse by constructing a knot of definitive meanings” (Torfig, 1999: 98-99), they unify a discursive terrain and thus conceal ambiguities; this, in fact, seems to be the main aim of hegemonic projects.

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<sup>12</sup> Floating signifiers are words that have no meaning of their own, but acquire their meaning when linked with a variety of other signifiers in chains of equivalences. Master signifiers (or nodal points) are those signifiers which do not have a referent, but give meaning to those floating signifiers by reducing them to a common referent and thus bringing them together in a single system. Thus, master signifiers act as a centre around which other signifiers obtain their meaning; they therefore structure the whole articulatory system.

Drawing on Slavoc Zizek, Howarth and Stavrakakis use the example of those pre-existing signifiers, such as democracy, state and freedom, which in communist ideology acquire a specific meaning through their articulation around the signifier 'communism', which functions as a nodal point. Due to the intervention of this nodal point their meaning is partially fixed, since "democracy acquires the meaning of 'real' democracy as opposed to bourgeois democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation and the role and function of the state is transformed" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 8). Using an example from the British press discourse, after September 11 'Islam' functioned as a nodal point, which formed and held together the discourse that established the meaning and significance of the war on terror. Islam was an empty signifier in the British press discourse; it had no symbolic value in itself but acted as a centre around which other signifiers acquired their meaning. It signified all those negative features that the western liberal democracies lacked, namely backwardness, brutality and totalitarianism. It was in contrast to Islam that the west gained its meaning as modern, peaceful and liberal. Moreover, the nodal point 'Islam' united in a chain of equivalences different Others under the label of one main Other. Thus, 'The Taliban', 'suicide bombers' and 'Saddam' were also defined in relation to the same nodal point 'Islam'.

## **Methodology**

As was pointed out above, discourses are "relational worlds of meaningful practices that systematically form the identities of subjects and objects" (Griggs and Howarth, 2002: 101). Moreover, meaning is ascribed to objects and actions through these historically specific systems of rules, making meaning discourse dependent. In fact, discourses are highly political since they are characterized by a constant effort to create hegemonic contents and to fix meaning around nodal points through constructing chains of equivalences in an antagonistic relationship to other discourses. Even though hegemonic formations are possible, they are only temporary, need conscious effort to be articulated and rearticulated and can be subverted as well as substituted by other discourses. Consequently, "in the modern era the world of politics is the world of contingent hegemonizations, an arena of incommensurable choices, of undecidability and acts of

power, which are the products of the interplaying logics of equivalence and difference” (Townshed, cited in Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

How does one then analyze and explore issues such as the construction and subversion of identities, the play of practice or hegemonic articulations? This section is divided in four parts; the first three parts elaborate on those methodological tools that I use in the analysis of the Greek and British press discourse. These representational practices work together to both fix and subvert identities, to establish and reverse hegemonic formulations or to demonstrate this play of practice, the impossibility of complete and infinite closure and a distinction between them is not always clear-cut. However, they are discussed separately in this chapter for explanatory purposes. Thus, the first part describes and analyzes those representational practices by means of which meaning is temporarily fixed and nodal points are established. The concept of discursive nodal points has already been defined as those privileged discursive points upon which meaning is fixed and positions are established. As Doty points out, “it is possible to locate representational practices in texts that work to establish these nodal points” (Doty, 1996: 10) that “provide analytic categories” that enable one to “get at how discursive practices constitute subjects and objects and organize them into a ‘grid of intelligibility’” (Doty, 1993: 306). These practices, which will be analyzed in the first part of this section, are presupposition, subject positioning, predication, articulation and interpellation, which all work both separately and together to establish those nodal points that fix meaning and identities. It is by means of these practices that common sense is produced and particular representations become acceptable at the expense of others. The second part of the section will focus on the logics of equivalence and difference which show the ways in which identities are simultaneously fixed and subverted and how political frontiers discursively divide political space into opposing camps or undermine that division. Even though these two logics could have been analyzed in the first section along with articulation, predication and the other methodological tools, they are discussed separately because they are capable – at least more evidently than the previous methodologies – of showing the ways in which discourses change over time. Through the interaction between the two logics, it is possible to account for change. In the third part,



deconstruction is analyzed as a methodological tool capable of exposing the play of practice. This is a very important task, because exposing the instability of discourses enables an understanding of different possibilities and options. The fourth part engages in an analysis of photos and captions which are essential elements of the press discourse and which can be analyzed as texts. Finally, the fourth section elaborates on the workings of a discursive analytic approach and its relevance to the project.

## **Predication – Presupposition – Subject positioning/ Interpellation**

### *Presupposition*

Presupposition refers to all those background assumptions which are implicit in an utterance. All texts, even those which seem clear and straightforward, carry with them presuppositions or background knowledge that is taken to be true, when in fact their truth claims may be highly debatable. Presupposition, as Doty observes, is therefore “an important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true” (1993b: 306). Presupposition is very useful, since many statements in news reports seem to rely on common sense, expressed as if they are uncontroversial facts. Narratives on a particular issue build on one another, with references to past actions and understandings about the issue becoming accepted as conventional wisdom. For instance, the statement “Even Mary wasted the money” presupposes that there is such a thing called money, that it was wasted by more than one person, that Mary wasted it and that she did waste it even though she was the least likely person to waste it. Doty (1993b: 302) provided a very good example of presupposition by quoting that “the logic of realpolitik...best captures the essential nature of the international political system”, presupposes that there is something called realpolitik, that it has a logic, and that there exists an international system which has an essential nature.

Drawing from the present case study, and according to the hegemonic representation in *The Times*, a war in Iraq was imperative and necessary, not only because Saddam

Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, but also because a war would liberate the Iraqis and allow Iraq to become a model country. Such statements include various presuppositions which are presented as ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ and described as what simply ‘is’, rather than a debatable assumption. Specifically, it was presupposed in the dominant *Times* discourse, not only that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, but also that he was prepared to use those weapons. It was also assumed that the Iraqis welcomed a war and that a post-war Iraq would be a better place for the Iraqis. Moreover, these taken for granted ‘truths’ were based on specific presuppositions as to what constitutes a democracy and the ways in which democracies are meant to act both domestically and internationally. As a result, a war in Iraq was naturalized as a moral and necessary enterprise bound to be beneficial for everyone and questions such as what the negative effects of a war in Iraq would be were rendered inconceivable in *The Times* discourse in the months leading to the Iraq war. Moreover, in the absence of these ‘facts’ and ‘truths’, the statement that the war was a moral and necessary enterprise would make no sense.

### *Predication*

Predication attributes and assigns intrinsic characteristics, differences, qualities and properties to the different subjects and objects in a discourse. That is, predication demonstrates how language practices construct meaning in regard to subjects and objects. This is done through the use of particular terminology and verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Thus, “predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capabilities” (Milliken 1999: 232; see also Doty 1993b: 307). In predicate analysis a text’s object space is thoroughly analyzed and attention is paid to these adjectives, verbs and adverbs linked to subjects to see what negative or positive qualities these subjects are constituted as possessing, and how they are distinguished from and related to one another. Yet, it is not only the identification of the object spaces of different texts that is the concern of predicate analysis, but also the comparison of these object spaces “to uncover the relational distinctions that arguably order the ensemble, serving as a frame for defining certain subject identities” (Milliken 1999: 233). Thus, predicate analysis is an effective method to understand how discourses

are related, in what ways subjects are positioned and how power works to favour particular interpretations.

In the months leading to the Iraq war, the Greek newspaper *Eleutherotipia* described the Americans as “ruthless, bloodthirsty, murderous ... hypocrites ... who deny civilization ... you see them in battle array and you are filled with disgust” (Tsalidis, 2003). This statement attributed specific qualities to the Americans, and constituted them as particular types of subjects, in this case undesirable and very negative subjects. Specifically, the Americans were seen as merciless, brutal, hypocritical murderers, warlike, uncivilized as well as a threat to civilization. Moreover, the pronoun “you” created a relation of identity between the reader and the author and a relation of opposition between these two subjects and the Americans. Thus, the Americans became the “other”, while the reader and the author become the “self” as “speaking, writing and knowledgeable subjects” (Doty, 1993: 307). Thus, the reader and the author were established as subjects who “knew” the Americans and their real nature, and were at the same time superior to and more virtuous than them.

### *Subject positioning - Interpellation*

Finally, subjects are always positioned in relation to one another, and it is by means of this positioning that they are defined and understood. As a textual mechanism, subject positioning examines these kinds of relationship between different identities or subjects and objects. For example, a discursive analysis of the Greek and British newspapers and the way they understand the role of the U.S., as well as their country’s position in the international system and as E.U. members would be interested in the positioning of different identities, such as for example that of the Greek versus the Greek-European identity, the British versus the British European, the British versus the American and many others. As Doty observes, examples of these types of relationships that position subjects are those of “opposition, identity, similarity, and complementarity” (Doty 1993b: 306). Thus, for instance, immediately after the war in Afghanistan, the British press discourse positioned the U.K. in a relationship of similarity and identity with the United



States and of opposition to the terrorists. Moreover, the 'west' was positioned in a relationship of opposition to the terrorists and the 'Muslim world', while the terrorists and the Muslim countries were positioned in a complementary and similar relationship to each other.

Similarly to subject positioning, interpellation highlights and examines this creation of subject positions, but also points to the hailing (see Althusser, 1971: 174) of individuals by those subject positions. That is, "subjects recognize themselves in the discourse" and thus "speak it spontaneously as its author" (Hall, in Weldes, 1999: 105). Thus, meaning is naturalized and temporary closure is achieved. On a state level this identification is achieved primarily by creating a sense of belonging. Thus, after the September 11 events the British press constructed this sense of belonging by representing "the west" as the family to which "we" belong. As Weldes points out, the "we" is very important, since interpellation is achieved by means of this "we" which functions as a "shifty-shifter", that is a "context-sensitive personal pronoun" by means of which "the 'person' designated by the message is always determined by the message itself" (Schwichtenberg, in Weldes, 1999: 105). Moreover, the shifter is characterized by ambiguity since it can be seen as referring to many different people and entities. Precisely because of this ambiguity "it helps to define the subject position that the audience is asked to assume; it helps to weld potentially disparate members of its audience into a single, unified identity" and therefore helps to create common sense and provides legitimization (Weldes 1999: 106).

## Articulation

Articulation illustrates how common sense is produced and in what ways discursive constructions are naturalized, taken for granted and treated as if they are real and uncontroversial. As Weldes points out, "articulation refers to the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements" (Weldes, 1999: 98), which come to be associated with each other, even though there is no necessary connection, and thus specific representations of the

world are created and meaning is temporarily fixed. As Stuart Hall (1996) also said, an articulation is the way in which two things are linked together, while Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). For example, after the September 11 events nouns like “terrorist”, “sheriff”, “empire”, adjectives such as “evil”, “aggressive”, “bearded” and “uncivilized”, as well as metaphors of disease and containment were combined to temporarily fix meaning and create common sense. One element which is particularly important in articulation is repetition, because “with their successful repeated articulation, these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected” (Weldes, 1999: 99) and thus their meaning is naturalized despite their contingency. Precisely because of the non-fixity of meaning, articulation reveals the non-necessary character of specific articulations by pointing out how things could have been represented differently.

Drawing once more from the British press discourse, in the months after the September 11 events the terms terrorism and “Islamic terrorism” were granted specific meanings and acquired particular connotations which in turn resulted in the alienation and “othering” of the “Islamic terrorists”, whose actions ended up having no motivation other than the destruction of “western civilization”. The constant articulation and re-articulation of terrorism as an infectious epidemic, of Islam as a religion and political system in clash with modernity and of Muslims as “bearded aggressive cavemen”, placed in contrast to articulations of western leaders as symbols of globalised modernity and defenders of a superior civilization, widened the gap between “us” and “them”. It also naturalized identities and legitimized particular responses to the attacks in Washington as well as silenced alternative interpretations. If we focus on the articulations of the Taliban and the terrorists as bearded (see also Weldes, 1999: 182-186), it could be argued that this articulation of the Taliban and the “Muslim terrorists” as bearded carried with it connotations of dirtiness, uncivilized behavior, irresponsibility and a threat to the liberal, western values. Thus, terrorism became a problem of uncivilized terrorists attacking the civilized, superior western liberal values.

## The logics of equivalence and difference

How, then, are identities simultaneously fixed and subverted? This is achieved by means of the logics of equivalence and difference, which, seemingly opposed yet also working together, show how political frontiers discursively divide political space into opposing camps or undermine that division. The logic of equivalence depends on the disbanding of the particular identities of subjects within a discourse by the creation of a totally negative identity that is presented as threatening. “The logic functions by creating equivalential identities that express a pure negation of a discursive system” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). Thus, and as Norval also points out, “where the logic of equivalence predominates, social division tends towards a dichotomization of political space, a paratactical division of the social sphere into two opposing camps” (Norval 2000: 221). While equivalence functions by dividing a system of differences and constructing a political frontier between two opposing camps, the logic of difference takes place when a discursive order is expanded by breaking existing chains of equivalence and creating more differences, which in turn are included in the discursive formation. Therefore, “the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 129).

For example, in the aftermath of September 11, a chain of equivalences was created in the British press between the terms civilized, humane, western and defensive, while another was created between the terms uncivilized, aggressive, inhumane, evil and non-western. An antagonistic frontier divided ‘us’ from ‘them’, as two opposing camps. This chain of equivalences united a set of otherwise different identities into a “totality” in opposition to ‘terrorism’ and whatever that signified, since all those “differential elements on either side of the sets of oppositions referred back to one another in an endless signifying chain” (Doty, 1996: 46). Therefore, being civilized was equated to being from the ‘west’ and to be ‘western’ was equated to being humane, while being uncivilized was to be inferior, aggressive and inhuman. Unlike the war in Afghanistan, in the months leading to the Iraq war these chains of equivalence were unable completely



to subvert the relations of difference, and therefore the frontier vis-à-vis the antagonistic outside wasn't as clear-cut and fixed. For this reason, there wasn't a united hegemonic articulation in the British press in favour of a war in Iraq, since it was no longer possible to represent the enemy as an absolute threat. Thus, the war was represented in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* as a unilateral U.S. unlawful action that the British government should oppose.

Similarly, in the Greek press in the months before September 11, a chain of equivalence was in place between the terms powerful, profit-seeking, unilateral and anti-European and another one between the terms weak, multilateral, collective and pro-European. This divided the E.U. in two opposing camps, namely the more powerful countries of the G-8, with the less powerful, pro-European countries, which were seen as positive forces in contrast to the more powerful members. After September 11 and in the months leading to the Iraq war, these chains of equivalence were progressively substituted by a different chain of equivalence between the benign, civilized, peace-loving E.U. (the anti-Iraq war countries) and the benevolent, uncivilized, aggressive United States (and the pro-war European countries secondarily).

### **The workings of deconstruction**

Finally, deconstruction as a methodological tool reveals the play of practice that was analyzed in the first section; it reveals the instability and non-fixity of discourses and it exposes the myth of a unitary subject and of 'established truths'. Through the privileging of certain abstract oppositions, and logics, and the repression of others, texts create particular 'realities', which are taken for granted and are accepted unquestioningly. Since these discourses with their privileging of certain 'truths' and the displacement of others have real material effects on the structuring of social relations, a deconstructive approach is politically important in its critique and exposition of the volatility of these 'universal realities', which could have actually been represented in different ways (Milliken 1999: 242). A deconstructive approach involves "critically examining the discursive processes of materialization that produce settlements – such as the idea of pre-

given subjects upon which the criteria for judgement are based” (Derrida, cited in Campbell 1998: 30). Deconstruction is based on the premise of the infinite play and the impossibility of total closure of discourses. Thus, what is ‘destroyed’ in a deconstructive reading is the claim to the domination of one mode of representation over another. Simply reducing a text to a ‘correct’ or single homogeneous reading contains the free play of its elements. This means that it is possible for a particular articulation to be privileged and to become hegemonic, suppressing other alternatives and silencing voices. For this reason, deconstruction is a very useful technique and philosophical orientation, since it allows for an examination of how certain myths of unity are created, thereby enabling a particular discourse to create hegemonic meanings.

How, then, does deconstruction expose the play of practice? The key term here is binary oppositions. A binary opposition is a pair, usually but not necessarily a pair of opposites, which are used in such a way that one of the terms is privileged over the other, thus creating a hierarchy and rendering the two terms mutually exclusive. Deconstruction involves identifying the binary oppositions working in a text and then showing the ways in which the text itself undermines the hierarchy implied or asserted by the opposition. If we see deconstruction as a step-by-step process,<sup>13</sup> the deconstruction initially traces all the bipolar terms and dichotomies implicit or explicit in the text. It could be, for example, that one term in the dichotomy precedes the other, or is thought to be more natural than the other, or is seen as a manifestation of the other. It could also be that one term is seen as original whereas the other is seen as an imitation of the original, or that one term is the rule and the other is the exception. It is important to note that both terms often do not appear in the text. Rather, the term mentioned implies its partner, since one term depends on its binary for its meaning. The second task of the deconstruction is to explore and reinterpret the hierarchy, to examine how the two terms are related and one privileged over the other. Third, the deconstruction denies the authority of the dominant voice, showing the other side of the story, which is usually marginalized and silenced.

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<sup>13</sup> Derrida refused to break down deconstruction in a series of steps since he did not merely view deconstruction as a methodology. Even though I view deconstruction as a philosophical orientation and not simply a methodological tool, I have broken down the process in four steps based on Derrida’s deconstruction of the speech/writing binary (Derrida, 1976) for explanatory purposes.

Thus, the story is reversed, but not with the intention of replacing one center with another, but in order to deconstruct the underlying hierarchy and ultimately demonstrate this play of practice. Finally, the opposition itself is deconstructed by deriving another reading of the text and by finding out what is not said, by tracing what is between the lines. In other words, “the deconstructive critic seeks to find by this process of retracing, the element ... which is alogical, the thread in the text in question which will unravel it all, or the loose stone which will pull down the whole building. The deconstruction annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the text has already annihilated that ground, knowingly or unknowingly” (Miller, in Leitch, 1983: 195).

For example, the binary good/evil was prevalent in both the British and Greek press discourses. A speech by President Bush (2001) to the United Nations made this distinction between good and evil. “The evil has returned ... we know that evil is real, but good will prevail against it ... it is our task ... to provide the response to aggression and terror”. In this speech Bush refers to the return of evil and the prevailing of the good. In the first step of the deconstruction, the opposition between the two important terms good and evil is identified. The second step shows how the term good is privileged over the term evil. Thus, on a state level, this good/evil dichotomy is usually implicitly linked to an inside/outside dichotomy (see also Campbell 1998). As is also implicit in this statement, the good resides inside and the evil intrudes from the outside and against this evil the good must be defended. This statement assumes a world divided between good and evil, in which one can be either good or evil. By proclaiming that the evil has returned and that the good will prevail, people are divided with the good ones on one side and the evil ones on the other. Thus, the statement draws a sharp distinction between those who are good and can under no circumstances be evil and those who are evil and will stay evil. Therefore, the terms good and evil in the good/evil dichotomy are seen as mutually exclusive terms; one is either good or evil. Third, the deconstruction puts the dominant term under erasure and shows the mutual dependency of the two terms. Good and evil cannot be treated as mutually exclusive, because they depend on each other for their meaning. There can be no evil without good, and no good without evil. Thus, this sharp separation between good and evil is a construction, which simplifies the political



space, is characterized by moral certainty and precludes the possibility of a middle ground. All binaries exist by virtue of their opposite; these two terms rely on each other for their definition, since in order to assert goodness, one has to juxtapose it against evil. Similarly, according to Belousek, the good/evil dichotomy is far from innocent, since it “assumes that evil is found primarily in human intentions: the origin of evil is the evil will of evildoers. Evil does not have its source in human nature so that humankind as a whole is not “fallen” – otherwise, we, too, would be mixed with evil”. Moreover and most importantly, “this is a paradigm without either the necessity of repentance or the possibility for redemption – the good are beyond judgment, and the evildoers are beyond salvation” (Belousek, 2005). Finally, having shown the mutual dependency on the two terms, the deconstruction can uncover all those repressed presuppositions which led to the privileging of the one term over the other and thus free the text from determinate meaning opening it up to multiplicity. Thus, moving beyond good and evil (Nietzsche, 1990) with the recognition that good and evil can reside with everyone, encourages dialogue rather than war and aggression and peaceful resolutions of conflicts rather than constant warfare, which perpetuates conflict.

### **The role of images and captions in the press discourse**

One of the most distinguishing aspects of newspaper discourse is the coexistence of written text and image. Texts, images and the accompanying captions interact in an elaborate, mutual relationship. It is thus important to take news photographs and cartoons into account in the analysis of newspaper articles, since they work alongside the written texts to temporarily fix meanings and can enable the privileging of one interpretation over another. Cartoons which are described “as a means of expressing usually critical political and social commentary through a visual format that may include images, words, or both” (Bergen, 2003: 2) can be analyzed in the same ways that texts are .

Traditionally images have been regarded as more ‘objective’ than texts; they are perceived as carrying a tangibility lacking in other communicative forms (Hall, 1981:

240). Due to their visual impact, they “have a specific way of passing themselves off as aspects of nature”. They are conceived as “visual-transcriptions of the real world”, as witnesses to “the actuality of the event they represent”. Yet the choice of a particular moment of an event as against another, of one person rather than another, and of one specific angle shows that photos don’t simply accurately represent the ‘real world’ (Hall 1981: 241). As Barthes points out, it is by virtue of their being iconic that images are not subject to an interpretative reading, that they are taken for granted. “The absence of a code clearly reinforces the myth of photographic ‘naturalness’: the scene is there, captured mechanically, not humanly ... This purely denotative status of the photograph, the perfection and plentitude of its analogy, in short its ‘objectivity’ has every chance of being mythical” (Barthes in Weber 1980: 185). Thus, in reality images don’t speak for themselves. They can fix meanings, at least temporarily, and construct or support hegemonic articulations in a similar way to written texts.

Images, like other texts, can acquire a multiplicity of meanings. As Burgin stresses, there is no single signifying system upon which images depend, but a “heterogeneous complex of codes upon which photography may draw” (Burgin 1984: 143). There are many different issues that an analyst of photographic discourse should be aware of when looking at photos so as to determine issues of subject positioning and presupposition. Kress and Van Leeuwn have touched upon some issues, affecting the way an image will be read and thus how a specific interpretation of the image is more likely to be reached. These issues include the image act and the gaze, the size of the frame and the creation of social distance, the amount of involvement and the horizontal angle, as well as issues of power and the vertical angle (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1999).

As far as the gaze is concerned, Kress and Leeuwen indicate the difference between pictures in which represented participants look directly at the viewer’s eyes, and pictures in which they don’t. Contact is established between the gazing represented participant and the viewer, even though it is only on an imaginary level; it seems as if the person in the photo directly addresses the viewer and demands something from him/her. In contrast, pictures which address us indirectly position the viewer as the subject and not

the object of the look; the viewer's role is that of "an invisible onlooker" (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1999: 380-383).

The size of frame and the choice between close-up, medium shot and long shot position people within the frame and show the distances people keep, which often depend on their social relations. Thus, images allow us, imaginatively, to come as close to public figures as if they were our friends or to look at people like ourselves as strangers (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1999: 387-388). Finally, the choice of the photographic angle may affect the viewer's relationship with it. The body of a represented subject may be angled away from or near the plane of the viewer, which will facilitate the "othering" of the participant or his acceptance as one of "our own". Similarly, "if a represented participant is seen from a high angle, then the relation between the interactive participants (photographer and viewers) and the represented participants is depicted as one in which the interactive participant has power over the represented, the represented participant is seen from the point of view of power" (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1999: 390-397).

### **Conducting discourse analysis**

One of the main premises of a discursive analytic approach is its emphasis on the discursive construction of reality. Discourse analysis does not treat agents as rational actors, does not "look at individual or collective actors as the locus of meaning" (Doty, 1992: 302) and refutes the idea that meaning is there to be discovered. Moreover, such an approach maintains that discourses are power structures, with power being "inherent in the linguistic practices by which agents are constructed and become articulated within particular discourses" (Doty, 1992: 302); merely the fact that meaning often appears to be fixed and stable as well as uncontested manifests the workings of power. Thus, discourse analysis "embraces a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying 'real causes', concerning itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another" (Campbell, 1993: 7-8). Finally, discourse theorists emphasize the non-fixity of social constructions, which undergo continuous historical and social change as a



result of political practices, with the analyst's main task being to "chart and explain such historical and social change by recourse to political factors and logics" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 6).

Since discourses construct subjects and position them vis-à-vis each other, it is very important to study these subject positions in order to understand the ways in which reality and meaning is constructed and what the implications of this are. By means of "how" rather than why questions (see Chapter 1) the discourse analyst can understand the "necessary but not sufficient conditions of various practices" (Doty, 1992: 303). Moreover, by comparing different discourses, it is possible to gain insight into how discourses differ in their constitution of reality. Also, by such examinations it is possible to question and denaturalize dominant forms of knowledge (Milliken, 1999: 237). Similarly, a main concern of discourse analysis is to "deconstruct the center itself, to expose its arbitrariness and contingency and thereby call attention to the play of powers in constructing all centers" (Howarth, 2000: 12).

One of the major intentions of this project, then, is to look at the Greek and British press discourses and to find out what the representations were in the proposed period of study, to examine what type of subjects were produced and reproduced by the discourses, to determine whether there were prevailing hegemonic articulations before September 11, and to investigate the extent to which the September 11 events affected the Greek and British press discourses. This comparison of different time periods is essential because it allows for an examination of the possibility of change and the formation or subversion of potentially dominant discourses. Similarly, a comparison of the press discourses of two culturally distinct members of the E.U. allows for an examination of the cultural specificity of discourses with the "same" event potentially being represented in quite different ways and enables a deconstruction and denaturalization of the myth of an uncontested meaning. Finally, drawing from the belief that discursive practices are political practices, I am interested in the ways in which these discourses may have enabled or disabled particular responses and courses of action and the ways in which they may have marginalized other discourses.

# **CHAPTER 3: THE PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 DISCOURSES IN THE BRITISH AND GREEK PRESS**

The U.S. refusal to ratify the Kyoto protocol, the G-8 summit in Genoa, the anti-globalization marches and the spy plane incident between China and the U.S. were some of the incidents that received extensive coverage in the British and Greek press in the six-month period prior to the September 11 attacks and generated discourses on the role of the U.S. and the E.U. in the international system, the role and alliances of the U.K. and Greece respectively, as well as the meaning of globalization and its perceived benefits or ills.

Even though this thesis concentrates on the period after September 11, in particular after the attacks in New York and Washington and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential to explore the dominant discourses prior to the events. By looking at the representations of the U.S., the E.U. and the perceived international threats/challenges in the period before September 11 it is possible to determine whether these representations and any existing hegemonic articulations remained the same or changed after the events, as well as the ways in which any changes may have occurred. Since this thesis aims at looking at the ways in which discourses are formed and change over time, it is important to study the discourses and the formations of identity prior to the September 11 events, which will also enable me to evaluate the ways and the extent to which the September 11 attacks had an impact on existing discourses.

For this reason, the chapter focuses on the discursive articulations in the British and Greek press from March to September 10<sup>th</sup> 2001. There clearly was diversity in the British press representations during this period, with *The Times* newspaper adopting a

pro-globalization, pro-Bush, and anti-E.U. stance, while *The Independent* and *The Mirror* on the whole adopted a more critical, though still mostly positive, globalization stance, as well as a generally anti-U.S. and pro-E.U. stance. The Greek press representations were less diverse with the bulk of articles focusing on globalization as a world ill, the anti-globalization movements, and the G8 summit in Genoa. At the same time there was less focus on the U.S. itself or the Kyoto protocol. Not only was there less diversity in the Greek than in the British press, but there was also only one overarching discourse in all three Greek newspapers, which consisted of prevailing anti-globalization, anti-capitalist, anti-G8 as well as anti- E.U. representations. The chapter is divided in three sections. The first concentrates on the British press discourses, while the second section examines the Greek press representations in those six months. Finally, the third section delineates points of convergence and divergence within each country and between the two countries.



## **The British press representations: April to September 2001**

This section comprises of three parts: In the first part I analyze the *Times* representations of the Kyoto protocol as a “dead letter” and as “anti-American”. I also elaborate on the construction of the U.S. government’s handling of the plane incident with China<sup>14</sup> as a manifestation of ‘Chinese totalitarianism’ versus ‘U.S. wisdom and true, conservative leadership’ and on the construction of the E.U. as an “imperialist venture” and the U.K. involvement in the E.U. as “enslaving”. These distinct representations are joined together to fix meaning around nodal points resulting in the ‘U.S. rightfulness versus the EU wrongness’ discourse. The second part of this first section focuses on the *Independent* and *Mirror* representations of the Kyoto protocol as “a matter of life and death” and of the U.S. as “toxic”, as well as the representations of the British relationship to the U.S. as “subservient” and its relationship to the EU as “empowering”. The third part of the first section analyzes and compares the constructions of globalization, which is described as either “liberating” or “exploitative”.

### **Discourse One: U.S. rightfulness versus E.U. wrongness**

The main discourse in *The Times*, which was only marginal in the *Independent* and *Mirror*, represented the U.S. as a superior, positive force. The U.S. government and president Bush were constructed as mature subjects, whose realistic and down to earth approach on issues as diverse as the Kyoto protocol, missile defence and China was refreshing. At the same time, the U.S. was positioned in opposition to the E.U., whose attributes of oppression, immaturity, hypocrisy and ignorance rendered it an inferior subject to the U.S. This naturalization of the E.U. as enslaving and regressive enabled and facilitated the constitution of the U.K. as a power whose participation in the E.U. would result in its loss of freedom and stature.

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<sup>14</sup> On April 1, 2001, a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter while gathering intelligence off the Chinese mainland. The U.S. plane landed on a Chinese island, where the US crew was detained for eleven days.

## *The Kyoto disaster and European anti-Americanism*

In 2001, George Bush pulled the U.S. out of the Kyoto accords as one of the first acts of his presidency, a move heavily criticized by many European leaders. This incident received extensive coverage in the British press. Specifically, *The Times* discourse construed the Kyoto protocol as “a dead letter”(Sullivan, 2001a), “a self-indulgent, dangerously expensive exercise that will do nothing to help the poor or to control climate, a force over which we have no more control than did King Canute over the waves and the tides” (Stott, 2001). Not only was it stressed that “the prospective gains [of the Kyoto protocol were] unreliable”, but it was also pointed out that “the environmental science on which it was built is unproven” (McElvoy, 2001a). Specifically, global warming was constructed as a minor problem only, since “there is no conclusive evidence to support the global warming theory ... many of the claims are false”, and “our current rate of warming is no big deal and is part of the natural cyclical pattern in which the Earth has periodically warmed and cooled” (Phillips, 2001a). “Even the gloomiest of environmentalists concede it [global warming] wouldn’t shift temperatures by much more than a trifle” (Sullivan, 2001a). It was thus questioned whether global warming posed a problem, but “Even if there is a problem, Kyoto cannot be the answer” (Anderson, 2001a: 3). Besides, “Asking a leading country to forgo up to 2% of economic growth every year for a decade in pursuit of a theory that has as many holes as the ozone layer is at best a gesture in grandstanding. At worst, it’s pure cant” (Sullivan, 2001a).

As is evident in the above extracts, *The Times* constructed the climate as a physical force which could not in any way be affected or controlled by human activity, since it was governed by its own rules. Therefore, human activity would neither result in global warming nor be able to stop it. Human agency was thus discursively erased with regard to global warming, and responsibility for the emergence of the problem, as well as its solution, was relocated from specific agents to the climate itself (Carvalho, 2005: 6). Moreover, such a discursive construction was triggered by and made possible what Dryzek (1997) calls Promethean perspectives, whereby human beings have an infinite capacity to intervene and exploit nature, since either nature itself has an infinite capacity

to endure this exploitation, or it is governed by its own laws which are not affected by human activities anyway. Naturalizing the climate as an independent, unaffected force rendered the Kyoto protocol irrelevant.

The condemnation of the protocol in *The Times* discourse was facilitated by the construction of global warming as a purely technical issue, “which demanded technical solutions rather than moral reflection and discussion. Environmental issues could best be resolved by recourse to straightforward, auditable questions of ‘costs’ or ‘rational science’” (Crane, 2000: 4). The global warming problem was thus discussed in terms of ‘rationality’, costs and benefits, and economic growth and scientific certainties, which were seen as the only valid basis for policies. In addition, these representations were privileged over those representations which called for different, non-technical solutions and which were constructed in this discourse as either “false” or “pure cant”. Therefore, global warming issues were understood and explained in economic or technical terms and economy was constructed as of a higher order than other social, political, cultural or moral dimensions of the issue (see Doty, 1996). Business concerns were positioned over different types of concerns; growth and economic prosperity was classified as the top priority.

As a result of the above representations the U.S. refusal to sign the Kyoto protocol was overwhelmingly represented in *The Times* as “sensible” (Stelzer, 2001a). With global warming having been constructed as either an uncertainty or non-existent, and with the economy having been prioritized over a very uncertain environmental concern, Bush’s position was described as “not the result of some crazed Texas oilman wanting to foul up the planet, but the simple recognition of reality. It won’t happen. It can’t happen. Nor should it” (Sullivan, 2001a). In fact, Bush was compared positively to other leaders, emerging as “one of the few politicians who is not a hypocrite on global warming” (Henderson, 2001), and “one of the most innovatively green presidents in recent years” (Sullivan, 2001a), since he “plans to put forward alternative proposals for meeting any threat that may exist from the burning of fossil fuels” (Stelzer, 2001a). In other words, “Bush has done the world a favour” (Henderson, 2001). Not only was it presupposed that



the president would propose different solutions to the problem, when in fact the Bush government had not at that stage made such promises, but the President was idealized as environmentally conscious, even though he had clearly pointed out that he would not ratify the protocol, since “it would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy” (Bush, 2001) and had shown no signs of placing environmental issues high on his agenda.

While the U.S. government was commended for its refusal to ratify the protocol, the E.U. was described as “speaking nonsense” (Stelzer, 2001a) and as absurd. “In Europe the voice of the cuckoo is heard in the land” (Stelzer, 2001a). The Union and European leaders as well as the Kyoto protocol itself were described as anti-American, as the E.U. means to diminish the U.S., rather than as a treaty aiming at protecting the environment. “Europe ... inclines towards a sort of ill-defined, uncomfortable, it'll -all-end-in-tears anti-Americanism” (McElvoy 2001a) and is overcome by “envy” and “resentment” (Sullivan, 2001a). This envy, it was maintained, resulted in unjustified accusations against the U.S. and the distortion of reality as far as global warming was concerned. “The science of global warming ... was hijacked by those who wanted a new stick with which to beat western capitalism, America and globalisation. It is the green version of the big lie” (Phillips, 2001a). Therefore, “Something less overtly anti-American than the Kyoto protocol will have to be fashioned” (Stelzer, 2001a). Finally, the Kyoto protocol was seen as an immoral enterprise, aimed at blaming the U.S. and avoiding responsibility for shared responsibility in world problems. “And how moral is this strident European position” (Stott, 2001)? “It is much easier to criticise the ‘Toxic Texan’ than to leave your car at home ... Bush is a scapegoat for political cowardice everywhere and the oil companies are laughing all the way to the bank” (Henderson, 2001). European governments were thus described as hypocritical and dishonest for accusing the U.S. of being anti-environmental, when they had not made any effort themselves. “Not a single leading country has even come close to ratifying a treaty the Europeans currently describe as the only thing that stands between us and climatic Armageddon” (Sullivan, 2001a) and “the European nations who are so unhappy with Mr. Bush have chosen a curious way of showing their commitment to Kyoto. None has yet ratified it” (Anderson, 2001a: 3).

In the above representations the E.U. was positioned in an oppositional relationship to the U.S., with the U.S. acquiring all the positive attributes and the E.U. being constructed as an inferior subject. Predicates constituted European leaders as envious, resentful, crazy and hypocritical, in contrast to President Bush, who was described as sensible, honest and sane. Such representations were rendered possible through the construction of the Kyoto protocol as inappropriate, but also reaffirmed the 'uselessness' of the protocol. Moreover, the naturalization of the 'reality' of the unsuitability of the protocol, the construction of the U.S. as right and of the E.U. as wrong, all added up to the construction of the protocol as 'Anti-American', as a means to attack the West, capitalism and the U.S. Thus, the protocol was further delegitimized by constituting global warming as a tool to attack society, rather than, for example, an existing problem that needed to be dealt with.

#### *The spy plane incident and true conservative U.S. leadership*

The representation of the U.S. in positive terms was reinforced by its juxtaposition with China after the spy plane incident, whereby a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter while gathering intelligence off the Chinese mainland. In particular, China was described as a "totalitarian state that routinely tramples on human rights and bullies its neighbours, a land riddled with corruption" ('This row over a spy plane', 2001: 3) and which "like all communist dictatorships has no respect for truth" (Sullivan, 2001b). It was also seen to be characterized by "hegemonic ambitions" and a "desire to place itself above the normal rules by which democracies play ... Beijing is determined to crush democratic forces within its own country and to bring all Asia under its dragon's wing" (Gove, 2001a). "There is no prouder, nor more racist nation on earth" (Anderson, 2001a: 3). While the Chinese government and China in general were heavily criticized, the Bush government was highly praised for its handling of the plane incident. "The spy-plane stand-off showed a new administration adept at crisis management, firm in refusing to apologise for something that merited no apology" (Sullivan, 2001b). Elsewhere, it was pointed out that "the open minded are likely to be impressed by the President's quiet

authority and willingness to accommodate the views of others - without abandoning his bedrock principle that he must act in the best interests of America”(Stelzer, 2001c). It was also stressed that a different approach towards the incident would have been a huge mistake. “Had Bush appeased, and apologised over the spy plane, he would not have been contributing to a more peaceful world. He would have been paying danegeld to the most reactionary and anti-democratic forces in Beijing ... Bush's refusal to appease Beijing shows he's smart enough to learn the lessons of history” (Gove, 2001a).

The meaning of this representation is fixed around the nodal point of democracy, which serves the function of positioning China as a very dangerous actor, while at the same time positioning the U.S. in a defensive stance against aggressive Chinese expansionism. As a nodal point, democracy is an empty term which only gets filled with meaning through its juxtaposition to the non-democratic other. Democracy as a nodal point classifies states into presupposed categories, the democratic and the non-democratic, thus enabling the logic of equivalence to operate. It is clear from the above representational practices that China was described as an undemocratic communist state, a term which has negative connotations in western liberal democracies. In her deconstruction of democratic peace theory, Grayson explained that in DPT “liberal democracies are naturalized so that they can be objectively differentiated from non-liberal/democracies”. Moreover, “the framework of this relationship shapes our thinking to naturally view liberal democracies as predisposed towards peaceful interactions with each other” and therefore only likely to employ non-peaceful methods towards those states which are ‘objectively’ non-democratic. Force against those states is justified because they are necessarily aggressive and are therefore not legitimate global actors (Grayson, 2003: 5). By being branded as undemocratic, China was automatically seen to be characterized by totalitarianism and hegemonic ambitions. It was therefore constructed as an unwanted, aggressive and dangerous ‘other’. This othering of China as undemocratic and authoritarian at the same time affirmed the self as democratic and liberal.

Therefore, the U.S. government was cleared of any possible responsibilities with regards to the spy plane incident since it was dealing with an undemocratic actor. Moreover,



non-conciliatory action on the part of the U.S. was justified since it was positioned as a liberal democracy with the right to defend its democratic values against aggressive totalitarianism. Such a representation of the China/U.S. spy plane incident called for policies of provocation rather than appeasement. As Hall points out, “all these inscriptions have effects which are real. They make a material difference, since how we act in certain situations depends on what our definitions of the situations are” (Hall, 1986: 39).

Interestingly, this discourse was mainly, yet not exclusively, a *Times* discourse. Both *The Mirror* and *The Independent* also represented China as an undemocratic, authoritarian actor, but without incorporating positive U.S. representations within discourses.

### *The European path and U.K. enslavement*

In this primarily *Times* discourse, the E.U. was constructed as an imperialist, malfunctioning bureaucracy which was intent on destroying the states' sovereignty. In particular, the E.U. was seen as “too ambitious, too intent on empire-building and too eager to take control over more and more areas of national policy” (Quinn, 2001a). Elsewhere it was pointed out that “they [the Europeans] are illiberal and authoritarian, and intend to impose their particular world view on everyone else” (Phillips, 2001b). The E.U. principles of “convergence”, “common standards” and “consistency” were compared to the “dogmas of the medieval church”, and the E.U. as the “new Holy Roman and Napoleonic Empire” (Selbourne, 2001). In short, the E.U. project was seen as being “all about political unification and the destruction of member states' ability to govern themselves” (Rees-Mogg, 2001a).

Following the representation of the E.U. as an oppressive, hegemonic regime, the British system and its values were compared to those of the E.U., with the British system emerging as far superior. “In the real Europe, as I know, the British are most admired for the very institutions and traditions that are being transformed in order to meet the demands of bureaucratic ‘Europe’ - the rule of common law, parliamentary sovereignty,

local autonomy and accountability” (Selbourne, 2001) and “big bureaucracy, corruption and bungling cannot do what legislative autonomy, democratic dissent, national cultural independence and un-interfered-with local administrative choices can achieve” (Selbourne, 2001).

For this reason, British participation in the E.U. was seen as enslaving and damaging. “The United Kingdom is being destroyed by ... a relentless process of obedience to the will of unelected forces in Europe” (Howard, 2001). Similarly, under the E.U. “the concept of Britain as a self-governing nation is under wholesale assault” (Phillips, 2001b). It was also pointed out that adherence to the E.U. principles would mean a denial of Britain’s glorious past. “British history, culture and language point them politically in the opposite direction. To go deeper into the history of the ‘European idea’ brings us to a landscape where Britain belongs even less” (Selbourne, 2001). Nevertheless, “our governing class is intent on destroying the idea of an indigenous culture with its own history and traditions” (Phillips, 2001b) and to “surrender almost anything just for a European motorcade” (Lamont, 2001). The E.U. was thus seen as “the real extremism, against which liberal values, freedom and democracy must be defended” (Phillips, 2001b).

In this discourse the notions of ‘Europe’ and ‘nation’ were constructed in antithetical terms, even though in essence the two notions were closely interlinked, since the definition of Europe as ‘other’ was at the same time closely tied to the definition of the self. The constitution of the E.U. as the opposite of the U.K. was fashioned in a similar way to the oppositional subject positioning of communist China and the liberal democracies. However, in this discourse the contrast was represented as even more striking, and the E.U. was construed as a very dangerous and threatening other, intent on destroying the nation, by depriving it of its independence and sovereignty. This ‘other’ was constructed as much more menacing, since it attacked the core values of the nation, meaning that it attacked ‘the self’. ‘The self’ was therefore constructed as under attack by the E.U., while ‘the other’ was constructed in direct, threatening opposition to the nation and its identity. State sovereignty and E.U. membership was thus impossible, and

the only way that the U.K. could be a member of the E.U. was as a slave. As Painter stresses, “the growth of European identity is normally presented as a mutually exclusive alternative to national identity, as if to be European is not to be British” (Painter, 2000: 235). Thus, Britishness and Europeanness were mutually incompatible.

In fact, the metaphor of occupation, which as seen above was emphasized through the overwording (see Fairclough 1992: 193) of phrases such as “sovereignty”, “authoritarian”, “autonomy”, “obedience”, “assault”, “surrender” reinforced the need to break free from such an oppressive regime. At the same time that the E.U. was constituted as an ominous occupier, the U.K. was represented as the paradigm of democracy, values, efficiency and accountability in a discourse of British exceptionalism, in which the U.K. was idealized as the model nation-state towards which all other states aspire or should aspire. Such representations of the U.K. and the E.U. created a sharp pro U.K.- anti E.U. dichotomy, thus precluding the possibility of cooperation between the two actors, not only because the U.K. was superior, but also because the E.U. desired crushing this superiority and destroying U.K sovereignty. However, as will be seen in the following section, other possibilities do exist and different representations can construct different possibilities, whereby for example a close U.K. relationship with the E.U. is not only desirable, but even imperative.

### **Discourse Two: The U.S. threat versus E.U. partnership**

The main discourse in *The Mirror* and *The Independent* represented the U.S. as “a rogue state” (Boggn, 2001: 4), “a military, economic and cultural imperialist superpower” (Routledge, 2001: 6). Bush was described as planning “to slash taxes for the rich, wreck the environment and threaten world peace” (‘Bush-beater’, 2001: 6). The main issues that received extensive coverage in both these newspapers were the Kyoto Protocol and the U.S. missile treaty agreement. In fact, both these topics were very frequently covered in the newspapers’ leading articles, which constructed the Bush government and the U.S. in general as a unilateral, peace threatening actor. While the U.S. was positioned as a ‘dangerous other’, the E.U. was constituted as an indispensable ally, ‘an essential other’,



which would strengthen the U.K. role in the world. As in the previous *Times* discourse, the U.S. and the E.U. were construed as opposites. Nevertheless, in this case the E.U. was endowed with positive qualities, which in turn naturalized the inevitability of stronger U.K. links with the E.U.

### *The Kyoto Protocol – Our only hope for the future*

This second representation of the Kyoto Protocol was the hegemonic representation in both *The Mirror* and *The Independent*. To begin with, global warming was represented as a very serious problem which would definitely have to be dealt with promptly. Thus, “the weight of scientific evidence suggests that the earth is warming even more quickly than only recently forecast” (‘Europe must persuade’, 2001: 3) and “the world is heating up twice as fast as has previously been thought” (‘This is no time for Mr. Blair’, 2001: 24). The threat was constructed as an imminent inevitability, and failure to act quickly would be disastrous. “That is the only hope. There is no alternative to the Kyoto Protocol that could be brought into effect in time to stop global warming running out of control” (‘This is no time for Mr. Blair’, 2001: 24). Moreover, “we are running out of time” (Lean, 2001: 14) and we therefore “have to make a start or the future of the planet will be bleak”, (‘Vital fight for future’, 2001: 6).

While the importance of swift action was constantly pointed out, Bush was heavily criticized for his decision to withdraw from the protocol. “George W. Bush ... is extending his toxic touch to the rest of the world” (‘Our future threatened’, 2001: 23) and “the negotiations have been thrown into chaos by George W. Bush's unilateral decision last March to reject, and to try to kill, the Kyoto Protocol” (‘This is no time for Mr. Blair’, 2001: 24). Not only was Bush condemned for his rejection of the protocol, but this rejection was directly linked to his economic aspirations, which would be impeded were he to abide by the protocol’s regulations. “The US's most polluted state allows big businesses with deep pockets to disregard environmental concerns” (Buncombe, 2001: 9) and “The President ... is telling the rest of us that he's prepared to destroy our planet if it

helps the billionaires who elected him to make another buck ... there is something far more precious than money, called the future of the human race” (Reade, 2001a: 11).

Moreover, such a prioritization of business over the environment would endanger humanity in its entirety. “This is short sighted and dangerous. We are all on this earth together. No nation, however powerful, should avoid its responsibility to the future” (‘Dirty Dubya’, 2001: 6). Finally, even though the U.S. was seen as an immoral, profit oriented actor, cooperation was still perceived as imperative, since only collective action would prove effective. “The Americans cannot simply be ignored. Coaxing them into doing the decent thing sometimes seems doomed to failure. But simply turning away from America would be just as unproductive” (‘Fudge is now the only way’, 2001: 3). Similarly, “it will be hard to change President Bush's mind. But the EU countries are right to try. The consequences are far too great to let him get away with what he is doing” (‘Vital Fight for’, 2001: 6).

The above representation was substantially different from *The Times* discourse since it constructed global warming as an undeniable reality, an existing problem which would inevitably destroy Earth unless it was tackled immediately. Phrases such as “we are running out of time” or “out of control”, constructed global warming as spreading fast and needing to be stopped. Such a representation of global warming as an imminent global threat rendered cooperation for the solution of the problem imperative and any refusal to deal with the issue was therefore condemned and heavily criticized, hence the construction of the U.S. as an inconsiderate actor, interested in protecting its financial interests at the expense of the human race. Even though this appears to be the exact opposite of *The Times* discourse, there are some common presuppositions underpinning both, namely the technical framing of global warming, which was only seen in physical terms.

More specifically, global warming was constituted as a globalized, generalized, physical problem (see Carvalho, 2005: 6), which existed ‘out there’ and needed to be stopped, since it would eventually be destructive towards humanity. Global warming was seen as

a problem that emerged out of the blue. Its causes and effects were mainly seen in physical terms and in a very straightforward and technocratic manner. There was, in sum, a clear “denial of an explicit political understanding of environmental issues in preference for a technical understanding” (Dalby, 1996: 602). Agency was deleted from the global warming problem, since it was represented as a negative force which was self-constructed. Even though the U.S. and big businesses were heavily criticized, this critique was confined to the reaction to the problem rather than its construction. Therefore, the criticism of the U.S. and the economic conglomerates had to do with their refusal to deal with global warming, rather than their possible contribution to its emergence and escalation.

What is also interesting is the construction of the Kyoto protocol as the only solution to global warming. Phrases such as “only hope” and “no other alternative” naturalized Kyoto as the only viable measure. However, this was merely a presupposition and not an undeniable ‘reality’ that could not be contested. It could and has actually been claimed, for example, that the Kyoto protocol is an insufficient measure which perpetuates rather than seriously deals with global warming. For example, Lohmann points out, that “the Protocol opens up new ways of subsidizing global warming”, its “trading schemes worsen inequalities”, it uses “technical fixes to remedy political problems”, and thus “piles inequality on inequality”. Moreover, “the current negotiations distract from or even threaten many existing climate-friendly practices and initiatives” (Lohmann, 2001: 2-16). If one accepts such a representation of the Kyoto Protocol, the *Independent’s* and the *Mirror’s* discourse on the Kyoto protocol as the only solution to global warming doesn’t make a lot of sense.

The third and final point about this representation is the positioning of the U.S. in opposition to the E.U. as the only actor impeding solutions to the problem. Following from the representation of the Kyoto Protocol as the only solution to global warming, the U.S. was represented as ‘the rogue actor’ who had refused to ratify the protocol. The use of the shifters (see Weldes, 1999: 106) “we”, “us”, or “rest of us” versus “him” or “them” othered the U.S. as the only one responsible for ‘the future of the human race’. Signing



the Kyoto was thus seen as the ultimate commitment to the protection of the environment, while refusal to ratify it was seen as the ultimate negligence and irresponsibility. Therefore, such representations not only demonized the U.S., but also shifted all the responsibility for global warming to one particular actor, while absolving the rest from accountability.

### *Our future lies in Europe*

One hegemonic discourse in *The Independent* and in *The Mirror* represented the U.K. need to disassociate itself from the U.S. and embrace the E.U. The U.S. – U.K. ‘special relationship’ was undermined and the U.K. was represented as a slavish follower of the U.S. “Special relationship? What special relationship? Like a teenager who doesn't realise their true love is a faithless slut, Britain doesn't understand that America has a special relationship with lots of countries ... We probably sneak into the top 10 of special relationships. But then so does Vietnam” (Parsons, 2001b: 8). Similarly, “the US itself cares less about Europe and Britain ... It is time to bury that hackneyed, and misleading, phrase, the special relationship” (Riddell, 2001a).

Not only was the special relationship a myth, but the U.K. by constantly obeying U.S. orders, showed it had no will of its own. It was described as “slavish” and “incapable of independent thought, let alone action, in foreign affairs” (Jenkins, 2001a). Likewise, “for the past 60 years Britain has done nothing but suck up to their [U.S.] every whim. Forget the way we slavishly offer ourselves as a launch pad when they want to ‘take out a nutty A-rab’. Forget the way we beg them to tell us we still have a special relationship” (Reade, 2001a: 11). This ‘slavish’ behaviour was condemned, since it weakened the U.K. and drew it apart from the E.U. “We don't always have to follow meekly behind America” (‘Listen to us’, 2001: 6). “A subservient Blair government ... Do we really have to do EVERYTHING the Yanks tell us? I damn well hope not” (Routledge, 2001: 6). Finally, “it concerns me that we British still trot along at Uncle Sam's heels, while remaining suspicious of our fellow Europeans” (Lewis-Smith, 2001b: 6). For this reason, “there needs to be the very maximum of pressure exerted on the Prime Minister to

encourage him to line up with the rest of Europe, and not with the United States” (Seddon, 2001b: 4).

The slavery metaphor and the representation of the U.K. as subservient and submissive resulted in the positioning of the U.K. as a dependent subject who would remain a follower rather than a leader unless it disassociated itself from the U.S. This discourse held that the U.K. should stand on its own feet rather than be dependent on the U.S. An association with the U.S. equaled the loss of sovereignty and the continuing of a submissive policy to the will and dictates of another state, the U.S. Considering the construction of the U.K.’s role in world politics as a leader and not a follower, as will be seen in the following paragraphs, an engagement with the U.S. was harmful.

While a close relationship with the U.S. was discouraged, the discourse in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* pointed towards close U.K.-E.U. cooperation. The E.U. was praised as a normative organization, capable of and intent on building peace between and amongst countries. “The thinking within the EU is to unite the countries in Europe in peace and prosperity after hundreds of years of conflict and inequality (O’Rourke, 2001: 6)” and “for nearly 50 years now the countries of Europe have put war, conflict and poverty behind them and worked together in the European Union. We have helped one another and grown prosperous together. That’s what the European Union is all about (Ahern, 2001: 6). The E.U. was thus envisioned as the means for the U.K. to achieve both safety and affluence. “For long-term prosperity and security, there must be long-term vision. That means ... strengthening our links with Europe” (‘Europe is strongest link’, 2001). As a consequence, “the Independent’s vision is of Britain as a modern European country” (‘Let us hope’, 2001: 3). Not only was the E.U. seen as a means to prosperity but it was also envisaged as a means of continued existence in a globalized world. “We want a stronger EU to have better tools to survive in the globalised world” (Soltyk, 2001: 4).

For all these reasons, it was generally agreed that “Europe is Britain’s future. A move away from Europe would be catastrophic for all” (‘Let us hope’, 2001: 3). It was

constantly pointed out that Britain's national interest could only be defended through the E.U., which was the only way for the U.K. to maintain and even enhance its international leadership role. "The real choice is between those who would fight to advance Britain's national interests through meaningful engagement in Europe, and those who would weaken our global standing and undermine our economic performance by turning our backs on the EU ... Let us be clear: saying "No" to the euro would undoubtedly relegate Britain to an outer tier of the EU, damaging our influence and our prosperity" (Buckby, 2001: 4). The choice was easy according to this discourse because an involvement with the E.U. would definitely be beneficial for the U.K. both domestically and internationally, while a withdrawal "would leave Britain weakened ... The era of imperial power is over ... But we can still be a world leader, particularly in alliance with our partners in Europe. The EU gives us a chance to assert a decisive influence in world affairs, arguing for free trade and fair conditions. An isolated Britain would be a small voice, trading on past glories. It would only be a matter of time before a Britain out of the EU would be stripped of its international influence ... we would just be another medium-sized country on the fringes" (Cook, 2001: 6). It was also stressed that the E.U. would not impede or destroy state sovereignty. "Europe, as it is likely to develop over the next decade, will not threaten the survival of Britain as a nation-state" (Garton -Ash, 2001a: 4).

In this representation, the E.U. was positioned as an actor who would enhance Britain's role in the world. There is a clear divergence between *The Times* representations of the E.U. and the U.S. and the representations in *The Independent* and *The Mirror*. Thus, the metaphor of slavery was used in both cases but for different actors. The U.S. was emancipating and the E.U. was enslaving in *The Times* discourse, whereas the opposite was the case in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse. However, a question that is worth asking is what sort of Europe was constructed in this discourse. In other words, how was an ideal E.U. envisaged and what was permissible?

The E.U. in the discourse of *The Independent* and *The Mirror* was articulated as an 'other'. Nevertheless, this other was not threatening, but welcoming and useful.



Therefore, the U.K and the E.U. were positioned in complementary subject positions. However, the role of the E.U. was represented as confined to that of a facilitator enhancing the centrality of the U.K. in the world. In the above discourse, then, the nation-state and sovereignty are prioritized over a European collectivity. The importance of being an E.U. member and E.U. necessity was thus linked to national interest and the maintenance of the state's power.

Articulations of Britain's 'glorious past' and its role as a 'leader' formed the discourse of exceptionality, which clearly demonstrated the primacy of the nation state. Thus, cooperation was essential and the antithesis between 'leading' and 'diminished' country, 'international influence' and 'medium-sized country on the fringes' constructed the E.U. as an absolute necessity; nevertheless, the relationship constructed was economic, rather than cultural, social and ideological. Predicates such as 'prosperous' and 'economic performance' highlighted this primarily economic relationship, while at the same time predicates such as 'partners' or 'partnership' constituted the E.U. as a union of self-interested nation states. As Buonfino also points out in her study of New Labour's discourse on Europe and immigration, "discourse on Europe is constructed around the notion of cooperation for national interest and for the maintenance of sovereignty" (Buonfino, 2005: 8-9), and "the E.U. is cautiously portrayed as a grey, functional 'box', as a background for cooperation of self-interested nation-states ... a functional framework for survival".

### **Globalization: A blessing or an ill?**

The press discourses on the the U.S. and the E.U. were very similar in *The Mirror* and *The Independent* and substantially differed from *The Times*. Moreover, on the issues discussed here there was homogeneity within each newspaper and the representations were dominant. However, globalization was a slightly more contested issue. Even though the hegemonic representation in *The Times* was of globalization as the means to achieve global prosperity, the discourses within the other two newspapers were more varied. There was a mixture of representations, ranging from globalization as a positive

force to discourses of globalization as an exploitative force. On the whole, however, globalization was more likely to be represented in (mainly cautiously) positive than a negative light.

### *The Need for globalization*

Globalization was constituted as the only way to defeat poverty and guarantee global prosperity. “Free trade ... offers ways out of poverty” (‘World leaders must’, 2001: 3). “We cannot hope to defeat poverty without embracing globalization” (Brown, 2001). Similarly, “globalisation is not a force for ill” (Wheatcroft, 2001), and “a global economy has huge potential to liberate” (‘Global good’, 2001). While globalization was praised for its liberating potential, any alternative to globalization was heavily criticized as protectionism and as enhancing poverty. “If you want to help the poor, protectionism, regulation and higher taxes won't do it” (Sullivan, 2001c). By the same token it was accepted that “the challenge is to spread the benefits of globalisation more widely, not to halt it by buckling to demands for ‘fair’ wages and labour standards which are protectionism in humanitarian disguise”, since “the poorest are not victims of predatory capital but of the lack of access to it ... the protectionist retreat of the Great Depression years, which put the barriers back up, was an unmitigated disaster, above all for the poorest” (‘Global good’, 2001). It was therefore imperative that globalization was allowed to spread its benefits unhindered, since it was a guarantee of prosperity. “The world of open, not sheltered, economies; of international, not national, capital markets; of global, not local, competition ... the way to attack poverty is not to walk away from global co-operation but to enhance it” (Brown, 2001a).

Capitalism, in turn, was compared to all other systems and emerged as superior. “No rival system has emerged with such an extraordinary capacity to generate wealth. This may produce inequalities, but that is an argument for modifying rather than destroying capitalism” (Appleyard, 2001b). Even though it was at points recognized that globalization/capitalism was not flawless, it was nonetheless seen as the only possibility. “Global capitalism is not perfect but, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, the alternatives

would be much worse” (‘Save our summits’, 2001). Therefore, revision of the system rather than rejection were encouraged. “Even those of us who rejoice in the global triumph of the liberal market economy must seek to fix the problems it generates” (Mcrae, 2001: 5). Moreover, anti-globalization protesters were criticized as ignorant and dangerous. “If the goals of these self-proclaimed champions of “the wretched of the earth” were to be realised, they would condemn them to poverty for ever ... they have turned against the great liberalising forces that have made their own societies prosper” (‘Global good’, 2001).

In the above representation globalization was represented as an external force, something that naturally happens and has even effects on everyone in the world. As Painter (2000: 231) also points out in his study of the discursive construction in the U.K. of Britain’s relationship to European integration, globalization was represented as “a single, uncontradictory, unidirectional phenomenon exhibiting the same features and producing the same inevitable outcomes everywhere ... as if it is a self-regulating and implacable force of nature”. Globalization was constructed as a nominal condition, with no attention being paid to what may have caused it and to the actors involved. Even though its effects were explicitly stated (prosperity, liberalization), what was meant by globalization was either taken for granted or left undefined.

Such representations of globalizations have implications for the way it is perceived. By constructing it as an objective, self-created, natural phenomenon, rather than, for example, an engineered phenomenon, global change is exogenized as something to which actors merely respond. (see Rosamond, 1999: 667). In this discourse, globalization was not produced by the actions of actors (governments etc.), but merely happened to national governments. Therefore, governments were seen as external to globalization, as outsiders and agency was ascribed to globalization, which was described as a subject that did things and had the power to, in this case, “liberalize”, “generate wealth” and “defeat poverty”.



The above representation also constructed globalization as an inevitable, unstoppable and irreversible process (Rosamond, 1999: 664; Weldes, 2001), since “the alternatives would be much worse”. Thus, according to this discourse, the most that could be done was to attempt “to fix the problems it generates”, rather than, for example, completely to alter its course. As a result, politics was reduced to “nothing more than a clean-up process to smoothe over some negative externalities of globalization” (Risse, 2004: 15). Not only was globalization constituted as inevitable and as the only option, but it was also seen as the wisest option, since it would result in global prosperity and liberalization.

In this liberal globalization discourse (see Weldes, 2001), it was, thus, presupposed that globalization would inevitably lead to progress which would be beneficial for everyone. Such a presupposition naturalized a progressive evolution where “everybody is affected, no matter where you reside on the globe” (Risse, 2004: 14), and did not acknowledge that globalization could have both winners and losers, that it is not necessarily beneficial for all at all times. Moreover, such a presupposition meant that any state intervention to the workings of the market would be harmful and should therefore be prevented.

Not only was the state constructed as an ‘other’ to globalization, but it was also constituted as a ‘threatening other’, an enemy. This was achieved through the binary positioning of the state and globalization, with globalization described in positive terms and the state perceived as “protectionism in humanitarian disguise” and as “disastrous”. While globalization eliminated poverty, state intervention increased it. It was therefore state intervention that had inhibited and was inhibiting progress and liberalization. The impression was created that the reason globalization had not yet benefited everyone was this state intervention and that if the market was allowed to act unfettered it would resolve poverty and other world problems.

### *Globalized exploitation*

Globalization was not only represented in positive terms, although representations of globalization as exploitative and harmful were less common in the British press. This

British press discourse described a gloomy picture of the world, which was controlled by the few at the expense of the rest. “The wealthiest countries ... are dominated by the wealthiest people, a very small number of whom control a huge amount of the collective wealth” (Orr, 2001: 5) and “we have a Third World full of starving people, a developed world full of workers who have lost control of their lives and a global environment heading for disaster. And all this so the billionaire can make more billions” (Reade, 2001b: 11).

A distinction was also made between developed and developing countries and it was pointed out that developed countries prosper at the expense of developing ones. “Grotesquely unfair global distribution of wealth and the miserable conditions that the citizens of many Third World countries have to endure, just to provide rich Western nations like ours with cheap trainers and designer sweatshirts (Lewis-Smith, 2001a: 6). Swift action was therefore rendered imperative for the sake of humanity. “We need to take action against the destruction of our planet, and of human life on a massive scale, due to IMF/World Bank policies in developing countries ... We believe that the priorities of the system are wrong, that at the beginning of the 21st century, no child should starve to death, no one should be poisoned by agribusiness, or be enslaved in sweatshops by multinationals; and that it would be nice if the next generation had a planet capable of sustaining life (Taylor, 2001: 4).

Such a discourse constituted a completely different picture of the world, since globalization was not described as an external, self-functioning actor, but as a means for the powerful to exploit the rest, or as a means for the exploitation of developing countries. Thus, globalization was not disassociated from the state, but was seen as a product of states, agencies and institutions, with emphasis placed on the ‘priorities of the system’, which were ‘wrong’. Therefore, according to this discourse, globalization was constructed as exploitative, but nonetheless reversible, since it was not an external, uncontrollable force but the product of actions either of states or multinationals. Moreover, and even though globalization was represented as an ill affecting everyone, it was acknowledged that the negative effects of globalization were more devastating for

the developing countries, thus pointing to the presence of hierarchies and the existence of a global North and a global South. Constructing globalization in such a fashion meant that swift action was necessary not just for the correction of some minor externalities, but for the radical transformation of the system, which generated life-threatening problems.



## The Greek press representations: April to September 2001

Unlike the British press, the Greek press representations were strikingly similar within and across the newspapers. For this reason, the second part of this chapter analyzes the Greek press representations as one hegemonic discourse revolving around the interrelated constructions of globalization as ‘the mother of all ills’, the G8 as imperial dynasts aiming at enslaving the rest of the world, the U.S. as an arrogant, neo-imperial superpower and the E.U. as either part of this dynastic system as a powerful, corrupt actor, or as enslaved to the globalized markets, capitalism and the American superpower and in need of restructuring. Finally, the anti-globalization movement was hegemonically constructed as the people’s revolutionary movement of resistance against the globalized dynasts.

### **Globalization: The sum of all fears**

Globalization, capitalism and neo-liberalism were often used interchangeably in the Greek press discourse as authoritarian forces which have taken over the world and which are bound to create havoc. Thus, articles referred to globalization/capitalism as “a new form of totalitarianism” (Papakonstantinou, 2001b)<sup>15</sup> or as a “totalitarian ideology” (Koulourianos, 2001)<sup>16</sup> that is “notorious” since it “kills more people than all wars together” (‘What Genoa showed’, 2001).<sup>17</sup> The markets were seen to have imposed “a global dictatorship” (Sotirhos, 2001)<sup>18</sup> and capitalism was described as “unrestrained, absurd, unfair and inhuman ... the root of all evils ... absurdity of globalization” (Votsis, 2001).<sup>19</sup> Moreover, references were made to “the destructive domination of the market” (Skotioniotis, 2001)<sup>20</sup> and it was constantly pointed out, that “capitalism can only be inhumane” (Fakatselis, 2001).<sup>21</sup> It commits “crimes ... at the expense of humanity ...

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<sup>15</sup> “ένα είδος νέου ολοκληρωτισμού”

<sup>16</sup> “ολοκληρωτικές ιδεολογίες”

<sup>17</sup> “τρομερή παγκοσμιοποίηση ... Σκοτώνει περισσότερους ανθρώπους απ’οτι όλοι οι πόλεμοι μαζί”

<sup>18</sup> “παγκόσμια δικτατορία”

<sup>19</sup> “παράλογο, άδικο και απάνθρωπο ... από τον οποίον απορρέουν όλα τ’ άλλα ... παράνοια της παγκοσμιοποίησης”

<sup>20</sup> “ισοπεδωτική κυριαρχία της αγοράς”

<sup>21</sup> “το πρόσωπο του καπιταλισμού δεν μπορεί να είναι ανθρώπινο”

capitalism ... renounces all the values of civil humanism and shows its real face, with all its barbarity ... The enemy of humankind” (Bitsakis, 2001b: N06).<sup>22</sup>

The market’s logic and aims included the “maximization of profits, with a minimization of cost and with a complete disregard for its effect on human beings, their health, and their quality of life as well as the natural environment” (Votsis, 2001),<sup>23</sup> and “the creation of a unified, global unregulated market which is controlled by multinationals, where any significant control of the markets for the protection of employment and the environment will be impossible” (Fotopoulos, 2001a).<sup>24</sup> The consequences of globalization were described as economically devastating. “It is common knowledge that globalization brings about social inequalities, it makes the rich richer and the poor poorer ... Globalization is harmful for most people, a nightmare for the deprived and for the armies of unemployed” (‘Globalization of the police’, 2001)<sup>25</sup>, and “the first thing that has become globalized is poverty. The gap between the rich in a rich country and the poor in a poor country has never been larger” (Vranas, 2001b: N42).<sup>26</sup>

However, it was not only the economic sphere that was so negatively affected by globalization, since there was an “absolute reign of the logic of the market not only in the financial but also in the social and cultural sphere (Mouzelis, 2001: N14).<sup>27</sup> In fact, “nowadays, globalization and the worship of the unaccountability of the markets have reached colonial levels, both financially and culturally” (Vergopoulos, 2001)<sup>28</sup> and “the

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<sup>22</sup> “Τα εγκλήματα του νεοφιλελευθερισμού εις βάρος της ανθρωπότητας ... Ο καπιταλισμός ... απαρνείται τις όποιες αξίες του αστικού ουμανισμού και προβάλλει γυμνός, με όλη του τη βαρβαρότητα. Εχθρός του ανθρώπινου είδους.

<sup>23</sup> “μεγιστοποίηση των κερδών, με ελαχιστοποίηση του κόστους και με πλήρη αδιαφορία για τις επιπτώσεις στον άνθρωπο, την υγεία του και την ποιότητα της ζωής του και στο φυσικό περιβάλλον”.

<sup>24</sup> “Ο στόχος είναι φανερός: η δημιουργία μιας ενιαίας παγκόσμιας απορρυθμισμένης αγοράς ελεγχόμενης από τις πολυεθνικές, όπου κάθε ουσιαστικός έλεγχος των αγορών για να προστατεύεται η εργασία και το περιβάλλον θα είναι αδύνατος”.

<sup>25</sup> “Είναι γνωστό ότι η παγκοσμιοποίηση προκαλεί κοινωνικές ανισότητες, δηλαδή κάνει τους πλούσιους πλουσιότερους και τους φτωχούς φτωχότερους ... Είναι η παγκοσμιοποίηση μια πρόκληση για τους πολλούς, ένας εφιάλτης για τους εξαθλιωμένους και τις στρατιές των ανέργων”.

<sup>26</sup> “Το πρώτο πράγμα που έχει λοιπόν παγκοσμιοποιηθεί είναι η φτώχεια. Το χάσμα ανάμεσα σ’ έναν πλούσιο μιας πλούσιας χώρας και έναν φτωχό μιας φτωχής χώρας δεν ήταν ποτέ μεγαλύτερο”.

<sup>27</sup> “απόλυτη κυριαρχία της λογικής της αγοράς όχι μόνο στον οικονομικό αλλά και στον κοινωνικό και πολιτισμικό χώρο”.

<sup>28</sup> “η σημερινή παγκοσμιοποίηση και η λατρεία της ασυδοσίας των αγορών έλαβαν αποικιοκρατική μορφή, τόσο οικονομικά, όσο και πολιτιστικά”.

‘neoliberal’ foolishness arrogantly downgrades every cultural element, in the name of money and trade” (Vergopoulos, 2001).<sup>29</sup>

In addition, globalization was articulated as a relatively recent phenomenon which was increasingly undermining the state and social achievements. “The last twenty years we have been witnessing an unprecedented attack on every social achievement, on all democratic and human rights” (Kostadopoulos, 2001)<sup>30</sup> and “even though national states had achieved significant progress in democratic governance, democracy has shrunk during this last century, as the economy has expanded” (‘It is harmful for democracy’, 2001).<sup>31</sup> “What neoliberalism demands is the demolition of the ‘welfare state’ (Bitsakis, 2001b: N06).<sup>32</sup> It is “a value system which undermines human dignity, emphasizes vulgarity and transforms national governments in guardians of the economic interests” (Stavros, 2001).<sup>33</sup>

Similar to the British press discourse, globalization in the Greek press was constituted as an overpowering force that affected the entire world. Unlike in the British press, this domination of the markets was constructed in very negative terms in the Greek press. Specifically, globalization was “unregulated”, “unified” and “harmful for most people”, while its “domination” and “absolute reign” had “reached colonial levels”. Therefore, globalization was less than welcome since its effects were “devastating” and “destructive”. Even though globalization was not defined, and even though there was no conscious effort to explain its causes, its effects were very clearly represented.

In fact, globalization was anthropomorphized, since it could think, make plans, and act upon people. So, globalization was “notorious”, “absurd”, “unfair”, and “inhuman”. It also “imposes”, “it shows its real face” and was, in short, “the enemy of humankind”.

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<sup>29</sup> “Η ‘φιλελεύθερη’ αφροσύνη υποβαθμίζει αλαζονικά κάθε πολιτιστικό χαρακτηριστικό, εν ονόματι του αφηρημένου χρήματος και εμπορεύματος”.

<sup>30</sup> “Τα τελευταία είκοσι χρόνια γινόμαστε μάρτυρες μιας πρωτοφανούς επίθεσης απέναντι σε κάθε κοινωνική κατάκτηση, απέναντι σε κάθε δημοκρατικό κι ανθρώπινο δικαίωμα”.

<sup>31</sup> “Η δημοκρατία, ύστερα από σημαντική πρόοδο στα εθνικά κράτη, κατά τον τελευταίο κυρίως αιώνα, άρχισε να συρρικνώνεται, όσο διευρύνεται η οικονομία”.

<sup>32</sup> “Αίτημα του νεοφιλελευθερισμού είναι η κατεδάφιση του λεγόμενου ‘κράτους πρόνοιας’”.

<sup>33</sup> “Ένα σύστημα αξιών που υποβαθμίζει την ανθρώπινη αξιοπρέπεια, εξάρει τη χυδαιότητα και μετατρέπει τις εθνικές κυβερνήσεις σε φύλακες των οικονομικών παραγόντων”.



These anthropomorphic metaphors constituted globalization as a tangible and imminent threat, as the ultimate enemy. As Barkan points out, “the human body is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically one of the first and most basic entities the mind can grasp” (Barkan, 1975: 62). Since “it is instinctive for humans to make sense of objects in their own terms” (Luoma-aho, 2004: 123), the use of these anthropomorphic metaphors to describe globalization rendered it a very powerful actor and the negative connotations in these anthropomorphic metaphors also rendered it a very threatening actor, the ultimate Other, in direct opposition to the Self.

This threat posed by globalization was accentuated by constructions of globalization as an enemy, waging war against the state. Predicates such as “unprecedented attack” and “demolition” constituted globalization as an attacker intent on “demolishing the welfare state” and imposing its “totalitarianism” and its “global dictatorship”. The state and globalization were positioned as opposites, since the state stood for “progress”, “democratic governance”, “social achievements” and “democratic and human rights”, while globalization stood for “totalitarianism” and destruction of all those values. In addition, this relationship between globalization and the state was constituted as linear, meaning that the more globalization expanded the more the state shrank.

Such a construction of globalization as an attack on the state had implications not only for the way globalization was perceived but also for the way it should be dealt with. According to Christie, “When the physical body of the state is attacked, our very identity is assaulted. In essence an attack on the soil of a country is an attack on the people” (Christie, 2003: 7). Since globalization (which, as seen, was represented as a tangible actor) attacked the state, it followed that the attack was on the people themselves. Consequently, the only way globalization could be dealt with was with a revolutionary counterattack to defend the state’s identity and values. In other words, such a construction of globalization would not consider the possibility of alternative courses of action other than the complete eradication of globalization. Finally, such a construction of globalization was also based on a further presupposition, namely that globalization is a very recent phenomenon. However, it could and has been argued that globalization has

been going on for many centuries, and is not merely a phenomenon of “the last twenty years” or of “the last century”, as was assumed in the Greek press discourse. According to Lloyd, “unification of markets on greater scales and the widening powers of imperial states and now firms to create and manipulate markets have been features of particular historical eras in many times and places in the past ... Even in the time of Alexander the Great and his successors in the third century BC, a kind of Hellenized, quasi-globalized world existed across the vast reaches of Eurasia from the gates of Hercules to the Indus river” (Lloyd, 2000: 264). If one conceptualizes globalization in such a way, then the construction of the state as attacked by the market does not necessarily make much sense, since globalization has been part of the world system for centuries without threatening state power and state identity or reducing states to slaves of the world economy. In fact, it could be argued that “the de/territorialization of the state, in both its roles in identity formation and security, has been followed by a re/territorialization that has re/entrenched the role of the state” (Christie, 2003: 12).

### Globalized dynasts

The Genoa G8 summit of July 2001 received extensive coverage in the Greek press and the G8 leaders were represented as the actors behind globalization, maintaining and spreading globalization for their own profit in an “imperial raid to conquer humans and all the riches of the planet” (‘What Genoa showed’ 2001)<sup>34</sup> and thus revealing “its [the New Order] cynicism, its vicious soul, its raw violence” (Stamatopoulos, 2001a).<sup>35</sup> According to this representation, globalization was only beneficial for these few powerful men, who aim at profiting at the expense of the entire world. Specifically, “the financially powerful and their local representatives want to create an international community which looks like the Third World with abundance and provocative luxuries for the few, and misery and unhappiness for the rest as well as totalitarian regulations”(Tsovolas, 2001)<sup>36</sup> and “a planet which looks like a prison, a cemetery or a

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<sup>34</sup> “αυτοκρατορική τους επιδρομή στους ανθρώπους και τον πλούτο του πλανήτη”.

<sup>35</sup> “η Νέα Τάξη δείχνει πλέον τον κυνισμό της, την αδίστακτη ψυχή της, την ωμή βία της ... εξέγερσης”

<sup>36</sup> “οι οικονομικά ισχυροί και οι τοπικοί αντιπρόσωποί τους θέλουν να οδηγήσουν σε μια διεθνή κοινωνία πάνω στα πρότυπα του Τρίτου Κόσμου, με νησίδες αφθονίας και προκλητικές πολυτέλειες για τους λίγους, μέσα σε ωκεανούς δυστυχίας και μιζέριας για τους πολλούς και με ελέγχους ολοκληρωτικού χαρακτήρα”.



casino” (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001).<sup>37</sup> The G8 were therefore deemed responsible for world poverty and for accelerating rather than impeding the globalization processes through destructive policies and ideologies. “These policies and this civilization which is being implemented by the G8 transforms life into bank transactions and is responsible for the poverty and wretchedness of millions of people in the third world as well as in the heart of the capitalist countries (E.U., U.S.A.)” (Alfieri, 2001).<sup>38</sup> This destruction that they caused was massive, global and affected everyone. “The U.S. and the governments of the NATO and EU countries, along with the industrialists and the gun traders, murder and massively destroy human beings (both the citizens and the soldiers), nature and the environment” (Georgiou, 2001).<sup>39</sup>

In fact, the relationship between the ones in power and the rest of the world was constituted as one between slaves and dictators, since the G-8 were described as “globalized dynasts” (Korovesis, 2001a)<sup>40</sup> and “masters of the world” (Votsis, 2001),<sup>41</sup> who “will keep treating human rights as miserable relics of the past ... They will keep dividing people in plebeians and patricians and only accept those who are obedient. They will keep globalizing inequality, oppression and violence” (Boukalas, 2001a).<sup>42</sup> Therefore, the current system was described as undemocratic, since people were not allowed to disagree or express their views, but were treated as inferior. “In our ‘democracy’, nowadays, the citizens have the right to agree with what is being decided, but nothing more; they are ‘spectators’ and not ‘participants’” (‘Viewers rebel’, 2001).<sup>43</sup> To sum up, “the paradise of the 7 + 1, who grant wishes, smile and promise a better life, after death that is. For now, the armies of the modern slaves (who have a tv, a car, many

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<sup>37</sup> “έναν πλανήτη φυλακή, νεκροταφείο, καζίνο”.

<sup>38</sup> “η πολιτική αυτή και ο πολιτισμός που εφαρμόζεται από τους G8 μετατρέπει την ανθρώπινη ζωή σε εμπορικές πράξεις και έχει την ευθύνη για την εξαθλίωση της ζωής εκατομμυρίων συνανθρώπων μας στον τρίτο κόσμο αλλά και στην καρδιά των καπιταλιστικών χωρών (Ε.Ε., ΗΠΑ)”.

<sup>39</sup> “Οι ΗΠΑ και οι κυβερνήσεις των χωρών του NATO και της Ε.Ε, μαζί με τους βιομηχάνους και τους εμπόρους ... όπλων, δολοφονούν και καταστρέφουν μαζικά ... τους ανθρώπους (πολίτες και στρατιώτες), τη φύση και το περιβάλλον”.

<sup>40</sup> “παγκοσμιοποιημένοι δυνάστες”.

<sup>41</sup> “οι αφεντάδες του κόσμου”.

<sup>42</sup> “Θα συνεχίσουν να αντιμετωπίζουν τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα ... σαν άθλια κατάλοιπα του παρελθόντος ... Θα συνεχίσουν να μοιράζουν τους λαούς σε πληβείους και πατρίκιους και να θέτουν υπό την αιγίδα τους μόνον τους υπάκουους. Θα συνεχίσουν λοιπόν να «παγκοσμιοποιούν» την ανισότητα, την ανελευθερία, τη βία”.

<sup>43</sup> “στη δημοκρατία της εποχής μας οι πολίτες έχουν το δικαίωμα να συγκατατίθενται, αλλά τίποτε παραπάνω· είναι ‘θεατές’ και όχι ‘συμμέτοχοι’”.



credit cards and Big Brother) should keep working; everything else in moderation ... That is what the modern hegemons of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Middle Ages command” (Roubanis, 2001a).<sup>44</sup>

The first point that needs to be made about the above representation is the positioning of the G8 leaders in a relation of similarity (Doty, 1993: 306) to globalization. The characteristics attributed to the G8 and to globalization are very similar, since they are both treated as unified entities, with similar aims for and effects on humanity. Specifically, similarly to globalization, the G8 are constituted as one unit, rather than, for example, as a collection of different states whose interests may not always converge. Moreover, globalization “kills” and the G8 “murder”; globalization is “colonial” and the G8 are “imperial”; globalization “makes the rich richer and the poor poorer” and “aims at the creation of a unified, global unregulated market” while the G8 “keep globalizing inequality” and “transform life into bank transactions”. The relationship between globalization and the G8 was constructed not only as one of similarity, but also as one of complementarity, since the G8 and globalization were seen to need each other and complete one another. In particular, the relationship was articulated as one in which the G8 relentlessly promoted globalization in order to profit at the expense of everyone else, while globalization’s destructive expansion was facilitated by the “G8 dynasts”. Therefore, the G8 and globalization were constituted, both separately and as a single unit, as destroying humanity and promoting authoritarianism.

Another relationship established in this discourse was one of opposition between the G8 and everyone else. The G8 were constructed as a big, threatening ‘other’ endangering the identity and existence of the ‘self’. This was achieved by means of predicates that endowed the G8 with very negative attributes. The metaphor of enslavement to the “modern barons” highlighted this opposition between the G8 and the rest, while at the same time constructing the world as a united front against the eight hegemons and

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<sup>44</sup> “Ο Παράδεισος των 7+1. Οι οποίοι μοιράζουν ευχές, χαμόγελα και υποσχέσεις για μια καλύτερη ζωή. Μετά θάνατον. Τώρα οι στρατιές των σύγχρονων σκλάβων (με τηλεόραση, αυτοκίνητο, πολλές πολλές πιστωτικές κάρτες και Μεγάλο Αδελφό) πρέπει να δουλεύουν. Τα υπόλοιπα με μέτρο ... Είπαν οι σύγχρονοι ηγεμόνες, οι νέοι φεουδάρχες του 21ου Μεσ-αιώνα”.

suggesting a common cause against the “tyrants”. In addition, such a binary representation, whereby the G8 were the oppressors and the rest were the victims, transferred the blame for any problems onto the G8, who were seen as the only culprits, while absolving ‘the self’ of any responsibility. ‘The self’ was not part of the system as an active agent, but was merely the passive victim of globalized exploitation. As Schopfin stresses, “victimhood is a highly effective form of identity construction, in as much as it satisfies the need for a sense of moral worth and does so relatively easily” (Schopfin, 2001: 3). Therefore, constructions of the G8 as the oppressors both constructed a relative sense of ‘self’ and constituted this self as morally superior and ethically right.

### **The United States as the leading corruptor**

Even though the G8 were heavily criticized for their ‘totalitarian’ policies and their promotion of ‘globalized inequalities’, the U.S was singled out for criticism rather than merely as part of a coalition of powerful countries. For example, France or Germany were at no point individually accused of promoting globalized inequalities, but only as G8 members. In contrast, the U.S. was criticized both as an individual actor and as a G8 member. As a result, the U.S. was constructed as the most powerful, accountable and dangerous ‘other’.

In particular, references were made to “the greed of American financial interests” (‘Environmental darkness’, 2001)<sup>45</sup> and the Bush administration was constituted as exclusively driven by economic motivations and intent on resorting to any means in order to profit. “President Bush places the American financial interests, which gain by polluting the Earth, above the planet’s life, and also above human life” (‘Bush’s cruelty’, 2001),<sup>46</sup> and “Bush merely aims at serving the American financial interests and the American war industry” (‘Europe and Bush’, 2001)<sup>47</sup> since “the American government is

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<sup>45</sup> “Η απληστία των αμερικανικών οικονομικών συμφερόντων”.

<sup>46</sup> “Πάνω από τη ζωή του πλανήτη, και φυσικά πάνω από την ανθρώπινη ζωή, θέτει ο πλανητάρχης Μπους τα αμερικανικά οικονομικά συμφέροντα, που κερδίζουν ρυπαίνοντας”.

<sup>47</sup> “ ‘οράματά’ του, που μοναδικό στόχο έχουν να υπηρετήσουν τα αμερικανικά οικονομικά συμφέροντα και τις αμερικανικές πολεμικές βιομηχανίες”.

greatly vulnerable to and dependent on business interests” (Vranas, 2001: N46)<sup>48</sup> and adopts “a political stance of violently defending the American national interest with a complete disregard for the consequence” (‘Bush against all’, 2001).<sup>49</sup> Besides, “one only needs to glimpse at the list of the supporters of Bush’s pre-election campaign in order to ‘read’ the future in this country in which the governmental policies are directly and to a great extent affected by the business interests” (Elafros, 2001).<sup>50</sup>

Other than financial gain, the U.S. was constructed as interested imperial expansion, since “after the war, Washington emerged as an imperial city” (Mourtos, 2001)<sup>51</sup> “with the intention of imposing their global hegemony, shaping the world as they see fit” (Moronis, 2001b).<sup>52</sup> Even more than previous administrations, “the Bush administration aims at imposing its views all over the world, disrespecting the international system and ignoring the international rules and international justice” (Moronis, 2001b).<sup>53</sup> The U.S. was not described as an empire in the traditional sense. Instead, “the new imperial power does not conquer lands, but intervenes with bombardments and creates tension in many areas in the world, solely aiming at promoting the interests of the empire, exploiting the planet’s wealth, selling guns and controlling the ‘world order’ with the sheriff’s laws” (‘New Imperium’, 2001).<sup>54</sup>

These U.S. interventionist policies were heavily criticized in the discourse, since “American interventions with bombs and guns have opened bigger wounds, which don’t

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<sup>48</sup> “το αμερικανικό σύστημα διακυβέρνησης είναι εξαιρετικά ευάλωτο και εξαρτημένο από τα επιχειρηματικά συμφέροντα ... Με Μπους αντί για Στάλιν”.

<sup>49</sup> “μια πολιτική βιαίας προτάξεως του αμερικανικού εθνικού συμφέροντος, συνοδευομένης από πλήρη αδιαφορία περί των συνεπειών, της δυσφορίας και των αντισυσπειρώσεων που προκαλεί”.

<sup>50</sup> “αρκούσε να ρίξει κανείς μια ματιά στη λίστα ενισχυτών της προεκλογικής καμπάνιας του Μπους για να «διαβάσει» το μέλλον”.

<sup>51</sup> “Η Ουάσιγκτον, μετά τον Πόλεμο, αναδείχθηκε σε ‘αυτοκρατορική’ πόλη όπου όλες οι μορφές ισχύος ήταν και παραμένουν συγκεντρωμένες, όπως στην αρχαία Ρώμη”.

<sup>52</sup> “στην πρόθεση των ΗΠΑ να επιβάλλουν επ’ άπειρον την παγκόσμια ηγεμονία τους, διαμορφώνοντας τον κόσμο στα μέτρα τους”.

<sup>53</sup> “Στόχος της κυβέρνησης Τζορτζ Μπους είναι να επιβάλλει τις απόψεις της στον κόσμο δρώντας έξω από το διεθνές σύστημα και αγνοώντας τους διεθνείς κανόνες και το δίκαιο”.

<sup>54</sup> “Δεν καταλαμβάνει, βεβαίως, εδάφη η νέα ιμπεριαλιστική δύναμη, αλλά επεμβαίνει με βομβαρδισμούς και δημιουργεί εντάσεις σε διάφορες περιοχές του κόσμου, με αποκλειστικό στόχο να προωθεί τα συμφέροντα της αυτοκρατορίας, να εκμεταλλεύεται τον πλούτο του πλανήτη, να πουλάει όπλα και να ελέγχει την «παγκόσμια τάξη» με τον νόμο του σερίφη”.



close” (‘Manufacturing Consent’, 2001)<sup>55</sup> and “American policymakers design bloody and miserable ‘solutions’ for many parts of the world” (Papathemelis, 2001: N10).<sup>56</sup> Moreover, not only was the U.S. seen as intervening unjustly, but it was also represented as “indifferent towards the tragedy that faces millions of people who die of thirst, hunger, exhaustion and illnesses; it is indifferent towards the value of life itself” (‘U.S. harassment’, 2001).<sup>57</sup> Moreover, “because of their military and financial power, the United States ‘have the right’ to abrogate any law they don’t agree with” (Galiatsatos, 2001a: N41).<sup>58</sup> It was thus concluded that “what in reality happens is that the U.S. government goes against the entire world” (Trigazis, 2001)<sup>59</sup> and that “George Bush has managed to transform America into a rogue state ... America is transforming into an Empire of Evil” (‘America has transformed into a new pariah’, 2001).<sup>60</sup> Resistance to the U.S. imperialist reign was thus rendered imperative in this press discourse. “Anti-Americanism means fierce opposition to the logic of the gangsters, to the beastly ‘we decide’ of the empire and ... to their terrorist reign” (Triadis, 2001).<sup>61</sup>

The representations of the U.S. were similar to the representations of the G8, since they were both constructed as self-interested, dangerous ‘others’ who “go against the entire world”. However, there were also differences between the representations of the U.S. as a member of the G8 on the one hand and as a single actor on the other, as well as between the G8 and the U.S.: Specifically, the G8 were largely represented as the main agents of globalization, while the U.S. was constructed as a modern empire interested in world hegemony. In other words, while the G8 were constituted as a single unit interested in

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<sup>55</sup> “Όπου έγιναν αμερικανικές επεμβάσεις με βομβαρδισμούς και όπλα, άνοιξαν μεγαλύτερες πληγές, που δεν κλείνουν”.

<sup>56</sup> “Συχνά οι Αμερικανοί γεωστρατηγιστές, εν ονόματι της υλικής υπεροχής τους, σχεδιάζουν επί χάρτου για διάφορα σημεία του κόσμου «λύσεις» αίματος και δυστυχίας”.

<sup>57</sup> “για την αδιαφορία που επιδεικνύει η υπερδύναμη στο δράμα εκατομμυρίων ανθρώπων, που πεθαίνουν από τη δίψα, την πείνα, την εξαθλίωση και τις ασθένειες, την αδιαφορία για την ανθρώπινη αξία”.

<sup>58</sup> “Χάρης στη στρατιωτική και την οικονομική τους ισχύ, οι ΗΠΑ «έχουν το δικαίωμα» να ακυρώσουν ό,τι θέλουν

<sup>59</sup> αυτό που στην πραγματικότητα συμβαίνει, είναι ότι η κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ στρέφεται εναντίον όλου του κόσμου”.

<sup>60</sup> “ο Τζορτζ Μπους κατάφερε να μεταμορφώσει την Αμερική σε παρία ... η Αμερική μετατρέπεται η ίδια σε αυτοκρατορία του Κακού”.

<sup>61</sup> “Αντιαμερικανισμός σημαίνει λυσσώδης αντίθεση στη λογική των γκάνγκστερ, στο κτηνώδες «αποφασίζομεν» του imperium και ... της τρομοκρατικής κυριαρχίας των ΗΠΑ”.

“globalizing inequality” and disciplining, while at the same time maintaining the status quo, the U.S. was construed as aspiring towards an indefinite expansion.

The G8 were “dynasts” who “want to create an international community which looks like the third world”, “a planet which looks like a prison”, and people who are “slaves” and “spectators, not participants”. The U.S. on the other hand was “a new imperial power”, “an empire of evil” and “an empire city”, which “intervenes” “with the intention of imposing their world hegemony”. Thus, the G8 metaphor of slavery mostly connoted control and authoritarian governance, rather than an expansionary politics, whereas the constitution of the U.S. as an empire connoted expansion. This meant that the G8 were articulated as exercising a different, more indirect type of intervention by means of globalization and the economy, whereas the U.S. engaged in a more traditional type of intervention, with direct threats to state sovereignty.

By singling out the U.S. as a self-interested, independent actor and by positioning it as an imperial subject, the above press discourse constructed the U.S. as both the most powerful and the most dangerous ‘other’: It caused destruction by intervening both indirectly and by means of the globalized markets, as a G8 member, as well as directly, through military, expansionary interventions.

### **Milosevic’s arrest and the menacing New Order<sup>62</sup>**

On 1 April 2001, Slobodan Milosevic was arrested in Belgrade and was later transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Greek press represented Milosevic’s deportation as a manifestation of the big powers’ (and especially the U.S.) authoritarian imposition of their own interests. Milosevic’s arrest and the forthcoming trial was summed up as “another step ... towards the submission of states to

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<sup>62</sup> I only discuss the representations of Milosevic’s arrest in the Greek section because it wasn’t of major importance for the British press. Even though it was discussed in the British press, it was only a minor issue compared to issues such as global warming. Similarly, global warming was a minor issue in the Greek and for this reason I don’t discuss the Greek press representations of global warming.

the will of the New Western Order” (Papadopoulos-Tetradis, 2001a)<sup>63</sup> and a “cynical demonstration of power of the ‘international community’ (which is neither international, nor in essence a community)” (‘The criminal and the criminals’, 2001).<sup>64</sup> It was also described as aiming “at paralyzing any contestation of the New Order of Things ... we should think of the International Tribunal as a collective organ of the new “Holly Alliance” of our era, which is used as a means to consolidate its authority” (Delastik, 2001b).<sup>65</sup>

Milosevic was represented as another victim who got punished because he resisted the capitalist market. “The nation-state is an obstacle to the domination of ‘the market’. Whoever tries to resist will be eliminated for the sake of ‘humanism’”(Bitsakis, 2001: N06)<sup>66</sup> and “the leaders of the United States, as well as the socio-democratic hyenas of the European Union grant themselves the right to punish those nations which resist their capitalist globalization” (Bitsakis, 2001c: N06).<sup>67</sup> Thus, the trial was seen as the completion of “the plan which was devised by certain powers in the European Union and by the United States ... The leader who didn’t succumb to the blackmailing of Ms Albright from Washington and who resisted Nato should be punished (Diakogiannis, 2001: N51).<sup>68</sup> Since Yugoslavia “represented the last remnant of the ‘socialist camp’, it had to be smashed” (Bitsakis, 2001: N06).<sup>69</sup> The U.S. more than any other state was heavily criticized for its unaccountable interventionary policies and breach of state sovereignty. “None of the fundamental rules of state sovereignty will be respected from now on, if it goes against Washington’s wish to intervene militarily or politically in a country” (Polimilis, 2001a).<sup>70</sup> Elsewhere, “the truth is that the American imperialists in

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<sup>63</sup> “εχτές έγινε άλλο ένα βήμα για την υποταγή των κρατών στις βουλήσεις της Νέας Δυτικής Τάξης”.

<sup>64</sup> “μια κυνική επίδειξη ισχύος της «διεθνούς κοινότητας» (που ούτε διεθνής είναι, ούτε κοινότητα)”.

<sup>65</sup> “αποσκοπεί στο να παραλύσει κάθε σκέψη αμφισβήτησης της διαμορφούμενης Νέας Τάξης Πραγμάτων ... το Διεθνές Ποινικό Δικαστήριο πρέπει να το δούμε ως συλλογικό όργανο της νέας «Ιερής Συμμαχίας» της εποχής μας στην προσπάθεια παγίωσης της εξουσίας της”.

<sup>66</sup> “Το έθνος - κράτος αποτελεί εμπόδιο στην κυριαρχία της ‘αγοράς’ ... Όσοι αντιστέκονται θα εξοντωθούν χάριν του ‘ανθρωπισμού’”.

<sup>67</sup> “Οι ηγέτες των ΗΠΑ, και από κοντά οι σοσιαλδημοκρατικές ύαινες της Ε.Ε., χορηγούν στον εαυτό τους το δικαίωμα να τιμωρούν τους λαούς που αντιστέκονται στην καπιταλιστική παγκοσμιοποίηση”.

<sup>68</sup> “Το έργο, που έστησαν ορισμένες δυνάμεις της Ε.Ε. και οι ΗΠΑ, πρέπει να ολοκληρωθεί. Ο ηγέτης, ο οποίος δεν υπέκυψε στα κελεύσματα της κυρίας Ολμπράιτ από την Ουάσιγκτον και αντιστάθηκε στο ΝΑΤΟ, πρέπει να τιμωρηθεί.  
<sup>69</sup> αντιπροσώπευε το τελευταίο κατάλοιπο του ‘σοσιαλιστικού στρατοπέδου’. Έπρεπε λοιπόν να διαλυθεί”.

<sup>70</sup> “Το μόνο που τους ενδιαφέρει είναι ν’ αποδείξουν ότι αυτοί είναι τα αφεντικά, ότι αυτοί αποφασίζουν, αυτοί καθορίζουν τους κανόνες του παιχνιδιού ... Αρκεί που απέδειξαν, για μια ακόμα φορά, ότι είναι σε θέση να επιβάλλουν τη θέλησή τους, έστω και ισοπεδώνοντας με τα δολάρια και τον τσαμπουκά το διεθνές δίκαιο”.



their competitive race for the redistribution of the world promoted the shattering of a country and the massacre of its people ... they are truly carnivorous, these imperialist wolves who tear the flesh of Yugoslavia and hypocritically talk about 'peacemaking initiatives' and 'humanitarian assistance'" (Samaras, 2001).<sup>71</sup>

This section is very much in line with the three previous discussions. In fact, this section brings previous discourses together, since it is presented as an example of how state sovereignty is threatened both by the globalized markets and its representatives, as well as by imperialist U.S. interventionism. Yugoslavia was articulated as a socialist, and thus non-compliant, sovereign state, whose sovereignty was attacked initially by the imperialist U.S. in the Kosovo war and later by globalization and its representatives by means of arresting Milosevic and trying him in Hague. Milosevic's Yugoslavia was thus articulated as an example of how the "New Order" "disciplines" those who don't "succumb" or obey the rules set by globalization. Milosevic, in particular, was positioned in an oppositional relationship to the U.S. and the remaining powerful countries, while Yugoslavia and all sovereign states were juxtaposed with capitalist globalization emerging as the victims of the "truly carnivorous ... imperialist wolves". While the U.S. and the other powerful countries were endowed with aggressive attributes, Milosevic was constructed as a defensive and somewhat heroic actor who was protecting his state's sovereignty. Thus, on the one hand, the big powers were "imperialist wolves", who "smashed", "intervened", "dominated" and showed their "cynical demonstration of power", while Milosevic "didn't succumb" and "resisted". This representation created certain 'realities'; that is, it constructed Milosevic's arrest as a dangerous and disgraceful event, while at the same time precluding other possible scenarios. A different representation which, for example, emphasized Milosevic's brutal and deadly rule would have created different realities and possibilities. It is also worth pointing to the striking similarities between this discourse and the Greek press discourses during the Kosovo

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<sup>71</sup> "Το πραγματικό γεγονός είναι ότι οι αμερικανοί ιμπεριαλιστές στον ανταγωνισμό τους για το ξαναμόρφωμα του κόσμου προώθησαν το κομμάτισμα μιας χώρας και το ματοκύλισμα των λαών της ... Πραγματικά σαρκοβόρα, οι ιμπεριαλιστικοί λύκοι ξεσκίζουν τις σάρκες της Γιουγκοσλαβίας και την ίδια στιγμή με απέραντη υποκρισία μιλάνε για 'ειρηνευτικές πρωτοβουλίες' και 'ανθρωπιστικές βοήθειες'".

war, which openly and uniformly condemned NATO actions against Serbia. This uniformity amongst newspapers was emphasized by Kondopoulou in her analysis of Greek media representations during the Kosovo war: “The offensive against the Serbs, according to Greek media, was an unjustifiable action against a sovereign neighbouring state whose internal affairs were being used as a vehicle of western intervention and expansion at the expense of civilians, both in Kosovo and Serbia, and ultimately on the Balkan peninsula as a whole” (Kondopoulou, 2002: 2). Headlines in the front pages of the newspapers during the Kosovo war, such as “war criminals: Americans, NATO, EU”, “senseless slaughter”, “human sacrifice in the name of human rights” (Kondopoulou, 2002: 3) were very similar to Greek press representations of Milosevic’s arrest in 2001, as described above.

### A glimpse of hope ... Resisting the globalized market

While there was continuous condemnation of globalization in the Greek press, there was also a simultaneous appraisal of the anti-globalization movements, which were defined as a confrontation between “the two worlds, that of riches and imperialism on the one side, and that of poverty, work and struggle on the other” (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001).<sup>72</sup> Elsewhere it was pointed out, that “two worlds confront each other: power and riches against conscience which cares about humans and the planet, keeping hope alive” (Bakomarou, 2001a). For these reasons, the anti-globalization movement was hegemonically represented as “revolutionary” (Mihailidis, 2001)<sup>73</sup> in the Greek press discourse, since “it preludes a major cultural resistance of modern societies against the unaccountability of the markets and the Stock Markets” (Vergopoulos, 2001)<sup>74</sup> and was reminiscent of “the great message of the ‘French May’ which is still alive: ‘Be realists. Strive for the impossible’” (Bourdaras, 2001a).<sup>75</sup> The protesters themselves were described as “the children of resistance who generate hope ... Resistance to the

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<sup>72</sup> “οι δυο κόσμοι, αυτός του πλούτου και του ιμπεριαλισμού από τη μια, αυτός της φτώχειας της εργασίας και της πάλης από την άλλη ... βρίσκονται αντιμέτωποι”.

<sup>73</sup> “επαναστατικό”.

<sup>74</sup> ... προαναγγέλλει μείζονα πολιτιστική αντίδραση των σύγχρονων κοινωνιών ενάντια στην ασυδοσία των αγορών και των χρηματιστηρίων ...

<sup>75</sup> “το μεγάλο μήνυμα του ‘Γαλλικού Μάη’ που ακόμη δεν έχει σβήσει: ‘Να είστε ρεαλιστές. Να ζητάτε το αδύνατο’”!

unrestrained globalized market... resistance with the motto “the man above profits” (Votsis, 2001).<sup>76</sup> This movement was represented as “a new movement of political disobedience to the plans of the rulers of this world” and was thus, “quoting from Brecht, ‘the world’s hope’” (Valavani, 2001: N06).<sup>77</sup> Similarly, “the international movement of disobedience which started in Seattle against the laws and the rules which are put in practice by the globalized economy of the markets, brings hope and slowly but steadily constructs a new society of solidarity and humanism, a society which recognizes that all humans are above profits” (Alfieri, 2001).<sup>78</sup>

Since the movement was the world’s only hope, it was very important that all citizens joined in and resisted the market exploitation. “We shouted in Genoa, but we will also shout wherever it is necessary, ‘Youth of all nations resist’... don’t let your soul be a pray to the modern ‘vampires’ of money and exploitation” (Georgakakis, 2001).<sup>79</sup> Submission or compromise would only have negative effects. “We will not succumb or stay satisfied with the few crumbs of provisions or with the few hopes. ...Submission has never been a good tactic for liberation; neither has the reconciliation with the executioner” (Panousis, 2001: N06).<sup>80</sup> Finally, it was pointed out that the movement should keep struggling against globalization. “We are not scared of it [globalization]. We reveal its aims and at the same time we pursue to control and subvert it” (Zohios, 2001).<sup>81</sup> By the same token, “the struggle will continue by all means, against ... imperialism and the capitalist storm” (Tsirigotis, 2001).<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> “τα παιδιά της αντίστασης, που γεννά την ελπίδα ... Αντίσταση στην ασυδοσία της παγκοσμιοποιημένης αγοράς ... Αντίσταση, με σύνθημα ‘ο άνθρωπος πάνω από τα κέρδη’”.

<sup>77</sup> “ένα κίνημα πολιτικής ανυπακοής στα σχέδια των κυρίαρχων αυτού του κόσμου ... Και είναι σήμερα, κάνοντας χρήση του Μπρεχτ, ‘του κόσμου η ελπίδα’”.

<sup>78</sup> “Το διεθνές κίνημα ανυπακοής που ξεκίνησε από το Σιάτλ απέναντι στους νόμους και στους κανόνες που εφαρμόζει η παγκοσμιοποιημένη οικονομία των αγορών, γεννά ελπίδες και κτίζει με αργά βήματα είναι αλήθεια την κοινωνία της αλληλεγγύης και της ανθρωπιάς, την κοινωνία που αναγνωρίζει ότι οι άνθρωποι είναι πάνω από τα κέρδη”.

<sup>79</sup> “Γι’ αυτό λοιπόν φωνάξαμε στη Γένοβα, αλλά θα φωνάξουμε και όπου αλλού χρειαστεί, ‘Νέοι όλων των λαών αντισταθείτε’ ... μην αφήνετε την ψυχή σας βορά στους σύγχρονους ‘βρικόλακες’ του χρήματος και της εκμετάλλευσης”.

<sup>80</sup> “δεν θα συμμορφωθούμε αρκούμενοι στα όποια ψίχουλα παροχών ή στις όποιες ελπίδες ... Η υποταγή ποτέ δεν λειτούργησε ως τακτική απ-ελευθέρωσης. Ούτε η συμφιλίωση με τον δήμιο”.

<sup>81</sup> “Δεν τη φοβόμαστε. Αποκαλύπτουμε, παγκόσμια, τους στόχους της και ταυτόχρονα επιδιώκουμε τον έλεγχο και τη μετατροπή της”.

<sup>82</sup> “ο αγώνας θα συνεχιστεί με όλα τα μέσα. Ενάντια ... τον ιμπεριαλισμό και την καπιταλιστική καταιγίδα”.



This discourse follows from the representations of globalization as a dynastic, enslaving force and its representatives as authoritative dictators. However, the new discursive element added here is the anti-globalization movements, located in a position of similarity to 'us' and in one of opposition to globalization and the big powers. This relation of similarity was achieved through the frequent repetition of the personal pronoun 'we', by means of which the reader was hailed (see Althusser, 1998: 302) to identify with a particular position. Moreover, the ambiguity and non-specificity of this 'we' "helps to define the subject position that the audience is asked to assume; it helps to wield potentially disparate members of its audience into a single, unified identity" (Weldes, 1999: 106). As a result, the anti-globalization movements were constructed as representing everyone.

This identification of the anti-globalization movements with 'us' was both facilitated by and, in turn, facilitated the oppositional structuring of the movement and globalization/its representatives, which were constituted as belonging to "two worlds", the first standing for "poverty, work and struggle", as well as "solidarity", "humanism" and "conscience", while the second standing for "power", "riches and imperialism". This construction of the world in terms of two broad categories, the all-righteous oppressed and the evil oppressors necessitated a revolutionary reaction on the part of the oppressed – 'us', that is, and naturalized the construction of the anti-globalization movement as "revolutionary" and as a necessity for "liberation", while the protesters themselves were called the "children of resistance" against the "capitalist storm".

### **The European crisis**

The discourse on the E.U. consisted of disillusionment about the democratic ethos of the union, as well as an aspiration towards a more democratic union which would be capable of gaining power and independence from the U.S. To begin with, the development of a socially democratic and politically united E.U. was deemed imperative in the Greek press discourse in order to deal with the threats of globalization and the U.S. "Europe needs

independence and power” (‘Bush’s message to Europe’, 2001).<sup>83</sup> As far as globalization was concerned, the E.U. was seen as “the only power which can now seriously contest the global marketization as well as the resulting capitalist culture is United Europe ... For this reason, those who are really interested in our cultural autonomy should be fervent supporters of a united, socio-democratically oriented Europe” (Mouzelis, 2001: N14).<sup>84</sup> Besides, “a Europe which is subjected to the laws of the one and only globalized market, which is socially powerless and politically unstable will soon find itself in a dead end” (Polimilis, 2001b).<sup>85</sup>

Bush was also described as disempowering the E.U., which was losing its independence. “They [the U.S.] mistreat their globally closest ally, the EU ... The tragedy is that European security is decided in Washington and the Europeans slavishly follow ... Europe is the Pontius-Pilate for what goes on in its area” (Papatthemelis, 2001: N10).<sup>86</sup> Moreover, the situation will not change unless the E.U. itself takes some initiatives. Since “the EU is only an economic union and is lacking a common vision and common planning for issues of global strategy ... the U.S. intervene and play the role of an international referee” (Liapis, 2001).<sup>87</sup> “As long as the Europeans don’t commit to shape the future of the EU, Washington will take up this role” (Kapopoulos, 2001b).<sup>88</sup> It was therefore imperative that the E.U. attained that all important empowering unity which would give it a voice. “It is ridiculous that Europe is still under American guardianship and still hasn’t got its own autonomous politics for its security and its defence, as well as its foreign policy” (‘No to closed doors’, 2001).<sup>89</sup> “Let’s hope that European solidarity

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<sup>83</sup> “Η Ευρώπη χρειάζεται ανεξαρτησία και δύναμη”.

<sup>84</sup> “Η μόνη δύναμη που για τη στιγμή έχει και τη δυνατότητα και το συμφέρον ν’ αμφισβητήσει σοβαρά την παγκόσμια αγοροκρατία καθώς και την άκρως καταναλωτική κουλτούρα που την συνοδεύει είναι η Ενωμένη Ευρώπη. Και μόνο γι’ αυτό το λόγο, αυτοί που πραγματικά ενδιαφέρονται για την πολιτισμική μας αυτονομία θα έπρεπε να είναι θερμοί υποστηρικτές μιας ενωμένης σοσιαλδημοκρατικά προσανατολισμένης Ευρώπης”.

<sup>85</sup> “μια Ευρώπη υποταγμένη στους νόμους τής μίας και μόνης παγκοσμιοποιημένης αγοράς, αδύναμη κοινωνικά και ανερμάτιστη πολιτικά, μπορεί πολύ σύντομα να βρεθεί σε αδιέξοδο”.

<sup>86</sup> “Τον παγκοσμίως καλύτερό τους σύμμαχο, την Ε.Ε., αρέσκονται να τον έχουν “του κλώτσου και του μπάτσου”. Η τραγωδία είναι ότι η ευρωπαϊκή ασφάλεια αποφασίζεται στην Ουάσιγκτον και οι Ευρωπαίοι αιδημόνως ακολουθούν ... Η Ευρώπη λειτουργεί ως Πόντιος Πιλάτος για τα τεκταινόμενα στην περιοχή της”.

<sup>87</sup> “Σήμερα, απλά η Ε.Ε. είναι μια κοινότητα οικονομικών συμφερόντων. Και στερείται ενός κοινού οράματος και κοινού σχεδιασμού για θέματα παγκόσμιας στρατηγικής. Με συνέπεια, οι ΗΠΑ να βρίσκουν γόνιμο έδαφος να παρεμβαίνουν και να παίζουν το ρόλο του διεθνούς επιδιαιτητή”.

<sup>88</sup> “Όσο οι Ευρωπαίοι αποφεύγουν να αναλάβουν τη διαμόρφωση του μέλλοντος της Ε.Ε., η Ουάσιγκτον θα το κάνει γι’ αυτούς”.

<sup>89</sup> “Δεν μπορεί η Ευρώπη να βρίσκεται ακόμη υπό αμερικανική κηδεμονία και να μην έχει μια αυτόνομη πολιτική για την ασφάλεια και την άμυνά της, όπως και για την εξωτερική της πολιτική”.

will be enhanced and that European unification will move in a different direction than the one it is currently heading towards, so as for Europe to rid itself of 'Euro-Atlanticism' and to defend the 'european social model' against the American one" (Trigazis, 2001).<sup>90</sup>

The case of the need for political unification was made possible in this discourse through the juxtaposition of the E.U. and the U.S./globalization in an oppositional relationship, whereby the E.U. was dependent on and enslaved by those two actors. Predicates such as "defend", "autonomous" and "independence" were repeated in juxtaposition with "guardianship", "slavishly", "intervene" and "subjected" and constructed the E.U. as both a dependent actor and are in need of liberation through unification. In fact, the repetition of predicates such as "solidarity", "unify" and "unification" and "social model" reinforced this necessity for a stronger, more socially and politically united Europe rather than a mere economic union of separate nation states. As Diez also points out, "the way these arguments are structured is different from a purely economic interest based argument, and it is this structure, and its implication for politics that is decisive from a discursive perspective" (Diez, 2001: 24). In fact, this oppositional positioning of the E.U. and the U.S./globalization facilitated the construction of a common identity. The U.S. was an 'other', an 'outside' threatening the existence of the 'inside' in the above discourse. As Doty also emphasizes, "identity is contingent and exists only by virtue of strategies which expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity" (Doty, 1993: 454). Therefore, the existence of an 'outside', the U.S. in this case, strengthened the identity of the 'inside', the E.U. that is. The political community of the E.U. was distinguished and differentiated from the U.S. and at the same time established itself as a unity. Moreover, the threat posed by the U.S. rendered further unification imperative.

Even though the necessity of a "united Europe" was continuously stressed, there was also the recognition that this unification was not being realized because the most powerful E.U. countries were not acting collectively as E.U. members but were taking advantage

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<sup>90</sup> "Ας ελπίσουμε δε ότι παράλληλα θα ενισχυθεί η ευρωπαϊκή αλληλεγγύη και ότι η ευρωπαϊκή ενοποίηση θα κινηθεί σε κατεύθυνση διαφορετική από τη σημερινή, ώστε να απαλλαγεί η Ευρώπη από τον 'ευρωατλαντισμό' και να υπερασπιστεί το «ευρωπαϊκό κοινωνικό μοντέλο» έναντι του αμερικανικού".



of the smaller and less powerful members. The E.U. was therefore described as a union of the few: “The small countries of the EU are not taken into account anymore” (Delastik, 2001)<sup>91</sup> and “only the most powerful members of the EU regulate the EU politics” (Oikonomopoulos, 2001a).<sup>92</sup> For this reason, “the Union is in danger of becoming an oligarchy of the most powerful countries” (Fragoudaki, 2001: R07).<sup>93</sup> “One should see the suffocating atmosphere in international and European conferences in order to understand how unbearable the pressure [towards the less powerful countries] is” (Koumados, 2001).<sup>94</sup>

While the E.U. as a whole was constituted in opposition to the U.S., the most powerful E.U. leaders were often also similarly positioned to the U.S. as equally lawless actors. “The great European powers (Germany, France, Britain) may obviously be less significant actors than the United States in the leading bloc of the New Order of things, but they still belong to the leaders rather than the marginalized in this international power net” (Delastik, 2001a).<sup>95</sup> Elsewhere, “according to Chomsky, all the postwar presidents of the United States should be hanged. I would add: And all the current socialist leaders of the European Union. I would add this, if I was not in principle against the death penalty” (Bitsakis, 2001b: N06).<sup>96</sup> These most powerful E.U. governments were thus severely criticized for imposing “an immoral and illegal authority” (Panousis, 2001:N06)<sup>97</sup> characterized by “democratic deficiency” (‘Globalization of the police’, 2001).<sup>98</sup> They were also described as destroying Europe, since “they build the Europe of unemployment, the Europe of the submissive to the transatlantic leaders and the Europe of wars, the Europe of the terrorist laws and of the cops” (‘Europe as a policeman’,

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<sup>91</sup> “οι απόψεις των μικρών κρατών δεν λαμβάνονται πλέον υπόψη”.

<sup>92</sup> “στους όρους που οι «ισχυροί» θέλουν να ρυθμίζουν την όλη πολιτική”.

<sup>93</sup> “Την Ένωση, άρα, παραμονεύει ο κίνδυνος να μετατραπεί σε ολιγαρχία των ισχυρότερων χωρών της”.

<sup>94</sup> “Πρέπει να έχει ζήσει κανείς το κλίμα που δημιουργείται σε διεθνείς ή ευρωπαϊκές διασκέψεις για να καταλάβει πόσο αφόρητες μπορεί να είναι οι πιέσεις”.

<sup>95</sup> “Οι μεγάλες ευρωπαϊκές δυνάμεις (Γερμανία, Γαλλία, Βρετανία) μπορεί να είναι εμφανώς υποδεέστεροι παράγοντες σε σχέση με τις ΗΠΑ στο ηγετικό μπλοκ της Νέας Τάξης Πραγμάτων, ανήκουν όμως στους ηγέτες και όχι στους παρίες αυτού του πλέγματος εξουσίας σε διεθνές επίπεδο”.

<sup>96</sup> “Κατά τον Τσόμσκι, όλοι οι μεταπολεμικοί πρόεδροι των ΗΠΑ θα έπρεπε να απαγχονισθούν. Εγώ θα πρόσθετα: Και οι νυν σοσιαλιστές ηγέτες της Ε.Ε. Θα το πρόσθετα, αν δεν ήμουν θέμα αρχής εναντίον της θανατικής ποινής”.

<sup>97</sup> “μία ανήθικη και ανομιμοποίητη εξουσία που δεν υπόκειται σε κανένα Δίκιο και θεσμικό περιορισμό”.

<sup>98</sup> “το δημοκρατικό έλλειμμα”.

2001).<sup>99</sup> For this reason, the E.U. had been turned into “a violent, money – oriented dictatorship” (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001)<sup>100</sup> wearing a “façade” and hiding “its true identity of violence and repression” (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001).<sup>101</sup>

As a result of all these representations “the objective of an EU with more political coherence which will be the protagonist in the global scene has not been achieved” (Kapopoulos, 2001e).<sup>102</sup> Despite what was described as an E.U. failure, it was maintained that the vision of a more united Europe was still feasible, but only with brave moves. “The European case cannot be won with weak compromises. What is needed is bold initiatives” (Katiforis, 2001: N07)<sup>103</sup> and “the vision can only be feasible if Europe decides to implement policies of genuine coherence and convergence, which will eliminate the current inequalities” (‘Vision and delusion’, 2001).<sup>104</sup>

This representation constructed the E.U. as it currently was, ‘false Europe’, but also visualized the E.U. as it should be, ‘true Europe’ (also see Makarychev, 2005: 489). Both discourses were made possible by means of binary identity constructions and demarcations of an inside/outside. To begin with, the E.U. was dichotomously represented as divided in two camps; the more powerful members of the E.U., ‘the oppressors’, versus the remaining E.U. members, ‘the oppressed’. While ‘the oppressors’ “regulate”, “build” and “impose”, ‘the oppressed’ are “taken for granted”, “suffocate”, they are “marginalized” and “pressurized”. There was therefore a division between those countries who controlled the E.U. by taking all the decisions, and those countries who had no say and were controlled by the bigger powers. Moreover, the countries belonging to each camp were constituted as unified wholes, rather than separate state entities. Thus,

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<sup>99</sup> “Αυτοί που μεθοδικά χτίζουν την Ευρώπη της ανεργίας, την Ευρώπη των υποτακτικών στους υπερατλαντικούς πλανητάρχες και των πολέμων, την Ευρώπη των τρομονόμων και των μπάτσων”.

<sup>100</sup> “Η Ενωμένη Ευρώπη ... μια στυγνή πλουτοκρατική δικτατορία”.

<sup>101</sup> “τα προσώπεία της δημοκρατικής τάχα Ευρώπης και δείχνουν το γυμνό πρόσωπο της βίας και της καταστολής”.

<sup>102</sup> “η πρόκληση για μια Ε.Ε. με περισσότερη πολιτική συνοχή που θα διεκδικεί ρόλο πρωταγωνιστή στην παγκόσμια σκηνή δεν υπήρξε μέχρι στιγμής αρκετή για να επιδράσει καταλυτικά στους ευρωπαϊκούς συσχετισμούς”.

<sup>103</sup> “Με πλαδαρούς συμβιβασμούς δεν προχωρεί πια η υπόθεση της Ευρώπης. Χρειάζονται τολμηρές πρωτοβουλίες”.

<sup>104</sup> “Το όραμα θα καταστεί εφικτό μόνο αν η Ευρώπη αποφασίσει και εφαρμόσει μια πολιτική πραγματικής σύγκλισης και συνοχής, που θα μικρύνει έως και θα εξαφανίσει τις σημερινές ανισότητες”.

what was seen as a problem of European governance was mostly put down to the more powerful European countries which were responsible for the E.U. having become an “undemocratic”, “violent” and “repressive” “oligarchy” rather than the “united” and “socio-democratically oriented” entity that was desired, while the smaller countries were absolved of any responsibilities for the current shaping of the E.U. Following from this, one side pursued their own interests whereas the other was willing and eager to selflessly give up their national interests, but was hindered by the most powerful countries. Even though Greece was not verbally associated with either camp, it was obvious that it was essentially linked with the smaller and less powerful countries which were not to blame for the existing undesirable situation in the E.U.



## Conclusion- Comparing the British and the Greek Press

### Representations

The press representations were quite distinct both between the two countries and in the case of Britain, across the newspapers of the same country. At the same time, there were many similarities between and across the newspapers in the metaphors and techniques employed, which led to similar attitudes of closure. This final section compares the British press discourses, and also makes a cross-country comparison, examining the press's constructions of globalization, the U.S. and the E.U.

#### **The British press representations**

Since the representations in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* were very similar, the comparison is between, on the one hand, *The Times* representations and, on the other, *The Independent/Mirror* representations. *The Times* discourse constructed the need for U.K. engagement with the U.S. and disconnection from the E.U., while *The Independent/Mirror* discourse encouraged closer U.K. ties with the E.U. and disengagement from the U.S.

To begin with, the Kyoto protocol was represented in two different ways, as an inappropriate protocol which manifested E.U. anti- Americanism in *The Times*, and as the only solution to the very serious problem of global warming in *The Independent* and *The Mirror*. These two representations seem very dissimilar, since *The Times* construed global warming as uncertain and the climate as an independent force non-affected by human intervention. Consequently the Kyoto protocol was naturalized as irrelevant and the E.U. as either absurd or anti-American, in contrast to the U.S., which was sensible. On the other hand, global warming was represented as an undeniable reality and the most important threat facing humanity in both *The Independent* and in *The Mirror*, while it was also presupposed that the Kyoto protocol was the only solution to this serious threat of global warming. As a result, and in contrast to *The Times* discourse, the E.U. was

constructed as a rational actor and the U.S. a selfish actor promoting its business interests at the expense of humanity.

However, these two representations are not as contrasting as first appears. Both discourses framed global warming in technical terms and as a physical, self-constructed, a-historic problem, which could be dealt with in a straightforward and technocratic manner. Moreover, such a framing of global warming absolved any actors from the responsibility of its construction. In *The Independent and Mirror* discourse, for example, the U.S. was criticized for not implementing the Kyoto protocol and for not having contributed in its construction, while the E.U. leaders were not criticized at any point; by contrast, they were praised for their decision to implement the protocol.

The two main constructions of the U.K. role in the world were antithetical in terms of content, but very similar in the representational techniques and metaphors employed to position the U.K. either in a relation of similarity and complementarity with the U.S. and opposition to the E.U., in the case of *The Times*, or the reverse in *The Independent and The Mirror*. *The Times* and *The Independent/Mirror* constructed the E.U. and the U.S. respectively as imperialist powers, intent on destroying the state's sovereignty and enslaving the U.K. in a state of powerlessness, submission and dependency. The metaphor of slavery was very prominent in both discourses, even though in *The Times* the enslaving actor was the E.U., while in *The Independent* and in *The Mirror* the U.S. was the oppressive, enslaving power threatening the U.K. Moreover, the representation of 'British exceptionality' was prominent in both discourses, and the U.K. was envisioned and constituted as a powerful actor, a leader in world politics. Where the two discourses diverged was regarding which other actor could provide the U.K. with, or not deprive it of, this power. Thus, a partnership with the E.U. in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse was constructed as a partnership facilitating U.K. centrality. The E.U. remained a Union of self-interested states, rather than for example a United Europe. Therefore, both discourses and consequently all three newspapers constructed the U.K. similarly, as a major actor in world politics which should endeavour to maintain and increase its

influence. The only difference in the discourses and between *The Times* and *The Independent/Mirror* were the ways in which this power can be maintained and enhanced.

Finally, there were two main representations of globalization which differed significantly from each other. According to the first *Times* discourse, globalization was a beneficial force capable of eradicating poverty. The second representation, in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* constituted globalization as a means of exploitation by the ones in power, which creates inequalities. However, the distinction between newspapers in the use of these two representations isn't straightforward. While the first representation was hegemonic in *The Times*, one could find both representations in the other two newspapers. These two representations were not compatible, since they constructed the world in completely different ways. The first constituted globalization as an external force, a natural phenomenon, to which actors merely respond. Globalization was not merely seen as something which happens to national governments in the second representation, but as a product of the state and of the multinationals. Therefore, globalization was not in this case external to the system, but part of the system. Moreover, the state was not an enemy or an obstacle to globalization but an actor essential for globalization's operation.

### **Greek versus British press representations**

The Greek and the British press representations that are compared in this section concern globalization, the E.U. and the U.S. To begin with, the representation of globalization in the Greek press is in some ways similar to and in other ways different from both representations on globalization in the British press. The initial link would be between the Greek press representation of globalization and the second (mostly *Independent/Mirror*) British press representation, since both construct globalization in negative terms, as exploitative and as enhancing rather than decreasing poverty. However, the representational techniques were more similar to the first (mostly *Times*) British representation and even though thematically these two representations differed, they both used very similar techniques to reach different conclusions. Specifically, and



in accordance with representation one in the British press, the Greek press constituted globalization as an overpowering and total force, an anthropomorphized actor capable of independent thought and action. Even though the G-8 were represented as exploiting the world and countries by means of globalization, it was nonetheless constructed as an independent force rather than in line with state action. In addition, both in the pro-globalization British press representation and in the Greek press discourse, globalization was positioned in an oppositional relationship to the state, the difference being that in the first case the state was seen as hindering globalization's positive effects, while in the second globalization was diminishing and weakening the state and creating havoc. In both cases, the state was described as external to globalization.

The U.S. was hegemonically represented as a very negative actor in the Greek press, both as a G-8 member and as an individual actor. This construction was very much in line with the *Independent* and *Mirror* discourse, since in both cases the U.S. was seen as powerful and dangerous, as well as imperialist, while in *The Times* the U.S. was constituted as a sensible actor and Star Wars as a defence rather than an expansionary strategy.

A very interesting comparison is that of the Greek and British press representations of the E.U., which was constructed as a completely different actor in all three discourses that is the two British and the Greek one. The Greek press discourse was similar to *The Times* discourse, in the sense that it constituted the E.U. as a failed actor, but it substantially differed as well as it also constructed it as a potentially powerful and very important one as well. While the press in both countries positioned the E.U. as an 'other', it was also evident that this was desirable in the British press, in which the nation state had to be the primary and most important actor, and the E.U. was either a threatening other, in *The Times*, or a beneficial other, in *The Independent* and *The Mirror*, the E.U. was only seen as other in the Greek press discourse so far as it had not yet met the requirements of being part of the self. The ideal E.U., as constructed in the Greek press, was a United Europe, rather than a union of self-interested nation states. In fact, the most powerful states in the E.U. were very heavily criticized as self-interested actors, in a union that had to achieve

more political unity and a common identity. It is also not coincidental that the British press referred to the European Union as E.U., whereas the Greek press often referred to it as Europe. Besides, Greece's role and interests in relation to the E.U. were very rarely mentioned; rather, Greece's interests were only seen through the prism of the E.U. rather than as an individual state.

The representations of the U.S. in relation to the E.U., in the case of the Greek press, or the U.K. in relation to the E.U. and the U.S. in the British press, also form a very interesting comparison. In the Greek press the E.U. was directly juxtaposed with the U.S. in an oppositional relationship. In contrast, in the British press the comparison was not between the E.U. and the U.S. directly, but the question posed was whether the U.K. should form closer ties to the E.U. or the U.S. The main similarity between these three opposites - the E.U. vs. the U.S. in the Greek press, the U.K. versus the EU. in *The Times*, and the U.K. versus the U.S. in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* - was the metaphor of slavery, which was used to construct the second part of the binary as the dangerous other, and the relationship between the two parts as one of submission and slavery of the first part in the binary construction to the latter. Thus, in *The Times* the E.U. was a threatening other enslaving the U.K. and depriving of its sovereignty and power, in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* the U.S. acquired the exact same role that the E.U. did in *The Times*, while in the Greek press the E.U.'s sovereignty and unity was threatened by the U.S. which was constituted as enslaving the E.U.

To conclude, thematically and in terms of representational practices there were both similarities and divergence within the British press and between the British and the Greek press. What effect, if any, would the September 11 events have on the British and Greek press discourses? The following chapter looks at the press discourses of both countries in the four months following September 11.

## **CHAPTER 4: THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DISCOURSES IN THE BRITISH AND GREEK PRESS: SEPTEMBER 12-DECEMBER 31, 2001**

After the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington European governments expressed their sympathy towards the U.S. and pledged to assist in any way possible in the new 'fight against terror'. Britain seemed to have adopted the most empathetic stance towards the U.S. In his first speech after the collapse of the Twin Towers, on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September, Tony Blair expressed his conviction that "this is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world" (Blair, 2001). During the speech he emphasized, that the U.S. was only one amongst many targets "and therefore it is important for us, whilst this has happened in the United States of America, to remember that very basic fact - this is an attack on the free and democratic world as a whole" (Blair, 2001). This British support persisted in the next few months, with a full military involvement in the Afghanistan war. Moreover, the majority of the British public approved of the American and British military action in Afghanistan (Guardian poll, 2001).

By contrast, following the events of September 11, the majority of the Greek citizens adopted a very critical stance towards the U.S. Even though the Greek government expressed their sympathy for the U.S., many Greeks expressed a fierce criticism of the U.S. and its foreign policy. As Takis Michas points out, not only did some of the most prominent figures in Greece, such as the Archbishop Christodoulos and the composer Mikis Theodorakis, directly accuse the U.S. of being responsible for the September 11 attacks, but the majority of the Greek population shared similar sentiments. In a football match between Greece and Scotland which took place a few days after the September 11 events, fans of the Greek team tried to burn the American flag before the start of the



game and then booed when they were asked to keep a minute of silence as a sign of respect for the victims of September 11 (Michas, 2002). In a poll conducted by the Gallup International Association between the 14<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> of September in 34 different countries, only Greece, Finland and Austria were very negative towards any type of military intervention (Iriotou, 2001: N16). At the same time protests and marches were ongoing outside the U.S. embassy and many protesters crammed the main squares in Athens.

The representations between the British and Greek press substantially differed. As is analyzed in this chapter, the British press hegemonically represented the terrorist attack as an event of epic proportions and terrorism as the biggest threat facing humanity that needed instantly and drastically to be dealt with. By contrast, the Greek press hegemonically opposed a war in Afghanistan and represented the U.S. as the greatest global threat and the biggest terrorist of all. As far as the British press was concerned, discourses in the British press of course varied and a range of different representations appeared over many, primarily practical, issues, especially about the extent of any course of action and possible outcomes. However, as I demonstrate certain issues such as the nature of the attacks or the intentions of the terrorist were barely questioned, thereby rendering certain courses of action more desirable than others. Specifically, I argue that discursive constructions of the terrorist threat as well as the subject positioning of the U.K. and the U.S. as two liberal, democratic, western countries in defence against Islamic radicals constructed views on the attacks in Afghanistan and rendered a military strike necessary and desirable, or at least acceptable and justified. Such arguments were based on very specific, taken for granted ideas about what the attacks signified, the role of the main actors and the disposition of the terrorists, as well as distinctions between “the west” and the rest, “the inside” and “the outside”, “Christianity” versus “Islam”. It is the naturalization of such ideas and binary oppositions that shaped the character of the response and rendered certain options more appealing and seemingly more appropriate than others. Thus, in the first section of this chapter I deconstruct and analyze the representations in the British newspapers of the terrorists and the so-called Islamic radicals, the U.S., as well as the role of the U.K. in the conflict, from September 12 until

December 31, 2001, that is between the original attacks and the end of the war in Afghanistan, and show the non-necessary character of the representations as well as the ways in which the representations rendered certain courses of action essential while at the same time marginalized others.

The Greek press representation of the U.S. did not change substantially after September 11. In fact, criticisms of the U.S. grew in fervour and scale. The U.S. was not only seen as a paternalistic bully, an arrogant superpower who disregards everyone else's wishes, as was the case before September 11. It also came to be seen as ruthless and aggressive, a terrorist empire and an evil superpower, the main cause for many world problems. Only one out of the three newspapers under study, the conservative, right-wing *Kathimerini*, represented the U.S. as a positive force under attack by evil terrorists – a representation similar to the British press discourse. However, such a representation of the U.S. was confined to the leading articles in *Kathimerini*, with the hegemonic discourse in the newspaper representing the U.S. in a very negative light, similarly to the other two Greek newspapers, *Eleutherotipia* and *Ta Nea*. Moreover, apart from the increasingly negative representations of the U.S. after September 11, the level of coverage on the U.S. and its deeds was also intensified in the Greek press discourse. Whereas before September 11 the topics of interest in the Greek newspapers were more diverse, after September 11 it was all about “America” and the war in Afghanistan. Most news topics, whether related to the U.S. or not, ended up being discussed in relation to the U.S. In addition, topics relating to Turkey, Israel and the E.U., which were more important before, lost their appeal and only appeared occasionally in the Greek papers. As with the British press, such discourses on the U.S. constructed the “truth” as uncontested and undeniable. The purpose of the second section of this chapter is to explore these discourses on the September 11 attacks and the U.S., as well as representations of the terrorist threat and the role of Greece after September 11. Finally, it is worth noting that there were very few differences with the press discourse of each country. For this reason, I do not analyze the discourse of each individual paper, but refer to the British or the Greek press discourse in its entirety.

## British press representations after September 11

This section is divided in 5 parts. In the first part, I look at representations of the September 11 attacks themselves as an event of epic proportions as well as an attack on civilized values. In the second part, I examine representations of the terrorists and terrorism as an infectious disease, while the third part explores the discourses on terrorism and the ways in which terrorism came to be associated in the British press discourse with Islam and Muslims, who were “othered” as backward, with the constant articulation of terms such as “bearded” also connoting their aggressiveness. In the fourth part I expand on the two main, yet contradictory, representations of the U.S. as either a good force, or a typically unilateral superpower, while the fifth and final part deconstructs and analyzes representations of the post-September 11 Britain as the good Samaritan of international politics. It should be noted at this stage that all these representations of the U.S., the U.K., terrorism, and Islam are discussed separately; however, they all complement each other and essentially work together to form the hegemonic British press discourse on the “War on Terror”. The only representation which was not in accordance with the overall discourse on the “War on Terror” was the representation of the U.S. as a negative force. However, this representation was not the predominant one, and did not seem to affect the overall discourse.

### September 11 as...

#### *... an event of epic proportions*

The attacks on the Twin Towers and on the Pentagon were described as an unprecedented event of epic proportions, which was bound to change the world forever, and which would affect American lives to such an extent that people would struggle to get to grips with normality again. “Yesterday’s coordinated attacks on the nerve centres of American power were *Pearl Harbour* and *Oklahoma City*, *Apocalypse Now* and the *Towering Inferno* all rolled into one: the ultimate American nightmare” (Dejevsky, 2001a: 1).



Similarly, “no thriller writer or film-maker could have dreamed that their wildest imaginings would come true in such appalling fashion. But yesterday’s was a disaster of such astonishing proportions that not even movie makers in Hollywood could have imagined it in their wildest dreams” (Scott, 2001: 23). The events were thus represented as being grander than fantasy could capture, more astonishing than any Hollywood blockbuster movie and utterly unexpected. “Until last Tuesday planes crashed into skyscrapers only when Steven Spielberg ordered them to” (Humphrys, 2001a). As a result, the attacks were represented as marking the new millennium, as one of the most important events in the history of mankind. “We can now say that 11 September is a date that will live in infamy” (‘Mr. Blair had a speech’, 2001: 3). Moreover, “if the fall of the Berlin Wall was the true end of the short 20<sup>th</sup> century, there is a good case for arguing that the demolition of the World Trade Center was the true beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>” (Garton-Ash, 2001b: 5). It was constantly reiterated in the press that the attacks “marked the true millennium ... The reach of modern terrorism has been demonstrated” (Rees-Mogg, 2001b).

Moreover, the hegemonic discourse described the events as not merely marking the beginning of a new era, but also one that would be more dangerous and insecure. “Never again will we be able to bask in the warmth of safety ... We know that at any moment a great black chunk of metal can come crashing out of the skies and obliterate everything we hold dear” (Malone, 2001a: 16-17). Elsewhere, “out of a clear, blue sky came a different world – more insecure, more vulnerable, more full of fear. Headline writers are naming the days we live in the age of anxiety. The terror has touched us all and we will carry its stain forever. Anyone who doesn’t feel afraid is probably lacking either imagination or a brain” (Parsons, 2001f: 14).

The attacks on the Twin Towers were thus described in an apocalyptic manner, as if this were the end of the world, or as if Armageddon were approaching. Such representations were enhanced by means of visual material. Huge headlines and visually and emotionally stunning images of the Twin Towers, of weeping or terrified individuals covered in dust running in the streets of Manhattan, and of brave fire-fighters intensified

the drama. For many days after the attacks, the newspapers dedicated pages to this 'ongoing mourning', publishing photos from all over the world of people holding American flags or pictures of missing relatives (see Appendix A, Figures 1-4). Most pictures were family-oriented; weeping children holding American flags and hugging their mothers or fathers were clear favourites, while headlines dramatically expressed universal declarations of fear and grief, such as "A silent world, united in grief" (Vallely, 2001: 1) or "America wakes up to a world of fear" (Sullivan, 2001f).

This representation of the attacks was naturalized on the basis of one main presupposition, namely that the September 11 events were indeed major. They were elevated to the status of a major historical event, of equal or in some cases of more importance than, for example, the end of the Second World War or the fall of the Berlin wall. They were constituted as opening a new and very important historical chapter and have since come to be known merely as "9/11". It was never questioned whether the events were as significant as they were described to be and whether they in fact deserved to receive the status of marking a date in history. As Derrida points out, "to mark a date in history presupposes, in any case, that something comes or happens for the first time, something that we do not yet really know how to identify, determine, recognize or analyze but that should remain from here on in unforgettable" (Derrida, 2003: 86); a major event is meant to be unprecedented and unforeseeable. The September 11 events do not necessarily fit this definition of a "major event", since many examples can be given either from the two world wars or latter events of "quasi-instantaneous mass murders that were not recorded, interpreted, felt, and presented as major events" (Derrida, 2003: 89). Moreover, the attacks themselves were not that unforeseeable, in the sense that the towers had been bombed before and "there have been many attacks of the same kind outside American national territory but against American 'interests'" (Derrida, 2003: 91).

Finally, that the attacks were a very threatening "major event" is also contestable. Statistically the chances of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack are insignificant. "Of the 2.4 million Americans who died in 2001, only 0.8% died from any form of criminal

action. The total number of people who died in the atrocities of 11th September 2001 is now thought to be 3,030, about 14.9% of those who died from criminal assaults in 2001 or 0.0125% of those who died from any cause". Actually, 29% of deaths were the result of a heart attack, and cancer was the second most important cause of death at 22.9% (Eurolegal services, online). The events of September 11 may, thus, have been shocking as well as novel in some ways, and the death toll may have been high, but their immediate elevation to such a status cannot be so easily justified,

To conclude, and even though the representation of the attacks as a major event can be contested, the continued articulation of the argument reconstituted the world we live in and therefore brought about this change that was meant to have happened with the attacks. As a result, such representations provided "a widely disseminated discourse which reified the threat and naturalized both the interpretations of the act and the subsequent Western response" (Christie, 2003: 15).

*...an attack on civilized values and a declaration of war*

In line with representations of the attacks as an event of major proportions, were articulations of the events as an attack on liberal democracies and on the civilized values of the West, rather than, for example, merely an attack on the U.S. "The slaughter in America was a wound against democracy and humanity" (Keane, 2001a: 3), "it was an attack on the civilized values of the whole world" ('Mr. Blair had a speech', 2001: 3) and on "civilized liberal society" ('Terror for All', 2001). Similarly, "this is a tragedy for everyone" (Parsons, 2001c: 16-17). "This was never an American catastrophe but always the world's" ('With One Voice', 2001). Such a representation of the September 11 events as an attack on the west and its values were facilitated by representations of the Twin Towers as western symbols. Thus, along with representations of the towers as "the most potent symbols of American prestige and economic power" (Pepinster, 2001: 10) and "symbols of American economic might" (Lines, 2001: 4-5), there were also representations of the towers as "the most powerful symbols of capitalism in the world" (O'Hara, 2001: 28-29) and "one of the symbols of the free world" (Brown, 2001: 6-7).



Therefore, “the American dream itself was the target of yesterday's co-ordinated and deadly terrorist attacks on the most potent symbols of Western political, commercial and military power. But it was more than that; it was an attack on civilised liberal society, designed to force all countries that could conceivably be targets to become, in self-defence, high security states” (‘Terror for All’, 2001). That the Twin towers had acquired symbolic status was also evident in that they became the focal point in the press discourse’s imagery with the majority of photos in the weeks following September 11 depicting either the towers themselves or people around them.

A very compelling photo published in *The Independent* on September 15 showed part of the site after the attack (Appendix A, Figure 5). The site of the Twin Towers was covered in smoke and dust. The place looked as though it had been swept by a tornado, with destroyed cars covered in dust and ruins everywhere. What was particularly interesting was that one could discern a street sign –“Liberty Street”- in the foreground which dominated the landscape. In fact, this sign was the focal point of the picture, and carried with it very similar connotations to the ones described above. Text and images worked together to construct the events as an attack on liberty, democracy and libertarian values. The connotation implicit in the photo was that the Twin towers stood for liberty and that the terrorists had attempted to demolish liberty by attacking the towers. However, that the sign of “Liberty Street” was still standing, even though the towers themselves had collapsed, constructed the attacks as a battle, which had nonetheless not yet been won by the terrorists.

In fact, the superiority of those values which were under attack and the ‘evil’ nature of the attacks were juxtaposed in the press discourse. “It becomes terrifyingly clear how close the ‘barbarians’ are, perhaps in reality always have been, to our gates. How literally, a symbol of our age can be destroyed in a moment, much as the fierce greatness of Rome was destroyed by hordes lacking science, literature, art but fuelled by a fanatical hatred of an urban, cosmopolitan, commercial culture and civilization far grander than their own”. Precisely because the threat was tangible and very serious, and since, as was proclaimed, “the west is dealing once more with an ideological challenge to its values”

(Gove, 2001d), “it is not an arrogance to assert them [the values] but a necessity” (‘Blair Shuttle’, 2001). “There is a danger to every civilized country” (‘It’s time to stand by our troops’, 2001: 6), but “democracy and modern civilization cannot be allowed to die in the rubble of the World Trade Center” (‘United we can defeat’, 2001: 6). “Against this monstrosity, the grandest of coalitions must be forged if evil is not to prevail” (‘Terror for all’, 2001). “Out of the good, the evil must be defeated” (‘United world can ... ’, 2001: 2).

As has been shown above, what underlined the hegemonic discourses in the press was a clear demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ through the use of binaries, mainly civilized/barbarian and good/evil (also see Kellner, 2003: 89). These binaries have clear implications on how ‘we’ envisage ‘ourselves’ versus ‘them’; the binaries construct our identity in contrast to the identity of the ‘other’, whether that ‘other’ is a person, a country, a thing or an anonymous force. In both binary pairs, good and civilized stand for something positive, while evil and uncivilized stand for pure negativity. Moreover, evil and uncivilized intrude to disrupt and destroy our goodness and our civilization. The juxtaposition between good and evil, as well as between civilized and uncivilized has clear implications for the way we envisage the ‘other’ as well as ourselves. Moreover, such dichotomies construct people in opposing terms, with the world seemingly consisting of absolute goodness and absolute evil, of superior civilizations and inferior ones. Since positivity lies always and only within ‘ourselves’ and ‘they; can only represent negativity, such dichotomies constitute a divided and more dangerous world by reducing “human beings into objects that embody the undesirable” (Muscati, 2003: 261).

Specifically, evil is usually defined as (Oxford Advanced Learner’s dictionary) “a force that causes wicked or bad things to happen”, “a wicked or a bad thing”, “something which is morally bad”, or “connected with the Devil and with what is bad in the world”. Evil, thus, is something that simply is, it is inherent, an essential trait, that determines the ways in which one will act in the world. Based on the above, the “evil” that struck on September 11 was absolute and no further explanation is necessary. As Lakoff points out, “there can be no social causes of evil, no religious rationale for evil, no reasons or

arguments for evil” (Lakoff, 2001). The enemy of evil is, of course, good. “Good is our essential nature and what we do in the battle against evil is good. Good and evil are locked in a battle ... only superior strength can defeat evil, and only a show of strength can keep evil at bay” (Lakoff, 2001). Thus, not attempting to defeat evil is immoral since it will encourage more evil deeds from these evildoers. Especially since evil has a “mystifying, supernatural quality” (Kellner, 2001: 1) about it, it is essential that the battle against it is fierce and relentless. In fact, performing non-permissible actions in the name of good while fighting evil is justified, since it is absolutely essential to obliterate evil and dialogue or concessions can only have negative effects. Thus, to sum up the use of binaries such as good/evil and civilized/uncivilized, not only enabled constructions of “self” and “other”, but also emptied the attacks of any political motivations as well as rendered future British or U.S. actions, such as the war in Afghanistan, essential and unavoidable.

Not only were the September 11 events seen as an attack on civilized values, but they were also unanimously articulated as a declaration of war. “Peace as we knew it vanished on September 11, 2001 and today we are facing a new threat to the free and democratic world ... No one will forget those terrible images of the day freedom and democracy were attacked and defiled” (Cordy-simpson, 2001: 20-21). “Such wholesale destruction and loss of life is an act of war, there can be no doubt about that” (Stott, 2001b: 16-17). The assumption which prevailed was that the terrorists declared a war on ‘us’ and we therefore have to respond by declaring a war on ‘them’ in order to defend ‘our’ values. The word ‘war’ featured in most articles and there was only very rarely expression of doubts as to whether this really was a war or not. “War is neither an inaccurate term nor a word without meaning in this hour” (‘Old War’, 2001). Restraint and caution were deemed essential by many commentators, but, with the exception of a few articles, the attacks were articulated as a “just war” to be conducted in the name of freedom and democracy, a war which was unavoidable and inevitable. The only divergence in the press representations concerned the type of war to be declared. Thus, on some occasions the attacks were described as a war between the terrorists on the one hand, and the U.S. and the U.K. on the other. A photo depicted a sailor hugging his wife



and holding his newborn child in his arms. Both the sailor and the baby wore a white navy hat, while the headline stated in big, black bold letters, "Hold tight for war", and was followed by the following caption: "After the sorrow comes the struggle. Britain and America are braced for a battle they cannot afford to lose" (Woods, 2001: 7). On other occasions, the attacks were articulated as a war on the west. It was loudly pronounced that the West was at war with the terrorists, a war that the terrorists themselves had declared. "Why are we about to fight a war? We are doing so because a war has been declared upon Western societies. It is mistaken to view the events of 11 September solely as a war on America. It was an act of war in America, on the West" (McElvoy, 2001c: 3). "Defeating Japan was like shooting an elephant, defeating the terrorists who inflicted the wounds upon America will be like stomping on jellyfish" (Kennedy P., 2001: 28). "The West has a fight on its hands" (Fielding, 2001). Finally, the "war" was often equated with a world war. On September 16, the *Sunday Times* published a picture of a heart that had been torn in half, bearing the pattern of an American flag next to the leading article. The headline of the article read: "This is a world war" (Appendix A, Figure 6). Elsewhere, "the war against terror is the new world war" (Keane, 2001a: 3).

The September 11 attacks were thus represented as war and a number of different identities were constructed which were all positioned in a relationship of opposition to the terrorists. Thus, it was not only the U.S., but also the U.K., "the West", and "the world", which were all positioned in a relationship of identity to each other as victims of the "terrorist war", and in opposition to the terrorists. As a result of this subject positioning, the U.K. would have to be involved, since war had been declared on it directly as a state, (a war on the U.K. and the U.S), or on the western culture and the world (to which it belonged). Thus the boundary separating the U.S. from the threatening other, was pushed outwards to include the U.S., the U.K., the west and the entire world, creating a chain of equivalence in opposition to the terrorists. On the one side were the terrorists and their supporters, and on the other was the rest of the world (also see Christie, 2003: 18). The war metaphor itself has material effects. By defining the September 11 events as war, the discourse of war was redefined and actual military

action was justified in response to the terrorist acts. As Slotkin also stresses, “once invoked the war metaphor governs the terms in which we respond to changing circumstances. It spreads to new objects; it creates a narrative tension for which the only emotionally or esthetically satisfying resolution is literal rather than merely figurative warfare” (Slotkin, 1992: 50).

To conclude, there was unanimity in the British press about the nature and the character of the attacks. Such a position is not to be taken for granted, however. The reaction to the attacks could have been different. As will be illustrated in the second section of this chapter, the same attacks were perceived in a very different way by the Greek press. Specifically, they were described as a result of western, and mainly U.S-led, globalized polarization. Therefore, a military response was deemed not only unnecessary but actually harmful. Similarly, the fact that the attacks were seen as a violent act of war and as a fierce attack on western civilization in the British press affected the ensuing responses to the attack. Once, for example, the presupposition that the attack in New York aimed at all Western liberal democracies was naturalized, and treated as a fact rather than a mere hypothesis, it became more likely that a full British involvement in the ensuing conflict would become necessary. Likewise, once the September 11 attacks were unquestionably and unanimously accepted as a declaration of war and a crisis of gigantic proportions, it was more likely that a fierce military retribution would be accepted as the most appropriate response. As Murray points out, “a crisis, like all news developments, is a creation of the language used to depict it, the appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a fact or of a rare situation...The political spectacle encourages people to support good causes and leaders and to oppose enemies, to sacrifice for the common welfare and to acquiesce in the inevitable” (Murray, 1988: 31).- In the case of the British press, the description of the attacks as massively destructive acts of war against all western, civilized countries rendered a military response appealing and appropriate.

## The Terrorist threat

In line with discursive constructions of the September 11 attacks, the representations of terrorists and terrorism in the period between September 12 and December 31<sup>st</sup> 2001 were very similar across the British newspapers. The image of the terrorist as evil and terrorism as an infectious disease that needed drastic responses, acquired hegemonic status. Essentializing representations of the terrorists and their positioning as particular types of subjects vis a vis the U.S. and the liberal, Western democracies not only enhanced the role of the 'West' as a beacon of freedom, prosperity and goodness, but also rendered justifiable and even in some cases imperative specific types of intervention by the U.S. and its allies.

### *Definitions of terrorism in the British press*

In the British press discourse the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center were hegemonically represented as "evil bastards", "barbarians with no principles or compassion" ('It's time for reason', 2001: 16) and "fanatics" (Holmes, 2001: 16-17), who "lack any shred of humanity" (Parsons, 2001d: 14), are "driven by blind hatred" ('It's time for reason', 2001: 16) and "despise our liberalism and tolerance" (Parsons, 2001d: 14). These are people "who will kill our families and then not only justify it, but laugh about it" (Parsons, 2001e: 14). Loathing, jealousy and fanaticism were the three main qualities attributed to the terrorists, whose "hatred is directed against the lives, livelihoods and values of all those, including Muslims, who do not share their fanatical bigotry or their murderous intentions" ('Another Front', 2001). Elsewhere, "it is impossible to keep cultural America at bay. The terrorists know this and it feeds their hatred" (Darwish, 2001: 29). Terrorists were therefore depicted as either motivated by hatred and jealousy, or by "irrational ideologies" ('When the dust clears', 2001: 3), or even by pure madness. They were thus described as "madmen", whose ultimate aim is "our total destruction" (Parsons, 2001f: 14), "suicidal madmen" (Humphrys, 2001a) "bent on destruction" ('When the dust clears', 2001: 3). Moreover, it was constantly pointed out that the September 11 attacks were the first of many future terrorist actions:



“There are other madmen out there who would do the same again” (‘Be vigilant of madmen’, 2001: 6). “If madmen can strike again, they will” (Parris, 2001b) and “will kill even if every injustice is ended” (Annan, 2001: 4).

Terrorists, then, were constituted as mad, evil killers, with twisted minds and distorted ideologies, prepared to do anything to destroy civilization. In his study of ABC’s representation of terrorism in the 80s, Dobkin concludes that the terrorists possessed certain unifying features, very similar to the ones described above. They were outcasts, suicidal, religious fanatics; they designed weapons to kill Americans because Americans represented the forces of good and civilization in the world (1992: 46-48). “Since terrorists are irrational and embody evil, hatred of what is good suffices as a plausible motive for terrorist action. Presenting terrorism as an ideological opposite to the United States empties terrorism of both political motivation and historical context” (Dobkin, 1992: 51). Such representations of terrorism merely described terrorist tactics and emptied the phenomenon of history and politics. Terrorists, thus, appeared to be devoid of any political motivation and were reduced to evil villains, who one cannot understand and with whom one could not negotiate.

### *Terrorism is infectious*

This depoliticized and a-historical phenomenon of terrorism was intensified by representations of the “terrorist threat” as a disease, primarily an infectious one. Such representations were common amongst British newspapers and added to the construction of the terrorist threat as “a major threat to human life across the globe” (Clark, 2001: 4). Frequent references to deadly diseases, such as metastasizing cancers and contagious viruses infecting the ‘body politic’ constructed the threat as one that needs to be dealt with promptly, before it turns into an epidemic or metastasizes. Thus, terrorism is “a cancer whose tentacles spread to every country and society, whatever its origins” (Mandelson, 2001b: 4), it is “a cultural phenomenon, more akin to cancer in the world...which is able to exploit the terrible weakness at the heart of the western values it is trying to destroy” (Phillips, 2001c). Terrorists “live, as parasites do, within the vital

systems of the host they mean to destroy. They may have bases which like the tumours of a cancer, are the centres of infection. But the disease is in the bloodstream of our systems and societies” (Ashdown, 2001: 25). Terrorists were thus represented as those cancerous, unwanted cells which reside within the body politic and which are threatening to spread by metastasizing in other parts of the ‘body’. Moreover, similar to cancer cells, terrorist cells cannot be reasoned with, and thus have to be killed. Since, when a group of cells within the body become cancerous they multiply uncontrollably, and if it isn’t treated the mass of cancerous tissue continues to grow as the cancer cells continue to multiply (CancerBACUP, online), terrorism as cancer requires immediate and fierce treatment, which does not promise to be painless. Moreover, it is understandable and even on some occasions required, that some healthy cells will die along with the bad, cancer cells.

The metaphor of a virus which prowls through a body and infects it as soon as the body is more vulnerable and least prepared to deal with the disease was also used to describe terrorism. “These two ancient mental illnesses (hatred and fanaticism) still bedevil us. Let us be careful not to be infected” (Oz, 2001: 8). According to the press representations, nobody is immune and no place is safe. The terrorists are everywhere, they are “scattered around the world” (Richards, 2001: 26). For this reason nobody can get away from the “infection of fanaticism and blind hate” that the terrorists carry. “It can strike anywhere” (‘Mankind’s humanity’, 2001: 8). Moreover, the terrorist virus is and will always be a threat to “mankind”, since it is characterized by adaptability and flexibility. It will never completely vanish or be destroyed. “The terrorists method can mutate and adapt and adapt again to the measures that are used against them” (‘Terrible acts of barbarism’, 2001: 3). Since there is such a huge danger that “We, the pure ones” could also be infected we should do our best to avoid any type of contact, or negotiation with the terrorist viruses, because they “form a deadly threat” (Fielding, 2001). In the terrorism as a virus metaphor terrorists live as part of the environment and are constantly present in one form or another. Their flexibility, adaptability and potential to mutate and change tactics make them very dangerous and necessitates their containment and extermination.

Even though cancer and viruses are different types of diseases, the implications of articulations of terrorism as cancer or as a virus are very similar, since they call for very similar types of treatment. Thus, in both representations terrorists are deadly, they can and often do multiply in an uncontrolled way, they are difficult to deal with and need immediate and drastic treatment. A very important implication of such a discourse is that the terrorists were constructed either as external threats or internal pests which needed to be eradicated. Such a discourse dehumanized the terrorists, excluded the possibility of any form of compromise or dialogue and called for drastic measures to quarantine and then exterminate the terrorists. David Campbell (1992: 84-86) asserts that representations of moral and social threats in medical terms has a number of consequences:

*It casts the danger as an aberration that deviates from the norm of health and threatens the integrity of the body of its habitual functions; it establishes a power relationship in which the authority making the diagnosis occupies the position of a doctor vis-à-vis the patient, thereby reproducing the notion that the health (or security) of the larger population is dependent on the specialized knowledge of an elite; it renders complex problems simplistically as the symptoms of an alien infection that is external in origin; and it mandates (often violent) intervention as the appropriate course of action that will result in a cure... In such discourses there are no grey areas, no complexities, no historical understandings, no doubts about the self, and no qualms about the nature of the response.*

The same rhetoric of cancers and viruses has been used in the past to represent threats. As Jutta Weldes points out, metaphors of infectious diseases were part of the U.S. security imaginary during the Cold War, only articulated to communists and communism, rather than terrorists and terrorism. U.S. officials described communism as a 'parasite', an 'infection', a 'virus' or a 'cancerous threat' that needed to be contained before spreading and infecting the healthy American body politic. Such a representation, Weldes maintains, enabled the U.S. to implement draconian measures against Castro and his regime (Weldes 1996: 180-2). Nevertheless, terrorism was not always described in these terms. Even though infection and cancer were the primary representations, an article published in *The Times* deviated from this norm. Terrorism is still an infectious,



scary illness, but this time it is a different type of ailment, it resembles more the HIV virus.

*Terror as a political movement is not a rampantly infectious disease galloping towards epidemic unless "stamped on" fast; it is more like the HIV virus: desperately fragile, tender, able to survive and spread in only the most specialised environment, and very containable indeed once we understand how and where and why it spreads. This is because no terrorist moves in a vacuum. He lives in our world with us and cannot operate without many quite uninvolved citizens seeing or getting a hint of his presence" (Parris, 2001a).*

This metaphor entails a subtly different understanding of terrorists. Terrorism is still external and very dangerous, but it can be contained, provided the appropriate precautions are taken. It is also a virus which can only develop in very particular places and under very specific circumstances. Thus, it can be managed, if its causes are detected and the problem is in turn dealt with. This metaphor, though quite similar to the more commonly encountered ones in the sense that it presents the terrorist as an illness, still invites another understanding. It does entertain the possibility that terrorism has tangible causes that need to be addressed. Thus, understanding and trying to deal with those peoples' dissatisfaction and misery, may be the actual solution to the problem.

### **Islam and terrorism: The connection**

It was constantly highlighted in the British press, after September 11 and throughout the attacks in Afghanistan, that Muslims were not to blame for the attacks in the United States and that Islam is a religion of peace. It was also pointed out on many occasions that this was not a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1998), since "the actions of the hijackers has nothing to do with Islamic theology ... what we will increasingly face will be the capacity of a few determined individuals to involve their entire civilization whether or not it agrees with their thinking and actions in confrontation with other civilizations" (Akbar, 2001: 4). The problem was articulated as one of 'extremists' committing crimes in the name of a religion. Therefore, whereas there was a clear polarization created between "us" and "them, the mad and villainous terrorists", the

polarization between 'us' and 'the Islamic them' was avoided, in the sense that there were only few explicit references to the 'threat' of Islam as a religion or of Muslims in general. "This is once more the battle between fanatics...and the rest of us, who ascribe sanctity to life itself... the vast majority of Arabs and of other Muslims are neither accomplices to the crime nor rejoicing in it" ( Oz, 2001: 8). "To cite Islam as their cause is a sham; they do not represent Islam" ("Treat Taliban recruits", 2001: 14).

However, even though Islam was not directly constituted as a threat, the overall impression created was nonetheless of Islam as an inferior, backward religion, that essentially hindered the progress of Muslim countries and of humankind in general. In short, the British press projected negative images of Islam and of Muslims, which constructed Muslims as specific types of subjects, as at least "uncomfortable others" or even "dangerous and threatening others", even with the ongoing argument that Islam is a peaceful and welcoming religion. Through this representation, not only the terrorists but Islam as a religion and Muslims the world over were represented in a negative way, inferior to "our civilized West". Islam came to be represented as the religion best suited for the breeding of terrorists.

### *Islam and its clash with modernity*

British press representations created an incompatibility between the religion of Islam, on the one hand, and modernity as well as capitalist, liberal democratic notions, on the other. Islam was constituted as a backward religion, or at least a religion that resists modernity, and Muslims as more susceptible to terrorism and extremism than Christians. "There does seem to be something about Islam or at least fundamentalist Islam that makes Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. Of all contemporary cultural systems, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and contains no countries that have made the transition from third to first world status in the manner of South Korea or Singapore ... Islam is the only cultural system that regularly seems to produce people, like Osama Bin Laden or the Taliban, who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel ... the hatred is born out of resentment of western success and Muslim failure" (Fukuyama,

2001: 5). Moreover, “no Muslim state is a liberal democracy, certainly not in the Middle East. This means there are few brakes on Islamic fundamentalism” (Quinn, 2001b). Islam and Western liberalism were juxtaposed, with Islam seemingly containing inferior values or values which resist any kind of novelty. “Whatever reservations we have about U.S. tactics to be decided, the values which underpin U.S. democracy are our values ... But we have failed utterly to communicate those values to the dispossessed of the Muslim world” (‘Bring the murderers to justice’, 2001: 3). There was a sense of “Muslim failure” in the press discourse, whereby Muslim countries “simply could not be adapted to the changing world ... Islamic ‘fundamentalist’ extremism is a violent reaction to the failed secular dreams of the Arab world and beyond, a simplistic turning back to old certainties ... Muslim governments still could not match the technology of the West; and most importantly, there was little reconciliation between modern life and Islamic teaching” (Binyon, 2001). There was, thus, the insinuation that Muslim countries are by definition impoverished, violent and backward because they are Islamic. Islam seemed to possess inherently an anti-democratic and authoritarian ethos that precludes democratization or “modernization” in the liberal democratic sense.

The main presupposition that facilitated and rationalized this representation was that of liberal, capitalist modernity as the most appropriate and superior form of governance. The world was described in evolutionary terms and systems were classified as superior and inferior, with liberal capitalist modernity emerging as the “ideal” system and the last phase in the evolutionary cycle of civilization (also see Fukujama, 1993). Moreover, this was a condition that liberal democracies had reached, but which Muslim countries would probably never manage to achieve due to the incompatibility between their religion and modernity. Specifically, predicates such as “success”, “transition”, “progress”, “changing world” naturalized the liberal democratic system as the latest and most successful phase in the history of political ‘evolution’; at the same predicates such as “failed”, “failure”, “simplistic”, “could not match”, “reject”, “hatred” and “resentment” constituted Muslim countries as inferior subjects since they had remained “backward”. Moreover, Muslims were doomed to failure due to ‘natural’ factors that precluded progress and modernization. Specifically, Islam was represented as the opposite of



modernity and liberal capitalist democracy, thus precluding the possibility of an Islamic country ever 'modernizing'. At the same time, Islam and Muslims were doomed to failure due to 'natural' factors that precluded progress and modernization. Essentially, Muslims were seen as representatives of a traditional, backward world, which is "an underdeveloped version of the modern world" (Ifversen, 2002: 4).

Not only did Islam come to connote backwardness, but this representation also facilitated constructions of the western, liberal democracies as embodying the universal. As Ifversen points out, "western values are viewed as modern per se. A standard narrative about the universal values of Enlightenment typically supports this claim. But it also needs an image of (an entity named) Islam as being immune to those values, either because Islamic values are radically different from the Western ones or because Islam got stuck in the past" (Ifversen, 2002: 5, also see Said, 1995: 304). Similarly, Inden points out that Indians were perceived as irrational, undisciplined and backward. This was put down to India itself, which as an Asian country is naturally inferior to the Western countries. Furthermore, this backwardness resulted from the fact that Indians belonged to an earlier time, "a prior stage on the human developmental or evolutionary scale. Oriental despotism and the Asiatic mode of production were, when they first appeared... at the forefront of the evolution of human civilization ... After Alexander the Great's conquest of Asia, however, the Hegelian light passed to the West itself" (Inden, 1986, pg.423). Essentially, Islam acted as the centre around which other signifiers acquired their meaning. It signified all those negative features that the western liberal democracies lacked, namely backwardness, brutality and totalitarianism. It was in contrast to Islam that the west gained its meaning as modern, peaceful and liberal. Moreover, the nodal point 'Islam' united in a chain of equivalences different Others under the label of one main Other. Thus, 'The Taliban', 'suicide bombers' and 'Saddam' were also defined in relation to the same nodal point 'Islam'.

The representation of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism as resistant to modernity can be problematized, however, because Al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism have quite convincingly been characterized as entirely modern phenomena. Rather than being a

relic of the past, radically antithetic to modernity, Habermas, for example, argues that Islamic fundamentalism is a distinctively and uniquely modern phenomenon, precisely because of its opposition to modernity and modernization. "Whether we discuss Islamic, Christian, or Hindu fundamentalist beliefs, we are talking about violent reactions against the modern way of understanding and practicing religion. In this perspective fundamentalism is not the simple return to a pre-modern way of relating to religion: it is a panicked response to modernity perceived as a threat rather than as an opportunity" (Habermas in Borradori, 2003: 19). The *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society* (online) also defines fundamentalism as "a quintessentially modern phenomenon. It actively strives to reorder society; it reasserts the validity of a tradition and uses it in new ways; it operates in a context that sets nontraditional standards; where it does not take decisive control, it reproduces the dilemmas it sets out to resolve; as one active force among others, it affirms the depth of modern pluralism; it takes on the tensions produced by the clash between a universalizing global culture and particular local conditions; it expresses fundamental uncertainty in a crisis setting, not traditional confidence about taken-for-granted truths; by defending God, who formerly needed no defense, it creates and recreates difference as part of a global cultural struggle. So compromised, fundamentalism becomes part of the fabric of modernity". Therefore, it could be claimed that Islamic fundamentalism is a contemporary phenomenon, a reaction to various aspects of modernity. It opposes the modern world, but still remains bound to it. But American style democratic capitalism is perceived as modern in the British press. As John Gray says, however, radical Islam is also modern, insofar as it is represented by Al Qaeda. It may be anti-western, but it is to a great extent influenced by western ideology. "Like Marxists and neo-liberals, radical Islamists see history as a prelude to a new world. All are convinced they can remake the human condition. If there is a uniquely modern myth, this is it" (2004: 3-4).

### *Radical versus moderate Islam*

One ongoing argument in all three British newspapers under study was that “the West” was under threat from radical Islam represented by fundamentalist Muslims and that the “moderate Muslims” had an obligation and a duty to voice their dissent against their “fundamentalist brothers”. “There was no association between Islam and violence; but those complaining of prejudice should not be surprised by this false Western assumption if they do not counter the claims of the fanatics ... British Muslims are overwhelmingly appalled at what terrorism has done to their image. Those who expound Islam’s tenets should make that revulsion explicit” (‘Fatwa on Terror’, 2001). As has already been mentioned, Islam as a religion and the values it adheres to were not usually directly attacked, but the dichotomy that was created between moderate and radical Islam or moderate/liberal and radical Muslims served the function of categorizing Muslims and Muslim countries in two groups, those who are moderate and thus are accepted or tolerated (the moderate ones usually being “our British Muslims”), and those who are radical, a threat and needing to be annihilated. Moreover, the radical ones “reject the modern world”, while the moderate and wise ones “wish to bring their civilization into the community of world civilizations” (Akbar, 2001: 4). This dichotomy ended up essentially representing Muslim countries and Muslims in general as either “mad supporters of terror” and “mad Mullahs” or more enlightened Muslims, who have a more secular vision of the world.

Moreover, the phrase “Muslim world”, which was so often mentioned in the British press, is evidence of this perception of Islam as having a uniform, massive and inflexible character, with the religion being the only guiding principle of all Muslims. The pictures published in the British press all depicted ‘bearded’ Muslims, holding guns and aggressively looking at the camera, or praying in the mosque, or praying while at the same time keeping a gun next to them, or violently protesting in favour of Bin Laden. The pictures of protesters were usually close-ups which depicted a few shouting demonstrators with glaring eyes, holding banners and flags. The effect of these close-ups



was to create the impression that the protesters were fanatics, since they expressed their convictions with such fervour (Appendix A, Figures 7-10). Headlines, in turn, would highlight this alleged Muslim obsession with guns and religion. “Battlefield of guns and prayers” (Loyd, 2001a: 9) and “If you think Bin Laden is extreme – some Muslims want to kill him because he is soft” (Hellen, 2001: 4) appeared daily in the press. A picture published in *The Independent* on October 27 (Appendix C, Figure 11) showed a disabled Pakistani who had climbed on a lamp-post and was staring at the camera while at the same time holding a big poster of Bin Laden. In the background one could see what appeared to be a march attended by thousands of Taliban supporters protesting against U.S. imperialism.

However, this monolithic image of the “Muslim world” is far from realistic. In reality, the “Muslim world” consists of over a billion people, with different traditions, languages and historical experiences, while “the social and cultural similarities between Muslims of different communities, be they Senegalese, Moroccan, Iranian, Chinese or Indonesian, are far fewer than the similarities shared with non-Muslim members of the same community” (Muscati, 2003: 261). As Derrida also points out, “we should not consider everything that has to do with Islam or with the Arab Muslim ‘world’ as a ‘world’, or at least as one homogeneous whole. And wanting to take all these divisions, differences and differends into account does not necessarily constitute an act of war; nor does trying to do everything possible to ensure that in this Arab Muslim ‘world’, which is not a world and not a world that is one, certain currents do not take over, namely, those that lead to fanaticism”! (Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 112-3).

### *Beards, burqas, turbans ... and the Muslim “other”*

In the British newspapers’ discourse ‘beards’ were granted specific meanings and acquired particular connotations, which in turn resulted in the further alienation and ‘othering’ of the Taliban, as well as Muslims in general. The repeated articulation of certain linguistic items such as beard or burqas enabled the representation of Afghans, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in a very specific way, enhancing the opposition

between “us” and “them”. Similar descriptions of “bearded Castro and his lieutenants” were also common within the U.S. cold war discourse and stressed the malevolent and aggressive character of the Cuban regime (Weldes, 1999: 182-184). Such articulations are not necessary and uncontested; neither are they logically and structurally coherent or essential. However, their constant articulation and rearticulation resulted in the positioning of the Taliban as particular types of subjects, hostile and primitive aggressors who needed to be eradicated.

**Bearded aggressors:** The constant use of the adjective “bearded” and the very frequently elaborate description of Afghan beards added to the image of the Afghan warlords, both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, as aggressive and primitive others. Through the characterization of the Afghans as bearded there was a continuous reminder of the distance between “us” and “them”. “We [British Muslims] have nothing in common with bearded men who beat up shrouded women” (Alibhai-Brown, 2001a: 5). This distinction was further enhanced with images of Afghans declaring their hate for the “West” and the U.S. “People say we Afghans are hairy people”, he spat, “and it is true: we have long beards and long hair, we have hairy ears and we have hairy hearts too. We will never hand over Osama Bin Laden, and we will be glad to fight America” (Popham, 2001b: 9).

Moreover, the detailed descriptions of the length and lack of tidiness of the beard and its depiction as the main and foremost characteristic of the Afghans enhanced this feeling of primitiveness and threat. “The cold steely eyes, the thick black beard and the craggy face framed by a white turban...” (Hibbs, 2001: 8-9). The state and colour of the beard, for example, seemed to determine the degree of backwardness and wildness of the Afghans. Beards were described as “ruggedly groomed”, and people were seen as “heavily bearded”. Bin Laden himself was depicted as “a mad bearded terrorist” (Aaronovitch, 2001b: 3) or “the one with the beard who we don’t like” (Steel, 2001c: 5). The beard was thus elevated to a metonym of ferociousness and brutality, with the Taliban and the Alliance being obsessed with their beards. “His beard had been smoothed to the shape of a pear by so much stroking” (Campbell, 2001). The longer and less combed the beard,

the more unruly and fierce was its bearer. Greying of the beard, on the other hand, was a sign of defeat. "Even bin Laden's precious beard has turned grey and his skeletal faces shows he has lost a tremendous amount of weight" (Dutt, 2001). Bin Laden's beard was elevated as a major symbol in the British press imagery, with progressive pictures of the amount of whiteness of the beard, from October to December; the last, picture in which his beard appeared to be in its whitest was depicted as a sign of defeat and withdrawal (Appendix A, Figure 12)

Furthermore, those Afghans characterized as more liberal had their beards "trimmed". "Mohammed, his beard freshly trimmed, is not a tyrant. For an Afghan, he is quite liberal" (Huggler, 2001:3). Obviously, as has been already delineated, being Afghan or Muslim and liberal didn't go together in the British press discourse. However, having a neater beard was definitely a sign of improvement. This relationship between 'us' and 'them', the 'west' versus 'the rest', with the latter being the inferior part in the oppositional pairs, was prevalent in the newspapers' discourse and the articulations of beards as signs of aggression and backwardness established such oppositions.

The beard, however, was not merely a symbol of aggression and primitiveness; beards were also symbols of oppression. For this reason, their removal signalled liberation and freedom. The main representation was that people in Afghanistan, with the exception of the ruling parties, would wear the beard not out of their own will but as a result of coercion and oppression. Shaving of the beards was, therefore, used as proof that Afghanistan was now free and liberal. This seemed to have been the only problem in Afghanistan and since it was solved, there was nothing else to worry about. "Everywhere in Kabul yesterday the men had shaved off their beards in small but telling acts of defiance" (Clark, 2001b:1), or "men in turbans queue to have beards trimmed by Asian barbers" (Studd, 2001). That this imagery was the only one prevalent in the press after the fall of the Taliban, not only constructed the U.S. intervention as liberation, thus legitimizing it, but also trivialized a very serious and still unresolved political issue, that is the future of a post-war Afghanistan.



**Bearded pride:** This representation of beards as signs of brutality and backwardness is highly contestable. Beards amongst Muslim men are generally viewed as symbols of faith and pride. As Weldes has also pointed out in her analysis of the U.S. 'Cuban problem', the beards had a positive symbolic value for Cuban revolutionaries, although they connoted irresponsibility and threat in U.S. discourse. Castro and his compatriots used the word bearded to describe each other, with positive rather than negative connotations. "Bearded" in their discourse stood for courage and determination; the beard represented the revolutionary hardships that they had eagerly accepted (Weldes 1999). Likewise, Muslims, and not only, (but it is the representation of Muslims that is of interest on this occasion) can willingly grow beards. Extracts from a poem by Tushar (March 2001), which is published on the website of the Islamic society of the University of Leicester, clearly shows that the negative description of beards in the British press cannot and should not be taken for granted.

*There is beauty in the beard ... And a Muslim man grows his beard in pride ... Showing the rest of humanity that he is to be respected. Can someone imagine a lion without its mane? Nay, thou canst not! Then imagine a man without his beard ... All the prophets had beards – yes they did! Muhammad had a beard – so big! So big! All the companions had beards – o yes! O yes! ... All the wise have beards. Tis true! Tis true ... What greater reason than this can there be. The fact that our prophet told us to see ... That we make ourselves appear to the world As full bearded men with honour untold ... So indeed I love my beard And adore the curls and tangles ... Which no oil, gel or superglue can ever straighten ... My glorious long, curly, messy, fluffy hair!!*

The above extract is just one example which shows the contingent and constructed character of the articulations of the British press. Alternative representations are always possible. The beard, in Tushar's poem, signifies pride, honour and faith, all positive connotations. However, what one gets from the newspaper's discourse is only an abhorrence of beards.

## Our mighty friend

The U.S. was both positively and negatively represented in the press discourse, either as a powerful empire standing for democracy and liberty, or as an arrogant, self-serving power that wreaks havoc with its unjust actions and double standards. Even though these two discourses are very different, they shared a common point; they constructed the U.S. as the strongest global actor, with unrivalled power and influence. “Bloody indignities may be inflicted upon it, but America-like Rome-will weather them. Like it or loathe it, the U.S. is a modern Rome” (Cornwell, 2001b: 7), or “[America] it can outlast or absorb practically anything” (Hitchens, 2001: 28).

### *Discourse One – The Empire as a good force or the angelic hegemony*

According to the first of the two prevailing discourses, the U.S. has, despite some failures, generally been a very positive and peaceful force in the global system. “This country stands for unity, freedom, opportunity, equal rights, diversity, liberty and justice” (Jurski, 2001: 14-15). Elsewhere, “America is free, very democratic, and hugely successful” (Appleyard, 2001c). Moreover, the U.S. was as benign an empire as it possibly could be. “The U.S. is at its heart a peaceful country. It has done more to help the world than any other actor in world history. It saved the world from the two greatest evils of the last century in Nazism and Soviet communism. It responded to its victories in the last war by pouring aid into Europe and Japan ... America need not have done any of this. Its world hegemony has been less violent and less imperial than any other comparable power in history” (Sullivan, 2001f). In short, the U.S. was positioned as one of the finest examples of a liberal democratic country which demonstrates the best of humanity, and which everyone should aspire towards. It was precisely this U.S. superiority that, according to this discourse, triggered and facilitated the attacks. “So at the most basic level America is loathed simply because she’s on top. The world leader is trashed simply for being the leader” (Appleyard, 2001c). Similarly, “its cultural and commercial superiority, and the relentless drumbeat of its free market doctrines have

been seen as a threat to many religious and class groups especially in traditional societies” (Kennedy, 2001: 28). Besides, due to its freedom and tolerance, the U.S. was challenged by terrorists who abused its lenience and open-mindedness. “A free country with open borders and a multiracial population carries within it its own self-detonation button ... in a country that pioneered religious freedom, and guarantees it in its constitution, there is no ability to deter or even stamp out even the most crazed religious sect. The enemy knows this” (Sullivan, 2001f). America’s freedom and openness, its strongest points, were at the same time its Achilles’ heel.

Finally, the critics of U.S. foreign policy or those who were more sceptical about the September 11 attacks were constituted as unworthy subjects in this discourse. “The failure to rally behind a freedom loving people world wide, not just America, at this time in our history is appalling – especially coming from those who earn their bread and butter from a free press” (McGilton, 2001). “Pinterism is all around, wearing its badges” (Aaronvitch, 2001a: 3). In fact, scepticism was equated with anti-Americanism. “A virulent anti-Americanism exists in Europe – and it is probably worse on the continent” (Parsons, 2001c: 16-17). Similarly, “this is the anti-Americanism that informs the ignorant dinner party guests of the west who, in their comfortable stupidity, pretend to have more in common with fanatical theocrats than they do with the land of The Simpsons and John Updike ... So they blame the victim” (Appleyard, 2001c). In line with the above, it was established that “our cause is just. Our fight is right ... as the shooting begins America is doing exactly what it should do. Showing the world that the extremists are all on the other side” (Parsons, 2001e: 14).

In this representation, positive predicates such as “equality”, “freedom”, “democracy”, “liberty” and “justice” constituted the U.S. as a positive force. Moreover, the presupposition that the U.S. by definition was endowed with those qualities constructed the U.S. as a rightful subject, who would under no circumstances act in a non-liberal and undemocratic way. Such a presupposition not only legitimized any past and future U.S. actions and construed the U.S. as the blameless victim of the September 11 attacks; it also ‘othered’ anyone who challenged this presumption as anti-American. Since the U.S.



was positioned in this discourse as a peaceful, democratic and just subject, any criticism of the U.S. could only be unjust and ill-founded. Thus, this discourse essentially reinforced the “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) binary of inclusion/exclusion (see Christie, 2003: 17), whereby the world was divided in two camps.

### *Discourse Two – The U.S. as a typical superpower*

The second main discourse constructed the U.S. as a unilateral actor not abiding by international norms or laws. “Since September, the US has in essence, despite the convenient cloak of an alliance, been acting on its own, unilaterally, with no resource to the collective advice and wisdom of those who know a lot more about the situation than the US does or who will suffer the consequences of US actions” (Sayle, 2001: 5). Elsewhere, “Mr Bush’s unilateralism is deplorable” (‘President Bush’s missile plan’, 2001: 3). Not only was the U.S. construed as unilateral, but it was also positioned as a belligerent, bellicose and self-serving power intent on solving issues by violent means. The Americans “are not up for peace keeping, peace making, security assistance or that sort of business by whatever name ... America has thus evolved a modern warrior ethic, sharper yet under president bush, which will engage in conflict wholeheartedly when it believes its cause right, but considers, in the words of one former senior military figure, that peace keeping is for wimps – which means, as far as the US is concerned, for the rest of us” (McElvoy, 2001e: 3). In short, “Washington’s priority is the war (‘America must build peace’, 2001: 3). In addition, the U.S. was criticized for its violent expansionary politics. “Since the Second World War, American governments have sought to impose a Pax Americana on the entire globe through the barrel of a gun, in Korea, in Central America, in Eastern Europe and the Middle East” (Routledge, 2001b: 12.).

In fact, the September 11 attacks themselves were at least partly seen as a result of unjust U.S. foreign policies, which had incited hatred. “America’s failure to act with honour in the Middle East, its promiscuous sale of missiles to those who use them against civilians, its blithe disregard for the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqi children under sanctions of

which Washington is the principal supporter-all these are intimately related to the society that produced the Arabs who plunged America into an apocalypse of fire last week” (Fisk, 2001b: 29). In other words, “at the heart of problem is the duplicitous nature of American foreign policy, which has been responsible for thousands of deaths around the world over the years ... which has gained the US so many enemies” (Nyatsumba, 2001b: 4).

This discourse substantially differed from the previous one, since it constructed the U.S. as a different, more negative subject. Predicates such as “warrior”, “deplorable”, “unilateralism”, “failure” and “disregard” not only constituted the U.S. in negative terms, but also introduced a more political and historical understanding of the events. Specifically, the U.S. was constituted as an actor whose history of violent and belligerent behaviour had gained it enemies. Thus, this discourse allowed for an understanding of the September 11 attacks as something more than an unjustified act of violence by irrational, evil madmen towards an innocent, freedom-loving U.S; it allowed for an understanding of the events as acts of violence, partially rooted in U.S.-induced injustices, poverty and anger. Moreover, this discourse is incompatible with representations of the U.S. as an innocent victim, since it positioned the U.S. as an expansionary and warlike actor, which had gained its power by violent means and was thus neither innocent, nor a victim.

The U.S. was represented in two completely different ways, as has already been outlined. However, the second discourse, which was critical of the U.S. and its policies was not as prominent as the first. There was generally a positive posture towards the U.S. in the newspapers’ discourse, but it was not hegemonic, since the U.S. also received a fair amount of criticism. However, even though the U.S. was criticized, the constructions of the terrorist threat and the danger it posed to the “west”, combined with positive representations of the U.S., still positioned it as the inevitable leader on the inevitable “War on Terrorism”. Besides, the U.S. was still part of “our western civilized culture”, it was on our side. No matter what the discourses on the U.S. were, it was constituted as ‘our’ closest friend and ally, which holds ‘our’ values and thus deserves ‘our’ support.

Britain's role was, in turn, hegemonically defined as that of a "wiser" and more experienced consultant and minor partner of the U.S. in the "war on terror".

### **The U.K. after September 11: The good Samaritan**

After the September 11 events and throughout the entire period of the war in Afghanistan, the U.K. was positioned as a central actor in the international arena, with Tony Blair as its gifted Prime Minister and most appropriate representative. While there were different representations on the aims of the war, as well as the extent of its "rightfulness", there did not seem to be any substantial divergence in the press representations as to the role that the U.K. ought to play and the suitability of Blair, "the Persuader" ('Pakistan might yet prove', 2001: 3) as one of the most important actors in the global field and as the closest U.S. ally in the "war on terror". Since the conflict was presented as an attack on "Western culture and democracy", it was Britain's duty to respond. Moreover, it was Britain's, and Blair's, duty to stand by their closest ally, to face the common threat united. "Britain has always stood shoulder to shoulder with our friends and allies in America against terrorism, tyranny and oppression of every kind. Together we have pursued the causes of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Our horror at what happened yesterday has reinforced our joint resolve. This morning, the people of the United States can be sure of the support of their closest allies" (Straw, 2001: 18). Therefore, the U.K. was positioned in a relationship of similarity, identity and complementarity with the U.S., and of opposition to the terrorists in the "war against terror".

Moreover, Tony Blair was depicted as the ideal leader to deal with the serious issues emerging after September 11. "He has been Prime Minister for almost five years, which makes him one of the world's most experienced leaders. He has been tested in international conflict before and came through strongly. He combines toughness with a cool head. The essential qualities that are needed today" ('Blair must point way for Bush', 2001: 8). Moreover, "Mr Blair is a born leader" (McElvoy, 2001e: 3), and "an inspiring leader" ('Even this Prime Minister', 2001: 26), "courageous" and "not worried



about sticking his head above the parapet or standing up for what he believes in” (Malone, 2001b: 27). In a photo published in *The Independent* right after the September 11 events, Blair is shown during a press conference in 10, Downing Street (Appendix A, Figure 13). He is standing in front of the portrait of King George the second. King George II was the last British monarch to lead troops to battle and was renowned for his lifelong passion for the military and his courage on the battlefield against the French in 1743 (BBC history: online). In the portrait, the king is extending his hands towards the horizon and so does Mr Blair, who is right in front of King George’s portrait answering questions from journalists. The similarities between Blair and the portrait are obvious, since their posture is strikingly similar. Thus, the photo of Blair in front of King George’s portrait positions Blair in a position of similarity to the king, and creates connotations of Blair as a capable and courageous leader, ready to lead the U.K. in the “war on Terror”.

Additionally, Blair was often juxtaposed to other European and world leaders, emerging as a worthier leader. Specifically, “Blair understood more quickly than most national leaders the degree to which the global kaleidoscope has been shaken by the mass murder of 11 September” (‘Mr. Blair was right to avoid’, 2001: 3). Besides, “the Prime Minister, uniquely among Western statesmen, is a leader who has seen through a war and emerged with his international reputation enhanced” (Gove, 2001c). In short, “I am proud we’ve got this guy as our leader ... You just have to look at other political leaders around the world to know that ours stands head and shoulders above all of them” (Malone, 2001b: 27).

Finally, Blair was contrasted to President Bush, who was either seen as a weak leader or was believed to be dealing with his country’s plight in quite a restrained and cautious way, but was in no way the leader that Blair was. Specifically, Blair was characterized as “one of the democratic world’s most sophisticated communicators”, who being a lawyer “has an almost mystical belief in the power of good argument” (Macintyre, 2001d: 4). On the other hand, Mr Bush’s speeches “have lacked both resonance and depth” (Dejevsky, 2001b: 8), while “his thin-lipped, somewhat superficial manner of deliver

does not help” (Cornwell, 2001a: 7). Besides, as soon as the U.S. was attacked, it was Blair, not Bush who had dealt with them effectively. While “it looked like they [the U.S. citizens] were led by a petrified pygmy” (Reade, 2001c: 16), or a “frightened schoolboy who didn’t know his lines” (McKean, 2001: 16), “the PM has effortlessly become an international statesman ... As America was plunged into chaos, the PM was phoning world leaders in a bid to forge an unprecedented united front” (Hardy, 2001: 13). For all the above reasons, “we must throw full support behind President Bush but we must also be prepared to look elsewhere for leadership. And that means looking to Tony Blair” (‘Blair must point way for Bush’. 2001: 8).

Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that Bush and the U.S. were in need of guidance and advice, which only an accomplished leader like Tony Blair could offer. “As candid and loyal friends of the American people, Mr Blair must speak for the British in counselling restraint and understanding rather than revenge” (‘Hold Fire’, 2001: 3). “Mr Blair, by all accounts, has been a voice of reason in Washington” (Macintyre, 2001c: 2). It is evident, then, that Blair was depicted as a European leader, ahead of other European leaders, who was capable of offering insightful advice. “No one doubts that Mr. Blair is playing a pivotal role” (Grice, 2001a: 9).

Britain thus had a mission to fulfil in this conflict, the mission to guide, advise and stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the U.S. as the second most important actor in this long-term struggle against “terrorism”, not only because it is a struggle which is moral and “right”, but also because it is dangerous to leave the U.S. on their own. The U.S. was construed as a mighty “superchild” (see Milliken 1999) which may be powerful economically and militarily but is in desperate need of guidance from a more mature partner so as not to “mess up”. Such a representation of the U.S. is not new. Milliken described the representations of the U.S. by British policymakers during the Korean War. The U.S. was then also seen as an impulsive, often irrational actor who could resort to isolationism and so act unwisely. For this reason, the intrusion of the British government in the Korean War was essential; it would enable the older and more mature partner to advise the inexperienced child. The similarities in the British press discourse after 9/11 were

striking. The imperative to cooperate with the U.S., so it would not pursue unilateralist tactics, was strong. “The dangers of alienating an American administration at the time of its greatest test could not be plainer ... We need to ensure that the US is not, at this moment of unimaginable tragedy, forced back on to itself ... The allies have no chance whatever of promoting these causes unless they stand by the U.S. now” (Macintyre, 2001a: 4).

Moreover, the constant juxtaposition of Blair’s and Britain’s maturity against U.S. military and economic might is also worth noting, since it is this juxtaposition that constructed Britain as a wise actor, yet ultimately unable to determine events. “Mr Blair is in danger of giving the impression that he is co-equal to President Bush. In reality he is the junior partner who will have limited influence on the course of events” (‘Even this Prime Minister’, 2001: 26). Similarly, “for all Mr. Blair’s prominence and eloquence, Britain’s influence and contribution should not be exaggerated. It is primarily a US operation. Mr. Blair is certainly consulted, but President Bush takes all the key decisions” (Riddell, 2001a). Britain was, therefore, essentially presented as a wiser partner, who will help the inexperienced, yet powerful giant, the U.S. that is, which needs assistance. Britain may be wise and powerful, but it cannot compete with the military and economic giant, the U.S., which can and will act the way it wants unless Britain subtly interferes, always on the side of the U.S. so as not to aggravate the giant. “Blair realized immediately that it [military action] would happen whatever American allies did the question was whether Washington would act alone or in a coalition. If the U.S. closest ally offered support militarily and rhetorically, its influence might be circumscribed. But otherwise it would have none” (Macintyre, 2001b: 3). Therefore, it was imperative that Britain stayed by the U.S. side, as a partner, who will try to avert any possible disaster rather than let the U.S. act unilaterally. This, added to the fact that the U.S. is a democratic country, “like the rest of us in the West”, which justly wants to and should eradicate terrorism, legitimates and renders important Britain’s involvement in the Afghan conflict and in the longer “War on Terrorism” as the main U.S. ally; an ally who will have to compromise and accept possible U.S. caprices for a just world order to remain in place. “That is an unchallengeable reason for Mr. Blair’s presence in



Washington tonight. To listen. To report. And within all the limits which he well understands, to advise” (Macintyre, 2001b: 3).

To conclude, Blair was essentially hailed as a capable politician and a stabilizing actor. It is the way Blair and Bush were depicted that positioned Britain as a subject destined to play a dutiful role in the events. A different representation would have positioned Britain as a different type of subject, one, for example, that would side with Europe and let the U.S. act unilaterally, or even try to obstruct the U.S. from pursuing a war in Afghanistan.

## **Greek press representations after September 11**

In the first part of this section I analyze the September 11 events as they were represented in the Greek press; as a U.S. punishment, the humiliation of the superpower, a result of U.S. induced poverty and an excuse for U.S. aggression. I then analyze definitions of terrorism in the second part, where the discourses on the suicide bomber and on the U.S. terrorist are compared. I then illustrate the role of Islam and Muslims in the press discourse as victims of U.S. imperialism. Finally, the role of Greece as an honoured member of the “Western hemisphere” (see Weldes 1999: 146-7) is stressed, a discourse in conflict with previous representations, which demonized the powerful, western countries, primarily the U.S.

### **Dominant representations of the September 11 attacks**

#### *The Empire crumbles: Retribution of justice*

Unlike the British press, which primarily represented the attacks as a terrorist act of great proportions and a declaration of war on the “civilized West”, which needed to fight back and defend itself, the dominant representations in the Greek press were considerably different. They were nonetheless based on the same logic of stereotyping, naturalizing and asserting ones own identity through the exclusion of the “other” (for example see Campbell 1998; Doty 1996; Said 1995; Weldes 1996). A very similar representation of the events to the British press did, in fact, exist in the Greek press, but it was confined to only one of the three newspapers, the right-wing *Kathimerini*. However, even within *Kathimerini* it was a weak and marginal discourse, so it will not be elaborated on in this section.

There was clearly a hegemonic discourse in the Greek press, however. Specifically, the attacks were to a large extent represented as the just punishment of the ruthless

superpower, a punishment long awaited due to U.S. arrogance and disregard for any laws, rules or principles. “Our society may not have ever been ‘just’, but this should under no circumstances ‘justify’ practices that take for granted injustice, inequality, marginalization of whole groups of people” (Oikonomopoulos, 2001b).<sup>105</sup> Likewise, “humankind wept yesterday for what happened in the U.S. in the same way that the Americans mourned for the innocent when the bombs were spreading death in Serbia and Iraq, in Libya and Sudan” (Triadis, 2001b)<sup>106</sup> and “the villainies of a gang either of knights, or aristocrats, or respectable Texans in costume that control our lives and our existence with the comfort that they wind a swatch (not even a rolex), are well recorded in thousands volumes of a Black Bible written and dipped in oceans of the blood of millions of innocent creatures. How is it ever possible to expect a tear to fall from the wrinkled cheeks of an Iraqi mother for the innocent victims of Pearl Towers”? (Danikas, 2001: N20).<sup>107</sup>

Similar sarcastic statements of the “it serves them right” variety, whereby the superpower brought this disaster upon itself and deserved to be taught a lesson for all its wrongdoings, were abundant. “For a long time now, this country has spread injustice, has robbed and tyrannized; and, with the exception of Vietnam, never did America pay the toll for this criminal behaviour. Nemesis follows when there is no attribution of justice; and Nemesis is never just, it is horrid. It resembles the crime that caused it, and in this case it resembles the deeds of the U.S. for which they are now paying” (Nautilus, 2001b).<sup>108</sup> Thus, the element of shock or surprise was absent in the press discourse, according to which some sort of attack was expected and bound to happen because of the

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<sup>105</sup> “μπορεί μεν η κοινωνία των ανθρώπων να μην ήταν ποτέ «δίκαιη», αλλά αυτό δεν είναι δυνατόν να «δικαιώνει» πολιτικές και πρακτικές που θα θεωρούν ως «δεδομένη» την αδικία, την ανισότητα, την περιθωριοποίηση κατηγοριών ολόκληρων”.

<sup>106</sup> “Όπως δάκρυζαν οι Αμερικάνοι-και θρηνούσαν για τους αθώους-όταν οι βόμβες σκόρπιζαν τον θάνατο στη Σερβία, στο Ιράκ, στη Λιβύη, στο Σουδάν, έτσι δάκρυσε χθές ολόκληρη η ανθρωπότητα γι’ αυτό που συνέβη στις ΗΠΑ”.

<sup>107</sup> “Οι αθλιότητες μιας συμμορίας, άλλοτε ιπποτών, άλλοτε αριστοκρατών, άλλοτε γραβατομένων και ευυπόληπτων Τεξανών που ρυθμίζουν την ύπαρξή μας με την άνεση που κουρδίζουν ένα Swatch (ούτε καν Rolex), είναι καταχωρημένες σε χιλιάδες τόμους μιας Μαύρης Βίβλου γραμμένης και βουτηγμένης σε ωκεανούς αίματος εκατομμυρίων αθών πλασμάτων. Πώς είναι ποτέ δυνατόν να περιμένεις μετά να κυλήσει έστω και μισό δάκρυ για τα αθώα θύματα τού ... Περλ Τάουερς, από τα ρυτιδιασμένα μάγουλα μιας μάνας από τη Βαγδάτη”;

<sup>108</sup> “Επί μακρόν η Δύναμη αυτή αδικεί, ληστεύει, τυραννεί. Ουδ’ επ’ ελάχιστον όλα αυτά τα χρόνια, με εξαίρεση τα επίχειρα του Βιετ-Ναμ, πλήρωσε το όποιον τίμημα για αυτήν της την εγκληματικότητα! Κι όταν δεν αποδίδεται έστω κατά μέρος Δικαιοσύνη, επέρχεται η Νέμεσις! Και η Νέμεσις δεν είναι δίκαιη, είναι φρικτή. Είναι σαν το έγκλημα που την προκάλεσε -κι εν προκειμένω είναι σαν τα έργα των ΗΠΑ που τώρα πέφτουν πάνω στο κεφάλι τους.”.



long-standing brutality of the “empire”. The attacks thus came to connote the well-deserved and long awaited retribution of justice. “The capitalist giant is hit and I am not the only one who admits a feeling of justice” (Hatzioannou, 2001: N47).<sup>109</sup> Similarly, “if it weren’t for the dead, the melted towers of Manhattan would be the prettiest of sculptures ... Not even two oceans can wash out the blood with which they [the U.S.] have painted their hands and their soul (Triadis, 2001d).<sup>110</sup> This last quote was accompanied by the famous Vietnam picture of 1972, depicting the naked little Vietnamese girl running down the street whilst screaming helplessly. Some other frightened children were shown running in the foreground, whereas in the background one could discern American armed soldiers. The caption next to the photo read: “They spread hubris, they breed anger” (Triadis, 2001d).

In fact, the notions of ‘hubris’ and ‘nemesis’ were very often employed in one of the three newspapers, *Eleutherotipia*, to refer to the attacks of September 11 as the natural and just consequence of U.S. arrogance and exploitation of their power. “The United States, the greatest world sponsor of Islamic fundamentalism have decided to annihilate their former friends, who are now called terrorists and are backed by their former common enemy! ... The culmination of hypocrisy. Hubris” (Bakomarou, 2001c).<sup>111</sup> “If only they taught children the timeless notions of ancient Greek tragedy: Arrogance, Hubris, Nemesis” (Bardiabasis, 2001).<sup>112</sup> In Greek myth and tragedy, hubris is the pretension to be godlike and thereby fail to observe the divine balance among god, man and nature. It is seen as “an offence against the order of the world, it is having energy and misusing it self-indulgently, it is a behaviour that was intended gratuitously to inflict dishonour and shame to the values that hold a society together” (Ronfeldt, 1994: 1-2). Hubris would usually afflict leaders who abused their power and authority, whether intentionally or not, and exceeded the fate and fortune ordained by the gods. “Nemesis,

<sup>109</sup> “Ο καπιταλιστικός γίγαντας χτυπήθηκε και δεν είμαι η μονη που ομολογει ένα αίσθημα δικαιοσύνης”.

<sup>110</sup> “Αν δεν υπήρχαν οι νεκροί, οι λιωμένοι πύργοι του Μανχάτταν θα ήταν το πιο όμορφο γλυπτό ... Ούτε δύο ωκεανοί δεν ξεπλένουν το αίμα με το οποίο έχουν βάψει τα χέρια και την ψυχή τους”.

<sup>111</sup> “οι ΗΠΑ, ο «μεγάλος παγκόσμιος χορηγός» του ισλαμικού φονταμενταλισμού, έχουν αποφασίσει να εξοντώσουν τους παλιούς τους φίλους, που ... αναβαπτίστηκαν τρομοκράτες, με την πλήρη μάλιστα υποστήριξη του παλιού κοινού εχθρού! .... Η κορύφωση της υποκρισίας. Η ύβρις”.

<sup>112</sup> “Να μάθαιναν τουλάχιστον στα παιδιά τις πάντα επίκαιρες έννοιες της αρχαίας ελληνικής τραγωδίας: Υπεροψία, Υβρις, Νέμεσις”.

the goddess of divine vengeance and retribution might then descend to destroy the vainglorious pretender, to cut man down to size and restore equilibrium” (Ronfeldt, 1994: 2). The implication, then, was that the U.S. had committed hubris, and the terrorist attacks of September 11 were the nemesis, the just punishment of the superpower.

This sense of exhilaration for the assumed downfall of the U.S. was adorned with biblical images and allusions of former empires, whose own arrogance led them to self-destruction. “There have been major powers in the past of humanity and the beginning of their end happened exactly when their global domination led them to arrogance and overconfidence in their power. Before the United States came Athens and Rome” (Oikonomopoulos, 2001b).<sup>113</sup> Elsewhere, “Babylon! Babylon was defeated! The “Roman Empire” of our modern times seems to be wobbling ... In the ancient times when a Roman general or emperor would enter the city in triumph on his chariot, a slave would whisper in his ear- Don’t forget, you are only mortal. The Americans seem to have forgotten this ... The moment that the U.S. had come to believe that they could wage wars now and in the future with no losses or dead soldiers David reminds Goliath that a stone suffices” (Nautilus, 2001a).<sup>114</sup> The David versus Goliath metaphor, which was repeatedly employed in the Greek press, refers to the Biblical story of David, the diminutive, but brave and God-loving Shepherd who managed to defeat the nearly 10 foot tall giant who seemed to be unbeatable, merely by throwing a stone on him. Obviously in this case Goliath represented the “Evil Empire”, whereas David stood for the terrorists, who had caused destruction, but were nevertheless heroes because they had beaten the invincible giant. The representation of the “U.S. empire” as fallen and defeated permeated the press discourse. “No truth is absolute. No matter how many megaton bombs it may contain; no matter how many diamonds, gold and dollars it may

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<sup>113</sup> “Υπερδυνάμεις έχουν ξαναεμφανιστεί στην ανθρωπότητα και η αρχή του τέλους τους σηματοδοτήθηκε όταν ακριβώς αυτή η παντοκρατορία τους, τις οδήγησε στην αλαζονεία και την υπερεμπιστοσύνη της ισχύος τους. Των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών προηγήθηκαν στις ιστορικές σελίδες η Αθήνα και η Ρώμη”.

<sup>114</sup> “Η Βαβυλών! Η Βαβυλών ετρώθη! Το «ρωμαϊκόν αυτονόητο» της σύγχρονης εποχής φαίνεται να κλονίζεται ... Στα παλιά χρόνια, όταν Ρωμαίος στρατηγός ή αυτοκράτορας έμπαινε στην πόλη κάνοντας θρίαμβο, πάνω στο άρμα του πίσω απ’ τον ώμο του ένας δούλος του ψιθύριζε στο αυτί: ‘Να θυμάσαι ότι είσαι θνητός!’. Φαίνεται ότι οι Αμερικανοί το είχαν ξεχάσει αυτό! Τη στιγμή που οι ΗΠΑ είχαν φθάσει στο σημείο να πιστεύουν ότι μπορούν να διεξάγουν τώρα και στο μέλλον πολέμους χωρίς ίδιες απώλειες, χωρίς οικείους νεκρούς, (Κόσσοβο), έρχεται ο Δαβίδ να θυμίσει στον Γολιάθ ότι αρκεί μια πέτρα”.



have saved or how many marines or rockets it launches ... Nothing, absolutely nothing is indestructible and eternal. Not even the American Imperium” (Danikas, 2001: N20).<sup>115</sup>

The employment of metaphors, such as David and Goliath, whereby the giant is defeated by the powerless, yet brave, Christian shepherd, or the association of the U.S. with the ‘blood sucking’ crusaders, reinforced the image of the U.S. as the aggressor rather than the victim and thus minimized the impact of the September 11 attacks.

### *An excuse for the United States to enforce its expansive global vision*

The September 11 attacks were also depicted as actually serving U.S. interests, since they facilitated future U.S. imperialist strategies. “It is clear now that this tragedy will be the official and the legal excuse of the United States, to transform our planet into one of their states” (Koroversis, 2001d).<sup>116</sup> Moreover, with the end of the cold war, “there ceased to be a rival and the argument of an ‘enemy’ ceased to exist. The U.S. needed to invent a new enemy in order to maintain and establish their world hegemony. They finally did find a new ‘invisible enemy’, that is terrorism” (Metas, 2001).<sup>117</sup> Similarly, “Bin Laden was in many ways useful to the Americans. With Bin Laden faceless terrorism acquires a face, the Saudi Arabian becomes the personification of ‘evil’, which is essential for the launching of a crusade of the ‘good’” (Vranas, 2001e: N30).<sup>118</sup> Terms such as ‘War on Terror’ and ‘Counterterrorism’ were thus seen to be stemming from the lust for power and were not associated with feelings of revenge or justice, as was the case in the British press. “The declared “counterterrorism war” was not merely designed by anger and

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<sup>115</sup> “Καμιά αλήθεια δεν είναι απόλυτη. Όσες βόμβες μεγατόνων και να περιέχει. Όσα διαμάντια, χρυσάφι και δολάρια να έχει αποταμιεύσει. Όσους πεζοναύτες και ρουκέτες να εκσφενδονίζει. Όσους κομπιούτερ και να κουρδίζει. Τίποτα μα τίποτα δεν είναι ακατανίκητο και αιώνιο. Ούτε καν το Αμερικανικό Imperium”.

<sup>116</sup> “Είναι πλέον σαφές, πως αυτή η τραγωδία, που έζησε όχι μονάχα ο αμερικανικός λαός, αλλά όλη η ανθρωπότητα, θα γίνει η επίσημη και νόμιμη δικαιολογία των ΗΠΑ για να μετατρέψουν τον πλανήτη σε Πολιτεία τους”.

<sup>117</sup> “Με την κατάρρευση της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης έπαψε να υπάρχει αντίπαλος και κατέρρευσε το επιχείρημα του ‘εχθρού’. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, για να διατηρήσουν και να εδραιώσουν της ηγεμονία τους στον πλανήτη, θα έπρεπε να βρουν έναν νέο «εχθρό». Και βρήκαν έναν «αόρατο εχθρό», που είναι η τρομοκρατία”.

<sup>118</sup> “Ο Μπιν Λάντεν υπήρξε πολλαπλώς χρήσιμος στους Αμερικανούς. Με τον Μπιν Λάντεν η απρόσωπη τρομοκρατία αποκτά πρόσωπο, ο Σαουδάραβας ξαναγίνεται η ενσάρκωση του ‘κακού’, που είναι απαραίτητο για να εξαπολυθεί μια σταυροφορία του ‘καλού’”.



mourning, but by politics and love of power” (Boukalas, 2001b).<sup>119</sup> Most commentators predicted that the horrors of the past would inevitably be repeated, with the U.S. basing its foreign policy on the employment of binary oppositions, constructing enemies and thus furthering its self-centered objectives. “We will relive, it seems, the demonization of ‘the evil’, and the glorification of ‘the forces of goodness’, as happened in the past, so that any criminal action for the defense of “goodness” will be legally and ethically permissible, and will be blessed by the viewers of any and every religion” (Karkagiannis, 2001a).<sup>120</sup> The September 11 events would, thus, mark the initiation of a new Cold War on the part of the U.S. “Did you like anticommunism? You will love anti-Islamism” (Ramonet, 2001).<sup>121</sup> In fact, a cartoon (Appendix B, Figure 1) depicted two frustrated and disappointed looking men. ““Every now and then, America invents a new enemy; and the arms industry flourishes’ commented one of them. The second replied: ‘The other day it was Castro, afterwards it was Kadafi, yesterday it was Saddam. Today it is Bin Laden. Who will it be tomorrow’”?”<sup>122</sup>

### *A cry of despair as a result of U.S. led globalized polarization*

The attacks themselves were seen as a result of poverty and inequality created by U.S.-led globalized imperialism. “Terrorism is a wound. However, it is produced (and reproduced) by the politically, financially and militarily powerful, the powerful of globalization” (Kiaos, 2001).<sup>123</sup> In the hegemonic representation in the Greek press, the world is divided in two sides, the governors and the governed, with the latter suffering from the greed of the former. “I believe that nations are divided in those which govern and those which suffer... the notion of national sovereignty has vanished. The foundations of national sovereignty have been modified substantially in favour of a

<sup>119</sup> “ τον κηρυχθέντα «αντιπόλεμο» δεν τον σχεδιάζει μόνον ο θυμός και το πένθος αλλά και η πολιτική και ο έρωτας της ισχύος”.

<sup>120</sup> “Θα ξαναζήσουμε, όπως φαίνεται, τη δαιμονοποίηση του ‘κακού’ και την αποθέωση του ‘καλού’, όπως τη γνωρίσαμε και στο παρελθόν, ώστε κάθε πράξη για την υπεράσπιση του «καλού», ακόμη και εγκληματική, να είναι νόμιμα και ηθικά επιτρεπτή, που θα την ευλογήσει και ο ... θεατής κάθε θρησκείας”.

<sup>121</sup> “Σας άρεσε ο αντικομμουνισμός; Θα λατρέψετε τον αντισλαμισμό”.

<sup>122</sup> “Κάθε τόσο ανακαλύπτει κι ένα εχθρό η Αμερική. Και δουλεύει η βιομηχανία όπλων! ‘Αντιπροχθές ήταν ο Κάστρο. Προχθές ήταν ο Καντάφι. Χθές ήταν ο Σαντάμ. Σήμερα είναι ο Μπίν Λάντεν! Άυριο ποιος θα είναι άραγε”.

<sup>123</sup> “Η τρομοκρατία είναι πληγή. Την παράγουν όμως (και την αναπαράγουν) οι ισχυροί πολιτικά, οικονομικά, στρατιωτικά, οι ισχυροί της παγκοσμιοποίησης”.

military mechanism, that is global capitalism” (Negri, 2001: N16).<sup>124</sup> Even though the U.S. was the primary capitalist aggressor, it was the western capitalist system in its entirety and the western elites that were responsible for global inequalities and injustices. “The West (United States, North Atlantic Alliance, European Union, Multinational Corporations) have enforced a strategy of political, military, financial, and ‘cultural’ imperialism ... At the same time, the West looks down on International Law and tries to impose unjust solutions in Palestine, Cyprus, the Aegean. The main cause of this western behaviour is capitalism, which depends on ‘globalization’ and alienates conscience” (Stoforopoulos, 2001: N14).<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, “the instigators of this attack were the elite itself and the system of concentrated power that depends on the free market economy and the representative ‘democracy’ that creates and supports the elite ... This attack can be explained easily if one realizes that it was conducted by people who grew up knowing that their brothers in Iraq were being slaughtered by the most sophisticated war machine in the world” (Fotopoulos, 2001b)<sup>126</sup>. “How many fanatical terrorists were bred until now from this strategy of aggressive and massive military action”? (Vranas, 2001d: N22)<sup>127</sup> Therefore, terrorism was represented as the direct consequence of Western -- primarily U.S.-- induced poverty as well as U.S. military violence; terrorism would likely thrive in the future unless this polarization and U.S. military and expansionary violence came to an end. “As long as there is social impoverishment in the Muslim world, there will always be human material for terrorist actions” (Agelopoulos, 2001c).<sup>128</sup> It is thus impossible “to demand understanding, patience and compassion from the billions of the wretched who consume less than a quarter of the global goods, when the world is divided

<sup>124</sup> “Για μένα, τα έθνη χωρίζονται ανάμεσα σ’ αυτά που διοικούν και σ’ εκείνα που υποφέρουν ... Σήμερα, δεν υπάρχει πια εθνική κυριαρχία. Τα ίδια τα θεμέλια της εθνικής κυριαρχίας έχουν τροποποιηθεί ριζικά προς όφελος ενός πολεμικού μηχανισμού: του παγκόσμιου καπιταλισμού”.

<sup>125</sup> “Η Δύση (Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, Βορειοατλαντική Συμμαχία, Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, διεθνικές εταιρείες) έχουν εφαρμόσει στρατηγική πολιτικού, στρατιωτικού, οικονομικού και «πολιτισμικού» ιμπεριαλισμού ... Συγχρόνως, η Δύση περιφρονεί το Διεθνές Δίκαιο και προσπαθεί να επιβάλει άδικες λύσεις στην Παλαιστίνη, την Κύπρο, το Αιγαίο. Βασική αιτία της όλης δυτικής συμπεριφοράς είναι ο καπιταλισμός, που στηρίζεται στην «παγκοσμιοποίηση» και αλλοτριώνει τις συνειδήσεις”.

<sup>126</sup> “οι ηθικοί αυτουργοί της επίθεσης αυτής ήταν οι ίδιες οι ελίτ και το σύστημα συγκέντρωσης εξουσίας, το οποίο στηρίζεται στην οικονομία της αγοράς και την αντιπροσωπευτική «δημοκρατία» που δημιουργεί και στηρίζει τις ελίτ αυτές ... Ούτε βέβαια είναι ανεξήγητη η επίθεση αν πάρουμε υπόψη ότι έγινε από ανθρώπους που μεγάλωσαν βλέποντας τους αδελφούς τους στο Ιράκ να σφάζονται στην κυριολεξία από την τελειότερη πολεμική μηχανή στον κόσμο”.

<sup>127</sup> “Από τη πολιτική, αυτή της επιθετικής και μαζικής στρατιωτικής δράσης, πόσοι άραγε φανατισμένοι τρομοκράτες γεννήθηκαν μέχρι τώρα”?

<sup>128</sup> “Όσο θα υπάρχει κοινωνική εξαθλίωση στον μουσουλμανικό κόσμο, ανθρώπινο υλικό για τρομοκρατικές δράσεις δεν θα λείπει”.



in two unequal slices and since many of us either approve of or are indifferent towards this segregation and this incredible inequality” (Danikas, 2001: N20).<sup>129</sup>

The September 11 attacks were thus represented as an “emergency language which the repressed and the pursued started using when they realized that any other language they had used had no effect, and so resorted to “the language that requires no translation”, that is, the language of despair” (Fotopoulos, 2001b).<sup>130</sup> Therefore, even though terrorism may be “appalling”, it can “in some cases be considered as the only available strategic option for a nation in extremis, which yearns for freedom and self-determination” (Heraklidis, 2001:N06).<sup>131</sup> “Terrorism was always solitary, nihilistic and desperate” (Karkagiannis, 2001a).<sup>132</sup> The solution to the problem of terrorism would thus involve satisfaction of the fundamental rights to “country, justice, freedom, democracy and other similar values”, since “if those countries that the U.S. regards as terrorist nests were not deprived of these values, what would be their reason to breed terrorists or ‘terrorists’”? (Renieris, 2001: N22).<sup>133</sup> It is only “when a society is deprived of basic means of living and basic rights, when the injustices it suffers seem neverending, when the ‘enemy’ is powerful and the ‘subordinate’ is treated with brutality that rationality loses its meaning; and then two things fascinate the brain, the idea of a better life after death and the idea of revenge. Under poverty, repression and despair, human life loses its value” (Papadopoulou, 2001).<sup>134</sup> These representations of the suicide bombers were accompanied by photos of protesting Muslims followed by captions pointing out that “the

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<sup>129</sup> “ Αφού ο κόσμος είναι χωρισμένος σε δύο άνισες φέτες και αφού αρκετοί εξ ημών επικροτούμε ή αδιαφορούμε γι’ αυτόν τον διαχωρισμό, γι’ αυτήν την απίστευτη ανισότητα, πώς είναι ποτέ δυνατόν μετά να ζητάμε κατανόηση, υπομονή και συμπόνια από τα δισεκατομμύρια των εξαθλιωμένων που καταναλώνουν μόλις το 1/4 των παγκόσμιων αγαθών”.

<sup>130</sup> “Η επίθεση επομένως είναι απλώς η ‘γλώσσα έσχατης ανάγκης’, όπως εύστοχα χαρακτηρίστηκε, που άρχισαν να χρησιμοποιούν οι καταπιεσμένοι και οι καταδιωγμένοι όταν διαπίστωσαν ότι κάθε άλλη γλώσσα που χρησιμοποίησαν μέχρι τώρα δεν είχε αποτέλεσμα και κατέφυγαν στη ‘γλώσσα’ που δεν χρειάζεται μετάφραση τη γλώσσα της απελπισίας”.

<sup>131</sup> “Η τρομοκρατία ... όσο και αποκρουστική να είναι που βέβαια είναι, μπορεί σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις να θεωρείται η μόνη στρατηγική για ένα λαό in extremis που επιζητεί ελευθερία και αυτοδιάθεση”.

<sup>132</sup> “ Η τρομοκρατία πάντοτε ήταν μοναχική, μηδενιστική και απεγνωσμένη”.

<sup>133</sup> “διεκδίκηση πατρίδας, δικαίου, ελευθερίας, δημοκρατίας και άλλων παρόμοιων μεγάλων αξιών της ζωής ... αν αυτά τα αγαθά και οι αξίες υπήρχαν και στις εστίες (χώρες - περιοχές) που οι ΗΠΑ θεωρούν σήμερα ως φωλιές της τρομοκρατίας, ποιον λόγο θα είχαν οι περιοχές αυτές να γενούν τρομοκράτες ή «τρομοκράτες”.

<sup>134</sup> “Όταν μια κοινωνία στερείται τα βασικά της αγαθά και δικαιώματα, όταν οι αδικίες που υφίσταται μοιάζουν να μην έχουν τέλος, όταν ο ‘εχθρός’ είναι πανίσχυρος και ο «υποτελής» αντιμετωπίζεται με κτηνωδία, τότε το μυαλό κινείται πέρα από τα όρια της λογικής. Και τότε δύο πράγματα το γοητεύουν: η ιδέα μιας καλύτερης μετά θάνατον ζωής και η ιδέα της εκδίκησης ... Σε συνθήκες φτώχειας, καταπίεσης και απελπισίας η ανθρώπινη ζωή χάνει την αξία της”.



failure of the West to understand the dispossessed of the world breeds Islamic fundamentalism” or that “the terrorist action is not the result of madness, but the logical outcome of injustice, torture and death”.

The above discourse was based on the employment of binary oppositions, such as the West versus the rest, the governors versus the governed, oppressors versus oppressed, aggressive actors versus passive victims, rich versus poor, which fixed identities and constructed knowledge. As Doty points out, “thinking in terms of representational practices calls our attention to an economy of abstract oppositions that we routinely draw upon and that frame our thinking” (Doty 1996: 2). These binaries were used in a similar fashion to the ones encountered in the British press, but the reality constructed was entirely different. The U.S.-led capitalist West appeared to be the negative force assaulting the rest, who were seen as defenceless victims attacking the U.S. as a desperate last resort (see also Kaitatzi-Whitlock and Kehagia, 2004: 141).

The presupposition that the terrorists were driven by feelings of U.S.-induced despair, injustice and poverty naturalized the attacks as something that was bound to happen and which may have cost lives but was essentially ‘America’s’ fault. At the same time, the polarization created by the division of the world in two spheres, the developed and the developing, with the developing utterly controlled by the rich residents of the developed, demonized and empowered western elites, particularly the U.S., which was represented as having a mighty, unstoppable power determining global processes. This polarization also deprived the non-western, less powerful states of agency, representing them as helpless, passive actors whose lives and history were shaped by others and who were not responsible for their actions, mistakes or achievements. Thus, the common sense was created that the September 11 attacks could essentially only be understood in terms of former U.S. or western imperialist policies. This, in turn, created the implication that the solution to the problem rested with the U.S. and the western elites, since they were constructed as the actors responsible for the world ills. Moreover, such a representation precluded diplomatic or political solutions and thus legitimized terrorism as a means to deal with the mighty U.S. superpower. As Kaitatzi-Whitlock and Kehagia stress (2004:

151), these discourses “reveal a tacit accommodation to power politics rather than pursuing principled diplomacy and common interest politics. Thus, the ideology of ‘might is right’ advances unrestrained. This contingency is alarming as its certain outcome is more chaos and impotence to settle crisis rationally and collectively”.

A noticeable feature of the press discourse was the lack or at least the scarcity of the shifter ‘we’ (see Weldes 1999: 105). At very few points in the discourse was the pronoun ‘we’ mentioned and the reader wasn’t directly addressed. This was definitely not the case in the British press, where the employment of the shifter ‘we’ produced the appearance of a conversation of which the readers became a part (Sharp 1996: 559) and enabled the interpellation of the individuals into specific subject positions. The ambiguous ‘we’ helped “define the subject position that the audience is asked to assume, and created common sense, by rendering the argument being offered intelligible to that audience” (Weldes 1999: 105). In the Greek press discourse there was a notable absence of the shifter ‘we’ or ‘us’ and the binary opposition constructed was between ‘them, rich invaders’ and ‘them, poor victims’, rather than ‘us’ versus ‘them’. The reader was neither positioned in the first category of the western elites, nor in the second of the exploited nations; both were ‘othered’, even though ‘sympathies’ and ‘antipathies’ were constantly created, with the criticism of the U.S. and western foreign policy being the most favourite topic amongst the columnists.

This struggle to identify with neither ‘camp’ even though there clearly was the demarcation of two camps in the discourse can be partially explained by the fact that Greece is a country whose identities are blurred. Greek discourse contained a clear demarcation between ‘the west’ and ‘the orient’, but it was not clear to which of the two binaries Greece belonged. As Herzfeld points out, one of the main questions that Greeks pose to foreigners is where they position them, as European or as Oriental. This tension is prevalent in many aspects of Greek society, with newspaper and television channels daily asking whether Greece belongs to ‘the west’ or to ‘the third world/orient’. “In a country like Greece, which largely owes its independence to the self-interest of other, stronger nations, one will find an especially painful awareness of the inequality of

cultural models. The adoption of emblematically 'western' clothes or other symbols of externally derived status – reproductions of political hegemony built or draped around the consumer's body – does not mean passive acquiescence in the hegemony of this essentialized 'west'" (Herzfeld 2003: 220-221). Therefore, the Greeks are ambivalent as to which of the two camps they belong to, but are in no doubt as to the existence of these two camps, and cannot purely identify with or disassociate from either one of them.

## **The different faces of the terrorist**

### *The suicide bomber*

The representation of the perpetrators of September 11 as victims was not hegemonic; a second discourse constructed the suicide bombers as less sympathetic actors. This discourse didn't appear as frequently as the one described above; nevertheless, neither can it be seen as a marginal discourse because it was articulated by many commentators. According to this representation, the suicide bombers were fanatic and vicious individuals with perverse minds who acted in the name of their own twisted version of Islam and were driven by their hate towards the West and civilization itself. Such a representation resembled the one encountered in the British press, since the terrorists were seen as irrational creatures, whose totally unjustifiable actions could only be put down to fanaticism and blind hatred. Irrespective of U.S. foreign policy, the suicide bombers were guilty, the argument would hold, since their actions were both horrific and had nothing to do with U.S. oppression. The attacks of September 11 were in no way connected with feelings of desperation, because they were conducted by crazy barbarians with no political objectives, merely intent on destroying what they hate. "In the post-cold war era, we are witnessing an infinitely deadlier form of terrorism by fundamentalist religious or right-wing organizations with no political objectives, the blind and destructive hatred being the only incentive of those who feel ostracized from the global economic and political developments" (Papakonstantinou, 2001c).<sup>135</sup> As in British press

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<sup>135</sup> "στον μεταψυχροπολεμικό κόσμο, είμαστε μάρτυρες μιας απείρως φονικότερης τρομοκρατίας –προχθές στο μετρό του Τόκιο, χθες στην Οκλαχόμα, σήμερα στο Μανχάταν– από την πλευρά φονταμενταλιστικών, θρησκευτικών ή



articles, the perpetrators of September 11 were constituted as fanatics who hated the west and thus targeted it in order to destroy everything related to western culture and civilization. “The terrorists are not ‘innocent, oppressed victims of the Americans’; they express a completely different logic and culture, which in its extreme form hate the western type of life and aim at destroying it” (Loverdos, 2001),<sup>136</sup> or “in the atrocious criminal act of September 11 there is less deep rooted and more tangible causes. The blind religious fanaticism, the paranoid intolerance, the primitive barbarity” (Zoulas, 2001).<sup>137</sup> This hatred and spite towards the world was the main characteristic ascribed to the terrorists, who were entirely disassociated from any form of rationality or sanity. Their only interest seemed to be the creation of absolute chaos, death and destruction. Their only motive was extremism. “He [the terrorist] is a neglected Satan, one cursed. He forgets his limits, his bonds, his burdens and spreads his destructive fervour all over the world, for him a collection of murderers and parasites. The only thing he loves is the fire to which he gives birth. The pictures of destruction, the panic, the screams, the unutterable pain ... he is absolutely convinced that he saves his own life by spreading death to innocents, he wins his immunity from mortality, he transcends to eternity (Karaiskaki, 2001).<sup>138</sup> Finally, “this new type of war ... isn’t in the name of countries, banners, ideologies, gods or anything else. It is only interested in the rhetoric of mass death” (Boukalas, 2001b).<sup>139</sup> The articles which referred to the perpetrators of the attacks as nihilist madmen were fewer than the ones which presented them as the victims of an unjust world. Moreover, their impact was diminished due to the prevalence of representations of the U.S. as a terrorist state and a ruthless ruler. The terrorists in the Greek press discourse did not pose as large a threat as the “U.S. terrorists” did because

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ακροδεξιών οργανώσεων χωρίς καμία πολιτική στόχευση, με μόνο κίνητρο το τυφλό, καταστροφικό μίσος όσων αισθάνονται εξοστρακισμένοι από το παγκόσμιο οικονομικό και πολιτικό γίγνεσθαι”.

<sup>136</sup> “Οι τρομοκράτες δεν είναι «αθώα, καταπιεσμένα θύματα των Αμερικανών». Είναι εκφραστές εντελώς διαφορετικής λογικής και κουλτούρας, που στην ακραία τους μορφή απεχθάνονται τον δυτικό τρόπο ζωής και επιδιώκουν να τον καταστρέψουν”.

<sup>137</sup> “στο φρικαλέο έγκλημα της 11ης Σεπτεμβρίου υπάρχουν λιγότερο βαθιά και περισσότερο απτά αίτια. Ο τυφλός θρησκευτικός φανατισμός, η παρανοϊκή μισαλλοδοξία, η πρωτόγονη βαρβαρότητα”.

<sup>138</sup> “Ένας παραγκωνισμένος σατανάς, ένας καταραμένος. Λησμονεί τα όριά του, τα δεσμά του, τα άχθη του και εξαπολύει το καταστροφικό μένος του πάνω στον κόσμο - γι’ αυτόν, ένα συνονθύλευμα ενόχων και παρασίτων. Το μόνο που αγαπά είναι η φωτιά που γεννά. Οι εικόνες καταστροφής, ο πανικός, τα ουρλιαχτά, ο ανείπωτος πόνος ... Είναι απόλυτα πεπεισμένος ότι σκορπώντας το θάνατο σε αθώους προστατεύει τη δική του ζωή, κερδίζει την ασυλία από τη θνητότητα, περνά στην αιωνιότητα”.

<sup>139</sup> “Αυτός ο νέου τύπου πόλεμος, που μοιάζει να ανταποκρίνεται στη μορφή του τηλεπολέμου με τον οποίο εξοικειωθήκαμε τα τελευταία χρόνια, δεν επικαλείται πατρίδες, ιερά, λάβαρα, ράκη ιδεών, θεούς ή ό,τι άλλο. Μόνο η ρητορική του τρόμου τον ενδιαφέρει, η ρητορική του μαζικού θανάτου”.

they were only a few individual lunatics who could, therefore, only pose a limited threat. On the other hand, as will be seen in the following section, the U.S. was seen as a rational, calculating and immensely powerful terrorist. Even though both the executors of the September 11 attacks and the U.S. were equally loathsome, the U.S. was articulated as a much more 'effective' terrorist, due to its power and might.

### *The U.S. terrorist*

In this hegemonic representation, the U.S. government was represented as a corrupt actor, whose history and present actions were based on the abuse of other nations and people. For this reason, the U.S. was construed as a hypocritical power, not entitled either to denounce the September 11 terrorist actions or to take further actions against states and innocent civilians. "Good and essential is the condemnation of terrorism. However, the chief instructors, the global terrorists themselves, those whose state was built out of the blood of the native Indians, the black slaves, the exploitation of the nations of the third world or the abandoning of their own soldiers in Vietnam, have no right to condemn terrorism" (Roussis, 2001).<sup>140</sup> Not only was the U.S. accused of inducing poverty in nations all over the world, but it both created terrorism, and then used anti-terrorism as its method to expand its colonies. "The CIA constructed and donated three gifts to the universe: Poverty, Terrorism (in the labs of the CIA), and Anti-Terrorism (in the labs of the FBI)" (Nautilus, 2001c).<sup>141</sup> Moreover, such a "terrorist behaviour" was bound to result in global distrust and antipathy towards the U.S., which was positioned in a relationship of opposition to the rest of the world as the archetypal terrorist. "Let the world terrorists [meaning the U.S.] threaten and let them make malignant plans. Their new "invisible" enemy is not the atrocious terrorists, but the crowds which are increasing" (Triadis, 2001c).<sup>142</sup> Similarly, "the seemingly proper ones are the real

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<sup>140</sup> "Καλή και αναγκαία και η καταδίκη της τρομοκρατίας. Μόνο που δεν έχουν δικαίωμα να την καταδικάζουν οι πρώτοι διδάξαντες οι ίδιοι οι παγκόσμιοι τρομοκράτες, εκείνοι που έχτισαν το κράτος τους με το αίμα των Ινδιάνων ιθαγενών, των μαύρων δούλων, την εκμετάλλευση των λαών του τρίτου κόσμου, την εγκατάλειψη ακόμη και των δικών τους βετεράνων του Βιετνάμ".

<sup>141</sup> "Τρία δώρα κατασκεύασαν και χάρισαν οι ΗΠΑ στην οικουμένη: τη Φτώχεια, την Τρομοκρατία (στα εργαστήρια της CIA) και την Αντιτρομοκρατία (στα εργαστήρια του FBI)".

<sup>142</sup> "Ας απειλούν, λοιπόν. Κι ας καταστρώνουν σχέδια οι τρομοκράτες της υφηλίου. Ο καινούργιος 'αόρατος' εχθρός τους δεν είναι οι στυγεροί της τρομοκρατίας. Είναι το πλήθος που πληθαίνει".



terrorists of the whole world. Am I an anti-American? If Americanism is inconsiderate violence, injustice, censorship, arrogance, the disregard for all the others, fanaticism, the lack of critical thought, the lie, the right to the life of the other, the imposition, blindness, egocentrism, ignorance, lack of culture and spiritual civilization, then yes, I am an anti-American” (Kairos, 2001).<sup>143</sup> The predicates in the above sentence constituted the U.S. not only as a violent actor, but also as an uncultured and uncivilized one; this, in turn, facilitated the further “othering” of the U.S.

The U.S. was also not only constructed as a coercive actor, but also as intolerant of those who disagreed with its policies and actions. “How can we put up with the fact that entire nations are blackmailed with the slogan ‘whoever is not on our side is against us’”? (Papadopoulos I.St., 2001: N16).<sup>144</sup> The U.S. was, therefore, accused of violating basic human rights and democratic values by forcing everybody to side with it. “The values of democracy, freedom and human rights will once more be smashed and debased” (Poudourakis, 2001: N07).<sup>145</sup> Many cartoons criticized this U.S. bullying. In one cartoon, Jesus Christ had been captured by two Romans, whose helmets had CIA and FBI inscribed on them. They needed to take a decision on what to do with him, so the CIA Roman soldier asked his FBI counterpart. ‘Why should we crucify him since he doesn’t seem to be against us’? “Because he is not on our side either”, the FBI soldier replied (Appendix B, Figure 2). In another cartoon, one could distinguish two fully covered figures standing next to each other. One of them was enveloped in an Afghan burqa and the other one, which stood for the U.S., was a Ku-Klux-Klan member, who uttered: “We or them” (Appendix B, Figure 3). In a final cartoon, a U.S. soldier aimed his gun at a civilian who looked terrified. The soldier-reassuringly-uttered: “Don’t worry, I won’t eliminate you if you don’t think badly about me”; and the civilian thought to himself: “You didn’t kill my grandfather, you didn’t amputate my mother, you didn’t drive my

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<sup>143</sup> “Αυτοί είναι οι τρομοκράτες του κόσμου όλου. Οι εξευγενισμένοι δήθεν ... .Με ρωτάς αν, είμαι Αντιαμερικανός. Αν είναι αμερικανισμός η άκριτη βία, η αδικία, η λογοκρισία, ο υπερφιαλισμός, η έπαρση, η περιφρόνηση των άλλων, ο φανατισμός, η έλλειψη κριτικής σκέψης, το ψέμα, το δικαίωμα στη ζωή του άλλου, η επιβολή, οι παραωπίδες, ο εγωκεντρισμός, η άγνοια, η έλλειψη καλλιέργειας και πνευματικού πολιτισμού, ναι, είμαι Αντιαμερικανός”.

<sup>144</sup> “Ανεχόμαστε ολόκληρα κράτη να εκβιάζονται με το σλόγκαν ‘όποιος δεν είναι μαζί μας είναι εναντίον μας’”;

<sup>145</sup> “Οι αξίες της δημοκρατίας, της ελευθερίας και των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων για μια ακόμη φορά θα καταπατηθούν”.



sister crazy, you didn't destroy my country...I am not thinking of all these things, so you let me exist" (Appendix B, Figure 4).

In line with previous representations, the Wild West metaphor was widely used in the Greek press to describe U.S. foreign policy and intentions. President Bush was depicted as a cowboy or a sheriff, launching into a mission to hunt the Indians, who represented not just the terrorists, but also the poor and dispossessed. "Bush, the new sheriff, gets his troops ready so as to hunt the Indians" (Roubanis, 2001b).<sup>146</sup> "The cowboy ... constantly wearing a scornful smile, as though he was enjoying a movie, where the civilized and brave American soldiers hunt the wild and uncivilized Indians, slaughtering them in the woods" (Bakomarou, 2001b).<sup>147</sup> The U.S. cowboy government, it was maintained, didn't hesitate to use violence and spread death in order to expand their economic empire. "Sheriffs, cowboys and gangsters only take the power of the gun into account and money is their only interest and concern" (Papadopoulou, 2001: 10).<sup>148</sup> Articles commented on the violent and unlawful means that the U.S. used, which allude to another epoch, less civilized and more backward, where the law of the gun ruled. "We still live in an era where anyone even remotely suspicious is lynched, where the sheriffs shoot before trying to find out the truth; in an era where human life has value only for the 'proper' few residents of the village and nobody else ... if this is what civilization is about, I belong to the uncivilized" (Kairos, 2001).<sup>149</sup> Therefore, "the global western is not a solution" (Galanopoulos and Spiropoulou, 2001).<sup>150</sup> In many cartoons Bush was portrayed as a cowboy-sheriff, while a photo (Appendix B, Figure 5) showing a poster of Osama Bin Laden served to make explicit what was seen as a U.S. foreign policy resembling the Wild West. The main focus of the photo was the poster itself which was glued on some kind of gate and depicted Bin Laden, with 'wanted dead or alive' written above his photo.

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<sup>146</sup> "Ο Μπους, ως νέος σερίφης, φτιάχνει το απόσπασμά του για να κυνηγήσει τους Ινδιάνους".

<sup>147</sup> "Με ένα μειδίαμα στα χείλη συνεχώς, σαν να απολάμβανε ταινία, όπου οι πολιτισμένοι και γενναίοι Αμερικανοί στρατιώτες κυνηγούν τους άγριους και απολίτιστους Ινδιάνους, σφαγιάζοντάς τους, μέσα στα δάση".

<sup>148</sup> "Σερίφηδες, καουμπόηδες και γκάγκστερ, μόνο την ισχύ των όπλων λογαριάζουν και μόνο στο χρήμα ορκίζονται".

<sup>149</sup> "Έδειξε έτσι ο πολιτισμός ότι βρίσκεται ακόμη στην εποχή που ελιντσάρουντο διά βοής οι δακτυλοδεικτούμενοι, στην εποχή που οι σερίφηδες πρώτα πυροβολούσαν και μετά ρωτούσαν, στην εποχή που η ανθρώπινη ζωή είχε αξία μόνο για τους καθωσπρεπειζόμενους ολίγους κατοίκους του χωριού και για κανέναν άλλον ... Αν είναι όλα αυτά πολιτισμός, εγώ Δόνα μου, είμαι με τους απολίτιστους".

<sup>150</sup> "Το παγκοσμιο γουεστερν δεν είναι λύση".



This photo represented the U.S. as an unlawful subject, or at least as an uncivilized subject which sorted out its affairs by means of violence rather than dialogue.

The Greek press discourse often compared Bush and Bin Laden, with the former emerging as an equal, or bigger, villain. Both Bush and Bin Laden were depicted as demonizing their enemies and thinking in absolute terms; their only difference, it was claimed, was the capitalist drives of the former and the backward, anti-modernist urges of the latter. “President Bush talked yesterday about the battle of Good against Evil ... this duality also dominates Osama Bin Laden’s thoughts, as well as the thoughts of all fanatic Islamists ... the first needs Evil so as to justify the stock market games, the second needs it so as to justify his inability to comprehend the complexity of our modern world... Both, it seems, need each other” (Kabilis, 2001: N06).<sup>151</sup> Pictures of Bush and Bin Laden, one next to the other were followed by the caption “The Sheriff and the Sheikh”<sup>152</sup> (Bakomarou, 2001d). Elsewhere (Appendix B, Figure 6) Bush was depicted looking at himself in the mirror only to see the reflection of Bin Laden. “Are you here, you fool”? Bush asks. “Of course, where else could I have been”, the reflection of Bush/Bin Laden replied. Thus, both Bush and Laden were constructed as very similar type of subjects, namely very negative subjects. “The ‘faithful’ commits suicide so as to kill ‘infidels’, because he is certain that he wins the eternal pleasure of paradise with his faith. And the ‘civilized’ uses his technology to burn the entire country where the kamikaze is believed to come from, because he is also certain that he serves the ‘humanistic values’ of his ‘civilization’. Every ‘truth’, every ‘faith’, every ‘civilization’ which acts as if it is objectively correct and absolutely superior, is the womb of inhumanity and of any type of terrorism” (Giannaras, 2001).<sup>153</sup> Similarly, a cartoon showed a Taliban and an American soldier sitting next two each other, playing the guitar

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<sup>151</sup> “Ο πρόεδρος Μπους μίλησε προχθές για τη μάχη του Καλού εναντίον του Κακού ... Αυτό ο δυϊσμός είναι κυρίαρχος και στη σκέψη του Οσάμα Μπιν Λάντεν, αλλά και όλων των φανατικών ισλαμιστών ... Ο πρώτος χρειάζεται το κακό για να δικαιολογήσει τα παιχνίδια του χρηματιστηρίου, ο δεύτερος το χρειάζεται για να δικαιολογήσει την ανικανότητά του να κατανοήσει την πολυπλοκότητα του σύγχρονου κόσμου ... Και οι δυο τελικά χρειάζονται ο ένας τον άλλο”!

<sup>152</sup> “Ο σερίφης από τη μια μεριά, ο σείχης από την άλλη”.

<sup>153</sup> “Ο «πιστός» αυτοκτονεί για να θανατώσει ‘απίστους’, επειδή είναι βέβαιος ότι κερδίζει με την πίστη του την αιώνια απόλαυση του παραδείσου. Και ο ‘πολιτισμένος’ κατακαίει με την πολεμική του τεχνολογία ολόκληρη τη χώρα της πιθανής προέλευσης του καμικάζι, επειδή είναι επίσης βέβαιος ότι υπηρετεί τις ‘ανθρωπιστικές αξίες’ του «πολιτισμού» του ... Κάθε ‘αλήθεια’, κάθε ‘πίστη’, κάθε ‘πολιτισμός’ που εμφανίζεται με αξιώσεις αντικειμενικής ορθότητας και απόλυτης ανωτερότητας, είναι μήτρα απανθρωπίας και παντοειδούς τρομοκρατίας”.



and singing, “while you exist I will exist” (Appendix B, Figure 7). In a final cartoon, an adult explained to two children, that “state violence is very different to terrorist violence”. The children walked off and commented: “Maybe we should ask those who were the victims of violence to tell us the truth” (Appendix B, Figure 8).

Especially during the war in Afghanistan the U.S. was directly accused of exercising state terrorism and the air raids in Afghanistan were equated with the September 11 attacks. “With the air attacks on Afghanistan and the slaughtering of innocents we don’t have a war of ‘the good’ against ‘the bad’, but ‘the bad’ against ‘the bad’, who use the same condemned violence. There is no difference between the scenes of the criminal action of September 11, and the ones taking place in Afghanistan now”<sup>154</sup> (‘Collateral damage’, 2001). In fact, the terrorism inflicted by the U.S. was often presented as even worse than that caused the suicide bombers: “What is being planned is not only tragic, but it is an action even worse than the one of the terrorists ... It will be an action of state terrorism which will cause incalculable ‘collateral damage’ and will result in the reproduction and the culmination of violence” (‘Increasing Terrorism’, 2001).<sup>155</sup> In a cartoon Bush was interviewed by a journalist, who posed the following question: “Mr. President, what would you tell the terrorists if they were watching now”? “Stupid amateurs”, was the President’s answer (Appendix B, Figure 9). Thus, the superpower’s war in Afghanistan was established as a major terrorist action, comparable to the September 11 attacks. “With the declaration of war, the U.S. is launching a global terrorist attack and strengthens rather than deals with and eradicates terrorism ... Discovering the causes of terrorism and criticizing its policy, the American government is capable of and should realize that the real enemy is the arrogance of the superpower, which always wants to rule the world enforcing its own laws”<sup>156</sup> (‘Absurdity of War’, 2001).

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<sup>154</sup> “Με τις αεροπορικές επιδρομές κατά του Αφγανιστάν και τη σφαγή αθώων δεν έχουμε πόλεμο του ‘καλού’ εναντίον του ‘κακού’, αλλά του ‘κακού’ εναντίον του ‘κακού’, που εξομοιώνονται με τη χρησιμοποίηση της ίδιας καταδικαστέας βίας. Δεν έχουν καμία διαφορά οι σκηνές της εγκληματικής ενέργειας της 11ης Σεπτεμβρίου, με αυτές που μεταδίδονται τώρα από το Αφγανιστάν”.

<sup>155</sup> “Δεν είναι απλώς τραγικό αυτό που μεθοδεύεται, αλλά και συνιστά ενέργεια χειρότερη εκείνης των τρομοκρατών ... Θα είναι μία πράξη κρατικής τρομοκρατίας, που θα έχει και ανυπολόγιστες «παράπλευρες ζημιές» και θα συντελέσει στην αναπαραγωγή και την κλιμάκωση της βίας”.

<sup>156</sup> “Με την κήρυξη πολέμου και μάλιστα «διαρκείας» -κατά τον επίσημο αμερικανικό χαρακτηρισμό- οι ΗΠΑ εξαπολύουν μια επίθεση παγκόσμιας τρομοκρατίας και ενισχύουν, αντί να αντιμετωπίζουν και να εξουδετερώνουν, την τρομοκρατία ... Εντωπίζοντας τις αιτίες που προκαλούν την τρομοκρατία και κρίνοντας την πολιτική της, η



## Islam, the West and the clash of civilizations

One of the prevailing characteristics of the Greek press discourse after September 11 was the disassociation of terrorism from Islam. Even though it was often argued that the attacks on the Twin Towers were organized by people who had fanatically adopted a twisted version of Islam and had conducted crimes in the name of Islam, it was at no point stated or implied that Islam was in any way responsible for this fanaticism. It just happened that the extremists on this occasion happened to be Muslim: “Instead of describing these acts as what they really are, that is the adoption of distorted ideologies by small fanatical organizations, it has become the object of exploitation by different political cycles”<sup>157</sup> (Kosmos, 2001). Poverty was seen as a much more salient feature of Muslim countries than terrorism, and terrorism was represented as much more likely to be incited by poverty, than by religion. “Poverty is a parameter that characterizes the Muslim world to a much greater extent than terrorism. Of course, the constantly widening gap between North and South is not as exciting and moving as terrorist blows, such as that of the Twin Towers” (Tonchev, 2001).<sup>158</sup>

Additionally, many articles attacked the Huntington thesis that the primary conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be conflicts between civilizations rather than between nation- states and that the dominating source of conflict will be cultural, with Islam one of the foremost opponents of the Christian West (Huntington, 1998). “As far as Islam is concerned, it is neither naturally violent nor fundamentalist ... The Huntington theory is not valid. There aren't any unbridgeable gaps and differences between certain ‘civilizations’, and what

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αμερικανική ηγεσία μπορεί και οφείλει να καταλάβει ότι ο πραγματικός εχθρός είναι η αλαζονεία της υπερδύναμης, που θέλει να κυριαρχεί στον κόσμο με το δικό της νόμο”.

<sup>157</sup> “Η συγκρουσιακή θεωρία προϋποθέτει την υπεραπλουστευμένη ύπαρξη δύο ευρύτατων και ισχυρών μετώπων, εκείνου του Χριστιανισμού και εκείνου του Ισλάμ. Ο Χάντιγκτον μοιάζει να αδιαφορεί για τις εσωτερικές συγκρούσεις και αντιθέσεις που εμφανίζονται στο μουσουλμανισμό, επιλέγοντας την υπεραπλουστευτική και δημαγωγική άποψη, που περιγράφει τους πολιτισμούς ως μονολιθικούς ... Αντί οι πράξεις αυτές να χαρακτηρισθούν γι' αυτό που πράγματι είναι: η υιοθέτηση μεγαλοϊδεατισμού από μικρές οργανώσεις φανατικών έγινε αντικείμενο εκμετάλλευσης από διαφορετικούς πολιτικούς κύκλους”.

<sup>158</sup> “Είναι μάλλον ανακριβές να θεωρούνται όλοι οι μουσουλμάνοι του πλανήτη ακραίοι ισλαμιστές και υποκινούμενοι από κάποια ενιαία ιδεολογία. Εκ των πραγμάτων, είναι δύσκολο 1,2 δισεκατομμύρια άνθρωποι να συμμερίζονται τις ίδιες απόψεις ... υπάρχει τουλάχιστον μια άλλη παράμετρος που χαρακτηρίζει το μουσουλμανικό κόσμο σε πολύ μεγαλύτερο βαθμό: η φτώχεια. Αλλά, βέβαια, το συνεχώς διευρυνόμενο χάσμα Βορρά - Νότου συγκινεί πολύ λιγότερο από τα τρομοκρατικά πλήγματα τύπου Twin Towers”



type of 'civilizations' are we talking about? Islam has many versions and is multidimensional ... Moreover, there is more violence and even more clashes amongst parties that belong to different cultural and religious worlds. The Huntington schema is based on binaries: we (the West and U.S.A.) and 'all the others'" (Heraklidis, 2001: N06). Islam was perceived as a divergent and heterogeneous religion which should not be reduced to Huntington's oversimplified conclusions, themselves based on binaries and the demonization of entire states and peoples. "There isn't any unified antidemocratic, terrorist 'Muslim position', as there isn't any unified democratic, liberal 'Christian position' (Vranas, 2001f).<sup>159</sup>

The 'clash of civilizations' was therefore represented as nothing other than a consistent effort on the part of the capitalist, elitist West to disguise their hegemonic vision as a war against the enemies of the West. "As far as this so called clash of civilizations is concerned, it is obvious that it merely aims at cultivating war hysteria and justifying measures which will constrain even further the freedoms of the people. The ulterior causes of the clash have nothing to do with cultural differences, unless we call 'civilization' the system that perpetuates the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the western elite" (Fotopoulos, 2001b).<sup>160</sup> An article entitled "Mujahideen of Liberalization" stressed the hypocrisy of the West, which supported the Taliban during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 80s and represented them as the defenders of a glorious tradition that atheist Russia had tried to destroy. "In the eighties, the Westerners were fervent supporters of the extreme version of the Islamic burqa, which they now denounce. Photos of covered women next to communist mottos would appear in the western media with captions which blatantly declared their objection to every attempt of "modernization" of the female attire in Afghanistan".<sup>161</sup> The article

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<sup>159</sup> "Δεν υπάρχει ενιαία αντιδημοκρατική, τρομοκρατική «μουσουλμανική στάση», όπως δεν υπάρχει ενιαία δημοκρατική, φιλειρηνική «χριστιανική στάση»."

<sup>160</sup> "Όσον αφορά τη δήθεν σύγκρουση πολιτισμών, είναι φανερό ότι αποτελεί χρήσιμο ιδεολόγημα για την καλλιέργεια της πολεμικής υστερίας και τη δικαιολόγηση μέτρων που θα περιορίσουν ακόμη περισσότερο τις κατακτημένες ελευθερίες των λαών. Οι απώτερες αιτίες της σύγκρουσης δεν έχουν να κάνουν με πολιτιστικές διαφορές, εκτός βέβαια αν βαφτίσουμε «πολιτισμό» το σύστημα που διαιώνίζει τη συγκέντρωση της οικονομικής και πολιτικής εξουσίας στα χέρια των ελίτ"

<sup>161</sup> "Τη δεκαετία του '80, οι δυτικοί αποδείχθηκαν ένθερμοι οπαδοί της ακραίας αυτής εκδοχής του ισλαμικού τσαντόρ, που τους κάνει σήμερα να κραυγάζουν από αγανάκτηση. Φωτογραφίες με καλυμμένες γυναίκες δίπλα σε κομμουνιστικά συνθήματα έκαναν τον καιρό εκείνο την εμφάνισή τους στα δυτικά μέσα ενημέρωσης με λεζάντες που



was accompanied by photos of Mujahideen 'guerrillas' posing for Western magazines and newspapers, such as 'Now', 'L'Express', 'Stern' and 'Le Point' and being represented as brave resistance fighters against the Soviet 'totalitarianism' (Ios tis Kiriakis, 2001). Muslim countries were therefore seen as victims of an exploitative U.S. foreign policy. "Not only are they not world terrorists, but the nations of Islamic countries are victims, that is, the victims of American fundamentalism, whose power in all its forms, whether it is military, strategic or economic power, is the greatest source of terrorism on Earth" (Pilger, 2001: N07).<sup>162</sup> Orientalism and Edward Said were often cited and it was repeatedly pointed out that the image of Islam and the Arabic world is a constructed one that caters to western expansionary strategies. "The image of the Arabic world that the western civilization has available and puts in practice whenever the military needs call for it, is a racist ideology that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, during colonialism, was shaped into an academic field ... and is called Orientalism" (Terzakis, Eleutherotipia, 2001).<sup>163</sup> Furthermore, the representation called for equality in the treatment of others, who should neither be treated as enemies or immature adolescents. "The so-called 'multiculturalism' presupposes tolerance towards the others, as valid and equal actors, and not as inferior and in need of protection adolescents, or even worse, as enemies who need to be destroyed" (Tsalikoglou, 2001: N06).<sup>164</sup>

Even though one of the main themes in the Greek press discourse was the rejection of Orientalist ideology and the need for the treatment of Muslims and Muslim countries as equal actors, this discourse often adopted the ideology that it overtly rejected. As has already been delineated, Muslim countries were depicted as victims of American, and to a lesser extent western, imperialism and were deprived of any sort of agency. Especially during the war in Afghanistan, descriptions of Afghans and their daily lives were

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διατύπωναν ευθαρσώς την αντίρρησή τους σε κάθε απόπειρα «εκσυγχρονισμού» της γυναικείας ενδυμασίας στο Αφγανιστάν".

<sup>162</sup> "Οι λαοί των ισλαμικών χωρών όχι μόνο δεν είναι οι τρομοκράτες του κόσμου, αλλά αποτελούν τα θύματά του δηλαδή τα θύματα του αμερικανικού φονταμενταλισμού, η δύναμη του οποίου, σε όλες τις μορφές του, στρατιωτική, στρατηγική και οικονομική, είναι η μεγαλύτερη πηγή τρομοκρατίας στη Γη".

<sup>163</sup> "Η εικόνα του αραβικού κόσμου που ο δυτικός πολιτισμός έχει σε μόνιμη διαθεσιμότητα και κινητοποιεί όποτε οι στρατηγικές του ανάγκες το απαιτούν, είναι ένα ρατσιστικό ιδεολόγημα που στο δέκατο ένατο αιώνα -στην καρδιά του αποικιοκρατικού εγχειρήματος- διαμορφώθηκε σε ακαδημαϊκό κλάδο ... και έχει το όνομα του οριενταλισμού".

<sup>164</sup> "Η περίφημη «πολυπολιτισμικότητα» προϋποθέτει την αποδοχή του άλλου, ως έγκυρου και ισότιμου συνομιλητή, όχι ως κατώτερου υπό κηδεμονία ανήλικου, ή, ακόμα χειρότερα, ως υπό δίωξη εχθρού".



frequently essentialized and idealized (see Spurr 1993) to the extent that they lost their agency and were transformed into stereotypes. Even though such descriptions of Afghan daily life mainly aimed at widening the difference between ‘them, the kind, poor and innocent Afghans’ and ‘them, the evil, capitalist empire’, it also ended up estranging and isolating Afghans by merely presenting them as victims. Hall points out that stereotyping “reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes differences” (Hall, 1997: 258).

Unlike the British press, the Greek newspapers didn’t publish many pictures of the Taliban or the Northern Alliance. In contrast, there were many photos of refugees and the daily lives of Afghans. For example, a picture published in November showed an elderly Afghan carrying wood on his shoulders (Appendix B, Figure 10). The text following the photo read: “The old man in the photo- a figure which could have been derived straight from the Bible- is one amongst thousands of unlucky people who didn’t manage to desert Kabul because he was short of money. He thus wandered around the streets - these deserted streets of the capital city, gathered as much wood as he could, loaded the wood on his shoulders and made his way back home. Alone and deserted. That is how history is written; through the tired gaze of a human being whose life has always been a burden, and who now, in his final years, sees even those little things that were still his, turn into dust”.<sup>165</sup> Another picture (Appendix B, Figure 11) showed an Afghan lying on the dry ground of Afghanistan looking at the sky with his hand pointing towards the horizon. A cage with a canary lay next to him. The photo was very artistic and was followed by the following caption: “Despite the mayhem of the war, there is always space for some tenderness. Mustafa, the commander of an outpost in Rabat, watches the action of the American B-52 in the company of a canary”.<sup>166</sup> The text following the caption added: “The reality may be different. It could be that the Afghan warrior has the canary with him in fear of the deadly chemical gases. Nevertheless, we

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<sup>165</sup> “Ο γέροντας της φωτογραφίας (μορφή που θα μπορούσε να έβγαινε κατευθείαν από τη Βίβλο) είναι από τους εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες άτυχους που δεν μπόρεσαν να εγκαταλείψουν την Καμπούλ, γιατί δεν τους έφταναν τα χρήματα για να φύγουν. (Φανταστείτε: να θεωρείσαι τυχερότερος εάν είσαι ανάμεσα στους πρόσφυγες!). Πήρε λοιπόν τους δρόμους, τους έρημους δρόμους της πρωτεύουσας, μάζεψε όσα ξύλα μπορούσε, τα φόρτωσε στην πλάτη του και κίνησε για το σπίτι. Μόνος και έρημος. Έτσι γράφεται η Ιστορία. Μέσα στο κουρασμένο βλέμμα ενός ανθρώπου που - αλήθεια, πόσα βάρη να σήκωσε στη ζωή του;- και τώρα, στα ύστατά του χρόνια, βλέπει και τα ελάχιστα ακόμα που του απόμειναν να γίνονται ρημαδιό”.

<sup>166</sup> “Παρά την αντάρα του πολέμου, πάντα υπάρχει χώρος για λίγη τρυφερότητα, εδώ, ο Μουσταφά, διοικητής ενός φυλακίου στο Ραμπάτ, παρακολουθεί τη δράση των αμερικανικών B-52 συντροφιά”.



do prefer the first version. It is more hopeful and humane, more optimistic and probably more real as well”.<sup>167</sup> Both pictures were followed by text written in a more poetic and lyrical language than is usually used in newspapers. The first described the old Afghan as a saintly figure, since he was seen as a Biblic figure, and the second presupposed that the commander in Rabat had the canary with him to keep him company. In both pictures, the Afghans were idealized and interpellated as particular kind of objects, as innocent, saintly-like victims exploited by ‘the Americans’.

Moreover, this discourse explicitly rejected Orientalist ideology, but at the same time its references to the “west” or to the “western civilization” constructed and reinforced the same dichotomies that it criticized. Thus, this discourse falls into the category of what some have termed Occidentalism. Orientalism is a style of thought “based upon ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’” (Said, 1995: 2); the orient and the occident are treated as binary opposites, with the orient seen as the negative term in the pair. Occidentalism (Buruma and Margalit, 2004, Carrier, 2003) is a mirror image of Orientalism with the occident acquiring the negative connotations in the pair of opposites. Therefore, Occidentalism produces essentialist representations of “the West” which is usually seen as responsible for the majority of world ills.

In the Greek press discourse, the U.S. and the west were positioned in a relationship of identity and similarity as subjects favouring an ideology of clash; it was also pointed out that the problem should not be defined in terms of a clash of civilizations or cultures, but as the result of U.S. or western induced feelings of despair and injustice. In the press discourse the constructions of Islam as a monolithic entity were deconstructed and criticized. However, at the same time, the construction of the West was that of a monolithic entity accountable for the oppression of the rest of the world. Thus, in this discourse the conflict was still defined in terms of a clash, only this time between the

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<sup>167</sup> “Η πραγματικότητα όμως μπορεί να έχει και μian άλλη ανάγνωση! Μπορεί ο Αφγανός πολεμιστής να έχει μαζί του το καναρίνι για τον φόβο των αερίων! Των χημικών αερίων. Είναι μια πιο ελπιδοφόρα, πιο ανθρώπινη, πιο αισιόδοξη ματιά ... ίσως και πιο αληθινή”!

imperialist, capitalist “western civilization” and the rest of the world (see also Ifversen, 2002: 12).

### The role of Greece

Such negative representations of the “west” were not uniform in the Greek press discourse. The newspapers’ representation of the role of Greece in the international arena since September 11 is striking, considering the dominant and barely questioned anti-U.S. and anti-Western feelings, articulated in all three newspapers. In all the articles preoccupied with the role that Greece was meant to play after September 11, as well as its position in the international arena, a completely different discourse appeared, one resembling the British press discourse. The West acquired primarily positive connotations and Greece was positioned as a Western state and an American ally. The dominant representation undoubtedly was that Greece needed to side with the U.S. and “the West”, as “an inseparable member of the family of the free, western democracies” (‘Time for responsibility’, 2001).<sup>168</sup>

Such a representation doesn’t seem to blend in well with the ongoing anti-war and anti-Western or anti-American argument that was evident throughout the Greek press discourse. There seems to be discrepancy between, on the one hand, the depiction of Western values on their own, and, on the other hand, their depiction in relation to Greece. All articles concerning the role of Greece in the post September 11 international arena were clearly in favour of Greece acting as a dynamic member of the Western alliance. Even though the articles and the columns dedicated to the role of Greece in the so called War on Terror were far fewer than the ones elaborating on the role of the U.S. and the West as well as the ills of an attack in Afghanistan, the fact that there was such remarkable shift in the discourse once Greece was implicated is intriguing. “Whether we like it or not, we are not the far West of the East, but the Far East of the West, where we

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<sup>168</sup> “Αναπόσπαστο μέλος της οικογένειας των ελευθέρων, δυτικών δημοκρατιών”.



belong” (Moronis, 2001c).<sup>169</sup> Similarly, “Greece is clearly a member of the Western world, and has by definition sided with the West in this conflict” (Galatsiatos, 2001c: N06).<sup>170</sup> “Greece has changed ... If 20 years ago we simply had to understand that we belonged to the West, now we have to realize that we are strong members of a powerful alliance; and even if we don’t believe it, the other countries do actually believe it” (Voulgaris, 2001: R08).<sup>171</sup> There appeared to be a consistent attempt to assert a Western identity as the primary Greek identity, and an urge to link Greece with the West with articles elaborating on “why we belong to the West” (Karkagiannis, 2001b).<sup>172</sup>

According to this discourse, Greece was positioned as a subject in line with Western and E.U. post-September 11 policies. In fact, the west and the E.U. were positioned in a relationship of similarity. “As far as the current events are concerned, Greece doesn’t need its own policy: it should adopt and implement the E.U. policy” (Ioakeimidis, 2001b).<sup>173</sup> In a way, such a representation is unsurprising, considering the position of Greece as a small and essentially powerless country in the international system. Therefore, as Michas observes, feelings of anti-Americanism or anti-westernization “go hand in hand with a pragmatic attitude on the part of the majority of the Greek population toward Greece’s membership in NATO and its relations with the U.S. Thus, as many opinion polls have shown, the majority of the Greek population combines a critical attitude toward the United States and its policies with an acquiescence to the Greek government’s formal support for those policies” (Michas, online). It could be argued that the press discourse followed a similar pattern, driven, on the one hand, by anti-American and anti-Western sentiments and, on the other, by a ‘realistic’ and ‘down to Earth’ consideration of the repercussions of non-compliance with its allies.

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<sup>169</sup> “θέλουμε δεν θέλουμε, το πιστεύουμε δεν το πιστεύουμε, δεν είμαστε η Δύση της Ανατολής, αλλά ο φάρος της Δύσης, όπου και ανήκουμε”.

<sup>170</sup> “Η Ελλάδα είναι μία χώρα του Δυτικού κόσμου και έχει τοποθετηθεί σε αυτή τη σύγκρουση εξ ορισμού”.

<sup>171</sup> “Έχει αλλάξει και η Ελλάδα ... Αν πριν από είκοσι επτά χρόνια έπρεπε να εσωτερικεύσουμε ψυχολογικά ότι ανήκαμε στη Δύση, τώρα πρέπει να χωνέψουμε ότι ανήκομεν εις τους ισχυρούς. Κι αν δεν το πιστεύουμε εμείς, το πιστεύουν οι ‘απέξω’”.

<sup>172</sup> “Γιατί ανήκουμε στη Δύση”.

<sup>173</sup> “Σε ό,τι αφορά τα τρέχοντα γεγονότα, η Ελλάδα δεν χρειάζεται δική της πολιτική: συνδιαμορφώνει και εφαρμόζει την πολιτική της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης”.



Thus, Greece is a small country, it was claimed, which should not isolate itself, so as not to be left alone and unsupported in today's dangerous international environment. "Greece, as a member of the European Union, as well as a country with geographical and other particularities, reacted in the right way and bearing in mind its position in the international and regional system, as well as the protection of the values it holds. Of course, there inevitably were those voices, which would have wanted, once more, to lead the country to isolationism, they would have wanted Greece to become a dangerously queer and old fashioned presence in Europe and in the civilized world in general" (Ioakimidis, 2001c: N06).<sup>174</sup> For strategic reasons, it would thus be damaging to create more enemies or lose U.S. support. "Chomsky, the Islamists, and Mohammed Omar don't have open fronts in Cyprus, Skopia (FYROM), and Albania and neither do they always plead for economic aid from the European Union. The only way of salvation for Greeks is maybe the organization of a new protest march – this time against shame and stupidity!!" (Andrianopoulos, 2001: N23).<sup>175</sup> Protests and dissent would thus lead to instability and volatility, which would invalidate Greece. "For a country like Greece, which has invested everything for its political and economic stability in today's status quo, the issue of which camp it belongs to is out of question ... No matter how many marches there are out of the American Embassy" (Kapsis, 2001: N06).<sup>176</sup> "Powerful Greece' is deeply dependent and the consequences of any diversion in matters of international politics would be disastrous" (Kazakos, 2001).<sup>177</sup> Therefore, "we Greeks have to realize that we are in the same boat as the others. Our short-term as well as long term interests are tied to the ones of the West. We should think and act accordingly"

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<sup>174</sup> "Η Ελλάδα, ως μέλος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, αλλά και ως χώρα με ορισμένες γεωγραφικές και άλλες ιδιαιτερότητες, αντέδρασε επίσης σωστά και με γνώμονα την εξυπηρέτηση των συμφερόντων της, τη θέση της στο διεθνές και περιφερειακό σύστημα, αλλά και την προστασία των αξιών τις οποίες πρεσβεύει. Βεβαίως, υπήρξαν και πάλι οι αναπόφευκτες φωνές που θα ήθελαν, μία ακόμη φορά, να οδηγήσουν τη χώρα στην απομόνωση ως μια επικίνδυνα γραφική παρουσία στην Ευρώπη και στον πολιτισμένο κόσμο γενικότερα"

<sup>175</sup> "ο Τσόμσκι, οι ισλαμιστές κι ο Μοχάμεντ Ομάρ δεν έχουν ανοιχτά μέτωπα στο Κυπριακό, στο Σκοπιανό, στο Αλβανικό ούτε και ζητούν συνέχεια οικονομικές ενισχύσεις από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Μόνη οδός σωτηρίας για τους εχέφρονες Έλληνες είναι ίσως η οργάνωση μιας νέας πορείας διαμαρτυρίας αυτή τη φορά εναντίον της ντροπής και της βλακείας!!"

<sup>176</sup> "Για μια χώρα όπως η Ελλάδα, που έχει επενδύσει τα πάντα για την πολιτική και την οικονομική της σταθερότητα στο σημερινό «στάτους κβο», το ερώτημα σε ποιο στρατόπεδο ανήκει ούτε καν τίθεται... Όσες πορείες και αν γίνουν στην αμερικανική πρεσβεία!"

<sup>177</sup> "Η «ισχυρή Ελλάδα» είναι βαθιά εξαρτημένη και οι συνέπειες οποιασδήποτε απόκλισής της σε ζητήματα διεθνούς πολιτικής δεν θα ήταν αμελητέες"



(Iordanoglou, 2001: R08).<sup>178</sup> To make matters worse, “we are the political and cultural borders of the free, democratic and advanced world, and we will be lose first, if this world is defeated” (Malouhos, 2001).<sup>179</sup>

What is fascinating, nevertheless, is the way that the argument unfolds. One would anticipate that the columnists would push for Greece to maintain a non-aligned stance after the events. Another “rational” option, following from the ongoing argument concerning September 11 would be for the journalists to encourage commitment towards the E.U., since Greece is undeniably a small country that cannot stand on its own and needs to abide by certain rules and act as a member of an alliance. Nonetheless, this argument was only part of a wider discourse which deified the West and linked Greece with it, while at the same time silencing any form of criticism. What was stressed was the superiority of the West and the Western identity of the Greek nation, whose culture, history and development called for an endorsement of ‘Western views’ and the ostracism of any ‘backward, Ottoman relics’.

Thus, this discourse on “the west” differed substantially from the one in which the west was constituted as an unlawful, imperialist actor. Not only was Greece’s relationship to the West construed as that of an obligatory alliance for political reasons, but there was a clear positioning of Greece in a relationship of identity to “the West”, which was associated with the ancient Greek heritage. “Western civilization is the one which is deeply rooted in Greece. Since colonialism and the civilization of the barbarians, since Alexander the Great and all the way to the establishment of democracy and rationalism” (Moronis, 2001c).<sup>180</sup> Similarly, “the great and for many unexpected tragedy that hit the U.S. last Tuesday, also hit the Western world, the Western way of life and the Western civilization in its entirety, which owes a lot to the ancient Greek thought” (Loverdos,

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<sup>178</sup> “Ό,τι και να γίνει όμως, εμείς οι Έλληνες πρέπει να συνειδητοποιήσουμε πως είμαστε στο ίδιο καράβι με τους άλλους. Τα άμεσα και μακροχρόνια συμφέροντά μας είναι συνυφασμένα με αυτά της Δύσης. Πρέπει να μάθουμε να σκεπτόμαστε ανάλογα”.

<sup>179</sup> “είμαστε το πολιτικό και πολιτιστικό σύνορο του ελεύθερου, δημοκρατικού και ανεπτυγμένου κόσμου, που, αν ηττηθεί, εμείς θα ηττηθούμε πρώτοι. Εστω κι αν ίσως δεν το έχουμε καταλάβει”.

<sup>180</sup> “Οδυτικός πολιτισμός όμως είναι αυτός που έχει τις ρίζες του στην Ελλάδα. Από την αποικιοκρατία και τον εκπολιτισμό των βαρβάρων, από τον Μέγα Αλέξανδρο μέχρι τη δημοκρατία και τον ορθολογισμό, που πεισματικά θέλουμε να απορρίπτουμε”.



2001).<sup>181</sup> The “Western civilization” was constituted as superior, and no negative connotations were attached to it; moreover, this civilization seemingly stemmed from the Great ancient Greek civilization, which most Greeks strongly identify with, even though there doesn’t seem to be much in common between modern Greece and the Greece of that era. As Chrysoloras points out (2004: 7-18), the national imaginary which has attained a hegemonic position in Greek society since independence in 1821 has been structured around a series of nodal propositions, a primary one being that there is a unified Greek history of a unified Greek nation, which starts from the pre-Homeric era, through to Classical Ancient Greece, the Hellenistic period, the Byzantium, and extending up to modern Greece.

That there is little common ground between modern and ancient Greece does not diminish the importance of this representation, which constructs the West as a continuation of ancient Greek thought and thus positions Greece in a relation of identity, or at least in a relation of similarity and complementarity to the West. In fact, such representations are not new. As Huliaras and Tsardanidis point out, historical and cultural arguments, such as the ancient Greek legacy, seemed always to justify any territorial, identity or existence claims since the Independence in the early nineteenth century. Even when they applied to join the E.U. in 1974 the main arguments employed were historical rather than geographical. “According to the relevant official discourse, Greece was European not because of its geographical location, but because it was ‘the birthplace of European civilization’” (Huliaras and Tsardanidis, 2004: 19).

This construction of a western-Greek identity and the interpellation of Greeks as primarily western was facilitated by depictions of the western model as a superior one. “We belong in the West, not because it is a paradise, but because it is the most free battleground, where social clashes and their dynamic were never banned either through law or due to a holy command” (Karkagiannis, 2001b).<sup>182</sup> Besides, “we are on the side of

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<sup>181</sup> “Ημεγάλη και απροσδόκητη για πολλούς τραγωδία που έπληξε τις ΗΠΑ την περασμένη Τρίτη έπληξε στο σύνολό του τον δυτικό κόσμο, τον δυτικό τρόπο ζωής και τον δυτικό πολιτισμό, που οφείλει πολλά στον αρχαιοελληνική σκέψη”.

<sup>182</sup> “Ανήκουμε στη Δύση, όχι γιατί είναι παράδεισος αλλά γιατί είναι το πιο ελεύθερο πεδίο μάχης, όπου οι κοινωνικές συγκρούσεις και η δυναμική τους δεν καταργήθηκαν ακόμη ... διά νόμου ή κατόπιν θεϊκής εντολής”.



our own people, those who will put an end to the spreading of madness. We may not always agree with our allies. We are nevertheless always tied to our western cultural democratic tradition, precisely because we defend our right to have a different view and to criticize all the mistakes of our side” (Papadimitriou, 2001b).<sup>183</sup> Finally, this western liberal model was juxtaposed to what was seen as an eastern fundamentalist one. “The solution is the enrichment and the expansion of the model of representative democracy, individual freedoms and multiculturalism. This model, whether we like it or not, is not defended and articulated by the Eastern fundamentalists, but by the Western democracies...” (Mitsos, 2001: N24).<sup>184</sup> For this reason, “it would be ethically inconceivable for Greece to pursue any middle way” (Alevizatos, 2001: N07).<sup>185</sup> Furthermore, complete adherence to Western values was articulated as being in the interests of Greece, since not only were those values superior, but they had only benefited Greece in the past. “Thanks to this [western model] we Greeks enjoy an unprecedented level of welfare ... we are by far the richest country in the Balkans. Who could have imagined what would have happened if Greece had adhered to another model ... we would have probably collapsed economically and socially, like other countries around us ... This observation may displease those who safely accuse the western way of life ... because they enjoy all its privileges ... because they have the right to think and speak freely” (Kiriakatikes Voles, 2001).<sup>186</sup> Elsewhere, “if we look at our position in the modern world and if we compare our country to our neighbouring ones, we can clearly see that we definitely are not the victims of Western imperialism ... isolationism ...

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<sup>183</sup> “Είμαστε με τους δικούς μας ανθρώπους, εκείνους που θα εμποδίσουν την εξάπλωση της τρέλας. Μπορεί να μη συμφωνούμε πάντοτε με τους συμμάχους μας. Παραμένουμε όμως άρρηκτα δεμένοι με τη δυτική πολιτισμική μας παράδοση δημοκρατίας, ακριβώς γιατί υπερασπιζόμαστε το δικαίωμά μας να έχουμε διαφορετική άποψη, να ασκούμε κριτική για τα λάθη -και είναι πολλά- της δικής μας πλευράς”.

<sup>184</sup> “η λύση ... να εμπλουτιστεί και να επεκταθεί το μοντέλο της αντιπροσωπευτικής δημοκρατίας, των ατομικών ελευθεριών και της πολυ-πολιτισμικότητας. Κι αυτό το μοντέλο, καλώς ή κακώς, δεν το κηρύσσουν οι φονταμενταλιστές της Ανατολής, αλλά οι Δημοκρατίες της Δύσης”.

<sup>185</sup> “Θα ήταν ηθικά αδιανόητο η Ελλάδα να επιδιώξει την όποια μέση οδό”.

<sup>186</sup> “Χάρης σ αυτό εμείς οι Έλληνες απολαμβάνουμε ένα πρωτοφανές επίπεδο ευημερίας...και είμαστε μακράν η πλουσιότερη χώρα των Βαλκανίων ... Ποιός θα μπορούσε να φανταστεί τι θα συνέβαινε αν η Ελλάδα είχε προσχωρήσει σε άλλο μοντέλο ... το πιθανότερο είναι ότι θα είχαμε καταρρεύσει οικονομικά και κοινωνικά, όπως όλες οι άλλες χώρες γύρω μας ... Όπως η Αλβανία, η Ρουμανία, η Βουλγαρία, η Γιουγκοσλαβία. ... Η επισήμανση αυτή μπορεί να δυσανεστεί κάποιους που εκ του ασφαλούς μπορούν να κατηγορούν τον δυτικό τρόπο ζωής ... Γιατί απολαμβάνουν όλα τα προνόμια του... Γιατί έχουν τη δυνατότητα να σκέπτονται και να μιλούν ελεύθερα”.



doesn't serve our national interests" (Moronis, 2001c).<sup>187</sup> The presupposition that Greece would have been much worse off had it not sided with the Western, U.S.-led bloc after the second world war added to this urgency to go along with the E.U. and the U.S., which, according to this discourse, was not only superior but had always helped "us" prosper and advance.

Thus, it becomes evident that there were two different discourses concerning the West, one that dominated the bulk of the articles, whereby western values are corrupt and essentially inferior, based on capitalist and individualist pursuits, and one that always appeared once the role of Greece was debated. In this second discourse, there seemed to be no doubts as to the righteousness and supremacy of the western values and the western democratic tradition. Like in the British press, the 'western democracies' and the 'eastern fundamentalists' were constructed as binary opposites. A chain of equivalences was created between the terms civilized, democratic, liberal, cultural and western on the one hand, and authoritarian, eastern, fundamentalist on the other. Moreover, being civilized and democratic was equated to being liberal, and being liberal was equated to being western. In contrast, being uncivilized was equated to being from the East, and being eastern was to be fundamentalist and illiberal. Thus, an antagonistic frontier was created that divided "us, the western democracies" and "them, the eastern fundamentalists"

Therefore, there was an effort to construct a Western-Greek identity and denounce other identities, for example, a Greek-Balkan identity or a South-European-Greek identity, or an Orthodox Greek identity; moreover, any and every criticism towards the West was classified as anti-Americanism or anti-Western. Specifically, it was implied or even clearly stated that any condemnation of U.S. and generally Western actions meant a denunciation of the West and its way of life. "It appears that it is virtually impossible to calculate the degree of possible stupidity. It was only in Kabul, in Jakarta and in Athens that protest marches were organized against the American embassies ... the stamp of

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<sup>187</sup> "Και μόνον η σημερινή μας θέση στον κόσμο και η σύγκριση της χώρας μας με τις γειτονικές μας, δείχνουν σαφώς ότι μόνο θύματα του δυτικού ιμπεριαλισμού δεν είμαστε. Ο απομονωτισμός όμως ... Ούτε βέβαια προάγει τα εθνικά μας συμφέροντα".



stupidity marks a society which aspires at being included in the cultured communities and to possess the humanistic heritage of a bright ancient tradition” (Andrianopoulos, 2001: N23).<sup>188</sup> “Our anti-Western feelings have very deep roots in history, since they stem from the historical backwardness of our area compared to the West. Emotionally we still belong in the Ottoman Empire and we can actually see this in our everyday lives both in theory and practice” (Karkagiannis, 2001c).<sup>189</sup> “How could we hate the American more than the Turk”? (Mitsos, 2001: N24).<sup>190</sup> “Our passion with intrigues and dark theory where the U.S. and the CIA are to blame for everything should finally finish ... It is finally time to decide and practically prove whether we belong in the West or not” (Elis, 2001).<sup>191</sup> There were thus two options available; compliance with the Western allies or withdrawal from the Western “family”. Assertion or prioritization of any other identity equalled denial of the European or Western Greek identity.

Considering all those anti-U.S. or anti-Western sentiments which were manifest in the Greek press discourse after September 11, this effort to assert a specific Western identity at the expense of other identities when it came to determining the role of Greece after September 11 seems contradictory to the general press discourse, which represented “Western crusaders” and “American terrorists” as world ills. However, it has already been pointed out that Greece never sided with either “the west” or “the rest”; it refused to take sides in this “us” versus “them” dichotomization even when it was fiercely condemning the U.S. Even though the Greek press discourse disapproved of what it perceived as being U.S. and western imperialism and greed and even though it sympathised with the poor victims of this imperialist drive, it at no point took sides. Therefore, the sudden reversal towards the “western camp” is not entirely antithetical to

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<sup>188</sup> “Τελικά είναι αδύνατον να υπολογίσει κανείς μέχρι πού μπορεί να φθάσει η βλακεία. Από την υψηλίστη ολόκληρη μόνον στην Καμπούλ, στην Τζακάρτα και στην Αθήνα διοργανώθηκαν πορείες διαμαρτυρίας εναντίον των πρεσβειών των ΗΠΑ ... Η σφραγίδα της αηδίας σημαδεύει πλέον μια κοινωνία που θέλει να λέγεται πολιτισμένη και να διεκδικεί την ανθρωπιστική κληρονομιά μιας λαμπρής αρχαίας παράδοσης”.

<sup>189</sup> “Ο αντιδυτικισμός έχει πολύ πιο βαθιές ρίζες στην Ιστορία, καθώς πηγάζει από την ιστορική καθυστέρηση της περιοχής μας έναντι της Δύσης. Συναισθηματικά ανήκουμε ακόμη ... στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία και το διαπιστώνουμε καθημερινά στη θεωρία και την πράξη”.

<sup>190</sup> “Να μισούμε πλέον περισσότερο τον «Αμερικάνο» από τον ‘Τούρκο’”

<sup>191</sup> “Το πάθος με τις ίντριγκες και τις σκοτεινές θεωρίες όπου πίσω από τα πάντα κρύβονται οι ΗΠΑ και η CIA, πρέπει επιτέλους να τελειώσει. Με την ευκαιρία του τρομοκρατικού χτυπήματος είναι ώρα να αποφασίσουμε, και να αποδείξουμε έμπρακτα, εάν είμαστε με τη Δύση ή όχι”.

the general discourse. It can be put down to the fact that the commentators were convinced that Greece would have to take sides in this conflict if it was to survive and prosper. It can also partly be explained by the existence of a confused Greek identity, a Hellenic-Christian identity which drafted Western, liberal political institutions onto the traditional Greek heritage, which as Diamandouros asserts, resulted in “the emergence of powerful and often sharply conflicting cultural traditions, embedded in the novel (Western) and antecedent (Byzantine-Ottoman) elements of the Greek cultural experience, which, over time, reproduced themselves through ongoing and overlapping processes of interaction, accretion, assimilation and adaptation” (Diamandouros cited in Fokas, 2002: 8).



## **Conclusion – The British versus the Greek press discourse**

In this concluding section, the discourses of the British and Greek press are compared. Due to the homogeneity and striking similarities in the press discourse of each country, this comparison does not aim at delineating differences amongst newspapers of each country. Thus, this section primarily provides a comparison of the discourses of the British and Greek press, which share many differences as well as similarities. I initially compare representations of the September 11 events and then move on to a comparison of discourses on terrorism, Islam, the U.S. and the West. I finally look at the proposed roles of the U.K. and Greece in the “post-September 11 era” as represented in the British and Greek press.

### **Representations of the September 11 events**

The September 11 events and the ensuing war in Afghanistan received extensive coverage in both the British and Greek press. While the level of coverage of the events was equally high, the differences in the representations were striking.

Specifically, in the British press the events were represented as an attack on all of “us”, with this “us” referring often to the U.K. and the U.S., but also to “the west” and “the world” in its entirety. Thus, the events were constructed as an attack on “our civilized values” which “need to be defended”. Moreover, the metaphor of war, which was often employed in the British press, accentuated the seriousness of the threat, as well as the need for immediate and relentless response. In contrast, the Greek press discourse constituted the events merely as an attack on the U.S. Greece was not positioned in a relationship of similarity or identity to the U.S., since the attacks were seen as afflicting only the U.S. The lack of shifters such as “we” or “us” also enabled this disassociation of the events from “us”.



Another difference between the British and Greek press discourse was the construction of the events as completely unexpected in the British press discourse, and a long awaited, logical consequence of past U.S. imperial ventures in the Greek press discourse. Metaphors of “hubris” and “nemesis” in the Greek press and allusions to former empires, which had been punished for their arrogance, de-victimized the U.S., which was construed as an aggressor rather than a victim of unexpected, nihilistic attacks. Such a de-victimization was further achieved through representations of the attacks as a last resort and a cry of despair of the dispossessed and the use of predicates such as “arrogant” and “merciless” to describe the U.S.

As a result of all the above these two discourses constituted a contrasting picture of the September 11 events. The first discourse construed the events as a major threat to “us” and as a result of unjustified, “evil” terrorist actions, which need to be drastically dealt with; the second discourse, constructed the events as an expected retribution of justice on the U.S. only, which was justified because of past U.S. actions. It is also important to point out that these two different discourses were enhanced by, but also facilitated, very different representations of the U.S. and the terrorists.

### **Representations of the “terrorists”**

There clearly was a hegemonic and uniform discourse on the terrorists in the British press. Thus, the terrorists were constructed as irrational, “evil” madmen with no real motives or reasons to attack, driven by a malevolent and twisted vision of the world. Moreover, this discourse on terrorism dominated the British press with a large number of articles engaging in extensive analysis of the “terrorist threat”. Such representations of the terrorists, as has been seen, were also present in the Greek press, even though they were not at no point represented as posing a serious threat. Moreover, these representations were relatively “unpopular” in comparison to the primary discourse on the terrorists as victims of the U.S. aggressors, which were in line with the previously analyzed hegemonic discourse on the September 11 events. Moreover, representations in the Greek press of the terrorists as “evil madmen”, was not in opposition to

representations of the U.S. as aggressors and of the attacks as retribution of justice. An interesting comparison is the two different hegemonic discourses on terrorism in the press of the two countries, namely the September 11 terrorists and the U.S. terrorists. While the September 11 terrorists were constructed as irrational subjects, the U.S. terrorists were constituted as rational and very calculating ones. However, in both cases these two different types of terrorists were described as equally threatening, since they were equally malicious and bent on destruction, only for different reasons and using different tactics.

### **Representations of Islam**

In both the British and the Greek press Islam as a religion was disassociated from terrorism. However, in the British press metaphors of beards and constructions of Islam as the binary opposite of modernity, as well as the binary positioning of Muslims as either moderate or radical, constituted Islam as a monolithic religion, which was the most appropriate candidate for terrorism. Moreover, such representations encouraged the so-called clash of civilizations that was renounced by positioning this “backward Islam” in opposition to “western, civilized modernity”. The Greek press discourse on Islam was very different, since Muslims were constructed as innocent victims of western, expansionary policies. While such representations are different, they both result in constructions of Muslims as one-dimensional stereotypes, in the Greek case as victims rather than aggressors. Moreover, and similarly to the British press discourse, this discourse confirmed and established the clash of civilization that it renounced, by positioning “the West” as a negative subject in opposition to “the rest”.

### **Representations of the United States and the West**

There were two main discourses on the U.S. in the British press, one which represented the U.S. as a positive and superior subject, as well as the finest example of a liberal democratic country, and one in which it was seen as a negative force. However, it should be pointed out that the second discourse was not as dominant as the first one and did not affect the overall post-September 11 discourse. In contrast, the hegemonic and sole



discourse in the Greek press was of the U.S. as an “evil, terrorist nation” and as a malevolent empire. It is quite interesting to compare the two negative discourses of the U.S., since even though they both represent the U.S. in a negative light, they still are quite different. Specifically, in the British press discourse the U.S. was constructed as a unilateral, self-serving power, intent on solving some of its issues by violent means rather than dialogue. In the Greek press, the criticisms of the U.S. were much fiercer. Not only was the U.S. constituted as an unlawful, terrorist nation, but it was also positioned in relationship of similarity to former empires, and was seen as responsible for the majority of world ills. Thus, in this case, the U.S. was not only self-serving and unilateral, but also expansionary, utterly violent and very dangerous. Clearly the U.S. in the Greek press discourse was positioned in opposition to the world, in a similar way that the terrorists were positioned in opposition to the world in the British press discourse. Thus, in the Greek press discourse, the U.S. acquired a very similar position to the one that the terrorists had acquired in the British press.

The British press discourse positioned the U.K. in a relation of identity to the west, which was represented as the beholder of superior values. Moreover, the U.K. was constituted as a primary actor of the “western community”, who would be capable of and was entitled to assume the role of the leader in the “war on terrorism” alongside the U.S. The representations of the “west” were conflicting in the Greek press discourse. It was primarily positioned in a relationship of similarity to the U.S., with western elites described as exploiting entire nations and peoples. However, such representations were non-existent once the role of Greece in a post-September 11 era was analyzed. Even though only few articles referred to the role of Greece and its position in the world after September 11, in all those articles “the west” was disassociated from the U.S. and was positioned in a relationship of similarity and identity to Greece, as the beholder of a superior civilization. The ideal role that Greece was thus meant to play was alongside the superior and righteous “western family”. This latter discourse is strikingly similar to the British press discourse on the west. Nevertheless, in the British press discourse the U.K. assumed the role of a western leader, whereas in the Greek press discourse, Greece was



seen as a small country, in need of protection, whose best interests lie within the E.U. and the western family.

In sum then, the marginal or less dominant discourses in the press of each country shared more similarities with the dominant discourse of the other country. This was the case precisely because the British and Greek press discourses were for the most part very different. However, as has been shown, these differences created similar attitudes of closure. It would be interesting and useful to determine the extent to which these representations changed in the months leading to the Iraq war. This is the concern of the following chapter.

## Chapter 5: British and Greek Press

### Representations: October 2002-April 2003: The Iraq War

On 2 October 2002, the U.S. Congress passed a Joint Resolution which authorized the President to use the U.S. armed forces in any way deemed necessary and appropriate (White House, 2002). A month later, the UN Security council (2002) unanimously approved a resolution on Iraq, forcing Saddam to comply with its disarmament obligations as had been set out in previous resolutions. The following months witnessed heated debates and diplomatic rifts. On 15 February more than 10 million people protested against the war in Iraq in over 600 cities worldwide. Moreover, the UN Security council rejected the 24 February 2003 resolution by the U.S., the U.K. and Spain, which called for military action against Iraq. This was followed by a unilateral invasion of Iraq, with the first U.S. bombs dropping on Baghdad on March 19.

With the U.K., while the war in Afghanistan had, on the whole, been positively received by British public opinion and the British government, there was contention over the subsequent war in Iraq. Even though Tony Blair expressed support for the U.S. government and an unwavering conviction about the need for war to topple Saddam, the British public remained divided, as was evident in protest marches and widespread support for groups such as the “Stop the War Coalition”. Moreover, the government itself was split, with Labour MPs openly expressing their opposition to a potential war in Iraq. This dissent was not only evident within the U.K., but also all over Europe and even within the U.S. itself. The British press was equally divided; after the almost unanimous approval for a war in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, there was now a more critical and divided assessment of the war in Iraq. The discourse in *The Mirror* and *The Independent* significantly differed from the discourse in *The Times*, and could be seen as oppositional at most points. While the majority of articles in *The Times* endorsed the morality of the war, *The Independent* and the *Mirror* discourse represented



the war as immoral. However, the variation across the British press was not reflected within each newspaper. The hegemonic discourse in *The Times* was pro-war, anti-E.U. and pro-U.S., whereas the discourse in *The Independent* and *The Mirror* was, on the whole, anti-war, anti-Bush and even anti-U.S.

The war in Iraq was also a major concern amongst scholars, politicians and the wider public in Greece. Greek citizens frequently marched in protest to the U.S. Embassy in Athens and the U.S. Consulate in Thessaloniki. On 14 February 2003 approximately 100.000 people participated in the anti-war demonstration in Athens. There were nationwide strikes against the war, with the public services, private companies, shops and academic institutions shutting down for 24 hours on that same day (Tzogopoulos, 2005: 10). Over 95% of the population expressed their objection to what was generally viewed as an “imperial expedition” and “a war for oil”, while Prime Minister Kostas Simitis declared that “Greece is not participating in the war and will not get entangled with it” (Simitis quoted in Tzogopoulos, 2005: 5). Unlike in the British press, the representations amongst the Greek newspapers were uniform; the war in Iraq was unanimously represented as a threat to the global order, initiated by a dangerous empire with disregard for international laws and norms. Moreover, the E.U. was positioned in an oppositional relationship to the U.S. as a force of good, which, united, could “defeat” the U.S. peril.

This chapter delineates the main representations in the British and Greek press from October 2002, when the debates on the legality and the morality of the war began to intensify, until April 2003, when what is described as the initial stage of the war ended with the ‘siege’ of Baghdad.

## **British press representations: October 2002-April 2003**

This section is divided in four parts. The first part looks at the two main discourses on the war in Iraq, which was seen either as necessary and morally righteous or as dangerous and irrelevant to the 'war on terrorism'. After looking at the main discourses on the war, I examine the main actors involved, the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. Thus, the second part studies the main representations of the U.S. as a corrupt bully, an aspiring imperialist and a force of good. The third part moves on to representations of Blair as a poodle, a sincere leader who is nevertheless wrong, a moderator or a corrupt Prime Minister. Finally, the fourth part expands on depictions of a future Britain as a great European force or as a major U.S. ally and expands on discourses of the French and the "Franco-German axis" as bullies and as a threat to the world order.

### **A war in Iraq as...**

The first of the two discourses on the war in Iraq, the hegemonic discourse in *The Mirror* and *The Independent*, represented the war as irrelevant, dangerous for western security, unlawful and unhelpful for the Iraqis themselves. Saddam and Al Qaeda were positioned in a relationship of opposition to each other, and the non-essential character of a war in Iraq was also juxtaposed to the necessity of the war on terrorism. Moreover, constructions of the war in Iraq as obstructing the war on terrorism rendered the former not only irrelevant, but also dangerous. Finally, the positioning of the U.S. in opposition to the West as a unilateral actor pursuing an unlawful war, which would neither benefit the west nor the Iraqis, rendered the war in Iraq both unnecessary and damaging.

### ***Inappropriate***

The irrelevance of the war in Iraq was accentuated through the elevation of terrorism as the most important threat facing humankind, and the disassociation of the war in Iraq from the terrorist threat. Specifically, terrorism was constituted as posing a very serious threat to western values and to western societies. Especially after the Bali bombings and



the siege of the theatre in Moscow the hegemonic discourse on terrorism was very similar to the one described in chapter 4. Terrorists were “small men who want to look big, psychopaths ... zealots” (Humphrys, 2002: 19), “evil ... ideological fanatics whose hatred for the West is total ... they cannot be reasoned with, bought off or deterred” (Gove, 2003e: 20). This is therefore “an enemy with whom it is impossible to negotiate” (‘Answer to Terror’, 2002:18), “whose divine, irreducible aim is the destruction of western society” (Shawcross, 2002: 29). The only difference from representations of terrorism in the first few months after the September 11 events was that there were often references to Al-Qaeda, rather than merely the faceless terrorist as the enemy to be fought. Thus, “this threat from Al-Qaeda reaches across the skies to every western airplane, and every western passenger” (Toolis, 2002: 6) and “Al-Qaeda will continue bombing and killing because, in the words of Hezbollah: ‘We are fighting to eliminate you’” (Furbank, 2002: 25).

As was also pointed out in the previous chapter, negative predicates, such as “evil”, “psychopaths” and “small men” constituted the terrorists as irrational and fanatical individuals. Thus, the terrorists were positioned in opposition to everyone else, as inherently and innately evil. As Rai points out, “the personality defect model of terrorism holds that terrorists have fundamental and pathological defects in their personality structure, usually related to a damaged sense of self. Moreover, these defects result from unconscious forces in the terrorists’ psyche” (Rai, 2004: 544). The consequence of representing terrorists as evil and unreasonable, was the exclusion of complex histories of struggle, intervention and non-development which may shed light on the reasons for the attacks. Instead, such representations preclude the possibility of any reason other than the terrorists’ irrational fanaticism. “Once a terror attack occurs, it is held that all such historiography should be consigned to the proverbial scrap heap. It now becomes a matter of pure evil, with no history or reason” (Bhatia, 2005: 16). In turn, constituting the terrorists as ruthless others, without morality or restraints, and their actions as a-historical and unjustified, resulted in the need for an immediate and relentless resolution of the conflict. Since terrorists “cannot be negotiated with”, attack and destruction is the only solution to the problem of terrorism. Thus, by positioning the terrorists as a



particular type of subject, certain actions were deemed pointless and even dangerous, while others came to be seen as 'natural' and essential. In particular, exploring the causes of the attacks was inconceivable, while retaliation for the destruction of the terrorist threat and the pre-emption of future attacks was naturalized as the most logical and only viable option.

While terrorism was constituted as a major threat in *The Mirror* and *The Independent* discourse, and the war against terrorism was legitimized as an immediate necessity, a war in Iraq was construed as irrelevant, as a distraction which would divert attention from what was, in fact, a greater danger. "Bush and Blair are fighting the wrong war. As long as Bin Laden is alive this deadly threat from tourist bars in Bali to tourist aircraft anywhere in the world, will grow" (Toolis, 2002: 6). "The greatest effort must be reserved for the greatest threat. And that comes from al-Qaeda ... The priority must be to prevent Al-Qaeda striking. Not to play to the cameras with a gun-ho military invasion" ('Al-Qaeda is the real foe', 2002: 6). Due to the imminence of the threat from terrorist organizations, a war in Iraq was represented as delaying and distracting the 'War on Terror' campaign. "War against Iraq is a perverse priority when it is already the terrorists who present much the bigger threat to international security" ('Fight Terrorism, not Iraq', 2002: 28). Moreover, Saddam and Al-Qaeda were compared, with Al Qaeda emerging as a much bigger threat than the rogue dictator, who was seen as vile, but nevertheless, harmless to the West. "Is it Iraq, ruled by a hideous regime, to be sure, but which has nothing more than a clapped-out air force, a few rusting old missiles and an army with sub-zero morale to throw at us? Or is it Al-Qaeda, a global network that can call on up to 100,000 militants, dispersed in as many as 50 countries, with a proven track record in creating terrorist havoc and a fanatic's iron determination to create more"? (Freedland, 2003: 4). Therefore, "Anyone who thinks Saddam is about to start World War Three is a fool, the President of the United States or both" ('War looms, but peace can be won', 2003:6). In sum, "they found no evidence of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. And they confirmed that the possibility of Saddam Hussein attacking the West is as likely as Kylie Minogue challenging Mike Tyson to a 15-round title fight" (Sheridan, 2003a: 13).



According to the above representation, there was a clear demarcation between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, a differentiation which wasn't made in *The Times* discourse. Saddam and Al Qaeda were constructed as two different subjects, both vile and ruthless, yet not equally dangerous. Predicates such as "deadly threat", "greatest effort", "grow", "priority", "imminence", "iron determination" represented the terrorists as more dangerous than the Saddam regime, which, with "rusting old missiles", "clapped-out air force", "sub-zero morale", was represented as less threatening. Not only did this comparison result in the construction of Saddam Hussein's regime as non-threatening to the west, but it also resulted in the magnification of the Al-Qaeda threat and the representation of a 'war against terror' as an absolute necessity which could not be delayed. By pointing out that an attack against Saddam would be distracting and would delay the 'war on terror', the urgency of this war became apparent. A prompt response on the part of the west against the 'deadly terrorists' was deemed essential while a failure to respond quickly was seen as both unacceptable and dangerous. Therefore, this comparison increased the notion of risk and panic, since the west was seen to be in a state of emergency. This state of emergency was enhanced by the use and constant repetition of what Erjavec calls "lexical cohesive devices" (2004: 98), words such as 'threat' and 'danger' that constructed risk discourse and therefore rendered certain actions appropriate for dealing with the terrorists.

### *Dangerous to the West*

War in Iraq was also articulated as dangerous for the west, since it was expected to lead to terrorist escalation. "Attacking him [Saddam] will not ease the danger from terrorism. In fact, it will make it worse by infuriating and inciting fanatics ... they will find a perfect excuse if they can accuse America and the U.K. of bombing and killing innocent civilians in Iraq" ('War on Iraq will make us terror target', 2002: 6). In fact, "the moment our forces join with America to bomb and invade Iraq, Al-Qaeda will respond by launching a terrorist bombardment here" ('Why we're the target of terrorists', 2003: 6). Thus, "instead of increasing security for the West, we will have destroyed it" (Hamilton, 2003: 16). Muslim resentment would grow, which would, in turn, result in the creation of a



more favourable environment for the breeding of terrorism. “A war on Iraq will win yet more backing for jihadism in the Muslim world. A prolonged U.S. occupation of Iraq will be the greatest provocation yet” (Freedland, 2002: 6). As a result, “a pre-emptive war against Iraq would have the opposite effect of increasing martyrdom. It is bound to heighten the sense among some Muslims that the U.S. and its allies are engaged in a crusade against their values. It will make attacks like the bomb in Bali more likely” (‘Unless there is more justice’, 2002: 14). Finally, a war was bound to destabilize whole regions, which would yet again result in strengthening the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. “The U.S. and Britain seek a possible war that threatens to destabilise regions that are already terrorist breeding grounds” (‘Fight Terrorism, not Iraq’, 2002: 28). “The war could have an impact on surrounding states ... how do we calculate how many more suicidal bombers will be created, and therefore how many terrorist attacks can be directly related to this war”? (Mowlam, 2002: 6).

In this representation, the presupposition that the war in Iraq would lead to terrorist escalation constituted the war in Iraq as dangerous and threatening to western security. Predicates such as “destroyed”, “grow”, “increasing”, “heighten”, “destabilize” served to constitute the war as escalating terrorism. This representation did not significantly differ from the British press discourses on terrorism shortly after the September 11 events. It is still based on the binary construction of an inside/outside, a “west versus the rest” dichotomy, whereby the western inside is threatened by a non-western, Muslim outside. Muslim countries were positioned in a relationship of complementarity and identity to each other and to terrorism as breeding grounds for terrorists, and in opposition to the West. This orientalist discourse (see Said, 1995) was based on the construction and normalization of imaginative geographies (Graham, online: 3) that separated the “western homeland” from the terrorist “Muslim outside”. Thus, the “civilized, western world” was constructed as a coherent whole, which must defend itself from “Islamic terrorism”. As Graham (online: 9) points out, “once again, western nations-and the securitized cities now seen once again to sit hierarchically within their dominant territorial patronage – are being normatively imagined as bounded, organized spaces with closely controlled, and filtered, relationships with the supposed terrors of the outside world”. Moreover, the



articulation of the western inside as defensive on the one hand, and the Muslim outside as aggressive on the other hand, constituted the west as the victim which needs to defend itself against aggressive, Islamic terrorism. However, it was also pointed out that the war in Iraq would only enhance the “security” problem, rather than provide a solution.

### *Breaching international justice*

A representation found primarily in the *Independent*, although also in the *Mirror*, constructed the war in Iraq as a manifestation of U.S. unilateralist intentions and disrespect for the international community. “The most important lesson of the post-11 September world is that when America decides it has a clear national interest America will act - with or without the rest of us” (Keane, 2002a: 18). The UN was seen to have been disregarded by the U.S. “The suspicion remains that if the UN does not do what he wants it to do - and pass a second resolution with a wording similar to that issued by Britain and the US yesterday - then George Bush will ignore it” (‘Saddam is Neutralised’, 2003: 18). Similarly, “President Bush does not argue that might is right. He argues that America has overwhelming might and that it is always right, because it is America. If the UN Security Council is to survive at all, it must survive in the post 9/11 world, as a kind of international Supreme Soviet, whose duty is to endorse the American view. Ditto Nato” (Lichfield, 2003: 18). It was also pointed out, that President Bush “wants to destroy the UN” (Fisk, 2002: 21). In fact, a decision on the war in Iraq seemed to lie in the hands of the U.S alone, since it was not possible for any other actor to express dissent. “Nobody dares to say no to Washington ... Weapons inspectors and reports are irrelevant ... Whether Iraq is invaded or not will, in the end, depend entirely on the-US ... the rest of us - the UN, Britain, America's allies or the Arab world - have no say in the matter. And it's fantasy for anyone to say otherwise” (Hamilton, 2002: 17).

This discourse was critical of the U.S., which was positioned in a relationship of power over the E.U. and the West, as intent on disregarding international law and imposing its views on all others. Specifically, active verbs such as “decides”, “acts”, “ignores”, “destroy”, “decides” constructed the U.S. as a powerful and active agent, in contrast to

the U.N. and all other actors which were articulated as weak, by means of passive and receptive verbs, such as “endorse”, “survive”, and “(nobody) dares”. Therefore, in contrast to the previous representation, which positioned the West- including the U.S. - as a unified entity needing to protect itself from the terrorist threat, the U.S. was “othered” in this representation, only differently than the terrorists. Thus, it was not treated as a threatening or dangerous other, but as a non-compliant other, unwilling to co-operate and intent on protecting its own interests, at the expense of collective interests.

### *Unhelpful for Iraqis*

In line with the previous representation, the war in Iraq was not only represented as unlawful, but it was also constituted as unhelpful for the Iraqis. It was maintained that all the rhetoric about liberating the Iraqis and instilling democracy in the country would not be realized. “Sadly, a glance at previous U.S. invasions suggests their promise of rebuilding might not be entirely believable. Because to take the odd example at random, Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Grenada, Laos, and Somalia all seemed to miss out on this glorious regeneration scheme after the American military ripped them apart. They promise long-term commitment, have their way, then never phone, never write, you're just another notch on the Statue of Liberty” (Steel, 2003: 18). The U.S. was represented as creating havoc and making empty promises, which they then entirely disregarded. Moreover, it was also seen as intent on colonizing the countries it invaded and instilling puppet governments, instead of restoring democracy. “History is littered with examples of how American actions have removed a regime to replace it with a worse one” (‘Let’s stop the grim preacher’, 2003:6). Besides, “freedom, United States-style, so far means full hospitals, no water, a terrified civilian population and the specter of a humanitarian disaster that nobody can estimate ... He [Bush] demands democracy in the Middle East now, but the US has propped up brutal and corrupt dictatorships in the area for years. Not just Saddam's Iraq but Saudi Arabia and a host of smaller autocratic Gulf states” (Stott, 2003: 14). The U.S. was thus seen as having double standards, as being hypocritical and undemocratic, and thus both unwilling to and incapable of effecting a positive change in a post-war Iraq. “As well as giving their country back,



we're also going to bring them democracy. Where has America done this in the past, then? True, they have sometimes re-shaped a country's democracy. For example in Chile, they tried out a new system of picking a leader, where you hold an election and whoever gets the most votes, you kill him ... George Bush is sure to want to sort this out, because if there's one thing he can't stand, it's someone who uses his own family to undermine the democratic process to become ruler of their country" (Steel, 2003: 12).

This representation of the war as harmful for the Iraqis was reinforced by pictures of injured Iraqis, primarily children who had been hit by U.S. bombs. On the twenty-third of March, the cover of *The Independent on Sunday* featured a half-page image of a baby whose face was covered in burns, and which was crying in his mother's arms, under the headline, "This is the reality of war. We bomb. They suffer" (Appendix C, Figure 1). Another picture in *The Mirror* (Appendix C, Figure 2) showed a man holding an unconscious, severely wounded girl in his hands, with the headline, "The bombs that devastated ordinary homes. Not so smart"! Another very shocking and visually arresting picture in *The Mirror* on the 13<sup>th</sup> of March featured two little girls, lying dead in the rubble of their home. The headline of the article accompanying the picture, written by John Pilger, was: "These sisters were killed by one of our bombers. Look at the pictures ... and ask yourself what they say about Blair's 'moral case' for this phoney war" (Pilger, 2003: 6). Moreover, the covers of both newspapers often featured full page images of a bombed Iraq, attached to huge headlines such as "Mass Destruction", "Shocking and Awful", or "Baghdad's night of Terror" (Appendix C, Figures 3-5). These images and headlines constituted the Iraqis as the helpless victims of mostly U.S., but also British aggressiveness, since it was "our" bombers who cause "awful" "destruction"; it is "we" who bomb and it is "they" who suffer.

Moreover, many photos depicted people marching against the war, often featuring front page headlines such as "Not in our Name, Mr. Blair" (Appendix C, Figure 6), or "The People versus the War". The 15 February *Mirror* front cover was a full-size picture of a sick and skinny child, whose bones could be discerned. The child was facing the camera as if saying "Look at me! Save me" and big headlines in the bottom of the picture wrote

“For his sake ... March”. In small letters on the left side corner of the photo was a caption saying, “Suffering: This starving Iraqi child faced death in 1998 – a new war could kill a million children” (Appendix C, Figure 7). Another front cover full-page photo (Appendix C, Figure 8) showed a baby looking directly at the viewer’s eyes. In the background one could discern two placards, one with ‘peace’ written on it, and another featuring a previous *Mirror* cover showing a bleeding soldier, with half the page filled with the headline “No War”.

Such images were common in *The Mirror* and *The Independent*. Both photos featured children staring at the camera and both were followed by captions and headlines opposing war and encouraging readers to voice their dissent. The frequent choice of children is interesting. Children connote innocence and promise; thus, photos of injured children or children in protest marches, arouse the emotions and, at least for some, have a deeper impact than pictures of adults. This emotive impact is enhanced when children are shown facing the camera. As Kress and Van Leeuwen point out, “when represented participants look at the viewer, vectors, formed by participants’ eyelines, connect the participants with the viewer. Contact is established, even if it is only on an imaginary level”. This visual configuration both creates a visual form of direct address and constitutes an ‘image act’ whereby the participants gaze demands something from the viewer, “demands that the viewer enter into some kind of imaginary relation with him or her” (1999: 381).

The newspaper articles were also accompanied by mostly ironic sketches questioning U.S. intentions. One depicted the center of a post-war Iraq. The whole area seems to be rubble, but some of Iraq’s monuments are still standing. In the foreground one can see what used to be the famous Saddam statue. However, Saddam’s head (the statue’s head) lies on the ground and President Bush has taken Saddam’s place. Bush is holding a gun, while the statue has the phrase “the glorious leader” inscribed on it. In the background one can see the Triumphal Arch, which was built by Saddam to celebrate his victory against Iran. However, the shape of the crossed swords have changed, the swords in the sketch are bent, forming the logo of McDonalds food chain. Near the ‘Triumphal Arch’



there is another statue of George Bush pointing towards Iran, replacing what used to be a statue of Saddam pointing towards Iran. Finally, on the left one can see an image of Bush as Laurence of Arabia riding his horse and holding an American flag. In the top right corner there is what looks like a slip of paper attached to the sketch-photo, which reads: "Iraq-Reconstruction Plan [Top Secret]". This sketch ironically manifested the newspaper's distrust towards the U.S. government's reconstruction promises; moreover, through the substitution of major Iraqi symbols by American ones, the U.S. was represented as intent on exploiting rather than liberating Iraq. Since McDonalds connote Americanization and American commercial expansion, the substitution of the swords by the golden arches connotes commercial colonization. Moreover, the substitution of the Saddam statue by the Bush statue is very important symbolically, because the fall of the statue had come to be seen as a metaphor of Iraq's liberation in major 'pro-war' discourses. In contrast, this sketch was in line with *The Independent/Mirror* discourse, which questioned the discourse of the war as liberation, substituting it by a war as occupation discourse.

### **The righteousness of a war in Iraq**

The hegemonic discourse in *The Times* justified the war in Iraq in terms of its morality and the threat of the Iraqi regime. Specifically, a war in Iraq was construed as both necessary for western security and moral since it would liberate the Iraqis. Moreover, the anti-war protesters were articulated as anti-American and threatening to the west.

### *Saddam as a danger*

According to this representation, a war in Iraq was both justified and required because of the danger that Saddam posed to the international order. Saddam was represented as a "genocidal butcher" (Kaletsky, 2003c: 20) and a "mass murderer with the means of mass murder on a scale never before known" (Gove, 2003b: 20) and his regime as "an evil, fascist regime" (Clwyd, 2003: 20) and "a terrorist power with growing access to weapons of mass destruction" (Rees-Mogg, 2002: 18). Saddam was proven unreliable and to have

deadly intentions; it was therefore useless to negotiate with him. “There is ample evidence of Saddam's intentions; must we wait on his capabilities?” (Bobbitt, 2003: 22). Moreover, “If Iraq's arms programmes are not subdued, WMD are likelier to proliferate in other states, especially Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Libya ... Saddam would clearly be capable of using these non-state actors as unidentifiable agents to attack the US or the UK with weapons he would not dare use against us directly” (Bobbitt, 2003: 22). Therefore, “it would ... be fatal to any hopes of a meaningful international order to draw back from the use of force” (Gove, 2003b: 20), and “there remains only one way to bring this about: military intervention” (‘Mother of all bluffs’, 2002: 19). As a consequence, the regime “...must come to an end; with or without the help of the Security Council, and with or without the backing of the Labour Party in the House of Commons tonight” (Clwyd, 2003: 20).

The main presuppositions grounding this representation are Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction, his intention to use them against the west, and his links to terrorism and terrorist organizations. None of these claims have been proven; in fact, they have been highly contested by many analysts. What is noteworthy, however, is the ways in which these presuppositions and highly contested pieces of information came to be the accepted, as indeed the dominant discourse in *The Times*.

To begin with, representations of Saddam and his regime were very similar to representations of the terrorists. As Hodges also points out in his discussion of Bush's War on Terror Narrative, “central to the construction of identities in the BWOTN is the justification of war against Iraq vis-à-vis the events of 9/11” (Hodges, 2004: 2). Similarly, in the *Times* discourse, Saddam was articulated as a “genocidal butcher”, a “mass murderer”, and his regime as “fascist” and an “evil, terrorist power”. Thus, the terrorists and the Iraqi “terrorist power” were positioned in a relationship of similarity and complementarity to each other; similarity, in the sense that they were very both dangerous and non-negotiable subjects intent on destruction, and complementarity, since they needed each other in their deadly plans against the west. Moreover, these two subjects were positioned in opposition to “us”, the western countries. The west was



therefore articulated as the victim of collaboration between a terrorist alliance, and in need to defend itself against this “fatal” threat. As a result of the above representations, a war in Iraq was constituted as equally important to the war on Terror as hunting down the perpetrators of September 11, since “a strike against the one (Saddam) is justified by its equivalence to a strike against the other (Al-Qaeda)” (Hodges, 2004: 2).

Furthermore, the construction of Saddam as dangerous rendered imperative a swift and drastic response, while at the same time rendering risky and “fatal” anything that would delay the required military intervention. The U.N. was therefore naturalized as a hindrance to the maintenance of international order. “The inspectors are Saddam’s mechanism for delay ... the search is a futile distraction” (‘Phoney Peace’, 2002: 21). Furthermore, “Saddam would have a UN shield behind which he could continue to conceal and develop his weapons” (Powell, 2003: 13). To sum up such representations naturalized the importance of a military strike in Iraq by demonizing Saddam Hussein as an enemy, intent on destroying the West, and by constructing links between Iraq and terrorism, and between two otherwise quite distinct and separate subjects, with potentially divergent motivations. Thus, such constructions created closure and discouraged any form of non-military action as dangerous and risky. As Spence (2005: 284) points out, “dominated by this imperative, practices of evaluation, decision, negotiation and compromise, that is of the reasoned assessment of disparate and various tractable risk situations, are inconvenient distractions. Instead, the task of eliminating perceived challenges to the integrity of the nation-state supplants the relational and heterogeneous risk problematic with that of absolute security and its constitutive other, terror”.

### *The Morality of war*

Although *The Times* discourse supported the war in Iraq in terms of the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction, an equally if not more dominant representation framed the war as a moral enterprise. “Every day in Iraq prisoners are beheaded, electrocuted or locked in cells until they are driven to eat the flesh of other prisoners. Military force can

surely be justified to remove the man whose major contribution to modern Arab culture has been genocide" (Knowles, 2003: 18). Similarly, "Saddam is a genocidal butcher, whose removal will almost certainly save far more lives than it destroys" (Kaletsky, 2003c: 20), and "a modern Moloch engorged with the human blood of his tortured and slaughtered innocent child victims ... war is the only way to put an end to the suffering caused by Saddam. Ali and other dead and wounded civilians are the terrible and tragic price that has to be paid" (Nicholson, 2003: 18). Therefore, the deaths resulting from the war in Iraq were constituted as a necessary and unavoidable ill. "War is like chemotherapy. The good and innocent cells will be killed along with the bad. But where there is cancer that threatens to snuff out life, what is one to do but fight back? (Boteach, 2002: 20). Not liberating Iraq would thus be unethical and morally inconceivable. "The most moral of wars are not even those fought in self-defense, but rather those which are fought to defeat tyranny and genocide. If a war of self-defense demonstrates an appreciation of our own lives, a war to defend our neighbour's existence manifests an appreciation of all life" (Boteach, 2002: 20). Especially after the U.S. troops had entered Iraq it was pointed out that the Iraqis themselves were happy about the war, as was evident in the Iraqi reactions at the sight of the U.S. military. "By every indication we have, the population of Baghdad was making a secret holiday in its heart as those horrible palaces went up in smoke, and this holiday will soon be a public holiday, and if we all keep our nerve we can join the festivities with a fairly clear conscience" (Hitchens, 2003: 12,13). Likewise, "for the first time since 1958 Iraq has a chance to dream of something other than bloody dictatorship" (Taheri, 2003: 30).

According to this discourse, force in Iraq was justified on human rights grounds. Saddam was positioned in opposition to the Iraqis who were constructed as the victims of a tyrannical regime. This representation was accentuated by the articulation of Saddam as a "butcher", who "slaughtered" the Iraqis. As Tenorio (online: 54) points out, "the lexical item 'to butcher' is a verb that requires an [+animate, +human] agentive subject and a [+animate, +animal] affected object". The difference between a butcher and articulations of Saddam as a butcher is that Saddam was represented as "slaughtering" human beings like animals. Thus, the metaphor of Saddam as a butcher constituted



Saddam as a brutal dictator, who dehumanized the Iraqis by treating them as animals. Therefore, this metaphor positioned the Iraqis as “defenseless and innocent victims who have no choice but to be sacrificed like animals by a wicked human agent” (Tenorio, online: 54).

The representations of Saddam Hussein as a purely negative, brutal subject, who constituted a major threat to all Iraqis, facilitated representations of an intervention as liberation. Since all Iraqis were constructed as potentially suffering inhumanely treated under Saddam’s rule, an intervention could only be positive for the future of the Iraqi people. Therefore, the above representation constituted as truth the highly contested presupposition, that the ousting of Saddam equaled the liberation of Iraqis. This was further facilitated by means of predicates that construed the invasion as liberation. Thus, lexical items such as “save lives”, “life”, “appreciation”, “defend”, “justified” and “moral”, were juxtaposed to predicates such as “death”, “tyranny”, “blood” and “dictatorship” to constitute a “villain-victim-hero” fairytale discourse (Lakoff, 1991), whereby “we” are the heroes, who will rid the Iraqi victims of Saddam, the villain. This discourse facilitated the construction of the military intervention as necessary and unavoidable.

Finally, the war as a moral and just enterprise was also justified by means of the nation as a person metaphor (Lakoff, 1991 and 2003), whereby the ruler stands for the state. The articulation of the war as waged against Saddam minimized the negative consequences of the war and elevated it as a moral enterprise. However, this metaphor hides the fact “that the 3000 bombs to be dropped in the first two days will not be dropped on that one person. They will kill many thousands of the people hidden by the metaphor, people that according to the metaphor we are not going to war against” (Lakoff, 2003: online).

The above discourse, however, can and has been contested. As has already been pointed out, the *Independent* and *Mirror* discourses constituted the war in Iraq as unhelpful for the Iraqis and as pointless, while the Greek press discourse constructed the war as a colonizing U.S. expedition and as destructive for the Iraqis. Thus, in a different discourse

the war in Iraq could be represented as occupation, rather than liberation and the motives of the intervention could be seen as selfish. For example, as Bhatia (2005: 13) observes, “the construction of a savage, lawless or unordered subject is a noted prerequisite of intervention ... Descriptions of an opponent are used to emphasize the benefit that would result from the imposition of an imperial order. Any suffering caused by the newly arrived actor is thus dismissed as incomparable to the disorder previously present”.

### *The folly of the protesters*

Not surprisingly, this discourse constructed the anti-war protesters negatively. They were articulated as “morally deluded ... malcontents and emoting naïfs”, “whose activism ... is an unlovable eccentricity”, and who “march because marching is what they do. They are outraged, because outrage is what they do. But they do not march in my name, nor the public’s” (Millen, 2003: 22). Not only were the protesters constructed as non-representative of the general public, but they were also seen as disrupting order. “Doubtless many anti-war protesters felt that their actions yesterday, taking to the streets, lying down in roads and clogging cities, were in that noble tradition, even though their main effect was to inconvenience fellow citizens” (‘Democracy and dissent’, 2003: 23). In the above representations, the protesters were othered as aberrations from the norm, and the protests were depoliticized. In his study of the U.K. media’s portrayal of youth anti-war protesters, Stephen Cushion (2004) concluded, that “instead of promoting the intervention of young people in the political sphere, these images imply an immaturity of political expression”. Similarly, the predication of protesting as an “eccentricity” and of the protesters as “morally deluded”, whose actions “inconvenience” the rest, resulted in the construction of the anti-war protests as unwanted and pointless, since they were emptied of any significance and meaning.

Elsewhere, anti-war protesters were depicted as well intentioned, but nevertheless wrong in their judgments. Their protests, it was argued, weakened the West and empowered Saddam, thus making war inevitable. “Saddam Hussein must be thrilled by this support offered him by British peace protesters” (Rashid, 2003: 7). Similarly, “this great



demonstration -...was not assembled to support the liberation of Iraq, but to oppose it ... Subjectively the march was for peace; objectively it helped Saddam Hussein ... they are good people. One should not forget that ... unfortunately, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. I am glad that our Prime Minister is not anti-American or an appeaser” (Rees-Mogg, 2003a: 18).

Finally, some of the protesters, were simply anti-American. “Its opposition to Uncle Sam is the glue in the Left coalition, the brew which puts fire into bien-pensant bellies, the opium of radical intellectuals ... For Yankee-phobia is, at heart, a dark thing, a prejudice with ugly antecedents which creates unholy alliances. And, like all prejudices, it thrives on myths which will end up only serving evil ends” (Gove, 2003a: 16). As a result, “there was never any doubt which side they would take. When America does just that, the reaction is not to thank heavens for a nation that is prepared to stand up for freedom, but to spit in its face. That mindset infects the entire political culture” (Pollard, 2003: 18). Thus, the U.S. was constructed as a victim of anti-American sentiments which would never change no matter how righteous U.S. actions were. “And the peace camp still has the gall to call Bush and Blair butchers. They are the war criminals even when the evidence against the bestiality of Saddam's stinking regime is overwhelming ... Let the malcontents burn the Union Jack. Right now I feel like kissing it” (Parsons, 2003b: 17).

The above representation was based on two main presuppositions, namely that the U.S. is always well-intentioned, righteous and thus entitled to intervene whenever it decides to do so; it was also presupposed that the West was threatened by Saddam's regime. As a result of those presuppositions, whoever opposes the war is automatically ‘anti-American’, supports Saddam and harms the West. Thus, the world was constructed as divided in two camps, those who approve of U.S. actions and don't challenge U.S. authority and those who express disapproval and thus support terrorist, authoritarian regimes and consequently harm the west.

## The United States as...

### *...A corrupt, imperialist bully*

The U.S. was on the whole represented as a negative force in *The Mirror* and *The Independent*. In particular, it was constructed as a corrupt bully intent on imposing a new American-centered world order. "The New World Order turns out to be The World Ordered Around by the USA. The 20th century looks like being the century of unrelenting American imperialism. Its slogan: 'Agree with Washington - or you are dead.'" (Routledge, 2003b: 9). Moreover, "it [the U.S.] has created familiarity without respect, global recognition without affection, an unstable combination of desire, envy and loathing" (Smith, 2003: 23). However, it needs to be pointed out that a differentiation was made in this discourse between the U.S. generally, and the Bush administration in particular. Thus, for the most part, it was the Bush administration that was represented as a threatening subject, and not, for example, previous U.S. administrations. "The Bush Administration is deeply corrupt. It came to power on a voting fiddle. It emerged from a plot by the oil barons who want the USA to rule the world for profit" (Routledge, 2003c: 8-9). Likewise, "a gung-ho American president, surrounded by war -crazed advisers of the Reaganite school, are intent upon ruling the world. Their way. The terrible events of September 11 gave them the pretext they were looking for to impose a Pax Americana on the globe" (Routledge, 2002a: 6). Thus, the problem was constructed as stemming from the Bush government.

Bush, himself, was often described as mad, aggressive and a worthless leader. He was also frequently likened to an ape. "...Even though market research suggests that 87 per cent of chimp newspaper readers take the *Sun*, I'd hate to offend them by suggesting that their leader on Earth could be the sneering, sniggering ape we see punching his fist gleefully before announcing the start of war, or grinning imbecilically while addressing army families in Florida hours after one of his cruise missiles caused carnage in a Baghdad market" (Norman, 2003: 37). Similarly, "he is an ape, but that doesn't matter -



he is an ape with cruise missiles ... Bush's vanity is as dangerous as it is sickening. It also discredits us" (Routledge, 2003c: 8-9). Therefore Bush was represented as a very powerful, yet brainless and thus dangerous president. "There is less cynicism in Krusty the Clown. More gravity on the moon. More brains on a Texan plain full of buffalo droppings. Bush is not a serious statesman but a puerile punk ... those who have observed Bush closely say he is the immature buffoon satirists portray him as ... Draw a photo fit of the man you would least like to have in charge of our planet's destiny at this critical point in history and he would look remarkably like The Yellow Rogue of Texas" (Reade, 2003: 17). In her study of Hitler's use of metaphors in *Mein Kampf*, Felicity Rash (2005:103-105) points out, that Hitler used animal metaphors to dehumanize Jews and other groups of people, who were likened to apes, lizards, parasites or donkeys. Similarly, in this discourse the articulations of Bush as an ape dehumanized him and debased him as a 'lower', less intelligent species.

Furthermore, the aspirations for an American global empire were narrated as very dangerous for world order. "The US is hell bent on constructing a 21st century empire. America's weapon of choice is the cruise missile - and the way Bush is behaving, it might not be too long before he presses the nuclear button" (Sheridan, 2003b: 17). An *Independent* sketch (Appendix C, Figure 9) showed Bush in his office, somewhere in outer space, Earth visible from his windows. On his office there was a 'Fire' button and his finger was on top of it, ready to blow up the planet. On the top part of the sketch was written, "The Empire strikes back". The war in Iraq itself was described as an important step towards these imperial ambitions. "If America installs a colonial regime in Baghdad, certainly its dependence on Saudi Arabia will be dramatically eased, and its grip on the world's greatest oil market will be tightened This is the hidden agenda of the "war on terrorism" - a term that is no more than a euphemism for the Bush administration's exploitation of the September 11 attacks and America's accelerating imperial ambitions" (Pilger, 2002: 8-9). As a result, "the diplomatic charade is over and the slaughter is about to begin ...This is not a war. This is a massacre. A massacre with the goal of building a 21st century American empire" (Sheridan, 2003c: 21). A sketch (Appendix C, Figure 10) depicted an amended world map, called "The Dubyagraphic-

New world order". Texas was the focal point of the map, while all other areas, apart from England had been renamed. Europe, for example, was renamed "cheese eating surrender monkeys", the Middle East was "Greater Israel", while Canada was "North Texas".

This representation positioned the Bush administration in opposition to the rest of the world as a dangerous and threatening other, a corrupt and colonizing power. Therefore, in this representation the U.S. ceased to exist as a western ally in the war on terrorism, and became an enemy of the west and the world. Thus, this discourse broke the chains of equivalence between the terms civilized, humane, western, defensive and U.S., which resulted in a unified, hegemonic British press discourse after September 11 and during the war in Afghanistan.

This representation departed from previous British press discourses, in scrutinizing a western power. However, similarly to the hegemonic Greek press discourse, this scrutiny was directed at one western power only, the U.S., which was demonized as the only actor responsible for imperialism and exploitation. This representation didn't acknowledge, firstly, that the U.K. had backed the U.S. in a series of wars or invasions, including the Iraq war; secondly, it could be claimed that imperialism and exploitation are not unique to the U.S., but are inherent in the western, capitalist system. As Berglez (2004: 257) points out, the question of identification transforms "into a matter of identifying or disidentifying with 'them' (the U.S.), instead of navigating the discourse towards the fundamental question on whether or not 'we' identify with the hegemonic structures that rather include the U.S. as well as ourselves". Therefore, this discourse constructed a 'we' whereby, for example, 'the terrorist attacks were attacks on all of us, and not just the U.S., but the negative aspects of this 'western world' were only represented by the U.S.

### *...A force of good*

*The Times* and, to a lesser extent, the other two newspapers, represented the U.S. as a force for good. The U.S. may be a superpower, it was argued, but it is a benign and



compassionate empire that sets a good example and spreads democracy to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes around the world. "If there is an American empire, it is of a more benign variety than the majority of its earthly predecessors. During the past century, America has been on balance an immense force for good" (Cornwell, 2002: 13). For example, "the Russian people would not have been liberated from Stalinism if the Americans had not won the Cold War ... the U.S. model has repeatedly proved to be uniquely powerful, not just in defence, but in broader economic political and international terms. Now democracy is spreading in a remarkable way ... All of this, the spread of freedom in Africa, Europe, China and the former Soviet Union, is the result of the example of the American model" (Rees-Mogg, 2003d: 16). Moreover, the Bush administration itself was commented for its benign character. "While no government is perfect, the Bush administration is pre-eminently a force for good" (Anderson, 2003b: 16).

The U.S. was also represented as genuinely interested in democratizing nations and improving people's lives. "In its pursuit of Iraq, it is obeying one of its oldest instincts, that things - in this case the Middle East -- can be changed for the better ... people in very high places in Washington really do share the Wilsonian belief that Iraq can be remade into a progressive state to serve as a model for a blighted region." (Cornwell, 2002: 13). Ingratitude towards this benevolent America was due to jealousy deriving from feelings of powerlessness and inferiority. "As Britain should know as well as anyone, being top nation is a lonely job, in which gratitude from others is not among the rewards. Someone once wrote about the 'tragic lesson' that any dominant country must learn - that it cannot be loved. President Bush, I am sure, has learnt that lesson" (Cornwell, 2002: 13). However, this ingratitude could be damaging since the U.S. was the only power capable of enforcing order and was thus very much needed. "Since 1945 Europe has relied on the United States to defend the West ... The global village has only one policeman, though Britain has been a loyal special constable ... If there is only one policeman in the village, it is no good for the parish council to expect to tell him what to do. The policeman sees the maintenance of order as his responsibility. He knows very

well that any breakdown of order means that he will be called upon to intervene" (Rees-Mogg, 2003c: 18).

Democracy and freedom are the key terms in the above discourse. Both democracy and freedom were represented as conditions with some determinable essence which can unproblematically "spread" once authoritarian leaders such as Saddam Hussein were ousted. Moreover, the U.S. was constituted as a paradigmatic democracy, on the top of the hierarchy, which thus had the right to intervene in order to "restore order" and "spread" its democratic values. Not only was it presupposed that democracy has a specific and universally applicable meaning, but it was also presupposed that the world was divided in democratic and non-democratic countries. While democratic states were "benign", "progressive" and "better", the non-democratic ones were authoritarian, regressive, worse off and were thus inferior to the democratic ones. As Mouffe (2000: 4) also points out, "democratic logics always entail a frontier between 'us' and 'them', those who belong to the democratic and those who are outside it. This is the condition for the very existence of democratic rights". This binary positioning of states as democratic and non-democratic not only established the superiority of the democracies, but also enabled many, often violent, foreign policies to install democracy in the so-called non-democratic states, such as Iraq, which needed to be liberated. Since democracies are inherently benign and superior to the non-democracies, any intervention could only be humanitarian and well-meant, as well as necessary in order for democracy to prevail; democracies are thus entitled to "spread" and export democracy by any means available in order to liberate the backward and oppressed nations.

However, this sharp distinction between democracies/non-democracies is not as straightforward as articulated in the above discourse. Moreover, democracy cannot be seen as a finite, tangible, complete and uncontested term, which can be universally and unproblematically applied. There is constant struggle to naturalize its meaning and it only appears familiar through its constant abuse. One means, by which democracy fills with meaning, is through its juxtaposition to the non-democratic. By constructing the non-democratic as "worse", or "less progressive" or "less liberal", the democratic



acquires meaning as embodying all those qualities that the non-democratic lacks, whether this is the case or not.

Besides, “promoting” democracy to the “non-democracies” is in itself a paradox, since it manifests intolerance towards plurality, dissent and difference and involves adopting the high moral ground. For this reason Derrida refers to democracy as the “democracy to come”, a democracy that is and should always be undecidable and open. Thus, “a ‘true’ democracy could never be empirically realized, because it would involve the incompatible ideals of an infinite respect for the singularity and alterity of the other, as well as a quantifiable equality between anonymous singularities. Nevertheless, the recognition of this impossibility and incompatibility is essential to any striving for justice” (Derrida, 1997: 306).

Not acknowledging the undecidability of the democratic project and constituting democracy as uncontested and fixed facilitates imperative policies to promote democracy and freedom in those areas that are represented as non-democratic. The above discourse, for example, legitimized the Iraq war, since it was conducted by a democratic country to democratize a non-democratic one. Thus, such a discourse can legitimize an otherwise non-permissible and potentially damaging foreign policy. As Ake points out (quoted in Holbrook-Ellsworth, 2003: 12), “the contemporary world is not a favourable environment for democracy because we have trivialized democracy to the extent that it is no longer threatening to those in power or demanding to anyone. Democracy spreads because it has been rendered meaningless and innocuous without losing its symbolic value. While it spreads, our world is more repressive”.

### **Constructions of Tony Blair**

On the whole, Tony Blair was not criticized very heavily in the British press in the months leading to the war in Iraq. Representations of Tony Blair as an unworthy and corrupt politician were not as dominant as representations of Blair as a poodle, a moderator, and well-intentioned yet wrong. The representation of Blair as a poodle

constructed him as a loyal, follower of U.S. policies, while his representation as a moderator constituted him as a politician who had, in fact, managed to shape many decisions on the “war on Terror”. Finally, the representation of Blair as well-intentioned yet wrong, construed him as a brave politician, who acted out of his own conviction. Thus, even though he was often wrong, his actions were based on high moral and ethical standards. These three representations are not mutually exclusive; for example, Blair was often constituted as both a poodle and well-intentioned. For this reason, these three representations are treated in this section as sub-discourses of an overall discourse, which was sympathetic towards Tony Blair. By contrast, the construction of Blair as a corrupt politician is incompatible with the previous representations.

A common representation in *The Mirror*, but also to a lesser extent in *The Independent*, depicted the Prime Minister as a “poodle” who would follow the U.S. president no matter what decisions the latter took. “I suppose it is too much to ask a British Labour prime minister to do some thinking of his own and reject the consummate folly of blindly following President Bush and his wild men over the brink” (Routledge, 2002a: 6). Blair was referred to as a “poodle premier” (Routledge, 2002b: 6), or a “British lapdog” (Hardy, 2003: 4), who “barks and bites whenever George Dubya Bush gives the order” (Routledge, 2002b: 6), while Bush was seen as a “dog handler” (Routledge, 2002b: 6). Blair was thus described as a follower, rather than a leader. “Tony Blair has sold himself into unpaid political and military slavery to President George Bush” (Routledge, 2003b: 9), and “Bush gives his dog a bone” (Wallace, 2003: 4). As a consequence, “if they elected a monkey as US president, our leader would ingratiate himself and do its bidding” (Alibhai-Brown, 2003: 18). This metaphor of Blair as a poodle was reinforced by pictures and cartoons, one of which showed Blair in a collar, walking on four legs with his tongue out like a poodle being dragged by President Bush his master, who said: “We’re gonna bomb eye-rak ... I mean ... we’re gonna humanitarianly aid eye-rak ... back to the stone age” (Appendix C, Figure 11). The poodle breed’s most distinctive characteristic is their loyalty to their owner. Thus, articulating Blair as Bush’s poodle constituted Blair as a blind follower of Bush’s policies, not capable of exercising independent thought, or at least not capable of counteracting Bush’s decisions. Besides



the poodle metaphor, predicates such as “gives the order”, “blindly following”, “slavery” and “ingratiate” facilitated the positioning of Blair in a relationship of submission to Bush.

A different representation, mainly in *The Independent* and *Mirror*, described Blair as a well-intentioned and brave politician who sincerely believed that his cause was right and who acted out of his own conviction rather than as Bush’s lapdog. “Let’s give the guy some credit here. In recent weeks he’s been busting his guts to get a second UN resolution, NOT because he’s George Bush’s poodle (we know Bush spits on UN resolutions) but because he believes it’s the right thing to do. You’ve got to respect a man who has got the guts to gamble everything he’s ever worked for on a cause he believes to be right” (Malone, 2003: 33). Similarly, “one thing we can say about Tony Blair is that he gives every impression of being sincere about what he thinks, too ... Mr Blair may be hideously wrong, but he exudes the air and gaunt appearance of someone who cares” (‘Smirking gun’ (The), 2003: 11). Nevertheless, “Tony Blair is sincere, but also sincerely wrong” (Seddon, 2003: 20). According to this representation, Blair was wrong in his choices, but he was nevertheless praised for this honesty and his determination passionately to pursue his beliefs, even defying his own party for what he believed to be morally right. “You may not agree with him. You may think he is misguided. Even his enemies will have to admit, though, that he has been bold -almost reckless -in pursuit of what he believes to be right” (Sieghart, 2003: 2). Moreover, “the nation has been refreshed and inspired by its experience of this leader, who is wrong but morally honest ... For this, he deserves respect” (Orr, 2003: 16). Consequently, on this view, Blair was a valiant leader rather than a scared follower, and deserved respect, since his decision to back President Bush in the Iraq war stemmed from a sincere belief that the war was the right thing to do.

At this point it is interesting to compare *The Mirror* and *The Independent*’s representation of Bush’s decision to intervene in Iraq on the one hand, and Blair’s decision to support the war on the other. The articulations of Blair as a poodle, and as well intentioned but wrong essentially absolved Blair from any responsibility for the war in Iraq. The poodle

metaphor constituted Blair as unable to take his own decisions and as incapable of independent thought. Similarly, while it was presupposed that Blair had “honest” intentions, it was also presupposed that Bush’s same decision to go to war was dishonest and selfishly motivated. As a result, Bush and Blair were constituted as very different subjects even though they had essentially taken the same decision. In turn, the U.K. and the U.S. were also positioned as very different subjects, even though both the U.S. and the U.K. had taken the decision to start a war. As was also seen in previous sections, the U.S. was represented as the only perpetrator of the war in Iraq in *The Independent/Mirror* discourses, while the U.K. was positioned in similarity to the E.U. and in opposition to the U.S.

The third, mostly *Times* representation represented Blair as a moderator and mediator who privately influenced President Bush’s decisions. This representation shared both similarities and differences with the previous two. Like the first representation, Blair was constituted as loyal to Bush. However, he was not seen as a poodle, because his loyalty to Bush was described as measured and aiming at moderating Bush’s policies. Moreover, similarly to the second representation Blair was constructed as having sincere intentions; unlike it, Blair was represented as rightfully going to war in Iraq. “Tony Blair is not a poodle or a Rottweiler or any other kind of canine except maybe for some kind of dog with a good nose for sniffing out trouble” (Keane, 2002b: 22). Specifically, Blair was articulated as a retriever which is loyal, but is nonetheless not a follower. “Tony Blair is often depicted as President Bush’s poodle. But this is the wrong dog. In canine terms, Mr Blair is more like one of David Blunkett’s retrievers, publicly loyal but with its own sense of direction. The Prime Minister has many concerns which he will express in private” (Riddell, 2003a: 18). Blair was essentially referred to as a realist, who knew that influencing the U.S. could only be achieved by staying close to it, and that staying close to Washington was in Britain’s best interests. “Far from being George Bush’s poodle, Mr. Blair takes a more detached view of why being publicly close to Washington is in Britain’s interests. If there are obvious dangers, there are potentially big gains” (Riddell, 2003b: 20). The Prime Minister may not have confronted Bush openly, but he had privately shaped many decisions on the War on Terror and had also taken many



initiatives. “The relationship between the British Prime Minister and American President is much more subtle, and balanced, than many realize ... Over the past 18 months, the British Prime Minister, far from lamely following in President Bush's wake, has been an architect of the West's anti-terror strategy” (‘Dogged Diplomacy’, 2003: 27). This representation is very similar to the articulations of Blair as a wise advisor to Bush and the U.S. (see chapter 4) after the September 11 attacks. According to both representations, Blair was constructed as a worthy leader in world politics, whose relationship to the U.S. was one of similarity rather than submission and inferiority.

The final, least popular discourse, found predominantly in the *Mirror* articulated the Prime Minister as a “hypocrite” (Sheridan, 2003a: 13), and “the man with blood on his hands ... who took my country to war against Yugoslavia and bombed civilian targets hundreds of miles away from Kosovo. He is also the man who approved the carpet bombing of Afghanistan, resulting in untold deaths (Routledge, 2003a: 5). Moreover, he was “a tyrant who ignores the wishes of his people and does exactly what he wants, no matter how irrational” (Furbank, 2003: 19), as well as “a cuckoo in our nest ... Not for nothing is his name an anagram of B Liar” (Routledge, 2002c :8-9). What defined him was “weakness masquerading as strength and lies torted-up to look like truth” (Starling, 2002: 6).

A *Mirror* front cover (Appendix C, Figure 12) showed Tony Blair in the attire of an executioner looking at the viewer. The bold headline stated: “Blair’s Bleak New Year Message – You’ve never had it so bad”. Another *Mirror* cover (Appendix C, Figure 13) showed a full-page image of Blair smiling, under the headline: “Prime Monster”? Finally, a picture in *the Mirror* (Appendix C, Figure 14) depicted Tony Blair speaking from a lectern during one of his briefings. The photo was taken from a low angle, so the lectern was the focal point of the photo, while one could only discern half of Blair’s face above it. The angle created the impression that Blair was hiding behind a tombstone. This impression was enhanced by the caption: “Grave concern: Blair appears to be peering over a tombstone as he speaks from the lectern at his monthly briefings yesterday”. Blair’s predication as a “monster” and as an “executioner”, as well as the

image of him speaking behind a grave-looking lectern, positioned him in opposition to “us”, as warmonger intent on and bound to cause many deaths.

### **The future of Britain lies...**

The question of where Britain’s allegiances should lie, with Europe or with the U.S., featured prominently in *The Times* discourse, which favoured closer ties with the U.S. *The Mirror* and *The Independent* didn’t engage in a long debate about the role of Britain in the international arena, even though Europe was generally favoured and the war in Iraq was constituted as marginalizing both the Prime Minister and the U.K. in Europe. This section initially analyzes *The Independent* and *Mirror* pro-E.U. discourse and then moves on to an analysis of *The Times* pro-U.S. discourse.

#### *...in the European Union*

According to this pro-E.U. representation, which was mostly an *Independent* and *Mirror* representation, the alleged special relationship with the U.S. was nothing more than an illusion. “Far from being a partnership of equals, the special relationship has barely been a partnership at all. The Americans have been happy to have us with them, but only as long as we did their bidding” (Anderson, 2003a: 12). Similarly, “the only ‘special’ aspect of the relationship is its demeaning one-sidedness ... I don’t believe any future British prime minister, Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat, will again put the US before Europe. More than ever, it seems to me, Britain’s destiny is with Europe” (Whittam Smith, 2003: 19).

In addition, Britain’s position in the EU had been undermined as a result of Blair’s stance and his uncompromising backing of President Bush. “The Prime Minister has been sulking like a schoolboy nobody wants to play with ever since. From his corner of the EU playground, Blair has resorted to the kind of name calling which characterised the Thatcher years, when relations with the EU hit rock bottom” (Davidson, 2002: 6). Moreover, “our leadership has stamped over our democracy and our relationships with



the European Union and the rest of the world” (Alibhai-Brown, 2003:18). Finally, “Britain has squandered the opportunity to be a better European player” (Overy, 2003:26). A detachment from the E.U. not only isolated the U.K., but also disempowered it. “Increasingly, the issue of conflict with Iraq is isolating Britain inside Europe. It is stifling Britain's voice, diminishing Britain's influence and calling into question our country's European allegiance” (‘Symbolic Moment’, 2003: 18). It was also maintained that Britain should embark on an effort to improve its relations with the European Union, since it was in its best interests. “Tony Blair should admit that he cannot ride the twin horses of Europe and America. And it makes more sense to unite with our EU partners, whose interests are closer” (‘Stop doing Bush’s dirty work, Tony’, 2002: 6).

In the above representation, the U.S. and the E.U. were positioned in opposition to each other as two equally powerful, yet very different subjects. Because of this constructed incompatibility between the U.S. and the E.U., the U.K. “partnership” with one of the two was seen as destroying the relationship with the other. As a result, the U.K. was constituted as in need to choose and align with one of the two powers, namely the E.U. Thus, not only was the U.K. positioned in a relationship of similarity to the E.U., but it was also positioned in opposition to the U.S. This need to align with the E.U. was reinforced by means of predicates, such as “destiny”, “partners”, “opportunity”, “closer” which were attached to the E.U., in contrast to predicates such as “diminish”, “squandered”, “stamped over”, “demeaning one-sidedness”, which constructed the U.K.-U.S. relationship as detrimental to the more important U.K.-E.U. partnership. Finally, the U.S. was further othered by means of shifters such as “them” and “their”, in contrast to shifters such as “our partners”, which hailed the readers to identify with the E.U.

### *... with the United States*

The second representation, primarily in *The Times*, constituted the E.U. as an oppressive, bureaucratic institution of limited capabilities and increased expectations, which would never be capable of achieving significant political unity. “As Europe has become

politically more powerful, its institutions...have shown an increasing tendency to pursue their own interests, to turn into Japanese-style bureaucratic tribes. The idea that Europe will ever forge a sense of political identity strong enough to overcome these centrifugal tribal forces is surely far-fetched" (Kaletsky, 2003a: 24). Moreover, "under all the make-up of symbolic statehood - passports, flags, anthems, numberplates - the E.U. has never really been more than a highly sophisticated set of legal duties and reciprocal deals between nation states, albeit a unique one" (Tyrie, 2002: 22). Therefore, "It seems to me that the power game is already lost. It is very hard to see any set of circumstances where Europe collectively will be able to exert much military or even political power in the world over the next generation ... the EU as a body is and will remain impotent" (McRae, 2003: 16).

For this reason, it was in Britain's interests to disengage itself from the E.U. "We in Britain will not, and need not be sucked into such a state without our consent" (Tyrie, 2002: 22). "'Ever greater union' is rubbish ... nobody, especially a Briton, can act Napoleon to the myriad interests and cultures of Europe" (Jenkins, 2002: 20). With a European constitution, "the European nations will have lost their independence; they will, in effect, be colonies of a centralised European empire, ruled by the Franco German political class ... it is anti-parliamentary, anti-democratic, anti-British, and even ultimately anti-European" (Rees-Mogg, 2002: 18). Additionally, "When will the British wake up from their pathetic little dreams of being Europeans and realise that we have been looking for our future in all the wrong places? Who wants to be European today?" (Parsons, 2003a: 17).

In contrast, a bond with the U.S. was naturalized in this representation. Not only was the U.S. constituted as much more powerful than the E.U., but also the relationship between Britain and the U.S. was articulated as "naturally" closer and more important. "Britain has always been semidetached from Europe because that is its geography. The bond with America, so infuriating to the French, is embedded in British consciousness. It is crucial to European security. Government autonomy is also what British people want. They distrust Brussels as an agency of their domestic rule" (Jenkins, 2002: 20). The U.S. and



the E.U. were often compared, and the U.S. always emerged as the natural ally. “But if the one-sided scrap with Iraq taught us anything, it's surely that we need to break free from the European Union, not mate with it. For all the rampant anti-Americanism in this country, there can surely be no argument that we share a bond with the United States that no country in Europe can compare to. We are tied to America by language, culture, blood, history and instinct ... The war with Iraq proved that this country has no bond with its continental neighbours” (Parsons, 2003c: 17). Therefore, Britain would have to make a choice between the E.U. and the U.S., a self-evident choice according to this representation. “The world has changed: he can no longer have Brussels and Washington, too. He will have to choose between the new European constitution, which weds him to the Franco-German axis, and the alternative that strengthens and enlarges the historic special relationship with America, while at the same time solidifying Britain's role as the leader of ‘New Europe’” (Stelzer, 2003: 18).

The *Times* discourse created a dichotomy between the U.S. and ‘Europe’ by pointing out that a bond with the U.S. was natural while a further political alliance with the E.U. was enslaving. Moreover, the fact that the E.U. member states were often articulated as “impotent”, “ungrateful” or “pathetic” constructed Britain as a superior subject which belongs to a stronger and more ‘principled’ alliance, that is the U.S. The U.K.– E.U. relationship was to a great extent constructed in relation to the U.S. Since the U.S. and the E.U. were positioned in an oppositional relationship to each other, and since the U.K. was placed in a complementary relationship with the U.S., the E.U. and the U.K. were seen as being incompatible. In other words, the ties with the U.S. distinguished the U.K. from other EU members. Therefore, this discourse was essentially an inversion of *The Independent* and *The Mirror* discourse, which similarly positioned the E.U. and the U.S. in opposition to each other, but also constituted the U.K. as enslaved by the U.S. and as in need to ally with the E.U.

Similar representations have also been constructed in the past. For example, Ichijo points out that during the Kosovo crisis as well as during the Euro launch the British public discourse constructed the European Union as ‘Europe’, a super state in the making, which

would not be successful and would end up reducing its member states to subordinate units. Britain was constructed as different from and superior to other European countries, a difference which was often articulated with reference to history and the special relationship with the U.S. Since Britain was incompatible with Europe/EU, it would only be natural for Britain to pull out from the Union (Ichijo 2005:1-6).

### **“Old Europe” as a threat to world order**

Rumsfeld’s reference to France and Germany as “Old Europe”<sup>192</sup> was adopted in the pro-U.S. discourse and was naturalized as true. “Mr Rumsfeld did us all a favour by distinguishing the New and Old Europe” (Powell, 2003: 13). By the same token, “Donald Rumsfeld’s statement last week that France and Germany constitute Old Europe may not have been a triumph of diplomacy, but it didn’t lack condour” (‘Regime Change’, 2003: 25). Specifically, Old Europe was articulated as “mean spirited” (Kaletsky, 2003d: 24), with “sclerotic aspirations for world power, and terribly weak leaders, shored up by appeals to crude anti-Americanism (Schroder) or to the fact that they are not actually neo-fascist (Chirac)” (Sullivan, 2003: 4). On the other hand, New Europe with its “vibrant labour markets, high growth potential and inspiring futures, is growing up around the Old Europe, which generally lacks those things” (Brooks, 2003: 24)

Specifically regarding the war in Iraq, Old Europe was described as having adopted a “juvenile and obstructive stance”, which proved “the new weakness of Old Europe” (Gove, 2003c: 18), and which essentially isolated it in the international arena. “The posturing of Jacques Chirac and the strategic pacifism of Gerhard Schroder have painted a wholly misleading picture of European opinion” (‘Regime Change’, 2003: 25). “The ‘transatlantic rift’ actually involves just a handful of European countries, since Italy, Spain and most of Eastern Europe, have already given America the same unstinting support as Tony Blair” (Kaletsky, 2003a: 24). France and Germany were also constituted

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<sup>192</sup> On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January, 2003, The secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, remarked: “Now, you are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe” (2003:online)



as bullies, with “patronising attitudes” (‘Wanted’, 2003: 16) towards the candidate states which had sensibly opted for backing the U.S. in the war in Iraq. “British support for the US-led war -and the support offered by ten smaller current and prospective EU members -brought animosity from the ‘old’ states of France and Germany, and an outrageous attempt to intimidate candidate states into silence by the bumptious French President, Jacques Chirac” (‘Expanding Empire’, 2003: 25).

Furthermore, France’s opposition to the war and the fact that it threatened to veto a resolution on Iraq were narrated as dangerous for world order. “France's action will leave lasting bitterness in America, weaken the United Nations, divide the European Union, wreck the transatlantic alliance and signal the possible end of Nato as a useful political and military body ... It will encourage dictators around the world, from Pyongyang to Harare, to believe that they can defy UN resolutions, oppress their people and get away with it, safe in the knowledge that France will take a self-indulgent and unprincipled stand, at least as long as M Chirac is in the Elysee ... The threat to use the veto mindlessly has already caused damaging turmoil” (‘French disconnection’, 2003: 23). Therefore, “It is the President of France who is today the most serious obstacle to world order” (Hames, 2002: 18). Similarly, “Herr Schroder has considerably reduced the political and psychological pressure on Iraq, making it more likely that Saddam will continue to flout UN obligations and thus invite an American attack” (‘Berlin Blinkered’, 2003: 21).

Finally, “Old Europe’s” stance was not only seen as harmful, but it was also constructed as immoral. “While American neo- conservatives, at least, have a vision of democracy for the Arab peoples - through violently overthrowing the Arab dictators who stand in its way - the French offer the oppressed Arab people nothing but a pessimistic shrug and a few million francs more for the corrupt Yasser Arafat” (Hari, 2003: 18). Therefore, “this is fundamentally a division between those who believe that foreign policy should involve ethics backed with force and those who don't. It is a divide between Palmerstonians on one side and pacifists, parasites or pirates on the other ... French elites treat foreign

policy like sex, a sphere in which morality is never allowed to intrude" (Gove, 2003d: 18).

A dichotomy was thus created in *The Times* discourse, whereby the E.U. was divided in "old" and "new" Europe; while "old Europe" was constructed as "weak", "sclerotic", "juvenile", "patronizing", "lacking", "New Europe" was articulated as its opposite, that is "vibrant", "inspiring", "growing", with "potential". Moreover, while "Old Europe's" stance on the war was "dangerous", "immoral" and "pessimistic", "New Europe's" stance was "ethical". A polarization was thus created, whereby the E.U. was divided in two opposing camps, one which supported a war in Iraq and was a positive force, and the other which objected to the war and embodied negativity. As Rode (2005) also points out, this discourse is reminiscent of the Cold war discourse, in which democratic nations were labeled "the West", while countries with communist regimes were called "the East". However, not only did this discourse dichotomize the E.U. in two opposite poles, but it also united otherwise disparate identities against those countries which didn't support the Iraq war.

However, the above discourse can and has been contested. For example, there is a reversal of the old/new Europe binary in the Greek section, where "old Europe" connotes maturity, experience and morality, whereas "New Europe" connotes immaturity. As Rode also points out in his study of German media representations of Rumsfeld's "Old/New Europe" binary (2005), the German media constituted "Old Europe" as civilized, with a rich cultural and political history; it was also constructed as mature "through experience and history of bloody wars"; "Moreover, "Old Europe's" aversion towards the Iraq war in the German media discourse emanated from the fact that it had "overcome the concept of war as a political strategy" as a result of their history of bloody and destructive wars.



## Greek press representations: October 2002-April 2003

This section on the Greek press is divided in three parts, the first of which looks at the press representations of the U.S. as an empire, intent on colonizing the world. The U.S. was represented as a “New Rome” whose deeds were also reminiscent of “Hitler’s New World Order Vision”. The second part analyzes representations of the war in Iraq, which was described as a crucial step in the U.S. colonizing vision and was therefore perceived as a threat to humanity. A persistent discourse during the war, which I elaborate on in the third part, was the construction of Iraqis as heroically resisting U.S. domination and of the anti-war movement as a force capable of “defeating” the U.S. The fourth part looks at the role of Europe in the war, which was constituted as under threat and in urgent need of unification in order to “wipe out” the U.S. At the same time that the E.U. was glorified, the U.S. was condemned as a corrupt exploiter, while the eight European leaders in favour of the war were heavily criticized as “traitors”.

### **The U.S. subject**

#### *The Empire strikes back – A threatening New Order*

The Greek press represented the U.S. as a ruthless, greedy and constantly expanding empire aspiring to world domination. Such was the association of the U.S. with empire that the leading articles in left-wing *Eleutherotipia* always referred to Bush as “Emperor Bush” and to the U.S. as “the Empire”. “The American Empire ... is only satisfied when all existing regimes are subordinate to its hegemony and obey as well as carry out its orders without raising any objections” (Netas, 2003b).<sup>193</sup> Moreover, “with Bush and his policies for the National Security of the United States, imperialism becomes an official state policy aiming at military domination of the planet, with pre-emptive use of violence against any country which doesn’t appeal to America. This cannot merely be called a change of American foreign policy; it is the return to ancient Rome, the Colosseum,

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<sup>193</sup> “Η αμερικανική αυτοκρατορία...Ενδιαφέρεται, τα όποια καθεστώτα να είναι υποτελή στην ηγεμονία της, να υπακούν και να εκτελούν εντολές χωρίς καμία αντίρρηση”



where the Americans are the spectators and all the other nations are waiting for the lions in the arena” (Vranas, 2003a: N06).<sup>194</sup>

The “sheriff/cowboy” metaphor which was constantly used during the war in Afghanistan (see Chapter 4) was still frequently employed but Bush was predominantly depicted as a Roman Emperor and the U.S. as a modern Rome. “The anti-war cries of despair don’t move Caesar ... He is fascinated by the glory of the Roman Empire ... The world has to bow at his sight and not disappoint him. Even more, of course, people should not defy his grandiose plans to expand his empire and perpetuate it. The imposition of “Pax Americana” in the “broader Middle East” with the establishment of even more obedient regimes and the reformation of whole nations, as is scheduled by the professed plans of the neoconservatives and religiously obsessed eagles of Washington, is the most important aim of the bellicose emperor Bush ... the ambitious plans of New Rome” (Moronis, 2003a).<sup>195</sup> The main aim of the Empire was expansion, and ultimately the colonization of the whole world. Moreover, its immense military power rendered it the most dangerous and threatening Empire in the history of humankind. “Who out of the former emperors, Caesars, Great Alexanders or Napoleons had as much power (as he does)” (Boukalas, 2003a)?<sup>196</sup> “This is an empire worse than the ancient Persian, the Roman, the Byzantine and the British” (Papadopoulos, 2003a: N06).<sup>197</sup>

In this dominant representation, the U.S. was positioned in opposition to the world, in a relationship of occupier/occupied, by means of predicates, such as “obey”, “orders”, “arrogance”, “obedient”, “bellicose”, “domination” and “subordinate”. However, it was

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<sup>194</sup> “Με τον Μπους ... και την πολιτική του για την Εθνική Ασφάλεια των ΗΠΑ, ο ιμπεριαλισμός γίνεται επίσημη κρατική πολιτική, με στόχο τη στρατιωτική κυριαρχία σε ολόκληρο τον πλανήτη, με προληπτική χρήση βίας εναντίον οποιασδήποτε χώρας δεν αρέσει στην Αμερική. Αυτό δεν λέγεται στροφή της αμερικανικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής, αλλά επιστροφή στην αρχαία Ρώμη, στο Κολοσσαίο, όπου οι Αμερικανοί έχουν κλείσει θέση στα θεωρεία και όλοι οι υπόλοιποι λαοί περιμένουν τα λιοντάρια στην αρένα”.

<sup>195</sup> “Οι αντιπολεμικές κραυγές τους δεν συγκινούν τον Καίσαρα ... Η δόξα της Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας τον συναρπάζει ... Ο κόσμος επιβάλλεται να υποκλίνεται μπροστά του, όχι να τον απογοητεύει. Πολύ περισσότερο βέβαια να μην αντιστέκεται στα μεγαλεπήβολα σχέδιά του, να επεκτείνει την αυτοκρατορία του και να τη διαιωνίσει ... Η επιβολή, επομένως, της ‘Pax americana’ στην ‘ευρύτερη Μέση Ανατολή’, με την εγκατάσταση ακόμη πιο υπάκουων καθεστώτων και την αναμόρφωση των λαών, όπως προβλέπουν τα ομολογημένα σχέδια των νεοσυντηρητικών και θρησκόληπτων γερακιών της Ουάσιγκτον, αποτελεί τον βασικό στόχο των πολεμοχαρών σχεδίων του Μπους. τα μεγαλεπήβολα σχέδια της νέας Ρώμης”.

<sup>196</sup> “ποιος είχε τόση δύναμη από τους παλιούς κοσμοκράτορες, Καίσαρες, Αλεξάνδρους ή Ναπολέοντες”.

<sup>197</sup> “Μία αυτοκρατορία χειρότερη και από την αρχαία Περσική, τη Ρωμαϊκή, τη Βυζαντινή, τη Βρετανική”.



mainly the metaphor of the U.S. as Rome that facilitated and reinforced the positioning of the U.S. as a very dangerous subject with relentless imperial ambitions. The Roman Empire is recognized by historians as one of the most successful empires in history, and definitely the longest lasting one. It used military power to expand its territory, and at its height stretched “from the moors of Scotland out to the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys of Iraq today and from the North Seas of Germany to the sands of the Sahara” (‘Fears’, 2005: online). Thus, articulating the U.S. as the New Roman Empire, constituted the U.S. as a mighty superpower, capable of and intent on colonizing vast areas and expanding its territory by military means. Any U.S. action was therefore naturalized as stemming from its imperial ambitions. Not only was it presupposed that the U.S. was an Empire, but it was also presupposed that the notion of Empire was a very negative one. Since the U.S. was positioned in a relationship of similarity to all previous Empires, it was thus also presupposed that the U.S. Empire was a very negative force in the world. Moreover, the representation of the U.S. as the most dangerous and malicious Empire ever demonized the U.S. as the ‘ultimate other’.

The Empire metaphor was complemented by an equally dominant representation of the U.S. strategic plans as similar to Hitler’s “New Order” vision. “The Bush dogma for pre-emptive defence resembles Hitler’s dogma for “viable space”. It allows any type of war even when there is no cause or reason...” (Papadopoulos, 2003b: N06).<sup>198</sup> The U.S. was on its way towards the imposition of a new, menacing world order, characterized by ethnic cleansing and ruthlessness. “The New Order of things is there, it is relentless and very threatening” (Giannouloupoulos, 2003a).<sup>199</sup> Moreover, “the promoted new international order is nothing other than a Pax Americana” (Ligeros, 2003c).<sup>200</sup> Finally, “It is definitely neonazism, but I am not even sure that Germany’s Hitler had completely disregarded the then League of Nations or if it had treated immigrants in its borders with methods as fierce [as the U.S.]” (Giannaras, 2003).<sup>201</sup> The U.S. was therefore

<sup>198</sup> “Το «δόγμα Μπους» για ‘προληπτική άμυνα’ μοιάζει με το δόγμα του Χίτλερ για τον ‘ζωτικό χώρο’. Επιτρέπει κάθε είδους πόλεμο χωρίς αιτία και αφορμή”.

<sup>199</sup> “η νέα τάξη πραγμάτων υπάρχει, είναι αμελίκτη κι έρχεται κατά πάνω μας”.

<sup>200</sup> “η προωθούμενη νέα διεθνής τάξη δεν είναι τίποτα άλλο από pax Americana”.

<sup>201</sup> “Μιλάμε για νεοναζισμό, αλλά δεν ξέρω αν το χιτλερικό καθεστώς της Γερμανίας, πριν εξαπολύσει τον εφιάλτη του πολέμου, είχε ποτέ περιφρονήσει τόσο απροκάλυπτα συγκεκριμένες αποφάσεις της τότε ‘Κοινωνίας των Εθνών’ ή αν είχε συμπεριφερθεί, σε ελέγχους αλλοδαπών στα σύνορα, με μεθόδους ανάλογες”.



represented as an amalgam of Roman might and arrogance on the one hand and a more modern, fascist, Hitler-style authoritarian rule on the other, thus rendering it extremely deadly and murderous, as well as more merciless than Rome or Hitler.

Sketches in all Greek newspapers depicted the U.S. as a Nazi empire and Bush as Hitler, or as a Hitler worshiper. One sketch (Appendix D, Figure 1) depicted the *Akropolis* monument in Athens. In the place of the Greek national flag, which normally stands beside the *Akropolis*, there was the American flag, but it had been replaced by a Nazi swastika. The *Akropolis* is regarded as one of the most defining national symbols, along with the flag and the national anthem. Thus, replacing the Greek flag with the American one, connoted occupation; the swastika in the place of the American stars connoted occupation in the fashion of Nazi Germany. Another sketch (Appendix D, Figure 2) which reinforced this image depicted President Bush in his office sitting between two American flags. On the wall behind him was a large portrait of Hitler, while sitting near him was a female figure asking him: "Do you regard yourself as the new Churchill", with President Bush answering, "Javoll". Similarly to the previous sketch, Bush was equated with Hitler. Finally, another sketch (Appendix D, Figure 3) showed what looked like two Nazi soldiers marking the wall of a house with the Jewish sign, "Juden Raus" [Jews out]. The inhabitant of the house complained to the soldiers: "But we are not Iraqis". And one of the soldiers replied. "That is what Serbians and Afghans thought! Nowadays, whoever isn't American is an Iraqi". The whole world was positioned in opposition to the U.S. in this sketch, while the American soldiers were positioned in similarity to the Nazis. Thus, as a result of such representations, the world was constituted as under threat by the U.S.

It is noteworthy that the Hitler metaphor was also used by the Bush administration during the Gulf war to refer to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime (see for example Macdonald, 2002; Spellman and Holyoak, 1992). As Macdonald points out (2002: 38-39), Bush's and Thatcher's decision to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait so promptly with military force was partly due to the "30s analogy", which "ruled out any appeasement policies and influenced British and American perceptions of Hussein's irrationality, the stakes, policy options, and whether Iraq or the coalition would grow



stronger over time. The analogy thus directly influenced policy choices, leading to the early decision to respond promptly with military force”. Similarly, through articulations of Bush as Hitler and of the U.S. as Nazi, the threat emanating from the “U.S. Empire” was constituted as immense and immediate. As is seen in the following section, the Iraqis, the E.U. and the world in its entirety were constituted in opposition to the U.S., as well as in need to fight the U.S. Such representations were naturalized and rendered necessary through the articulation of the U.S. as a dangerous, totalitarian actor, in the fashion of Hitler’s Germany, and as an overtly ambitious and arrogant Empire, in the fashion of ancient Rome.

Despite all the descriptions of the U.S. as a mighty power and a nearly unstoppable force, it was also pointed out that the future of the Empire was grim since “descent starts when arrogance reaches its peak” (Papadopoulos, 2003: N04).<sup>202</sup> By the same token, “we should not forget that no empire can last forever” (Diakogiannis, 2003).<sup>203</sup> As a consequence, “Persia and Rome in antiquity and Nazist Germany in our times are examples which speak for themselves” (Oikonomopoulos, 2003c).<sup>204</sup> The problem nevertheless seemed to be, as was generally acknowledged, that the Empire would cause general havoc and destruction before its inevitable demise. “The Evil Empire will fall in a few decades. While heading towards decline, however, it will destroy everything with its arrogance and will fill the world with ills, blood and tears” (Papadopoulos, 2003b: N06).<sup>205</sup>

### *A disregard for international law*

International law and international justice were constituted as under attack by the unilateralist Emperor. “The emperor and his ally[Blair], who is nostalgic for the grandeur of the British empire, seem to be determined to dispose of the United Nations

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<sup>202</sup> “όταν η αλαζονεία φτάσει στην αιχμή της, από την άλλη ημέρα κιόλας αρχίζει η κατρακύλα”.

<sup>203</sup> “δεν πρέπει να διαφεύγει της προσοχής κανενός ότι καμία αυτοκρατορία δεν είναι αιώνια”.

<sup>204</sup> “Η Περσία, η Ρώμη –παλαιότερα– και η ναζιστική Γερμανία στη σύγχρονη εποχή αποτελούν παραδείγματα που μιλούν από μόνα τους”.

<sup>205</sup> “Αλλά η ‘Αυτοκρατορία του Κακού’ θα φθάσει στον πάτο ύστερα από δεκαετίες. Στη διαδρομή της όμως, θα διαλύσει τα πάντα με την αλαζονεία της και θα σωρεύσει στον κόσμο συμφορές, αίμα και δάκρυα. Την κτηνωδία και τη βαρβαρότητα του πολέμου”.



and violate international law, so as to launch a terrorist war of power demonstration” (‘Videogame of Disaster’, 2003).<sup>206</sup> Thus, the U.S. was constructed as a belligerent actor, intent on and capable of destroying or completely restructuring the international system, which would be based on Pax Americana, and would be utterly undemocratic. “Post-war international justice is restructured by the empire ... the new model of imperial justice replaces the United Nations and transfers the “right of intervention” to the most powerful force” (Kalfelis, 2003b: N06).<sup>207</sup> The power of the mightiest would overshadow any form of cooperation between nations, since every decision would be taken by the U.S. itself. “International relations will not be based on international justice, but rather on the mood and interests of the empire ... Democracy is raped and threatened with even further molesting when one shows contempt towards the will of the majority of nations and of peoples” (Netas, 2003d).<sup>208</sup> In the end, “‘Pre-emptive violence’ by one country, will have triumphed over collective action, which is meant to be based on the laws of international justice” (Bourdaras, 2002).<sup>209</sup>

Such constructions were complemented by a number of sketches, one of which showed two pictures in chronological sequence. In the first picture, one could discern two hands, with the words Bush and UN inscribed on them. The ‘UN hand’ was seen delivering the UN inspectors’ verdict to the ‘Bush hand’. In the second picture the ‘Bush hand’ was seen throwing the inspectors’ verdict, now a paper plane with a bomb attached to it. This sketch connoted U.S. unilateralism and aggressiveness. Not only was Bush shown to have completely disregarded the U.N. verdict, by turning it into a paper plane, but attaching a bomb to it also signified U.S. belligerence and warlike attitude. A second sketch (Appendix D, Figure 4) depicted Bush and Blair dressed as soldiers sitting on a bench while Kofi Annan, was shining Blair’s and Bush’s black boots. Blair asked Bush:

<sup>206</sup> “Ο αυτοκράτορας και ο σύμμαχός του, νοσταλγός του βρετανικού αυτοκρατορικού μεγαλείου, εμφανίζονται αποφασισμένοι να αχρηστεύσουν τον ΟΗΕ και να παραβιάσουν το διεθνές δίκαιο, προκειμένου να εξαπολύσουν έναν τρομοκρατικό πόλεμο επίδειξης ισχύος”.

<sup>207</sup> “η μετάβαση από τον ιμπεριαλισμό στην αυτοκρατορία μετασχηματίζει το μεταπολεμικό διεθνές δίκαιο, το οποίο καθοριζόταν από συμβάσεις και συνθήκες. Το νέο μοντέλο του αυτοκρατορικού δικαίου εκτοπίζει τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη και μεταθέτει το ‘δικαίωμα της επέμβασης’ στην ισχυρότερη δύναμη”.

<sup>208</sup> “οι διεθνείς σχέσεις δεν θα ρυθμίζονται με βάση το διεθνές δίκαιο, αλλά τις εκάστοτε διαθέσεις και τα συμφέροντα της αυτοκρατορίας ... Με την περιφρόνηση της βούλησης της πλειοψηφίας των κρατών και των λαών, βιάζεται η δημοκρατία και απειλείται με παραπέρα κακοποίηση”.

<sup>209</sup> “Η ‘προληπτική’ βία του Ενός, θα έχει θριαμβεύσει σε βάρος της συλλογικής δράσης η οποία, υποτίθεται, θα πρέπει να στηρίζεται στις αρχές του Διεθνούς Δικαίου”.



“George, what about giving it [the UN] a few more responsibilities”, while Bush replied: “Even more responsibilities, Tony”? Annan was thus positioned as Bush’s subservient employee and servant, being reduced to obeying Bush’s orders and shining shoes. This, in turn signified that the U.N. didn’t have a meaningful or powerful presence in the international system, and was rendered useless by the U.S.

### *U.S. as a violent and an unworthy culture*

U.S. aggressive foreign policy was associated with the innately violent American nature, which was manifest in their domestic policies as well as their daily lives. “Violence is inscribed in their genes and is the undeniable practice of their daily life” (Tsalidis, 2003).<sup>210</sup> “This uncontrolled, blind, insane violence is inscribed in the DNA of their civilization” (Danikas, 2003: N72).<sup>211</sup> The government was also described as nurturing “hard-line values” and encouraging violence in the everyday practices of its populace. “The country whose language is violence; [the country] which deifies its society’s violent murderers; ... which has allowed violence at the expense of black people; which honours violence in legalizing the use of guns by its citizens ... these well-fed cavemen in dark suits” (Kastriotis, 2003).<sup>212</sup> According to this representation, American culture was constructed as uniformly uninspiring and unworthy. “This god-fearing, hard-working, conservative white America, which regards its privileges as a divine gift, poverty as a just divine punishment towards lazybones, taxation as immoral, environmental restraints towards businesses as the invention of crazy communists, labour laws as an offence towards the rights of the employer, and social benefits as an immoral and atheist money transfer from the god fearing and hard-working white employee towards the black, drug addicts and the lazy, this same god-fearing America which votes for Bush, listens to hard-line right wing radio stations, watches Fox channel, laughs at what they see as a declining

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<sup>210</sup> “η βία είναι καταγεγραμμένη στα γονίδια τους και είναι η αναμφισβήτητη πρακτική της καθημερινότητάς τους”.

<sup>211</sup> “Η ανεξέλεγκτη, τυφλή, παρανοϊκή βία είναι εγγεγραμμένη στο DNA του πολιτισμού τους”.

<sup>212</sup> “Η χώρα που έχει γλώσσα τη βία. Που την αποθεώνει στα πρόσωπα των μανιακών δολοφόνων της πραγματικότητας και των ταινιών της ... Που την έχει επιτρέψει σε βάρος των μαύρων. Που την τιμά στην αξίωση νόμιμης κυκλοφορίας αυτομάτων όπλων ... Αυτοί οι καλοταϊσμένοι άνθρωποι των σπηλαίων με τα σκούρα κοστούμια.



French manhood and fears Saddam, as well as protests against homosexuals” (Tsimas, 2003b: N04).<sup>213</sup>

This representation has similar effects to the British press discourses on terrorism, since it constructed the U.S. as inherently violent (see also Karim in Riggins 1997 and Shaheen 1984). While the terrorists were articulated as irrational and evil, the U.S. was constituted as “genetically” violent and intrinsically “hard-line”. This essentially meant that it was impossible to negotiate with the U.S., which would remain violent and irrational no matter what. Moreover, this representation magnified the U.S. threat, because it couldn’t be reasoned with or pacified.

To sum up, the U.S. was constructed as an overtly dangerous ‘other’ intent on colonizing the world. That the Empire and Nazi metaphors outnumbered the descriptions of the U.S. as the Wild West and Bush as a sheriff/cowboy, which were the predominant metaphors in the months following September 11, demonstrates the magnification of the U.S. threat, which was constituted as spreading around the world; the Wild West metaphor is more contained than the Nazi and Rome metaphors, which construct the U.S. as an Empire. The American empire, it was argued, would follow the same route that other Empires had followed in the past. It would conquer and enslave many places before it eventually lost its power and fell. Moreover, the representation of the American culture as inherently violent and ignorant increased the danger stemming from the “evil Empire”. The above representation of the U.S. as the most dangerous and malicious Empire ever demonized the U.S. as the ‘ultimate other’ and constructed it as an entirely negative force. Moreover, it positioned the U.S. in opposition to the world, as the most dangerous threat facing humanity. As is seen in the following sections, a set of different and separate identities were united as a “totality”, in opposition to the U.S. Empire.

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<sup>213</sup> “Αυτή η θεοσεβούμενη, σκληρά εργαζόμενη συντηρητική λευκή Αμερική, που θεωρεί τα προνόμιά της θείο δώρο, τη φτώχεια μια δίκαιη τιμωρία του Θεού προς τους ακαμάτηδες, τη φορολογία ανήθικη, τους περιβαλλοντικούς περιορισμούς στις επιχειρήσεις εφεύρεση μασκαρεμένων κομμουνιστών, την εργατική νομοθεσία προσβολή στα εκ Θεού δικαιώματα του εργοδότη και τις κοινωνικές παροχές (όσες απέμειναν πια στις ΗΠΑ) ως μια ανήθικη και άθρη μεταφορά χρημάτων από τον θεοσεβούμενο και σκληρά εργαζόμενο προς τον μαύρο, τον πρεζάκια, τον τεμπέλη, αυτή η θεοσεβούμενη Αμερική που ψηφίζει Μπους, ακούει τα υπό ακροδεξιά κυριαρχία ραδιόφωνα, βλέπει Φοξ τσάνελ, ζητά το κεφάλι του Πίτερ Αρνέτ στο πιάτο, γελάει με ανέκδοτα για τον μειωμένο ανδρισμό των Γάλλων που φοβούνται τον Σαντάμ, και κατεβαίνει σε αντι-διαδηλώσεις εναντίον των ‘ειρηνόφιλων ομοφυλόφιλων’ - αυτή η Αμερική είναι μια νέα χώρα”.



## The war in Iraq and American imperialism

While the U.S. was constituted as an Empire intent on colonizing the world, the Iraq war, in turn, was constructed as simply a step in this colonization. This section looks at the construction of the Iraq war as a U.S. hegemonic and colonizing project. Moreover, the Iraqis in this discourse were articulated as heroically resisting this U.S. domination.

### *Colonizing Iraq and a threat against humanity*

The Greek press described the war in Iraq as a colonizing enterprise, whose aims were the control of the oilfields as well as the control of the wider Middle East region. Therefore, the war would result in Iraq becoming dependent on the U.S., rather than liberated and autonomous. “Iraq of 22 million people will be the second U.S. state in terms of population. And if Texas can’t put up with being third, President Bush could divide Iraq in North and South (this has happened before anyway)” (Vranas, 2003b: N84).<sup>214</sup> Moreover, the Americans would not withdraw their troops after the occupation of the country and Saddam’s demise, but would stay in Iraq for a long time, making the most of the conquerors’ privileges. “They will stay in Iraq so as to terrorize the whole area and mainly in order to establish their worldwide hegemony” (‘An Outrage with a View to Profit’, 2003).<sup>215</sup> The people would merely be slaves, with the U.S. rulers turning Iraq upside down. “It is as simple as that: The “liberation” in reality means enslavement and “the liberators” will be nothing other than tyrants” (Netas, 2003d).<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> “Το Ιράκ, με 22 εκατομμύρια, θα ήταν η δεύτερη πολιτεία των ΗΠΑ σε πληθυσμό (πρώτη είναι η Καλιφόρνια). Και αν αυτό δεν θα μπορούσε να το αντέξει το Τέξας, που έτσι θα έμενε στην τρίτη θέση, ο πρόεδρος Μπους θα μπορούσε να διαμελίσει το Ιράκ σε βόρειο και νότιο (υπάρχει και σε αυτό προηγούμενο) ... Αν το Ιράκ γίνει η 51η πολιτεία των ΗΠΑ, οι Αμερικανοί θα αισθάνονται σαν στο σπίτι τους και εκεί και στην Αμερική. Θα μπορούν να πηγαίνουν στα σύνορα με το Ιράν και να φωνάζουν στους αγιατολάχ, κουνώντας τους το μεσαίο δάχτυλο: ‘Εδώ είμαστε! Οι νέοι σας γείτονες, οι Μεγάλοι Σατανάδες!’”.

<sup>215</sup> “Θα μείνουν στο Ιράκ για να τρομοκρατήσουν όλη την περιοχή και προπαντός για να εδραιώσουν την ηγεμονία τους στον κόσμο”.

<sup>216</sup> “Πολύ απλά, η ‘απελευθέρωση’ σημαίνει υποδούλωση και οι «απελευθερωτές» δεν θα είναι τίποτα άλλο παρά δυνάστες”.



Moreover, there was no faith in the possibility of a relatively painless resolution of the conflict. It was generally agreed that the U.S. would remorselessly destroy the country. “Nobody doubts that America is intent on turning Baghdad into Guernica” (Vranas, 2003c: N72).<sup>217</sup> Additionally, when the war started it was agreed that “the illegal, the terrorist, the barbaric and murderous U.S. invasion turned Iraq into hell” (‘Murderers’, 2003).<sup>218</sup> Descriptions of the war, which was often referred to as an invasion, featured brutal U.S. invaders indiscriminately killing Iraqis and treating them inhumanly. “So suddenly on a Wednesday afternoon here comes a conquered, enslaved, humiliated and raped Baghdad ... the devastated Iraqi nation, on a land fed with blood and cancer because of the bombs ... with the children running tattered towards the invaders, with only one word coming out from their dried lips: “water”... with the captives a bit further covered with Ku-Klux-Klan hoods, tied and kneeling as is dictated by the ... Geneva Convention, before they are dragged like animals” (Bakomarou, 2003).<sup>219</sup> A sketch in *Ta Nea* (Appendix D, Figure 5) featured an American soldier with a gun in his hands having just bombed what looks like a wrecked maternity clinic. The soldier uttered: “At least we won’t need to kill all those who haven’t been born”.

The metaphor of slavery which runs through the entire Greek press discourse facilitated the construction of the Iraq war as a disaster for the Iraqis. The articulation of the Iraqis as slaves and of the U.S. as a tyrant followed from, and reinforced representations of the U.S. as a totalitarian Empire. Moreover, this metaphor reinforced the need for liberation from the tyrant. Thus, essentially this metaphor constructed moral dichotomies, whereby the U.S. was the ruthless occupier intent on enslaving the Iraqis, who were the innocent victims on the verge of enslavement and in need of liberation. However, in creating such moral dichotomies, this binary construction of the U.S. as tyrant and the Iraqis as

<sup>217</sup> “ΟΙ ΗΠΑ κανείς δεν αμφιβάλλει πια πως έχουν την πρόθεση να μετατρέψουν τη Βαγδάτη σε Γκερνίκα”.

<sup>218</sup> “Η συμμορία της παράνομης, της τρομοκρατικής, της βάρβαρης, της δολοφονικής επιδρομής, που μετέτρεψε σε κόλαση το Ιράκ”.

<sup>219</sup> “Έτσι ξαφνικά, το απόγευμα της Τετάρτης, να την κατακτημένη, ταπεινωμένη, βιασμένη η Βαγδάτη ο μαρτυρικός ιρακινός λαός, πάνω σε μια γη ποτισμένη με αίμα και με καρκίνο από τις βόμβες ... Με τα παιδιά να τρέχουν ρακένδυτα προς τους εισβολείς, με μια μόνο λέξη στα ξεραμένα χείλη τους: ‘water’ ... Με τους αιχμαλώτους πιο κει, σκεπασμένους με κουκούλες α λα Κου Κλουξ Κλαν, δεμένους -έτρεμαν τα χέρια με τα φαγωμένα νύχια ενός έφηβου- γονατιστούς, όπως επιτάσσει ... η Συνθήκη της Γενεύης, πριν τους σύρουν σαν τα ζώα ως τα ημιφορτηγά. Με τα νοσοκομεία να μη χωράνε άλλους κομματιασμένους -το 95% των τραυματιών είναι γυναίκες, ηλικιωμένοι και παιδιά ... Με τις μανάδες να φωνάζουν τρελαμένες τα παιδιά τους μέσα στα ερείπια ... Με τα ορφανά, μικρά κοπάδια, να ζητούν τις μανάδες τους ... Με τον θρήνο, τον τρόμο και τις κατάρεις πίσω απ’ τις κλειστές πόρτες”.



enslaved, denied social complexities (see for example Felstiner, 1983), since it merely demonized one side and did not take into account relevant issues, such as for example, the situation in Saddam-ruled Iraq.

It needs to be stressed that the U.S. was depicted as an imperial occupier by all commentators and at all points. The Iraqi war was thus described as the siege and occupation of a country which would have undoubtedly preferred the status quo, that is life under Saddam Hussein. Saddam himself was non-existent in the press discourse. The few times he was mentioned, he was represented as a victim, since, as was argued in the press, he was attacked by the U.S. even though he had destroyed his weapons. The absence of Saddam in the press discourse positioned the U.S. as the sole vile subject. The above representation is in contrast to *The Times* discourse, in which Saddam was described as the ultimate danger and the war in Iraq was therefore not only justified, but also imperative. Failing to describe the pro-war situation in Iraq, rendering Saddam invisible or even a victim and presupposing that the Iraqis were all against the war and ready to fight against the U.S., meant that the Iraq war was seen as a colonial occupation.

Following from the above, the Iraq war was seen as a threat towards humanity, since it would mark the beginning of an indiscriminate expansive expedition. “Because of Bush’s war the world will enter a neo-colonialist era with less democracy and freedom than what is the case nowadays” (Dretakis, 2003).<sup>220</sup> Similarly, “What is at stake nowadays is the future of humankind itself” (Bitsakis, 2003b: N06).<sup>221</sup> According to this discourse, the Iraq war should not be taken lightly, because it was of utmost importance for the world. “This is not merely slavery for the Iraqis. [This is] slavery for all those who don’t succumb to the desires and to the mood of the ones in power” (Kairos, 2003).<sup>222</sup> The U.S. was portrayed as the foremost menace in the history of humankind, threatening not only Iraqi but also world peace. “This is the largest bellicose machine ever known to humankind; in other words this is essentially the greatest threat against

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<sup>220</sup> “Γενικότερα, ο κόσμος θα έχει εισέλθει σε μια νεο-αποικιακή εποχή με λιγότερη και όχι περισσότερη δημοκρατία και ελευθερία από εκείνη που υπάρχει σήμερα”.

<sup>221</sup> “Αυτό συνεπώς που διακυβεύεται σήμερα είναι το ίδιο το μέλλον της ανθρωπότητας”.

<sup>222</sup> “Οχι σκλαβιά για το Ιράκ. Σκλαβιά για όλους όσοι δεν υποτάσσονται στις επιθυμίες και στις ορέξεις των ισχυρών”.



humanity” (‘Emperor and the Pope’, 2003)<sup>223</sup>, or “The Nazis were the enemies of all nations. The Americans are the enemies of the human race” (Nautilus, 2003).<sup>224</sup> It was maintained that the entire world was Bush’s victim. “Saddam Hussein will not be the only victim of the crime that will be committed by Bush the Caesar. It will be a crime against humanity” (‘What the Hegemon likes’, 2003).<sup>225</sup> Metaphors of slavery and the presupposition that the Iraq war was the first of many U.S. colonizing enterprises constituted the war in Iraq as a “threat against humanity”. Thus, the world was positioned in similarity to the Iraqis and in opposition to the U.S. invader.

The Iraq war was therefore depicted as a crucial point in U.S. imperialist history which would establish an even fiercer and more belligerent empire intent on attacking relentlessly. “This [the war in Iraq] is the continuation of previous ones (Balkans, Afghanistan), and is more importantly the link leading to an even more aggressive stance on the part of the chariot of American imperialism, the most criminal machine of human history” (Papavasileiou, 2003).<sup>226</sup> Consequently, the war was particularly critical to U.S. strategic plans on the way to realizing their global imperialist vision. “The war against Iraqis is a very important stage in the march of the U.S. towards world hegemony. U.S. leaders envisage a modern terrorist empire, which will fulfil Fukuyama’s prophecies: global capitalism under U.S. hegemony, global markets as a means of enrichment of the few at the expense of most people, global policeman, global cemetery of ideas and values. Global empire” (Bitsakis, 2003a: N06).<sup>227</sup>

According to this discourse, the U.S. was capable of creating a “global capitalist Empire”. However, such a discourse concentrated solely on the U.S. without asking

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<sup>223</sup> “Πρόκειται για τη μεγαλύτερη πολεμική μηχανή που γνώρισε ποτέ ο κόσμος, δηλαδή ουσιαστικά για τη μεγαλύτερη απειλή κατά της ανθρωπότητας”

<sup>224</sup> “Οι Ναζί ήταν Εχθροί των Λαών. Οι Αμερικανοί είναι Εχθροί του Ανθρώπου”.

<sup>225</sup> “Το έγκλημα, που ετοιμάζεται να διαπράξει ο καίσαρας Μπους, δεν θα έχει θύμα τον Σαντάμ Χουσεΐν. Θα είναι έγκλημα κατά της ανθρωπότητας”

<sup>226</sup> “Ενός πολέμου που αποτελεί συνέχεια των προηγούμενων (Βαλκάνια, Αφγανιστάν) και, κυρίως, κρίκο που θα φέρει σε πιο επιθετικές θέσεις το άρμα του αμερικάνικου ιμπεριαλισμού, την πιο εγκληματική μηχανή που γνώρισε η ανθρώπινη Ιστορία”.

<sup>227</sup> “Ο πόλεμος (αναπόφευκτος κ.λπ.) εναντίον του λαού του Ιράκ είναι «στιγμή» της πορείας των ΗΠΑ προς την παγκόσμια ηγεμονία. Οι ηγέτες των ΗΠΑ ονειρεύονται μια σύγχρονη αυτοκρατορία, που θα πραγματοποιήσει τις προφητείες του Φουκογιάμα: παγκόσμιος καπιταλισμός υπό την ηγεμονία των ΗΠΑ, παγκοσμιοποιημένη αγορά, μέσον πλουτισμού των λίγων και δυστυχίας των πολλών, παγκόσμιος χωροφύλακας, παγκόσμιο νεκροταφείο ιδεών και αξιών. Παγκόσμια αυτοκρατορία”.



important questions about the international state of affairs. This discourse emphasized agency over structure, since the U.S. was constituted as the only actor capable of transforming and shaping the international system. However, as Berglez (2004:258) points out, “the U.S. is an independent agent with a great deal of power, strength and personal ambitions”. At the same time, the U.S. is “an ‘aspect’ of a structural condition (the capitalist system) – a structural condition that could potentially be brought to the fore as relevant material for further interpretations and explanations”. One cannot refer to capitalist structures in a purely theoretical and abstract manner in which the agents concerned are excluded from the discourse. Likewise, one cannot simply base all judgement on a specific actor leaving aside important structural discourses. The actor, which in this case is the U.S. is “discursively more attractive than ‘capitalist structures’ as the U.S. has undoubtedly a distinguishable character and a ‘personality’. While discourse on the capitalist structures generates apathy and despair, discourse on the U.S. tends to create ‘passionate energies’ in various directions ... the U.S. is a polysemic text with a fundamental ability to stir up the minds and the hearts of the surrounding world, ‘doomed’ or rather ‘blessed’ with the ability to suddenly turn otherwise slacking and lazy consumers into passionately engaged political citizens and even into anti-imperialist revolutionaries” (Berglez, 2004: 259). It is therefore not only the U.S. that one should be referring to, but also the capitalist system with encourages some and discourages other behaviours.

### *The resisting Iraqis*

The prime action ascribed to the Iraqis was resistance to the U.S. invader. Thus, at the same time that the Americans were demonized, the Iraqis were praised for their braveness and resolve. “They [the Americans] are ruthless, bloodthirsty and murderous, humanlike creatures, vampires, liars, thieves, petty crooks, hypocrites, angels of darkness, soulless humanoids, zealots and arrogant bastards who deny civilization, victimizers of souls, fascists and Hitler-like. They are dangerous. You see them in battle array and you are filled with disgust. They speak and drink the blood of innocent people ... Their presence revolts the soul, targets the heart and offends the thought, their arrogance terrorizes and



their disdain for panhuman civilization provokes and ridicules the human spirit. Ruthless butchers” (Tsalidis, 2003).<sup>228</sup> In contrast, “Iraqi passion and courage, which stems from their civilization, is enlightening for all those nations which stand against the savagery and the colonizing vision of the Americans. It is enlightening for all those who still believe that there is the right to resist the might of the tyrants” (Stamatopoulos, 2003a).<sup>229</sup> Thus, “the power of the machine and of the bombs is eliminated by the decision to sacrifice life” (‘Fiasco and Fantasy’, 2003).<sup>230</sup>

While the U.S. was constructed in an entirely negative way, as the ‘dangerous other’, the Iraqis were the ‘brave others’, fighting not only for their liberation but for ‘us’ as well, for humanity itself. While the British press showed images of Iraqis celebrating the demise of Saddam along with pictures of suffering, the Greek press only published pictures of injured children and women, with newspaper covers featuring big headlines, such as “one foot in the grave for 6.000.000 people under siege”, “The massacre will last for months”, “Murderers” and “Serial Killers”, followed either by pictures of crying babies or injured Iraqis in bombed surroundings (see Appendix D, Figures 6-8).

Moreover, the Iraqi sacrifice and resistance was constituted as a wake-up call to the world. “Whatever happens in Baghdad, the Iraqi nation has already won. It sent the message to all the compromised, to all the subordinated, to all the subservient European realists that humanity is still there; it hasn’t been lost yet. The resisting Iraqis honour history itself, they defend thousands years of civilization, they fight against the illiterate tyrant, they slap all of us who think they are politically right, they set fire to the hibernated conscience of the drowsy consumer ... the Iraqis fight for their freedom, their own freedom, as well as our freedom, for dignity, for their dead, for their ancient

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<sup>228</sup> “Είναι εγκληματίες. Είναι αδίστακτοι, αιμοσταγείς και αιμοβόροι, τέρατα ανθρωπόμορφα, βελζεβούληδες, βρυκόλακες, ψεύτες, κλέφτες, τιποτένιοι απατεώνες, υποκριτές, άγγελοι του σκότους, άψυχα ανθρωποειδή, θρησκόληπτοι αλαζόνες, αρνητές του πολιτισμού, θύτες ψυχών, φασιστοειδή και χιτλερίσκοι. Είναι εγκληματίες. Είναι επικίνδυνοι. Τους βλέπεις παραταγμένους και η αηδία περισσεύει. Μιλούν και εμέσσουν το αίμα αθώων. Κάθε λέξη τους και ένα ψέμα, κάθε φράση τους και μια απειλή, η παρουσία τους εξεγείρει την ψυχή, πλήττει την καρδιά και προσβάλλει τη σκέψη, η αλαζονία τους τρομοκρατεί και η περιφρόνησή τους προς τον πανανθρώπινο πολιτισμό προκαλεί και διασύρει το πνεύμα. Ασύδοτοι σφαγείς”.

<sup>229</sup> “Το πάθος των Ιρακινών, προϊόν πολιτισμού, είναι το φως προς όλους τους λαούς που αντιστέκονται στη θηριωδία, στις κατακτητικές βλέψεις των Αμερικανών”.

<sup>230</sup> “Η δύναμη της μηχανής και τους πυρός μηδενίζεται από την απόφαση θυσίας της ζωής”.



civilization. The Iraqis give the outmost lesson of freedom to humankind” (Stamatopoulos, 2003b).<sup>231</sup>

Not only were the Iraqis seen as a role model for the rest of humanity, but they were also described as essentially saving humanity by resisting the imperial tyrant and by empowering the global movement against U.S. monocracy. “In reality, fighting for their country Iraqis also fight for another purpose, that of obstructing the imposition of American monocracy ... the longer Iraqi resistance lasts, the more the globalized movement will last ... Unfortunately, at this point, Iraqis are the only ones left to shed blood not only for their country, but for humanity itself” (Ligeros, 2003d).<sup>232</sup>

The Greek discourse inverted *The Times* discourse, since the U.S. stood for tyranny and terrorism and liberation was needed, not from Saddam Hussein, but from U.S. occupation. Thus, the same binaries of slavery versus freedom, conquest versus freedom, tyranny versus freedom, terrorism and barbarity versus civilization and humanity versus inhumanity, demonized the U.S. as the possessor of all the negative qualities in the binary and constituted the Iraqis as superior, civilized and brave. Moreover, this discourse was based on the otherwise highly contentious presuppositions that the Iraqis were satisfied with the status quo and were actually resisting the “U.S. invader”.

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<sup>231</sup> “Ό,τι και να συμβεί στη Βαγδάτη, ο ιρακινός λαός έχει ήδη νικήσει. Εστειλε το μήνυμα σε όλους τους συμβιβασμένους, σε όλους τους υποτελείς, σε όλους τους εθελόδουλους, Ευρωπαίους, ρεαλιστές, διαφωτιστές και όλους τους δουλόφρονες ότι ο άνθρωπος δεν έχει χαθεί ακόμη, ότι ο Αμερικανός του Μπους και των περί αυτόν ουδέποτε θα επιβληθεί ως ο άνθρωπος του εικοστού πρώτου αιώνα. Οι αντιστεκόμενοι Ιρακινοί τιμάνε την ίδια την Ιστορία, υπερασπίζονται χιλιάδες χρόνια πολιτισμού, εναντιώνονται στον αγράμματο τύραννο, σκαμπιλίζουν όλους εμάς τους πολιτικώς ορθούς, πυρπολούν την κοιμισμένη συνείδηση του αποχαυνωμένου καταναλωτή ... οι Ιρακινοί μάχονται για την ελευθερία τους, τη δική τους ελευθερία, αλλά και τη δική μας, για την αξιοπρέπεια, για τους τάφους τους, για τον μακραίωνα πολιτισμό τους. Οι Ιρακινοί δίνουν το μέγιστο μάθημα ελευθερίας στην ανθρωπότητα”

<sup>232</sup> “Στην πραγματικότητα, πολεμώντας για την πατρίδα τους, οι Ιρακινοί πολεμούν –έστω κι αν δεν το συνειδητοποιούν– για έναν ευρύτερο σκοπό: για να εμποδίσουν την επιβολή της αμερικανικής μονοκρατορίας ... Όσο περισσότερο διαρκέσει η αντίσταση των Ιρακινών τόσο θα τροφοδοτείται το παγκοσμιοποιημένο αντιπολεμικό κίνημα ... Δυστυχώς, στο σημείο που έχουμε φθάσει, έλαχε στους Ιρακινούς να χύσουν το αίμα τους όχι μόνο για την πατρίδα τους, αλλά και για λογαριασμό της ανθρωπότητας”.



## The need to fight the United States

The anti-war protesters were constructed as resisting the U.S. “Today’s universal ‘no to war’ is a no to slavery, no to submission, no to the authoritarianism of the empire. It is a proud no to the terrorism of the superpower” (‘No to the terrorism’, 2003).<sup>233</sup> The protesters were, in fact, elevated to the status of a powerful, rival force, capable of defeating the U.S. “Global public opinion, which demonstrated its opposition to arrogance, last Saturday, emerged as a rival superpower and actually a more powerful one” (Netas, 2003b).<sup>234</sup> Similarly, “in this war the empire is up against global public opinion, the superpower which consists of most people on Earth and which is armed with peace, justice, humanity and its values. If this superpower doesn’t give in ... the empire will be defeated, because it is morally unarmed” (‘Resistance’, 2003).<sup>235</sup> Thus, protesters were constructed as morally superior subjects with “bright faces, innocent and sincere eyes” (Kourkoula, 2003: N17)<sup>236</sup>, who significantly differed from the supporters of war. “My god, what a contrast this is! On the one hand the demonstrations of peace: Expressive and bright faces, feelings of solidarity and despair, belief in something better and the sincerity of anger. In the front of war, on the other hand: arrogant faces, a narrow-minded and calculating expression. If they win, you are very unfair my god” (Grammatikakis, 2003).<sup>237</sup> In short, “Imperialism cannot win a victory, because human consciences have solidarity and sensitivities”<sup>238</sup> (Tsoulas, 2003: N16). Finally, it was pointed out that failure to join the protesters or publicly express your anti-war conviction equalled submission and moral death. “Global protest is worth it! Silence and societal

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<sup>233</sup> “Το σημερινό πανανθρώπινο ‘όχι στον πόλεμο’ είναι όχι στην υποδούλωση, όχι στην υποτέλεια, όχι στον αυταρχισμό της αυτοκρατορίας. Είναι ένα περήφανο όχι στην τρομοκρατία της υπερδύναμης”.

<sup>234</sup> “αντίπαλη υπερδύναμη και μάλιστα μεγαλύτερη, έχει αναδειχθεί το περασμένο Σάββατο η παγκόσμια κοινή γνώμη, που διαδήλωσε την αντίθεσή της στην αλαζονεία”.

<sup>235</sup> “Σ’ αυτόν τον πόλεμο, η αυτοκρατορία είναι αντιμέτωπη με την παγκόσμια κοινή γνώμη, την υπερδύναμη που συγκροτούν οι πολλοί, με όπλα την ειρήνη, το δίκαιο, τον ανθρωπισμό και τις αξίες του. Αν αυτή η υπερδύναμη, δεν καμφθεί ... η αυτοκρατορία θα ηττηθεί, διότι είναι ηθικά άοπλη”.

<sup>236</sup> “καθαρά πρόσωπα, τόσο άδολα μάτια”.

<sup>237</sup> “Τι αντίθεση, Θεέ μου! Από τη μια οι διαδηλώσεις της ειρήνης: Πρόσωπα εκφραστικά και καθαρά, αισθήματα αλληλεγγύης και οδύνης, πίστη σε κάτι καλύτερο και η ειλικρίνεια της οργής. Στο επιτελείο του πολέμου, από την άλλη: πρόσωπα αλαζονικά, ύφος που απηχεί μικρόνοια και υπολογισμό. Αν η ‘νίκη’ είναι δική τους, πώς είσαι τόσο άδικος, Θεέ μου!”.

<sup>238</sup> “Την ιστορία της ανθρωπότητας δεν την γράφει ο πόλεμος και η βαρβαρότητα αλλά τα κοινωνικά κινήματα και οι λαοί. Καμιά νίκη δεν μπορεί να κερδίσει ο ιμπεριαλισμός, γιατί οι συνειδήσεις των ανθρώπων είναι πλασμένες με αλληλεγγύη και ευαισθησίες”.



submission to the interests and the plans of the ones in power equals complete surrendering” (Oikonomopoulos, 2003b).<sup>239</sup>

The confrontation between public opinion and the U.S. was also elevated to the status of a war. “All those sub-humans, fight them; and their servants, the scared bootlickers, wipe them out! Wipe them out with a straight ‘no’ and with the firmness of a civilization which refuses to be the prey of the cavemen; the prey of their jungle, of barbarity; of hypocrisy; of cowardice; of vileness. Wipe them out! Wipe them out with your civilization. Come on! Let’s get serious. We are at war. There is us, who want to sow dignity, honesty, friendship, braveness, compassion and directness, which are the seeds of coexistence. Then there is them, who sow calumny, bribery, pimping, the imposition of the jungle, stupidity, fear ... the beasts! Wipe them out ... only one force has power against the swastika, we; you; the entire world! We are at war. On the one side it is us, humanity. On the other it is them, inhumanity; cowardice ... not anymore. Fight them. It is us the entire humanity and they are its cancer. Fight the cancer before it kills you” (Papadopoulos G, 2003).<sup>240</sup>

The representation of the anti-war protesters was very similar to that of the resisting Iraqis, since they were both articulated as fighting for humankind’s “liberation” from the “swastika” Empire. The Iraqis and the anti-war protesters were positioned in similarity and complementarity to each other. Moreover, the binary construction of the U.S. and the anti-war protesters, whereby the former stood for “barbarity”, “cowardice”, “hypocrisy”, “inhumanity”, “immorality” and the latter for “civilization”, “bravery”, “dignity”, “honesty”, “humanity” and “justice”, further othered the U.S. negatively, while

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<sup>239</sup> “η παγκόσμια διαμαρτυρία, δεν θα πάει χαμένη. Η σιωπή, η συμμόρφωση της ανθρώπινης κοινωνίας στις βουλές και τα σχέδια των ισχυρών, θα ισοδυναμούσε με ανευ όρων παράδοση”.

<sup>240</sup> “Όλους αυτούς τους υπαιθρώπους. Πολεμήστε τους. Και τους υπηρετάκους, την πέμπτη φάλαγγα των κολαούζων, τους γλείφτες, τους ξεσκονιστές και τους φοβισμένους. Εξαφανίστε τους ... Εξαφανίστε τους με το όρθιο «όχι» και με το σταθερό βηματισμό ενός πολιτισμού που αρνείται πια να είναι έρμαιο των σπηλαίων. Ερμαιο της ζούγκλας, της βαρβαρότητας. Της υποκρισίας. Της δουλίας. Της ποταχότητας. Εξαφανίστε τους. Με τον πολιτισμό σας. Εμπρός. Τέρμα τα ψέματα. Εχουμε πόλεμο ... Είμαστε εμείς, που θέλουμε να σπείρουμε την αξιοπρέπεια, την εντιμότητα, τη φιλία, τη γενναιότητα, τη συμπόνια, την ευθύτητα, για σπόρο συνύπαρξης. Κι είναι αυτοί που σπέρνουν τη διαβολή, την εξαγορά, τη ρουφανιά, την επιβολή της ζούγκλας, τη βλακεία, το φόβο. Κυρίως το φόβο ... Τα τομάρια. Εξαφανίστε τους ... Μονάχα ένας έχει δύναμη απέναντι στη σβάστικα. Εμείς. Εσείς. Ο κόσμος όλος ... Ε, όχι πια. Πολεμήστε τους. Είμαστε ολόκληρη η Ανθρωπότητα και είναι ο καρκίνος της. Πολεμήστε τον καρκίνο πριν σας σκοτώσει”.

emphasizing the superiority of the protesters. In fact, the marches were represented as a battle and a war, whereby the morally and ethically superior “global public opinion” was “armed with peace, justice, humanity and values”, against the “morally unarmed” U.S., which would therefore “not win the victory”. The protesters were encouraged to “fight them” and “wipe them out”, and “not give in”, or “surrender”, because “we are at war” and “we can win it”. This discourse not only positioned the U.S. and the anti-war protesters in opposition to each other, but also positioned the U.S. in opposition to everyone else, since the anti-war protesters were seen to represent “global public opinion” and the “entire humanity”; the protesters and global public opinion were positioned in similarity and identity to each other. This was also facilitated by means of shifters, such as “us”, “we”, “you” and “our”, which interpellated the reader as belonging to “our camp” in this war against the U.S.

## **The role of Europe in the international sphere**

### *Europe under threat and a return to bipolarity*

The dominant discourse depicted the U.S. as a serious threat to the E.U. “The aim of this illegal war isn’t just Iraq, but also the European Union” (‘Aspirations of the Empire’, 2003),<sup>241</sup> since “the United States doesn’t want Europe to develop into an influential and competitive power, which would question the U.S. world dominance” (Netas, 2002).<sup>242</sup> By contrast, “it wants a European Union totally dependent on American hegemony without its own voice and opinions, without its own foreign policy and defence” (‘Europe is their Target’, 2003).<sup>243</sup> By acting unilaterally and disregarding European dissent on the war “Washington didn’t even try to hide its intention to split the European Union and destroy it politically” (Kazakos, 2003b).<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> “στόχος του παράνομου πολέμου δεν είναι μόνο το Ιράκ, αλλά και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση”.

<sup>242</sup> “Δεν επιθυμούν οι ΗΠΑ να εξελιχθεί η Ευρώπη σε μια ισχυρή ανταγωνιστική δύναμη, που θα αμφισβητούσε την κυριαρχία τους στον πλανήτη, γι’ αυτό και θα αντιδράσουν”.

<sup>243</sup> “Θέλει μια Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση απόλυτα εξαρτημένη από την αμερικανική ηγεμονία, χωρίς δική της φωνή και άποψη, χωρίς δική της εξωτερική πολιτική και άμυνα”.

<sup>244</sup> “Η γουασινγκτον δεν προσπάθησε καν να κρύψει την πρόθεση της να χωρίσει την ένωση και να την καταστρέψει πολιτικά”.



Since the U.S. “not only seeks the humiliation of its enemies, but even more of its allies” (Vergopoulos, 2003),<sup>245</sup> “Europe should not succumb and should fight for its self-reliance, so as to become an antagonistic pole with its own voice ... with the help of global public opinion and common sense, it will be able to resist absurdity and barbarity” (‘Europe is their target’, 2003).<sup>246</sup> Not only was there a need for a force to counteract the U.S, but “this force cannot be anything other than a united Europe, which will cooperate with powers such as China and Russia. However, a united and militarily powerful Europe means that there needs to be strong central governance, common foreign policy and common defence” (Giannouloupoulos, 2003b).<sup>247</sup> Thus, the only way Europe could act as a rival power would be through unity and common purpose. “Despite its divisions and disagreements, Europe should and can react. It should react by forming a more cohesive and effective foreign policy and political defence” (Ioakeimidis, 2003c: N06).<sup>248</sup> To conclude, “A future Europe ... should reflect and practically, rather than merely symbolically, express the citizens’ will transcending, if necessary, national borders” (Euthimiopoulos, 2003: N06),<sup>249</sup> since “there is no other solution if we don’t want Washington to keep being the only factor determining our fate” (Panagopoulos, 2002).<sup>250</sup> This representation is in line with the overall Greek press discourse which constituted the U.S. as an Empire in opposition to all other actors. In this case, the need for further E.U. unification was justified in terms of the need to counteract the “threatening” U.S.

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<sup>245</sup> “η Αμερική διεκδικεί την ταπείνωση όχι μόνον των αντιπάλων της, αλλά ακόμη περισσότερο των συμμάχων της”.

<sup>246</sup> “Η ευρώπη πρέπει να μην υποκύψει και να δώσει τη μάχη για την αυτοδυναμία της, για να γίνει μια ανταγωνιστική δύναμη με δική της φωνή. Μπορεί, τουλάχιστον, μέσα στην Ένωση να συγκροτηθεί η διπλωματική συμμαχία των προθύμων για την ειρήνη. Με τη στήριξη της παγκόσμιας κοινής γνώμης και της κοινής λογικής, θα μπορέσει να αντισταθεί στον παραλογισμό και στη βαρβαρότητα”.

<sup>247</sup> “πρέπει να δημιουργηθεί το αντίπαλο δέος. Όχι όπως στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο, αλλά με την έννοια ενός εναλλακτικού πόλου που θα διαθέτει την απαραίτητη οικονομική και στρατιωτική ισχύ για να γίνει αντίβαρο στην αμερικανική ηγεμονία. Ο πόλος αυτός δεν μπορεί παρά να είναι μια ενωμένη Ευρώπη, που θα συνεργάζεται με δυνάμεις σαν την Κίνα ή τη Ρωσία. Αλλά μια ενωμένη και στρατιωτικά ισχυρή Ευρώπη σημαίνει κάποια πράγματα: ισχυρή κεντρική εξουσία, κοινή εξωτερική πολιτική, κοινή άμυνα”.

<sup>248</sup> “Η Ευρώπη όμως, παρά τις διαιρέσεις και διχογνωμίες της, πρέπει και μπορεί να αντιδράσει. Να αντιδράσει με τη διαμόρφωση μιας περισσότερο συνεκτικής και αποτελεσματικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής και πολιτικής άμυνας”.

<sup>249</sup> “η Ευρώπη του αύριο ... πρέπει να μπορεί να αντανakλά και να εκφράζει με πραγματικό (και όχι συμβολικό) τρόπο τη βούληση των πολιτών υπερβαίνοντας, αν χρειαστεί, τα εθνικά σύνορα”.

<sup>250</sup> “δεν υπάρχει άλλος αν δεν θέλουμε η Ουάσιγκτον να είναι και στο μέλλον ο μόνος παράγοντας καθορισμού της τύχης μας”.



The U.S. and the E.U. were compared very often in the press discourse, which ascribed to the former negative characteristics while at the same time highlighted the positive values that the latter represented. “While Europe seems to be influenced by Kant, the United States is attached to Hobbes” (Ioakeimidis, 2002: N06).<sup>251</sup> Specifically, “Europeans have a more complex view of the world [than the Americans] and deal with such problems more discreetly and with more consideration. They try to influence others more indirectly, they are more patient and generally they are in favour of the peaceful solution of problems and prefer negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion rather than sanctions” (Hatzigakis, 2002).<sup>252</sup> The U.S. and the E.U. were thus represented as two completely different subjects. “There are two worlds – and in each one of them the value of human life differs” (Tzamalikos, 2002).<sup>253</sup> Moreover, “we and they truly live in different planets” (Giannouloupoulos, 2003c).<sup>254</sup> Thus, “substantially we have a clash of models, which may crack the Western alliance, as Francis Fukuyama also claims” (Moronis, 2003b).<sup>255</sup> No matter what the future held, however, the European values would prevail in the end. “Other powers may depend on military power. The Union depends on its values and sets the right example to the rest. History teaches that values prevail in the end and not the military power which ignores humanistic values” (Ioakeimidis, 2003b: N06).<sup>256</sup>

In this discourse, the juxtaposition with the U.S. covered over the differences within the E.U. and constructed it as a unified, internally coherent and harmonious body. Specifically, the U.S. was articulated as a military power, while the E.U. was constituted

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<sup>251</sup> “ενώ η Ευρώπη φαίνεται να ακολουθεί τον Καντ, οι ΗΠΑ εμφανίζονται να παραμένουν προσκολλημένες στον Χομπς”.

<sup>252</sup> “Οι Ευρωπαίοι από την άλλη έχουν μια πιο σύνθετη εικόνα για τον κόσμο και αντιμετωπίζουν τα προβλήματα αυτά με μεγαλύτερη λεπτότητα. Προσπαθούν να επηρεάζουν τους άλλους με πιο άμεσους τρόπους, έχουν μεγαλύτερη υπομονή και γενικά ευνοούν την ειρηνική επίλυση προβλημάτων και προτιμούν τη διαπραγμάτευση, τη διπλωματία και την πειθώ αντί των κυρώσεων”.

<sup>253</sup> “Υπάρχουν δύο κόσμοι -και στον καθέναν από αυτούς η αξία της ανθρώπινης ζωής διαφέρει.”

<sup>254</sup> “εμείς κι αυτοί όντως ζούμε σε διαφορετικούς πλανήτες”.

<sup>255</sup> “Ουσιαστικά δηλαδή έχουμε σύγκρουση προτύπων, που «ίσως ραγίσει τη Δύση», κατά τα λεγόμενα και του Φράνσις Φουκουγιάμα”.

<sup>256</sup> “Άλλες δυνάμεις μπορεί να στηρίζονται κυρίως στη στρατιωτική ισχύ. Η Ένωση στηρίζεται κυρίως στις αξίες και στο παράδειγμα. Η ιστορία διδάσκει ότι οι αξίες και το παράδειγμα τελικά επικρατούν και όχι η στρατιωτική δύναμη που αγνοεί τις ανθρωπιστικές αξίες”.



as a normative power (see also Diez, 2004; Kagan, 2003; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002; Wallace, 2005), which engaged in and favoured the “peaceful solution of problems”, “diplomacy” and persuasion. In his book *Of Paradise and Power*, Robert Kagan (2003: 2) also constructed this dichotomy by pointing out that, “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”. Even though he ascribed more positive characteristics to the U.S. than to the E.U., which he characterized as weak, the similarity in the two discourses lies in the dichotomization that they created. “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important questions of power-the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power-the American and European perspectives are diverging” (2003: 3).

This dichotomy in the Greek press discourse not only constructed the U.S. and the E.U. as operating in completely different ways and as following very different rules; it also reinforced the image of the U.S. as a threatening and dangerous “other”, while at the same time establishing the “self” as righteous and benign. The E.U. was thus constructed as the standard for the world, an “EU-topia” (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002:767), which everyone should aspire towards. This “normative power discourse” (Diez, 2004), which articulated the “United Europe” as the best available model, also enabled and naturalized the construction of those actors that objected to a specific E.U. policy or “sided” with the U.S., as “traitors”, as is seen in the following section.

### *The eight traitors*

The eight European governments<sup>257</sup> that supported U.S. war plans were heavily criticized in the Greek press discourse as “traitors of all democratic principles”, who “jointly raped democracy in a provocative and cynical manner” (‘Rape of democracy’, 2003).<sup>258</sup> These

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<sup>257</sup> A statement released in January 2003 by the leaders of Britain, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic, expressed support for the U.S., and urged the E.U. to unite with the U.S. to ensure that the Iraqi government was disarmed.

<sup>258</sup> “Συνέπραξαν στο βιασμό της δημοκρατίας προκλητικά και κυνικά οι οκτώ ευρωπαίοι ηγέτες που υπέγραψαν τη δήλωση συστράτευσής τους με τον Τζορτζ Μπους στο θέμα του Ιράκ ... πρόκειται περί προδοτών των δημοκρατικών αρχών, ακριβώς διότι υποστηρίζουν θέσεις αντίθετες με εκείνες των λαών που τους εξέλεξαν για να τους εκπροσωπούν”.



countries were represented as splitting European unity and impeding the political empowerment of the E.U. “It is verified that the Union cannot emancipate politically and form a plan of autonomous political intervention in the international stage, because some of its members refuse to differentiate themselves from Washington, not so much because they agree with it, but mostly because they don’t want to negatively affect their relations with it” (Ligeros, 2003b).<sup>259</sup> Moreover, “these countries expect to eat and drink from the European family but take this feast for granted and, in any case, regard it as less important than their oath of subordination that they sent to the superpower” (Karelis, 2003a).<sup>260</sup> Thus, the relationship between these European countries and the U.S. was one of subservient loyalty. “With their signature the eight European leaders state that solidarity towards the United States is more important than the loyalty towards the European family. Can there be a common European political system after all these? Can there be a powerful Europe” (Tsimas, 2003a: N04)?<sup>261</sup>

Not only were these countries constructed as undermining the E.U., but they were also seen as “collaborators and co-defendants”, who “won’t be forgiven for their sins” (Tsalidis, 2003),<sup>262</sup> since they morally supported an illegitimate war and the imposition of the new Pax Americana. “Above all, this disastrous letter of the ‘8’ gave the American president a moral legalization for his military choices ... the European advocacy for the management of the Iraq issue by the United Nations widely expresses an ideological antithesis to the new form of global domination, which the United States is trying to impose. This is what the ‘8’ didn’t understand” (Kalfelis, 2003a:N06).<sup>263</sup> Therefore, these “traitors” had done irreparable harm to humanity itself and would be punished for their sinful behaviour. “They flatter the emperor and his praetorian guard so as to be in

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<sup>259</sup> “Επιβεβαιώνεται ότι η Ενωση δεν μπορεί να χειραφετηθεί πολιτικά και να διαμορφώσει μια στρατηγική αυτόνομης πολιτικής παρέμβασης στη διεθνή σκηνή, διότι ορισμένα μέλη της αρνούνται να διαφοροποιηθούν από την Ουάσιγκτον, όχι τόσο γιατί συμφωνούν μ’ αυτήν, όσο γιατί δεν επιθυμούν να διαταράξουν τις σχέσεις μαζί της”.

<sup>260</sup> “αυτές οι χώρες προσδοκούν να φάνε και να πούν από την ευρωπαϊκή οικογένεια, αλλά φαίνεται ότι θεωρούν αυτό το φαγοπότη δεδομένο και, σε κάθε περίπτωση, υποδεέστερο από το σήμα υποτέλειας που έστειλαν στην υπερδύναμη”.

<sup>261</sup> “Με την υπογραφή οκτώ Ευρωπαίων ηγετών που δηλώνουν ότι η αλληλεγγύη προς τις ΗΠΑ είναι σημαντικότερη από τη νομιμοφροσύνη προς την ευρωπαϊκή οικογένεια. Μπορεί, κατόπιν αυτού, να υπάρξει κοινή ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική; Μπορεί να υπάρξει ισχυρή Ευρώπη”;

<sup>262</sup> “Όλοι είναι συνυπεύθυνοι και συγκατηγορούμενοι και τίποτε δεν μπορεί να τους ξεπλύνει”.

<sup>263</sup> “Όμως, πάνω από όλα η ολέθρια επιστολή των «8» εξασφάλισε στον Αμερικανό πρόεδρο μια ηθική νομιμοποίηση για τις πολεμικές του επιλογές ... η ευρωπαϊκή συνηγορία για τη διαχείριση της υπόθεσης του Ιράκ από τον ΟΗΕ εκφράζει ευρύτερα μια ιδεολογική αντίθεση στην καινούργια μορφή παγκόσμιας επικυριαρχίας, που προσπαθούν να επιβάλουν οι ΗΠΑ. Αυτό δεν κατανόησαν οι ‘8”.



good terms with them and they abandon their nations ... for the rest of their lives they will be ashamed and their remorse will torture them day and night. Their guilt, like predatory birds, will haunt them and they won't be able to get rid of it. It [the guilt] will eat away their flesh and souls, as well as the flesh and souls of their children" (Tsalidis, 2003).<sup>264</sup>

The constitution of the E.U. as a unified, superior subject in opposition to the U.S. subject, constructed the E.U. countries which supported the war as "traitors", and in opposition to the E.U. Moreover, the metaphor of destruction (see also Kelly-Holmes and O' Regan, 2004: 99) which was prevalent in the discourse through predicates such as "destroy", "destruction" and "disastrous" construed the eight governments' decision as impeding E.U. unity and as disrupting the otherwise harmonious E.U. construction. The E.U. was thus seen as an efficient mechanism which was under threat by these eight countries which decided to back the U.S. president. In other words, the construction of the eight countries as "traitors of E.U. democratic values" and E.U. unity presupposed that such unity existed and was only undermined because of the eight governments' deeds.

This was further achieved through the representation of the E.U. as a family (see also Hulse, 2000: 11; Musolff, 2006; Ringman, 2005: 7) whose members need to obey the family rules and agree with all E.U. decisions in order to be accepted as family members. Understood as a family the E.U. becomes an institution which demands our loyalty and devotion. Hence, the eight countries which didn't oppose the war in Iraq were constituted as the black sheep of the family. Specifically, this representation of the E.U. fits Lakoff's "strict family model" (1995), in which the father "insists on his moral authority, commands obedience, and when he doesn't get it, metes out retribution as fairly and justly as he knows how". According to this model, morality is a fundamental aspect

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<sup>264</sup> " Καλοπιάνουν τον αυτοκράτορα και τους πραιτωριανούς του για να τα έχουν καλά μαζί τους και εγκαταλείπουν στην τύχη τους τους λαούς ... Η ντροπή θα τους συνοδεύει σ' όλη τη ζωή τους και οι τύψεις θα τους ακολουθούν ημέρα και νύχτα, ως όρνεα που δεν θα μπορούν να τα εκδιώξουν και θα κατατρώγουν τη σάρκα και την ψυχή τους των ιδίων και των τέκνων τους, που θα τρέφονται από τις σάρκες και το αίμα των θυμάτων τους".

of the family unit. Therefore, the family members which stray need to be punished in order to “balance the moral books” (Lakoff, 1995).

## The role of Greece

It was generally agreed that Greece should favour the E.U., even though it was not yet as powerful as the U.S. “Greece may need to maintain good relations with the superpower, since there are still open fronts, but both its present and its future lies in Europe. Its development, its prosperity, its social model are identified with Europe” (Karelis, 2003b).<sup>265</sup> If Greece had to take sides and chose a camp that could be nothing other than that of the E.U. “The European Union is the preferential camp for modern Greece that we all desire” (‘European Challenge’, 2002).<sup>266</sup> “It is a blessing that during those critical moments our country is part of an extended and quite powerful family of countries, which cannot be ignored; and if we really face a clash of civilizations, the European civilization ... is not only our past but also our future” (Karkagiannis A, 2003).<sup>267</sup>

Even though it was unanimously argued that the U.S. was a bellicose Empire and a threat to world peace, and that the E.U. should rise as a real power to confront the U.S., the short-term future of Greece worried some of the columnists in the right-wing *Kathimerini*. In particular, it was maintained that Greece should not oppose the U.S. even though its “heart” beats for Europe, and even though Greece had immensely benefited from its membership in the Union. “Greece’s fate lies with the historic attempt at European unification because both its geopolitical and financial interests are linked with the European Union. However, this doesn’t mean that it [Greece] has the luxury to turn a blind eye to the defining role played by the United States” (Ligeros, 2003c).<sup>268</sup> As

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<sup>265</sup> “Μπορεί η Ελλάδα, με ανοιχτά εθνικά θέματα, να έχει ανάγκη τις καλές σχέσεις με την υπερδύναμη, αλλά το παρόν και το μέλλον της είναι στην Ευρώπη. Η ανάπτυξή της, η ευημερία της, το κοινωνικό της μοντέλο με αυτήν είναι ταυτισμένο, είναι το αποκούμπι της”.

<sup>266</sup> “η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αποτελεί το πιο προνομιακό πεδίο μάχης για τη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα που όλοι επιθυμούμε”.

<sup>267</sup> “Είναι ευτύχημα ότι τις κρίσιμες αυτές στιγμές η χώρα μας ανήκει σε μια ευρύτερη και αρκετά ισχυρή οικογένεια χωρών, την οποία κανένας δεν μπορεί να αγνοήσει. Και αν πράγματι βρισκόμαστε σε εποχή σύγκρουσης μεταξύ πολιτισμών, ο ευρωπαϊκός πολιτισμός, που και αυτός προέκυψε από πολέμους, επαναστάσεις και συγκρούσεις, φαίνεται ότι δεν είναι μόνο το παρελθόν μας, αλλά και το μέλλον μας”.

<sup>268</sup> “Η Ελλάς έχει συνδέσει τη μοίρα της με το ιστορικό εγχείρημα της ευρωπαϊκής ενοποίησης, γιατί προς αυτήν την κατεύθυνση την ωθούν και τα γεωπολιτικά και τα οικονομικά της συμφέροντα. Αυτό δεν σημαίνει, όμως, ότι έχει την πολυτέλεια να παραβλέψει τον καθοριστικό ρόλο που ασκούν οι ΗΠΑ”.



was argued, Turkey as a neighbour and the geographical position of Greece in the Balkans created security problems for Greece. “our country’s security mainly depends on the U.S. position towards Greece, since Washington only can determine the stance that Turkey will adopt and stop the aggressiveness that Turkey shows from time to time towards our country ... thus, if Greece is forced to choose between the United States and Europe, the cost will definitely be painful” (‘Clash between the U.S. and Europe’, 2003).

<sup>269</sup> Therefore, “it makes sense that our country should keep its composure and avoid a prompt involvement in the discord between the ‘great powers’” (Papadimitriou, 2003). <sup>270</sup> This discourse was to be found in one newspaper only, the conservative *Kathimerini*, and even within *Kathimerini* it was not the hegemonic discourse. In fact, this discourse is not entirely different from the rest. Europe was elevated as the morally superior actor, and the U.S. was merely presented as an unwanted, but nevertheless unavoidable ally due to the geopolitical issues that Greece was involved in.

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<sup>269</sup> “η ασφάλεια της χώρας εξαρτάται πρωτίστως από τη στάση που τηρούν απέναντι στην Ελλάδα οι ΗΠΑ, δεδομένου ότι η Ουάσιγκτον αποτελεί τον μοναδικό σχεδόν παράγοντα που μπορεί να επηρεάσει καθοριστικά την Τουρκία και να αναχαιτίσει την κατά καιρούς εκδηλούμενη επιθετικότητα της Αγκυρας ... Αν υποχρεωθεί σε επιλογή του ενός ή του άλλου, το κόστος θα είναι σίγουρα επώδυνο”.

<sup>270</sup> “Είναι λοιπόν λογικό για τη χώρα μας, να διατηρήσει την ψυχραιμία της και να αποφύγει μια βιαστική εμπλοκή της στις έριδες που έχουν ξεσπάσει μεταξύ των ‘μεγάλων δυνάμεων’”.

## **Conclusion – The British versus the Greek press discourse**

In this concluding section, the discourses of the British and Greek press are compared. As is evident throughout the chapter, there clearly was a hegemonic Greek press discourse, with little divergence amongst the Greek newspapers. As far as the British press is concerned, there seemed to be divergence between the newspapers, but less divergence within. Moreover, *The Independent* and *The Mirror* discourses were similar, since the hegemonic representations in both newspapers were generally anti-war and anti-U.S., while *The Times* discourse significantly differed, being primarily pro-war and pro-U.S. I initially compare representations of the war in Iraq and then move on to a comparison of discourses on the U.S. and the E.U. I finally look at the proposed roles of the U.K. and Greece in the “Iraq war era” as represented in the British and Greek press, in order to determine the similarities and differences both within and amongst the British and Greek press.

### **Representations of the Iraq war**

The Iraq war and issues relating to the Iraq war and the reasons why it should be supported or opposed received extensive coverage in both the British and Greek press. The level of coverage was equally high, even though there were different discourses both within the British press and between the British and Greek press. In fact, there were more similarities between the Greek press discourse and *The Independent* and *Mirror* discourses, than between the latter and *The Times* discourse.

Specifically, in *The Times* the war was represented as necessary for “western” safety. Saddam was positioned in similarity and complementarity to the terrorists and was thus constituted as a major threat to western security. Moreover, he was represented as a “tyrant” and a “butcher” who “slaughtered” his people, thus also rendering the war in Iraq a moral enterprise. In contrast, *The Independent* and *The Mirror* constructed the war as unnecessary. This was achieved through the disassociation of Saddam from the terrorists and the articulation of his regime as harmless and weak. In addition, the



presupposition that a war in Iraq would incite hatred and trigger more terrorist attacks also construed the war as harmful for western security. Finally, the war was also constituted as unhelpful and even harmful for the Iraqis through the predication of the U.S. as a unilateral, self-serving and self-interested power, unlikely to show any interest in Iraqi welfare or the rebuilding of democracy.

Even though these two discourses are very different from each other, they also have common grounds. Thus, whereas the war was seen as dangerous in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse and necessary in *The Times* discourse, in both cases the argument revolved around western security. In both cases, the West was articulated as a unified entity, to which “we” belong, and needs to be defended from the terrorists. That the terrorists and Saddam were seen as very different subjects in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse rendered the war unnecessary.

Moving on to the Greek press discourse, the war in Iraq was constructed as a U.S. colonizing enterprise which would not only enslave the Iraqis but would in the end enslave the entire world. This discourse was essentially an inversion of *The Times* discourse, since the U.S. and not Saddam was construed as the “tyrant” and the war was represented as occupation rather than liberation, as was the case in *The Times*. Similarly, the Iraqis were described as resisting the occupation, in contrast to *The Times* which represented the Iraqis as rejoicing. It seemed that the Greek press and *The Independent/Mirror* discourses had many similarities, since they both constructed the war as unhelpful for the Iraqis and as harmful. However, they also substantially differed, since the Greek press constituted the danger as directly stemming from U.S. aggression. In the Greek press, thus, the world was positioned in opposition to the U.S. which was construed as the most threatening and dangerous subject bound to cause irreparable harm if not stopped. Moreover, the Iraqis were articulated as victims of U.S. colonization and the Iraq war was represented as enslavement. In contrast, the British press represented the Iraq war as not improving, rather than worsening the Iraqi situation.

## Representations of the United States

The hegemonic representation of the U.S. as a corrupt, imperialist bully in both *The Independent* and *The Mirror* contrasted *The Times* discourse of the U.S. as a well-intentioned, force of good, intent on instilling democracy and promoting liberal values and were more in tune with the hegemonic and sole discourse in the Greek press of the U.S. as a malevolent Empire intent on colonizing the world. It is quite interesting to compare the two negative discourses of the U.S., since even though they both represent the U.S. in a negative light, they still are quite different. Specifically, in the British press discourse the U.S. was constructed as a unilateral, self-serving power, intent on imposing its views rather than collectively and diplomatically solving problems. Thus, the U.S. was described as a non-compliant other, rather than a dangerous or threatening other. In the Greek press, the criticisms of the U.S. were much fiercer, since it was constituted as the most dangerous other. Not only was the U.S. positioned as an unlawful, terrorist nation, but the metaphors of slavery, Empire and Hitler's Nazi Germany positioned the U.S. as the world's occupier, in opposition to all other actors. Thus, in this case the U.S. was not only self-serving and unilateral, but also expansionary, utterly violent and very dangerous. It is also noteworthy, that the U.S. actor received much more extensive coverage in the Greek press than in the British press, since most articles were to a lesser or greater extent related to the U.S.

## Representations of the European Union

Moving on to representations of the E.U., the Greek press discourse positioned Greece in a relation of identity to the E.U., which was represented as a normative power and the beholder of superior values. In contrast, *The Times* discourse positioned the U.K. in a relation of identity to the U.S. and in opposition to the E.U., which was constituted as a weak and corrupt force, in contrast to the powerful and morally superior U.S. While the E.U. was constituted as a superior actor to the U.S. in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse, the representation differed from the Greek press discourse representation, since the U.K. was positioned in similarity, and not identity, to the E.U. Moreover, even though the



E.U. was generally positively represented in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse, there were very few positive representations of France, while the 8 governments supporting the war in Iraq were not constituted as negative subjects, as was the case in the Greek press.

To sum up, during the period examined, the Greek press discourse and the dominant *Independent/Mirror* discourses had adopted a similar stance to the war in Iraq, while the very different *Times* discourse demonstrated the divergent discourses in the British press. However, as has been shown, this divergence was not total, since these two discourses also had some similarities. Moreover, despite the similarities between the Greek and *Independent/Mirror* discourses, they were still very different in many aspects. The purpose of the following, concluding chapter is to evaluate the continuity and changes in the Greek and British press discourses throughout the examined period, from April 2001 to April 2003.

# Conclusion

“Discourses are understood to work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude ... they are also unstable grids ... changeable and historically contingent” (Milliken, 1999: 229-230).

Based on this premise and refuting the existence of a true, unchanging and objective world, while also drawing from the belief that our reality is socially constructed and constantly produced and reproduced, the thesis compared British and Greek press representations in order to draw some general conclusions about the operation of discourses after September 11, the ways they were constructed, contested and changed, as well as the ways in which some were marginalized in the process. One of the main aims of the project was to examine the extent to which, and in what ways, the September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent war in Iraq affected existing articulations and existing state identity constructions. Moreover, the thesis studied the ways in which these discourses may have enabled, necessitated or disabled particular responses and courses of action and the ways in which they may have marginalized other discourses. In order to address the above issues and determine the way events are understood in different cultural contexts the thesis employed a post-structuralist, discursive analytic approach mostly drawing from Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault and Derrida.

Specifically, my main aims as outlined in the introductory chapter were to:

1. Identify the existing articulations in the press of the two countries and determine whether there were multiple discourse or a prevailing, hegemonic discourse.
2. Conduct a cross-country analysis in order to identify the similarities and differences in the press discourse of each country and between the two countries.



3. Determine whether there was continuity or sudden changes in the representations by means of a temporal analysis and thus understand the ways the discourses developed and whether the September 11 events and the ensuing wars affected existing articulations.
4. Explore the ways identities and subject positions were constructed, reconstructed and subverted in the texts, as well as the specific mechanisms that rendered certain discourses dominant while marginalizing others.
5. Finally, I was interested in the consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another and in the ways the discourses enabled, necessitated or disabled particular responses and courses of action.

The remainder of this concluding chapter engages in a more detailed discussion and theorization of these issues. The first section addresses the above research questions through a cross-time comparison and by delineating the main similarities and differences between the discourses and the extent to which they were contested or remained unchanged. Having answered the above questions and having drawn important conclusions on the British and Greek press representations, I then use these conclusions to address a further issue in the following section. Thus, in the second section I elaborate on the virtues of a comparative analysis of the Greek and British press after September 11. Finally, the third section makes suggestions for future research.

### **British and Greek press representations: June 2001-April 2003**

The previous three chapters analyzed and compared British and Greek press representations in the three periods under study. In this section I conduct a temporal comparison in order to understand whether there was continuity in the British and Greek press discourses, whether the events of September 11 affected the existing discourses and whether any changes were only temporary or had a more lasting effect, extending to the Iraq war period. This temporal comparison is also useful because it enables one to identify and understand the persistence of certain discourses and their hegemonic status or their volatility.

## British press representations

To begin with, the September 11 events had a profound impact on the British press, which constructed the 'terrorist threat' as the biggest threat facing humanity. Prior to the events, there wasn't a clearly identifiable threat in the British press. Thus, for example, climate change was represented as a threat in *The Independent/Mirror* discourse, but issues such as the Kyoto Protocol received much less coverage before the September 11 events than terrorism did after 9/11. Moreover, not only was climate change constructed as a minor threat compared to terrorism, but it was not even represented as threatening in *The Times* discourse. In contrast, in the months following September 11 there was unanimity across the British newspapers, which hegemonically represented terrorism as a major threat to national and international security, and terrorists as launching a devastating attack on the west. Thus, while there was significant divergence between the *Independent/Mirror* discourse and *The Times* discourse on issues such as the E.U., the U.S., the U.K. relationship to the E.U. and the U.S., climate change and the missile defence system before the attacks on the Twin Towers, there was convergence on most emerging issues after the events, or at least any divergence was concealed by the emerging hegemonic discourse on terrorism. Moreover, the threat of terrorism remained the dominant discourse in the months leading to the Iraq war, the only difference being that the chains of equivalence that had been created in the aftermath of the September 11 and resulted in a "united western front" against the "evil terrorists" could not completely subvert the relations of difference in the months leading to the Iraq war, and thus the frontier vis-à-vis the antagonistic outside was not as clear during the Iraq war period as it was after the 9/11 events. Thus, while in *The Times* discourse Saddam Hussein was positioned in similarity to the terrorists, this was not the case in the *Independent/Mirror* discourse, which represented Saddam Hussein as harmless and the Iraq war as immoral and dangerous.

There was also a shift in the representations of the E.U. and the U.S. immediately after September 11, although it did not last for long. Thus, in the months prior to the attacks,



the *Independent/Mirror* hegemonic discourse on the E.U. and the U.S. was essentially an inversion of the *Times* discourse. In *The Times* the E.U. was represented as an enslaving union harmful for U.K. sovereignty, while the U.S. was positioned as a natural ally whose partnership was vital for the U.K.; the same metaphors were employed by *The Mirror* and *The Independent*, only to glorify the E.U. and condemn the U.S. In contrast, after the attacks, the British press uniformly represented the entire 'civilized, western world' as under attack by the terrorists and in need of collaboratively eradicating the enemy. Thus, while before the events the U.K. was either positioned in opposition to the E.U. or the U.S. in the dominant discourses of the three newspapers, the E.U., the U.K., the U.S. and the whole "civilized, western world" were positioned in identity and similarity to each other after September 11. However, such unity was only temporary, and in the months leading to the Iraq war there was once more a shift to the pre-September 11 division between the *Mirror/Independent* discourse on the one hand, and the *Times* discourse on the other. In other words, the Iraq war broke this chain of equivalences and shortly after the Afghanistan war the *Times* hegemonic discourse articulated the U.S. as a moral force embarking on a necessary war, in contrast to the *Mirror/Independent* discourse, which represented the U.S. as a corrupt power, whereas the E.U. was constituted as a rather positive actor, with the exception of France and Germany. Finally, throughout the period under study, the British press hegemonically positioned the U.K. as a leader in world politics. However, in the pre-September 11 period and in the months leading to the Iraq war, it was the U.S. that would enable the U.K. to fulfil the role of the leader in *The Times* discourse. On the other hand, in the *Independent/Mirror* discourse, the U.K. would best fulfil its leadership role as a leading E.U. member, rather than a U.S. ally.

### *The British state identity before and after September 11*

In sum, September 11 affected the existing British press representations and, at least temporarily, resulted in a reconstitution of British state identity and its global role, which in turn reinscribed the British national interest and resulted in the adoption of some, as well as the rejection of other foreign and domestic policies. Specifically, the articulation

of the U.K. as part of a broader “western we” in opposition to the terrorists meant that “the war on terror” was constructed as a national priority and that national security issues extended beyond national borders. Thus, the attacks in New York and Washington., for example, came to be seen as an attack on “all of us”, rather than merely an attack on another country. Even though the positioning of the U.K. in identity with the E.U. and the U.S. was only temporary in the *Mirror/Independent* discourse, its effects are significant, since it facilitated and encouraged the construction of the war in Afghanistan as necessary and unavoidable. Had the September 11 events not been constituted as an attack on the west and on the U.K., the war in Afghanistan would have been represented differently. Had, for example, the war in Afghanistan been seen as merely a U.S. enterprise which was in no way imperative for global security, any U.K. involvement in the war in Afghanistan would have been represented as unjustified and even harmful. However, the hegemonic construction of September 11 as a terrorist attack on the west and of the war in Afghanistan as a necessary step in the war against terror rendered the war in Afghanistan imperative. Not only was the U.K. fully involved in the war in Afghanistan, but the majority of the British public itself was very supportive of the British response to the September 11 events. According to the MORI poll (2001: online), 72% of Britons approved of the way Tony Blair was handling the British response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and 71% believed that Britain was right to join America in the military strikes. Support was also shown by the then leader of the opposition party, Ian Duncan Smith and by the Democrat leader Charles Kennedy.

Moreover, these representations of terrorism as a very serious threat which needed to be dealt with promptly and the positioning of Islam/Muslims in similarity and identity to terrorism, resulted in a series of domestic measures which were readily accepted even though they were highly contentious. For instance, the field of immigration and asylum was brought to the foreground after September 11 and many new measures were introduced which could be seen as infringing civil liberties and going against international norms. Thus, part four, section 33 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act suggested new possibilities for detaining foreigners; where expulsion was not



possible, it was possible to keep a suspected international terrorist in detention indefinitely. Even though the 2001 Anti-terrorism act renounced articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is only allowed for by article 15 ECHR at times of war or public emergency, it was hurried through the national legislative processes (Haubrich, 2003: 8), instead of going through lengthier processes of negotiation and was enforced very quickly. Furthermore, even though part four of the 2001 Anti-terrorism act was replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2005, the latter has also been seen by many as incompatible with domestic and international human rights laws.

In addition, after September 11 a number of measures seem to have diminished or have the potential to diminish the citizens' privacy and informational self-determination. Indicatively, internet and phone providers need to keep communications data for two years, governmental authorities have the power to disclose any information required by the secret services or the police to carry out their investigations, while the policy powers have been expanded beyond the actual police force. Not only have such measures met little resistance, but they are mostly still in operation five years after the September 11 events, along with a widespread culture of fear, which amongst others results in extreme security measures in airports after alleged terrorist threats. Finally, as Ansari (2003: 4) points out, death threats against Muslims has increased since the events, while race-hate crime in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets was reported to have risen by 27% in September 2001 compared with September 2000, and of the 100 reported crimes 17 were explicitly related to September 11. A BBC survey taken in the summer of 2004 (online) found that employment applicants with Muslim names were far less likely to be called for an interview than applicants whose names did not appear to be Muslim. In 2006, a YouGov poll indicated that 53% of those people polled felt threatened by Islam, as distinct from fundamentalist Islamists, while 18% believed that "a large proportion of British Muslims feel no sense of loyalty to this country and are prepared to condone or even carry out acts of terrorism".

From the above, it becomes evident that it is important to study discursive constructions, their volatility and stability as a means of understanding the extent to which the discourses transformed the two countries' state identities and affected their foreign policies after September 11. This temporal comparison is also very useful, because it enables a comparison of the fixity and volatility of certain representations and can thus provide further insight on existing state identities and their future stability or volatility. It is naturally more difficult for a long-standing, hegemonic discourse to change or be replaced than it is for a discourse which shows signs of instability and constant transformation. Thus, for example, while the representations of the U.K. in opposition to either the E.U. (in *The Times* discourse) or the U.S. (in the *Independent/Mirror* discourse) were replaced, at least temporarily, by a uniform discourse of the west in opposition to terrorism, the British press representation of the U.K. as a leader in world politics remained fixed and constant throughout the period of study, which essentially reveals the predominance of the British exceptionality and British leadership discourse and its firm foundations. The British state identity is therefore informed to a larger extent by a faith in British exceptionality than an allegiance to either the E.U. or the U.S. This also explains U.K. attitudes on E.U. membership. The E.U. is generally seen as either disempowering U.K. leadership or as a means to maintain or achieve this leadership role. Due to the fixity of the above discourse, it is highly unlikely that it will change in the near future; therefore, any future U.K. actions as an E.U. member are likely to be determined by its positioning as a world leader. Due to this construction of its state identity, the U.K. is unlikely to take decisions as an E.U. member that undermine or are seen to undermine this role.

### **Greek press representations**

In the Greek press, the September 11 events affected the hegemonic discourse on the U.S. and the E.U., and the role of Greece in the international arena. Specifically, the events accentuated the existing representations of the U.S. Whereas in the pre-September 11 period the hegemonic discourse constructed globalization as the biggest ill, and the rich, western capitalist countries headed by the U.S. as the main exploiters of the rest of the



world, this discourse was replaced by a rather U.S. centered discourse after the attacks, in which the U.S. became the perpetrator of most ills and the only major exploiter. The U.S. was also positioned in opposition to all other actors in the months leading to the Iraq war. However, the representation differed from the Afghanistan war period, since the U.S. was not only articulated as a world terrorist, but was also constructed as an evil, expanding empire intent on colonizing the world.

Interestingly, the September 11 events substantially affected the Greek press representations of the E.U. Thus, before the attacks the E.U. was articulated as a potentially powerful and vibrant, yet nonetheless currently inactive and powerless body due to the domination of a few rich members. Immediately after the September 11 events and during the Afghanistan war, the E.U. did not feature often in the Greek press discourse, which focused on the U.S. terrorist state. However, shortly after the Afghanistan war, the E.U. was reconstituted as the only body capable of counteracting the U.S. empire. The E.U. was constructed as a normative power and a coherent, rather than a divided body that could and would save the planet from U.S. imperialism. Finally, throughout the period under study Greece itself was articulated as a small, powerless country that needed to be cautious and wary of its powerlessness in its relations with other countries, including the U.S. It was thus represented as needing to stay neutral, rather than taking sides in any emerging conflict. However, this was more evident during the Afghanistan war than during the Iraq war. Specifically, in the Iraq war period the U.S. was constituted as fiercer and more dangerous than in the previous two periods, while the E.U. was constructed as united and powerful. As a result, Greece was positioned in identity and similarity to the E.U. and in need of adhering to the normative E.U. principles.

### *The Greek state identity before and after September 11*

In sum then, September 11 affected the existing Greek press representations. However, unlike the *Mirror/Independent* discourse, in the Greek press this change was more gradual and longer-lasting, particularly in terms of the Greek representations of the U.S.

and the E.U. Analyzing the Greek press discourses reveals the stability and perseverance of negative representations of the U.S. throughout the entire period of study. The stability of the representation of the U.S. as a negative actor is evident in that it not only persisted throughout the period, but also gained strength after September 11, despite the fact that the attacks were inflicted on, rather than initiated by, the U.S. Constructions of the terrorist threat didn't diminish, but in fact enhanced the representations of the U.S. as the major global threat. This reveals the firm foundations of the above representation, which is unlikely to change. Since September 11 could not "soften" the negative Greek press representations of the U.S., in most likelihood this representation will persist and will also be a determining factor in future productions and reproductions of the Greek state identity, which exists in opposition to the U.S. It is also evident that the discourses on the E.U. were less fixed and were formed and transformed in relation to the stable U.S. discourse. The more dangerous for world order the U.S. became in the Greek press discourse, the more benign and united the E.U. became. Because of this oppositional positioning of the E.U. and the U.S. in the Greek press discourse, any future discourses on the E.U. are also likely to be shaped by reference to this positioning. At the same time, the dominant discourse of Greece as a powerless country in a volatile area means that any future state identity is bound to be inextricably linked to and associated with a wider European identity; any future foreign policy action is also likely to be justified in a defensive way, as dictated by an alliance or the need to survive in a dangerous international sphere.

In terms of Greek foreign policy, the representations of the September 11 events as the worthy punishment of a terrorist power and of the Iraq war as an illegal enterprise by an imperial superpower precluded the possibility of a close alliance with the U.S. In addition, the representations of the E.U. as the only solution in the post-September 11 era encouraged closer ties with the E.U. Moreover, the unimpeded U.S. and coalition use of Greek airspace and military assets for the war in Afghanistan was only justified by the government in terms of the need to survive in a hostile and dangerous environment rather than, for example, in terms of a U.S.-Greek friendship.



In the months leading to the Iraq war the Greek government refuted the U.S. military actions and encouraged a united E.U. front. Greek MPS irrespective of political affiliation cast a unanimous vote against the war. Greek policy makers were in agreement with the views held by the majority of the Greek public, which strongly opposed the war and U.S. actions. According to the ex minister of defence Akis Tsohatzopoulos, “bringing democracy was just an excuse for the U.S. to pursue its imperialist policies” (Tsakona, 2003: 8), while in an opinion poll conducted in March 2003, 90% of those polled replied that they totally disagreed with the war in Iraq, whereas almost 80% of the respondents held an unfavourable view towards the U.S. (Tsakona, 2003: 2). As the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis (2003) pointed out,

*I would like to express my regret that - despite persistent and continuous efforts ... the hopes that war might be avoided are now zero. The Iraq crisis, despite its importance for the region and the international community, will not affect the course of Europe. Nevertheless, I would like to stress the need for the European countries to finally take the decision to implement a common foreign policy and defense policy, so that their intervention on the international scene will be effective.*

Indeed, after the September 11 events Greece has witnessed an increasing Europeanization of its decision-making process (Ioakeimidis, 2000; Kouneliotis, 2001; Stavridis, 2003). Greece ardently supports the deepening of integration in the areas of common defence, economic support and social policies, as well as the adoption of a European constitution (Ioakeimidis, 2001), while the Greek political parties display significant convergence “not only over the principal direction of institutional reform in the E.U. but also on the need to protect the European social model” (Pagoulatos, 2002: 32). There has actually been a Europeanization of foreign policy, even to policy areas that haven’t had to adapt to E.U. membership (Kavakas, 2000). Furthermore, the Greek public seems to also be very supportive of further integration, since in 2002 it displayed the highest percentage of support for enlargement (74% compared to an E.U. average of 51%) and the highest percentage in wanting enlargement to speed up (Pagoulatos, 2002: 24). Besides, according to a Eurobarometer questionnaire, Greek public opinion favours EU decision-making over national decision making in 23 out of 26 policy areas mentioned in the questionnaire. Such positive attitudes towards the E.U. and negative



attitudes towards the U.S. are not self-evident, since the U.S. remains the largest foreign investor in Greece, three million Americans are of Greek ancestry and the E.U. hasn't necessarily been very helpful or effective in assisting Greece in times of crisis (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003: 307)

### The British versus the Greek press discourse

The comparison between the British and Greek press representations is very important, since it deepens our understanding of the ways in which the 'same' event/s are understood in similar, or at least seemingly similar, contexts. This thesis showed significant national variation on issues that are often treated as uncontested. Thus, for example, terrorism was articulated very differently in the two E.U. member states. Even though there has been disagreement amongst E.U. states on how to defeat terrorism, there has hardly been discord on the meaning of terrorism, which is usually defined as "non-state threats in Europe and North America". As was shown throughout the thesis terrorism was understood very differently in the Greek and British discourses. Whereas in the dominant British press discourse terrorism was articulated as non-state threats to the west, in the Greek discourse terrorism was mainly associated with the U.S. Even though the September 11 terrorists were also seen in a negative light, it was the U.S. terrorists who were represented as posing the biggest threat. Another example is the representations of the E.U. While in the *Mirror/Independent* discourse the E.U. was simply seen as a means for the U.K. to act as a leader in world politics, in the Greek press discourse the E.U. and the Greek state identity were inextricably linked in a relationship of identity.

Comparing the discourses of two E.U. countries enables one to understand the similarities and differences in the discourses themselves, and consequently in the countries' state identities. Moreover, this comparison enables us to appreciate the reasons why variation occurs and points of convergence and divergence between the state identities and is therefore valuable. A non-discursive realist approach would look, for example, at the countries' foreign policy relations and would focus on inter-state cooperation and inter-



state relations. Even though such an approach is useful, it doesn't account for change in the states' identities and merely compares stable and non-changing entities on similarly understood and uncontested issues. By showing significant variation in the countries' press discourses on issues such as terrorism and the E.U. this thesis has shown the importance of a discursive, comparative analysis as a means of understanding international relations. Understanding the non-fixity and ambiguity of our "reality" through the study of the press discourses of two seemingly similar countries on seemingly unambiguous or not very ambiguous issues is a positive step towards accepting difference and opening up dialogue as well as achieving both cooperation and change. More specifically, understanding that, for example, terrorism and the terrorists can be constituted as so different subjects and that specific issues are represented in different, often contrasting ways, which are nonetheless constructed as the "truth" can lead to the questioning of binary constructions and absolute truisms and the adoption of a more flexible and reflective approach, conducive to dialogue and cooperation. That often events or actors are represented in a one-dimensional way may seem to be a commonsensical and obvious observation, but it is nonetheless a very useful observation; Both in the British and Greek press there was a frequent use of the good/evil, civilized/uncivilized binary, only to constitute different subjects. In the Greek newspapers the U.S. was the evil and uncivilized parts of the binary, while in the British press it was the "Islamic terrorists" who took up that role. Moreover, the west/east or the west versus the rest binary was employed in both countries' press; however, in the British press the west was represented in a positive light, whereas the opposite was the case in the Greek press. We often perceive, consciously or not, of the world in such an absolute way, as is evident in the British and Greek press, which in turn has consequences for the ways in which we act upon the world.

Especially after the September 11 events such dichotomous constructions have dominated the public sphere. This thesis did not claim to provide solutions to problems such as terrorism or war; neither did it engage in a discussion of what is right or wrong. Its main aim was to analyze and deconstruct the main discourses that dominated the post-September 11 period in order to not only understand all those different discourses but

also expose the ways in which truth regimes were constructed, hoping that this exposition can encourage dialogue and change. The discursive analytic approach employed throughout the thesis was very useful in its elucidation of all those different discourses in the press of two culturally distinct, E.U. countries; it was also useful in showing that there were many similarities in the ways that these often opposing discourses were formed and transformed, thus rejecting the existence of one ultimate truth and highlighting the importance of respect for what is different.

### **Future research**

As far as future research is concerned, it would be interesting to compare the press representations over a longer period of time, which would more clearly show the ways certain discourses, such as the British exceptionality discourse, or the representation of the U.S. as a very negative actor developed or whether, for example, the discourse on the terrorist threat is comparable to any discourses prior to the September 11 events. What would also be interesting for future work is for these findings to be combined with an examination of public officials' discourses during that period. This comparison would explore the dynamics between media discourses and official discourses and would ask questions like "what are the similarities and differences between the governmental discourses and the media discourses", "how did they both develop", "was there convergence or divergence and what does this reveal about the relationship between media and official discourses and its implication for the construction of national identities". It would also be very interesting to extend this study and compare media representations in other E.U. countries. This would offer a clearer picture of what are the main discourses on the above issues within the E.U. and would thus provide insight on points of convergence and divergence within the E.U. and on the E.U. as an institution. Moreover, such an exploration can lead to more effective cooperation between member states, since it would possibly draw attention to previously unexplored issues and would encourage member states to deal with issues from a different perspective.



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## Appendix A



Firefighters on 11 September, in a picture that has become a symbol of American defiance

Figure 1: *The Independent*, 22 October




Figure 2: *The Independent*, 15 September





Alena Milarek, 4, on her father's shoulders at a vigil in Las Vegas for victims of the attacks. The tragedy brought families together, and explaining to children what had happened was no easy task.

Figure 3: *The Times*, 16 September



Figure 4: *The Independent*, 17 September






Fig. 5: Devastated site of Tuesday's attack on the World Trade Center in Manhattan

Figure 5: *The Independent*, 15 September





Figure 6: *Sunday Times*, 16 September






Figure 7: *The Independent*, 2 November





Shabeh: The leader of Luton's Al-Muhajiroun, a small but fanatical group that is urging all Muslims to take up arms against the West

Figure 8: *The Independent*, 30 October



The men on the front line have often seen service in previous Islamic wars. Their belief that they will go to paradise if they die in a holy war fuels their fanaticism

Figure 9: *Sunday Times*, 30 September



**If you think Bin Laden is extreme – some Muslims want to kill him because he's soft**



Figure 10: *The Times*, 21 October




Figure 11: *The Independent*, 27 October





Figure 12: *The Independent*, 28 December




Figure 13: *The Independent*, 13 September



## Appendix B



Figure 1: *Ta Nea*, 26 November



Figure 2: *Eleutherotipia*, 24 September






Figure 3: *Ta Nea*, 4 October



Figure 4: *Eleutherotipia*, 14 September





Figure 5: *Eleutherotipia*, 19 September




Figure 6: *Ta Nea*, 17 September



Figure 7: *Ta Nea*, 17 September






Figure 8: *Ta Nea*, 15 September



Figure 9: *Ta Nea*, 18 September



Figure 10: *Eleutherotipia*





«Παρά την αντάρα του πολέμου, πάντα υπάρχει χώρος για λίγη τρυφερότητα, εδώ, ο Μουσταφά, διοικητής ενός φυλακίου στο Ραμπάτ, παρακολουθεί τη δράση των αμερικανικών B-52 συντροφιά με το καναρίνι του»

Figure 11: *Eleutherotipia*, 31 December





Figure 1: The Independent, 23 March



# GULF WAR 2: THE BOMBS



Figure 2: *The Mirror*, 24 March




Figure 3: *The Mirror*, 21 March






Figure 4: *The Mirror*, 22 March

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
www.independent.co.uk

SATURDAY 22 MARCH 2003

\*\*\*\*\*1

● Allies close in on Basra ● Iraqi division surrenders ● Turkish troops cross border

## Baghdad's night of terror



This image taken from CNN shows Abu Dhabi television images of an explosion during the first few minutes of the massive air attack on Baghdad yesterday. Intended by America to induce 'shock and awe' CNN/Getty Images

Figure 5: *The Independent*, 22 March










Figure 9: *The Independent*, 23 March




Figure 10: *The Independent*, 8 April



Figure 11: *The Independent*, 27 March






Figure 12: *The Mirror*, 1 January





Figure 13: *The Mirror*, 14 March



GRAVE CONCERN: Blair appears to be peering over a tombstone as he speaks from the lectern at his monthly briefing yesterday

Figure 14: *The Mirror*, 19 February



## Appendix D



Figure 1: *Eleutherotipia*, 2 April



Figure 2: *Ta Nea*, 22 February





Figure 3: *Eleutherotipia*, 30 January



Figure 4: *Ta Nea*, 10 April





Figure 5: *Eleutherotipia*, 3 November



Figure 6: *Eleutherotipia*, 27 March



Figure 7: *Eleutherotipia*, 31 March





Figure 8: Eleutherotipia, 30 March